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Abstract 
 
 Taiwan adopted its National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme in 1995. Presently, the 
scheme FRYHUVYLUWXDOO\DOORIWKHLVODQG¶VFLWL]HQV+RZHYHUit is under the threat of a 
serious imbalance between expenditure and revenue. As spending has become 
unsustainable, everyone has realised the need for financial reform. However, the reform 
process itself is beset by political confrontations. There is a need to deepen the 
understanding of the relationships and dependencies among the policy actors. With a 
view to helping address this problem, this study empirically examines the multiple types 
of ties prevailing between the policy actors and the resulting power distribution while 
the DPP government was working earnestly towards reforming the 1+,¶VILQDQFLDO
system in the period 2000-2008. Apart from official documents, data are drawn from a 
network survey coupled with semi-structural interviews of 62 policy actors including 
government officials and related unofficial policy participants. Measures such as the in-
degree centrality index and core/periphery model, betweenness centrality, structural 
hole index (effective size), density index, E-I index and CONOOR procedure 
(Blockmodeling and multidimensional scaling - MDS) are used to identify the major 
participants and network structures in the NHI domain and assess their relative 
ii 
 
influence-powers on the basis of information transmission patterns, resource exchanges, 
action-set coalition relationships and reputational attributions. It is shown that, although 
the public sector and the medical associations were at the helm of the NHI reform, 
financial reform remained unfulfilled mainly because of poor communications among 
societal actors. We then performed a social network analysis and systematically mapped 
the prevailing political conflicts among diverse policy stakeholders. We confirm that 
SNA is an effective research tool for political feasibility evaluation; it can facilitate 
smoother policy adoption by enhancing better interactions within networks.   
 
Keywords: National Health Insurance (NHI), social network analysis (SNA), policy 
network, the 2G-NHI financing scheme, political feasibility, Taiwan 
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Chapter 1. Introductory Overview* 
1-1. Nature of Politics Related to the Financial Sustainability 
of Welfare 
A comprehensive welfare regime is an important factor facilitating social stability 
in politics. In many countries, expansive welfare provision systems operated by the 
respective governments have led to a redistribution of national income and narrowing 
the income gap between the rich and the poor. However, since the very notion of a 
welfare state is presently being questioned in much of the world, there is a need to 
rethink how welfare provision could be sustained in the future (Pierson, 2001, 2006). 
Following the profound economic, social and political changes witnessed over the last 
quarter of century, governments today are in the midst of the most extreme struggle ever 
experienced in recent history with regard to welfare provision. As Hewitt (2002) points 
out, WKHZHOIDUHVWDWHKDVHQWHUHGDSHULRGRI³FULVLV´VLQFHWKHWorld War II (Hewitt, 
2002). Likewise, Pierson (2001, 2006) noted that social welfare spending has been 
widely blamed since the 1970s for the economic crises and revolutions witnessed in 
many countries (Pierson, 2001, 2006). 
TKH³FULVLV´RIZHOIDUHVWDWHKDVPRYHGWRWKHFHQWUHRISROLWLFDOGHEDWHLQPRVW
democratic countries in the current era of retrenchment. In order to maintain legitimacy 
                                                 
*
 3DUWRIWKHFRQWHQWVFRQWDLQHGLQWKLVFKDSWHUDSSHDUHGLQWKHDXWKRUµVDUWLFOH- (2010). Financial 
Sustainability of Universal Healthcare and Its Reform: The Case of Taiwan. Asian Social Science (Scopus 
listed, peer reviewed), 6(4), 3-15.  
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of governance, many governments have tried to improve welfare services or even 
systematically dismantle the welfare regime in order to reduce excessive expenditure or 
contain costs (Giaimo, 2001; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Jost, 1998; Manow, 2001; 
Rhodes, 2001; Swank, 2001). Most efforts to resolve the financial burden arising from 
mushrooming welfare spending are political judgements rather than economically sound 
solutions (Giaimo, 2001; Myles and Pierson, 2001; Pierson, 2001). Experience has 
shown that, typically, reform proposals directed towards either increasing revenues or 
reducing benefits are unacceptable in view of the vested interests of people dominating 
the original welfare system (Chen and Wang, 2006). In addition, progress can be 
thwarted by conflicts among the seemingly unlimited needs of welfare provision, the 
capability to sustain finances and the UXOLQJSDUW\¶VQDWXUDOXUJHWRconsolidate its own 
political power.  
Since it is impossible for people to totally avoid sickness, healthcare provision is a 
central issue faced by many welfare states (Moran, 2000: 135). A healthcare system is 
an organised plan for health service provision. Usually, the term refers to a system or 
programme by which healthcare is made available to the population while being 
financed by government, private enterprise, or both (0RVE\¶V0HGLFDO'LFtionary, 
2015). Since healthcare is a crucial part of the welfare system in modern industrial 
societies, how to maintain a healthcare system efficiently and effectively is one of the 
most significant questions facing the makers of healthcare policy. Further, many 
societies are facing serious demographic shifts and social upheavals (Hewitt, 2002; 
Jackson, 2006; Schulz, 2006). For example, in the US, tens of millions of post war baby 
boomers entered retirement around 2010, thus precipitating a peak in labour shortage. 
The demographic restructuring is leading to a dramatic expansion of the demand for 
 3 
 
healthcare at a time there is increased shortage of labour, which is the main tax source 
VXVWDLQLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VEXGJHW. The erosion of the tax base in turn is leading to a 
financial deadlock and is creating a dilemma between healthcare maintenance and 
financial sustainability within the government. As Figure 1-1 shows, the average total 
expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP has been increasing steadily over the 
previous two decades not only in countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) but also in Taiwan. As more and more people 
are becoming unable to afford healthcare, governments are being forced to take 
mitigating measures. 
Figure 1-1. Average Expenditures on Health as Percentages of GDP in OECD 
Countries and Taiwan 
 
Source: OECD Health data 2013 and DoH, 2012a 
Four models of national health planning are of particular interest: the centralised 
and largely government-operated British National Health Service (hereafter NHS); the 
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employer-based, multiplayer system in Germany; U.S. Medicare, Medicaid and private 
health insurance systems; and Taiwan¶VJRYHUQPHQW-run system which is similar to the 
single payer system of Canada. Single payer health care is a system in which the 
government, rather than private insurers, pays for all health care costs. Single-payer 
systems may contract for healthcare services from private organizations (as is the case 
in Canada). Thus, single-payer national health insurance is a system in which a single 
public or quasi-public agency organises healthcare financing, but the delivery of care 
remains largely in private hands (PHNP, 2015). Table 1-1 compares these four systems 
with particular reference to healthcare spending, Among OECD countries, the U.S. has 
the dubious distinction of having the highest per capita healthcare spending. In 2005, 
the figure was $6,401, almost two times greater than that in prominent welfare-driven 
countries such as the U.K. and Germany, and six and a half times greater than that in 
Taiwan. Explanations for the higher level of U.S. health expenditure include excessive 
service use, administrative complexity, population aging, threat of malpractice 
litigation, defensive medicine, and a distaste for waiting lists (Anderson, Forgner, Johns, 
Reinhardt, 2006; Anderson, Reinhrdt, Hussey and Petrosyan, 2003; Anderson, Shea, 
Hussey, Keyhani and Zephyrin, 2004; Reinhardt, Hussey and Anderson, 2004). 
)XUWKHUPRUH86SURYLGHVPRUHKHDOWKFDUHPRUHGRFWRUV¶DSSRLQWPHQWVPRUH
surgery, more drugs, more diagnostic tests, and longer stays in hospitals than other 
countries (OECD, 2011).  
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Table 1-1. Per Capita Health Spending in U.S., U.K., Germany and Taiwan 
 USA UK Germany Taiwan 
Total 
health 
spending 
Percent 
of GDP 
per capita 
($PPP) 
Percent 
of GDP 
per capita 
($PPP) 
Percent of 
GDP 
per capita 
($PPP) 
Percent 
of GDP 
per capita 
($PPP) 
1985 10 1,765 5.9 694 8.8 1,409 NA NA 
1990 11.9 2,738 6.0 1,047 8.3 2,063 NA NA 
1995 13.3 3,656 7.0 1,370 10.1 3,129 5.3 681 
1996 13.2 3,803 7.0 1,437 10.4 3,090 5.4 728 
1997 13.1 3,951 6.8 1,559 10.2 2,682 5.4 749 
1998 13.1 4,114 6.9 1,687 10.2 2,725 5.5 693 
1999 13.1 4,317 7.1 1,779 10.3 2,688 5.7 770 
2000 13.2 4,569 7.3 1,782 10.3 2,372 5.7 822 
2001 13.9 4,917 7.5 1,835 10.4 2,395 6.0 780 
2002 14.7 5,306 7.7 2,028 10.6 2,610 5.9 788 
2003 15.2 5,648 7.8 2,382 10.8 3,183 6.1 824 
2004 15.2 6,037 8.1 2,880 10.6 3,499 6.0 879 
2005 15.3 6,401 8.3 3,064 10.7 3,628 6.0 940 
2006 15.9 7,107 8.5 3,711 10.6 3,733 6.3 1,033 
2007 16.2 7,482 8.5 3,909 10.5 4,415 6.2 1,057 
2008 16.6 7,760 8.8 4,091 10.7 4,600 6.5 1,129 
2009 17.7 7,990 9.8 3,684 11.7 4,856 6.9 1,132 
2010 17.6 8,233 9.6 3,771 11.6 4,391 6.5 1,211 
 Source: summarised from OECD, 2013 (Health data) and DoH, 2012a 
In the UK, the healthcare system is dominated by the government, which means it 
is easier to control the growth rate of spending via regulations and authorised power. 
Although health spending there has been rising continuously (Le Grand and Vizard, 
1998), healthcare in the UK has always been more affordable. In comparison with other 
OCED countries, the total spending of GDP on healthcare, including private, in the UK 
is 9.6% in 2010, considerably less than comparable economies such as France (11.6%), 
Germany (11.6%), Netherlands (11.9%), Canada (11.2%) and the USA (17.6%) (OECD, 
2013). The main feature of Germany¶VKHDOWKFDUHV\VWHPLVLWV statutory health insurance 
system (hereafter GHI), which is a collaborative self-governance mechanism between 
the employer and employee, subject to certain national rules. GHI is run on extractions 
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IURPHPSOR\HUSURILWVDQGZRUNHU¶VZDJHVDQGVDODULHV. Many such systems have failed 
to keep pace with the growth rate of healthcare spending (Brown and Amelung, 1999: 
79). Healthcare systems are indeed a part of the welfare system in a modern, 
industrialised society (Moran, 1999: 1). All this reminds us that new efforts are needed 
to ensure that health provision remains sustainable into the future.  
In order to sustain their healthcare systems, many governments have been trying to 
cope with the gridlock between unlimited needs and limited financial capabilities 
(Anderson et al., 2006; Brown and Amelung, 1999; Chen and Kwon, 2006, 2008; 
Giaimo, 2001). However, there is more to healthcare politics than healthcare policy 
formulation (Moran, 1999: 4). Since issues concerning healthcare WRXFKHYHU\RQH¶VOLIH, 
they lead many politicians to get involved at the policy level in order to attract SHRSOH¶V
votes. In democratic societies, the legitimacy and stability of the ruling party has to be 
maintained by continually seeking support from citizens on socially sensitive issues like 
healthcare operation and maintenance. In the U.S., numerous healthcare reform 
proposals have been debated and funded since 1912 in an attempt to develop, modify or 
provide a more sustainable and universal healthcare system for the people. Some of 
these proposals did look very good on paper; but almost all of them have been rejected. 
Despite such ³well-laid´ plans; universal coverage has consistently been felled across 
the world by one opponent: political infeasibility (Oberlander, 2003: 392). For instance, 
in the UK, Thatcher¶VConservative government launched a major campaign to contain 
expenditure on the NHS and minimise its expansion on a priority basis in the 1980s. In 
the event, the campaign absorbed much of the political energy available (Webster, 1994: 
60). In the early 1990s, the same government promoted aggressive attempts to privatise 
and introduce an internal market mechanism into the NHS in order to increase 
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efficiency via competition. 7KHUHDOVLJQLILFDQFHRI7KDWFKHU¶V1+6UHIRUPVOD\QRWLQ
what they achieved, but in putting in place key systemic changes that positioned the 
NHS for subsequent developments under New Labour (1997-2010) and under the 
coalition government formed later in 2010 (Scott-Samuel, Bambra, Collins, Hunter, 
McCartney and Smith, 2014: 63). With regard to Germany, several strategies such as 
curtailing benefits, broadening cost sharing and new types of payroll tax revenue were 
proposed to partially alleviate the prevailing financial imbalance. However, each of 
these reform proposals ended up in a political impasse as many of the policy 
stakeholders found it politically unpalatable or, even, offensive (Brown and Amelung, 
1999; Jost, 1998). As a consequence, government policies towards healthcare 
sustainability have become central to political controversies impinging on the welfare 
state (Moran, 1999), with politicians vying with one another to reassure the electorate 
that the healthcare s\VWHPLV³VDIH´LQWKHLUKDQGV  
These lessons on healthcare reform demonstrate that getting reform issues onto 
national policy agenda and consensus that a problem exists implies no agreement on 
solutions. Thus, although rising health spending has put the issue of financial 
sustainability on the agenda, the more likelihood of a reform proposal restraining costs 
or increasing revenues, the less the likelihood of it being politically viable (Moran, 
2000; Pierson, 1994, 2001, 2006). The reasons include the following. First, no single 
stakeholder wants to be asked to take on the thankless job of curbing excess health 
spending. Second, fragmented institutions and an unbalanced political arena lead to 
difficulties during actual reform. Third, any reform poses a threat to scores of people 
interested in maintaining the medical status quo, e.g. physicians, hospitals, the insurer, 
the insured, the employer, pharmaceutical companies, suppliers of medicals technology 
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and other possible interest groups and politicians. Every change is associated with 
certain potential victims who will do everything within the law to thwart 
implementation.  
Building an affordable healthcare system and promoting a healthcare reform are 
not easy tasks. This is perhaps the central political theme in nearly all industrialised 
countries operating a universal healthcare system. To an economist, the most significant 
worry concerns finding an optimal solution. But what is the best way? How much 
money is enough? Assuring the financial sustainability of healthcare spending may be a 
problem, but is the government able to intervene easily to set a limit to restrain the long-
term growth of spending? Controlling healthcare spending and increasing revenues are 
the most serious problems to be overcome in all countries running a universal healthcare 
system. Experience indicates that, in many industrialised countries, fundamental 
changes in healthcare policy usually suffer from political stalemates (Pierson, 2001). As 
with healthcare systems in many other countries7DLZDQ¶Vhealthcare system, National 
Health Insurance (hereafter NHI), has had its share of problems - this observation does 
not QHJDWHWKHFRXQWU\¶VFRQVLGHUDEOHDFFRPSOLVKPHQWLQXQLYHUVDOhealthcare system - 
and the actions notionally aimed at financial sustainability have been facing similar 
difficulties (Lu and Hsiao, 2003). For all these reasons, more attention will be paid in 
this thesis to understanding political challenges rather than economic feasibility.  
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1-2. Background to the Universal Healthcare Regime in 
Taiwan 
1-2-1. Historical Legacy: 7KH5DWLRQDOHEHKLQG7DLZDQ¶V1+, 
Taiwan is an island off the southeast coast of Mainland China. Its total territory is 
35,961 km2. The population in 2013 was about 23.3 million (BBC, 2014). In the same 
year, the GDP per capita was $ 21,902 which ranked 39th in the world. The GDP 
growth rate was 2.23%, as a result of gradual deterioration during the Great Recession 
(Knoema, 2013). The sophisticated and profitable industrial structure of Taiwan helped 
it to achieve an economic miracle in the 1980s, which transformed every socioeconomic 
feature. From a socio-SROLWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH7DLZDQ¶V high economic growth rate was the 
most important factor in turning it into a middle class society. This led to the 
replacement of the previous authoritarian regime by a democratic one by the early 
1990s (Hsiao, 1993). The high economic growth and the rise of middle class society 
caused the Kuomintang (hereafter KMT) government to benefit from more stable 
financial revenues to build and operate the universal healthcare system adopted in 1995.  
Following its defeat in the civil war with communist forces in1949, the KMT 
government was on the retreat within Mainland China and brought the entire Nationalist 
Government of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) to Taiwan, with Taipei as the temporary 
capital. In order to avoid a similar failure in its competition with the Communist Party 
of China in Mainland China, the KMT government launched a series of land reform 
policies (the 375 Rent Reduction Act, and an act to redistribute land among small 
farmers and compensate large landowners with commodities certificates and stocks in 
state-owned industries) with a view to maintaining a stable political and social order. 
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These reforms KDGDKXJHLQIOXHQFHRQ7DLZDQ¶VHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOGHYHORSPHQW
over the next several decades. After realising by the early 1960s that there was little 
likelihood of the communist regime being displaced in Mainland China, the KMT 
government shifted its attention to the development of basic infrastructure with the help 
of U. S. aid (Hsiao, 1993). The blue-print was generated by Premier Ching-kuo Chiang 
DQGWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWSURMHFWZDVWKH³7HQ0DMRU&RQVWUXFWLRQ3URMHFWV´ZKLFK
underpinned the establishment of the basic infrastructure and upgrading the industrial 
structure from agriculture to heavy industry by the early 1970s.  
Once the industrial structure got WUDQVIRUPHGVXFFHVVIXOO\E\WKHV7DLZDQ¶V
small and medium enterprises and its abundance of cheap labour started to facilitate 
rapid economic growth. The KMT government then adopted policies for building a 
strong export-driven trade economy to develop a further transformation to a high 
technology and service-oriented economy. ,QWKHPHDQWLPH7DLZDQ¶VKLJKVWDEOH
economic growth rates and significant export expansion elevated the country into the 
position as one of the Four Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan) which were in a relatively poor situation in the 1960s. According to official 
VWDWLVWLFDOUHSRUWWKH7DLZDQ¶VHFRQRPLFJURZWKUDWHVZDUHRYHUSHU\HDURQ
average during the economic progressive period since 1980s (CEPD, 1990). 7DLZDQ¶V
foreign exchange reserves were the sixth highest of any country in the world in 2013 
(Central Bank, 2014). Furthermore, the tremendous prosperity on the island was not 
only accompanied by economic and social stability but also resulted in the democratic 
reform and the establishment of a more universal healthcare network since the late 
1980s. By the 1990s, Taiwan transited into an era characterised via a middle class, 
ongoing political democratisation and welfare consolidation (Hsiao, 1993). 
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As the spectacular economic growth witnessed in the 1980s and early 1990s was 
making the Taiwanese wealthier than ever, the trend towards democratisation in East 
Asia was becoming D³WVXQDPL´undercutting the authoritarian ethos pervading 
governments. Soon after the KMT government retreated to Taiwan, martial law was 
promulgated with a view to maintaining social and political order as well as to keep the 
ruling party in power through two dominating instruments. The first was to build a 
patron-client relationship with Taiwanese political elites so as to sustain resource-
exchange interdependence on the basis of mutual reciprocity. Under the analytical 
framework of clientelism, the maintenance of relationships of exchange depends on the 
satisfaction of the actors toward each other and toward the expected return. If the 
expected return is not satisfied, the relationship will be terminated (Kaufman, 1974: 
285). The clientelism relationship in the authoritarian era in Taiwan was achieved 
through the manipulation of the party-state system of the KMT government (Yu and 
Wang, 2007). 
The other was paternalistic leadership which sought to create a highly efficient 
policy-making system and a technically competent bureaucratic system. The 
paternalistic leadership is a normal governance style in East Asian countries 
underscored a Confucian culture emphasising virtue, filial piety and ethics. The 
leadership style emphasised three principles of leadership: authoritarianism, 
benevolence and morality (Redding, 1990). These principles meant that, whatever be 
the business or an administrative sector, a leader should have paternalistic authority, 
high self-discipline and good morals so as to be able to maintain absolute power and 
decrease the decision making cost. In Taiwan, almost all the leaders of the KMT 
government, including Kai-chek Chiang, Ching-kuo Chiang and Teng-hui Lee, excelled 
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at paternalistic leadership.  
By the late 1970s and early 1980s - long before the fall of martial law in 1987 - the 
opposition movement developed into a quasi-party venture that started to challenge the 
ruling party. In consequence, the Taiwan government announced the termination of the 
martial law which led to the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party 
(hereafter DPP) and the dissolution of newspaper-regulations. All this resulted in a 
quick transformation of Taiwan into a fully fledged democracy (Aspalter, 2002: 4). 1996 
was the first time that Taiwanese could vote directly in presidential elections. In 2000, 
the KMT lost the presidential election and yielded a great amount of administrative 
power in the field of finance, policy administration, business and social affairs, to the 
DPP (Aspalter, 2002: 4). However, as the KMT still held a majority in the Congress, 
Taiwan entered an era of politically divided governance. In 2008, when Ying-jeou Ma 
was elected, the KMT not only retook the office of the president but also retained 
majority control over the legislature.  
 As for social factors, oIILFLDOVWDWLVWLFVVKRZDQLQFUHDVHLQ7DLZDQ¶V-and-over 
population; this indicates that the nation is on course to move on from being an aging 
society to an aged society (BNHI, 2007b). The working population in Taiwan peaked 
during the 1990s and the proportion of those aged over 65 H[FHHGHGRIWKHFRXQWU\¶V
total population in 1993. Because of the increasing numbers of the elderly, affordable 
healthcare services became more crucial for the inhabitants in Taiwan. Building a more 
fair and comprehensive welfare system started to dominate political appeals by the 
opposition party. All this meant that social welfare policies had become pivotal issues in 
7DLZDQ¶VLQWHUQDOSROLWLFV  
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,QDGGLWLRQWRVXFKSROLWLFDODQGVRFLDOIDFWRUVUHODWHGWR7DLZDQ¶VVRFLDOZHOIDUH
development, democratic transitions are now drawing greater attention to social policy 
debates concerning healthcare and social security systems and education among both 
policymakers and citizens. Though the politics of democratic consolidation in Taiwan 
had centred primarily on issues related to national identity, sovereignty and cross-straits 
relations (with Mainland China), social welfare policies and constitutional reform have 
nonetheless remained the core features of electoral competition (Wong, 2004). Thus, 
beginning in the 1990s, social welfare reforms have been emerging front-and-centre in 
mainstream public policy agendas in Taiwan. In order to win more identification and 
support from the public, the DPP, an opposition party, started in the early 1990s to 
strengthen the welfare policy discourse with a view to challenging the ruling party. For 
instance, the DPP advocated building a more comprehensive social welfare system for 
the people by including universal healthcare, an expansion of the universities, and a 
national pension insurance scheme.  
In order to cope with the challenges posed by the opposition party and consolidate 
its governance legitimacy during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the KMT started to 
shift its attention to the construction of an universal welfare system by integrating the 
original four insurance systems to expand the coverage from 59% to universal1 (BNHI, 
2007a: 6; Cheng, 2003: 73; Kwon, 2007: 12; Lu and Hsiao, 2003: 83). Before 1995, just 
8 million were covered by one of the insurance systems, which meant that almost 11.52 
million citizens were not covered by the protective umbrella of the insurance systems 
(Chen, 2005; Chen and Wang, 2006). Before the NHI, Taiwan had a multiplayer system 
                                                 
1
 Although 100% coverage is the aim of NHI programme, the coverage rate of NHI was 98% in 1995 and 
99% in 2007 (BNHI, 2007b). The 1% of the population excluded consisted of citizens residing abroad. 
 14 
 
consisting of four major social insurance programmes complemented by direct out-of-
pocket payments by patients. By the mid-1980s, on the one hand, rapid economic 
development started to fan public demand for better health insurance coverage. On the 
other hand, to pre-empt the political challenge, the KMT government, attempted to 
launch the NHI which sought to include the previously uninsured 8.62 million. The 
increase comprised 41 percent of the population; the majority were adults older than age 
sixty-five, whose needs for healthcare were the greatest. More details concerning the 
four insurance systems are provided in Figure 1-2. The figure highlights five major 
developmental episodes. Firstly, labour insurance was introduced in 1950 with the 
coverage reaching 40.12% population. Secondly, Government Employee Insurance was 
set up in 1958 with the coverage of 8.6% of the population. Thirdly, farmer insurance 
was introduced by 1985 with coverage of 8.21% population. Finally, Low Income 
Householder insurance was launched in 1990 and soon covered 0.55% of the population 
(Lu and Hsiao, 2003: 79). These health insurance systems were being run by multiple 
public sectors on the basis of an ecological distribution of 88% private health and 12% 
public health markets on average in the 1980s (CEPD, 1990), In response, the 
Department of Health (hereafter 'R+ODXQFKHGWKH³LQWHJUDWHGUHJLRQDOKHDOWKQHWZRUN
SURJUDPPH´WRGHYHORSDPRUHFRPSUHKHQVLYHhealthcare industry and integrate private 
and public healthcare UHVRXUFHVWRSURPRWHWKHSROLF\WDUJHWRI³KHDOWK\7DLZDQ´ 
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Figure 1-2. Insurance Coverage Expansion in Taiwan, Insured People as % of 
Population 
Source: for 1940-1995, Lu and Hsiao (2003: 79); for data after 1995, BNHI, 2007b 
As far as the political development and its influence on the development of 
7DLZDQ¶VZHOIDUHSROLF\DUHFRQFHUQHGWKHRQJRLQJSURFHVVRIGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQDOVR
DWWUDFWHGDWWHQWLRQIURPDFDGHPLFV¶ZRUOGZLGH6RPHLQWHUQDWLRQDOVFKRODUVFRQGXFWHG
research aimed at explaining the causal relationships between the development of 
7DLZDQ¶VZHOIDUHSURYLVLRQDQGSROLWLFDOGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ$VSDOWHU, 2002; Wong, 
2004). During the early 1990s, Taiwan government denied the trend of global 
government retrenchment revolution (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993), which led to 
increased public expenses. The most important reason is the development of party 
politics in Taiwan. For example, between 1983 and 1988, total government expenditure 
averaged 22.1 % of the GDP. After the introduction of supplementary elections for 
7DLZDQ¶VFHQWUDOOHJLVODWXUHLQDQGZLWKWKHFRQWLQXHGH[SDQVLRQRIQDWLRQDODQG
presidential elections, government spending jumped to an average figure of 28.9 % 
between 1989 and 1998. The general upward trend in public spending also reflected the 
redistribution of social welfare. Planning for the NHI programme was initiated in 1988 
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and the Prime Minister declared that it would be introduced by the year 2000. 
Moreover, after the martial law was lifted, electoral competition between candidates and 
parties witnessed a significant increase in contributory social insurance systems and 
escalated pressure on the ruling party to change the target year to 1995. As Figure 1-3 
shows, after the adoption of the NHI programme, the national health expenditure 
(NHE)2 started to exhibit a significantly upward trend (faster than the GDP growth rate 
in the period 1997-2004. This, however, led to a subsequent financial crisis related to 
NHI maintenance.  
Figure 1-3. Health and Government Expenditures Relative to GDP Percentage 
 
Source: DoH, 2006 
7RVXPXSWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI7DLZDQ¶VZHOIDUHSROLF\HVSHFLDOO\WKH1+,
represents an interactive confluence among the socioeconomic powers of capitalism, 
                                                 
2
 Health expenditure is the total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP. In Taiwan, national health 
expenditure refers to the expenditure on healthcare incurred by public funds at national and local levels. 
Health expenditures are broadly defined as activities performed either by institutions or individuals 
through the application of medical, paramedical, and/or nursing knowledge and technology, the primary 
purpose of which is to promote, restore, or maintain health (OECD, 2014).  
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democratisation and essential welfare starting in the 1980s. The development triggered 
several international research publications on East Asian welfare (Ku, 1997; Kwon, 
2007; Lee and Ku, 2003) and, thus, the emergence of social welfare as an important 
field of comparative social policy. However, almost all these studies followed Gosta 
Esping-$QGHUVHQ¶VFRQFHSWRIWKUHHZHOIDUHUHJLPHVDQGH[DPLQHGZKHWKHUWKH
welfare regime in East Asia differed from social democratic, conservative, or liberal 
models. The development and charaFWHULVWLFVRI7DLZDQ¶VZHOIDUHUHJLPHVGRQRWILWLQWR
any of the Esping-$QGHUVRQ¶VZHOIDUHUHJLPHPRGHOV+HQFHDQHZUHJLPHFDWHJRU\
³GHYHORSPHQWDOZHOIDUHVWDWH´KDGWREHLQYHQWHG.X/HHDQG.X
The present study endeavours to go beyond the existing categories of welfare regime 
VWXG\DQGH[SORUHWKHJRYHUQDQFHPHFKDQLVPRI7DLZDQ¶VXQLYHUVDOKHDOthcare system 
which has not become adequately familiar to the Western academic community (Lee 
and Ku, 2007). 
Based on the above discussion and the notion of developmental state along with 
the success of the rapid economic development in Taiwan and other East Asian 
countries (Japan, South Korea) was due largely to the developmental state, which 
played a strategic role in the process of industrialisation (Woo-Cumings, 1999). 
However, it represented not just an economic but also a social policy that was 
institutionalised so as to be able to play a part in the overall strategy for economic 
development. Hort and Kuhnle (2000: 167-168) showed that the above mentioned East 
Asian countries had introduced the first social security programmes as policy 
instruments for economic development and political stability with a view to maintaining 
social order and governmental legitimacy. Based on this view, over the past thirty years 
or so, Taiwan and other East Asian countries including Japan and South Korea have 
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been following a new social policy trajectory. Known most for their high growth 
capacities, these East Asian developmental states have begun to shed their reputations as 
³ZHOIDUHODJJDUGV´:LWKWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIXQLYHUVDOKHDOWKFDUHSHQVLRQVDQGQHZ
social policy innovations in long term care for the elderly and in family care, the notion 
that developmental strategies in East Asia are primarily JURXQGHGLQD³JURZWKDWDOO
FRVWV´HWKRVVHHPVOHVVDQGOHVVDSSURSULDWHLQWRGD\¶VLQGXVWULDOLVHG(DVW$VLD3HQJ
and Wong, 2004). Although it is still far from reaching the benchmark of the European 
welfare state, the direction of reform in Taiwan and other East Asian countries started to 
tilt decidedly towards the welfare state in the 1990s. Social policies in East Asia are 
now being understood increasingly in universalistic terms. They have become much 
more inclusive within social welfare being legitimate via language of social rights. As a 
result, the provision of social protection is being seen as a responsibility of the state, and 
less so of the family and individuals.  
Comparing with other social policy issues, the NHI was an important part of 
democratisation politics in Taiwan in 1990s. Universalising the healthcare system by 
piecing together the previous insurance systems was a major social policy achievement 
directed towards meeting the healthcare needs of the people in Taiwan in the 1990s. 
However, in spite of the fact that the universal healthcare system has achieved a unique 
record of social welfare movement (Chen and Wang, 2006), rising imbalance between 
revenues and expenditures is pointing to the need for further reforms on the political 
and financial fronts. This thesis focuses on financial issues related to the NHI.  
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1-2-2. &XUUHQW6WDWXVRI7DLZDQ¶V1+, 
Some two decades after the economic miracle and the political democratisation, 
Taiwan established its universal healthcare system with compulsory enrolment, single 
public payer (Bureau of National Health Insurance, hereafter BNHI), and contributions 
shared by the employer, the employee and the government. The NHI programme is 
perhapVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWVFKHPHLPSDFWLQJWKHOLYHVRI7DLZDQ¶VSHRSOHVLQFH
It integrates previous healthcare systems and public-private participation to achieve a 
universal service provisional system operated through administrative power (Wu, 
Majeed and Kuo, 2010). The desire for such a transformation arose in 1987 when the 
former authoritarian regime was replaced by a democratic one and, consequently, the 
KMT government realised the political advantages that lie in extending existing welfare 
state arrangements to farmers, the poor, the handicapped, and the rest of the population. 
The NHI was seen as the panacea to mitigate the ominous political situation of the KMT 
government was in. In turn, the political situation was a product of the political 
competition in Taiwan Island which existed during the early 1990s (Kwon, 2007). 
7DLZDQ¶V1+,LVDJRYHUQPHQW-run, single-player national health insurance scheme 
created under the regulations of the NHI ACT. It is financed through a mix of premiums 
and taxes that compensate a mix of public-private delivery systems operating 
predominantly on a global budget system basis (BNHI, 2015). The principle of single 
public payer and its relationship with the insured and providers is an important feature 
of the system. Single payer health insurance is a system by which the healthcare 
expenditures incurred on behalf of the entire population is paid for through a single 
source using tax revenues collected from individuals and employers. As the single 
 20 
 
public payer of the NHI, the BNHI has not only reduced administrative overheads but 
also increased the negotiation power needed to maintain a vast universal healthcare 
system effectively (Cheng, 2003: 64). For instance, tKHSURJUDPPH¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLYH
EXUGHQZDVSHUFHQWRIWKH1+,¶VWRWDOEXGJHWLQ%1+,EDOWKRXJKWKH
NHI Act allows the BNHI to spend as much as 3.5 percent of its annual budget on 
administration. 
NHI can be seen as a triangular governance regime between the BNHI, the insured 
and the providers (see Figure 1-4). As for the role of the single public payer and its 
responsibilities, the BNHI is the only body authorised to levy premiums and negotiate 
payments with providers in the NHI. It is an intermediary between the insured and 
providers and has the legitimacy to facilitate good communications between them. In 
addition, the BNHI is responsible for system planning, promotion, implementation, 
supervision, research and development, manpower development, information 
management and auditing (BNHI, 2007a: 6). To effectively manage the work of the 
BNHI and improve operating efficiency, six branches have been set up to directly 
handle underwriting operations: insurance premium collection, review and payment of 
medical claims and management of NHI-contracted medical care institutions. This is 
also the reason that the BNHI always receives close attention from the stakeholders in 
the operations carried out under the NHI programme.  
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Figure 1-4. Flow of Healthcare System under the NHI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: modified from BNHI, 2014 
Second, in order to sustain its operations, NHI not only levies premiums but also 
requests each insured patient to pay a co-payment when visiting a doctor (BNHI, 2015). 
For instance, the NHI co-payment requirement is that clinics and hospitals in Taiwan 
charge a registration fee ranging from 50 TWD (New Taiwan Dollar; 50 TWD=1 GBP; 
Great Britain Sterling Pound) to 250 TWD (5 GBP) each visit. Co-payment seeks to 
reduce unnecessary use of outpatient care as well as to encourage the use of physician 
services from primary clinics rather than big hospital outpatient departments. Adequate 
risk pooling and a broad-based collection of funds to finance the NHI are ensured by 
stipulating mandatory enrolment for every Taiwanese citizen with official residency and 
foreign national living in Taiwan with an Alien Resident Certificate (ARC). The benefits 
provided by the NHI are comprehensive to the extent of taking care of the essential 
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health needs of the people enrolled. The benefit package includes inpatient care, 
outpatient care, emergency care, dental care, Chinese medicine care, pharmaceutical 
care, home healthcare, psychiatric care, corrective surgery for congenital mal-formation, 
peritoneoscopic examination, cholecystectomy, knife, physio therapy, MRI, child 
delivery, pap smear, physical examination, pre-and post-natal examination and baby 
examination (BNHI, internet homepage, accessed date: 22/02/2015). 
Third, the providers have the responsibility to provide high quality healthcare 
service to the insured under the contracts with the BNHI. The medical behaviour, 
expenditure and ways of estimating payments are constrained by the contracts. This is 
SHUKDSVWKH%1+,¶VPRVWSRZHUIXOWRROLQQHJRWLDWLQJZLWKWKHVHSURYLGHUVHVSHFLDOO\
with regard to maintaining the service quality and restraining the medical costs. 
However, providers also have professional medical knowledge which leads them to 
enjoy a dominant position in an informationally asymmetric negotiation game. Finally, 
the insured and providers usually mobilise and organise in order to influence policy 
outcomes. Such interest groups and lobbyist-politicians frequently precipitate political 
conflicts or deadlocks in the policy-making or reform processes. 
Although the BNHI is the only public single payer, the BNHI is not the only 
administrative organisation involved in the operation of the NHI. The DoH of the 
Executive Yuan is the leader dominating the health policy formation and supervising the 
SHUIRUPDQFHRIWKH%1+,8QGHU([HFXWLYH<XDQ¶VIUDPHZRUNWKH'R+KDVPRUe 
decision-making power than the BNHI, so the DoH is compelled to take on more 
political responsibilities in the NHI. The DoH itself is made up of many components, 
e.g., the NHI Supervisory Committee (NHISC), the NHI Disputes Mediation 
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Committee (NHIDM) and the NHI Expenditure Negotiation Committee (NHIENC) and 
the NHI Task Force. The NHISC is the most important intermediary which permits 
social associations. Employers and providers have the chance to communicate with each 
other in public sectors under the NHI Act. The NHIDM is a neutral, quasi-public sector 
setup mediating disputes between the insured and the providers. With a view to 
facilitating negotiations concerning payments to providers under the Global Budget 
Payment (GBP) system, NHIENC is composed of delegates identified by providers and 
the BNHI (since 1999).   
In order to provide the public convenient and comprehensive medical care, the 
NHI permits practice of Western medicine as well as, traditional Chinese medicine 
while providing dental care, hospital care, preventive healthcare, and child delivery 
services. In 2012, there were 20,058 NHI-contracted medical care institutions (91.23% 
of all medical care institutions), which has meant that just 8.77% medical care 
institutions in Taiwan have no NHI contracts with the BNHI (see Table 1-2). The 
comprehensive benefits package of the NHI and the broadly distributed facilities have 
KHOSHGHTXDOLVHSHRSOH¶VILQDQFLDODFFHVVWRKHDOWKVHUYLFHV+RZHYHUWKLVKDVQRWPHDQW
necessarily that providers are physically available within a reasonable distance to 
everyone. For instance, 59 percent of residents in mountainous areas reported having to 
travel for more than thirty minutes (one way) to their primary doctor (National Health 
Research Institute, 2001). The BNHI has taken actions to ameliorate this problem 
through a multifaceted scheme. As for the supply side, the scheme encourages the 
provider to practice in remote areas. On the demand side, the BNHI encourages cost 
sharing not only for the disadvantaged minority but also for people living in remote 
areas.  
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Table 1-2. Number of NHI Contracted Hospitals and Clinics 
 Total Hospital Clinics Chinese 
Medicine 
Hospitals 
Chinese 
Medicine 
Clinics 
Dental 
Clinics 
Total Medical 
care institutions 21,437 488 10,997 14 3,462 6,476 
NHI-contracted 
medical care 
institutions 
20,058 478 10,026 13 3,192 6,349 
Proportions 
contracted 93.57% 97.95% 91.17% 92.86% 92.20% 98.04% 
Source: DoH, 2012b 
Because running a huge universal healthcare system is not easy, it needs to be 
supported through sustained financial resources. Thus, although it is acknowledged that 
the NHI has made healthcare more affordable at the point of service for patients, issues 
about how much it has increased total national health spending and how to adopt 
suitable premium and payment systems to contain spending are getting more and more 
attention. As Figure 1-5 demonstrates, the financial flow of the NHI can be separated in 
three parts: premiums, medical expenses and co-payments (BNHI, 2015). The six-
categories premium scheme is run by the BNHI to levy premiums from the insured, and 
the employer and the government have responsibilities to share the contributions. Also, 
the BNHI evaluates the performances of the providers with regard to healthcare 
provisions and negotiates payments with provider sectors including dental care, 
traditional Chinese medicine, Western medicine, outpatient care, and hospital care in 
accordance with the regulations of the GBP system. In addition, the co-payment system 
seeks to contain costs. 
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Figure 1-5. Financial Flow in the NHI 
Source: the author 
To sum up, Taiwan has established a compulsory healthcare system that provides 
universal coverage and a comprehensive benefit package to all of its inhabitants. The 
single public actor, the BNHI, also controls the administrative costs to a very low level 
aQGSURYLGHVWRROVWRPDQDJHKHDOWKVSHQGLQJLQFUHDVHVHIIHFWLYHO\$OWKRXJK7DLZDQ¶V
OHJLVODWXUHKDVGHVFULEHGWKHIHDWXUHRIWKH1+,DVDFDU³GHVLJQHGDQGSURGXFHGEXW
ZLWKPDQ\FRPSRQHQWVLPSRUWHGIURPRYHUWHQRWKHUFRXQWULHV´the NHI has 
demonstrated high performance as evidenced by a high satisfaction rate. It is playing an 
important role in supplying the essential demands for all residents in Taiwan since 1995 
(Cheng, 2003: 61). TKH1+,KDVEHFRPHRQHRI7DLZDQ¶VFURZQMHZHOV(BNHI, 2007a: 
48). 
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1-2-3. Emerging Issues: a Crown Jewel or Hot Potato? 
Although the NHI is a product of political competition, in no way was it conceived 
hastily. While planning the NHI, the KMT government employed or consulted with 
numerous leading domestic and international experts for about half decade (Chen, 
2005). The KMT government designed its new NHI to achieve two essential objectives: 
provide equal access to healthcare for all citizens and contain the total health 
expenditure to be within a reasonably acceptable level (CEPD, 1990). This goal has 
EHHQYLQGLFDWHGE\WKHIDFWWKDW7DLZDQ¶V1+,KDVLQGHHGGHPRQVWUDWHGDORZ-cost, 
high-efficiency performance, with a satisfaction rate as high as 70% on average (see 
Figure 1-6). For the performance of low-cost, as previous indicated, the administrative 
cost was only 1.7% of all the expenditure in 2007 (BNHI, 2007b). Moreover, based on 
over 91% contracting rate with healthcare providers in Taiwan (91.75%, 18,450 
healthcare providers in total in 2007; BNHI, 2007b), it offers free choice of service 
provider and practice modes followed by the providers. That the system has remained 
workable at least up to now is attested by the fact that waiting lists are absent and 
administrativHFRVWVKDYHUHPDLQHGVWDEOHDQGORZ$VDUHVXOW7DLZDQ¶V1+,KDVEHHQ
attracting notable, word-wide attention. For instance, in 2000, the Economist (2000) 
UDQNHG7DLZDQ¶V1+,DVWKH1RLQWHOOLJHQFHXQLWLQZRUOGKHDOWKUDQNLQJWKH-RXUQDO
of Health $IIDLUVSXEOLVKHGDVSHFLILFLVVXHLQRQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI7DLZDQ¶V
1+,DQG3URIHVVRU3DXO.UXJPDQZURWHDFRPPHQWDU\³3ULGH3UHMXGLFH
,QVXUDQFH´H[WROOLQJLWLQ1HZ<RUN7LPHVRQWK1RYHPEHU. 
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Figure 1-6. Public Satisfaction Rate with NHI between 1995 and 2012 
Source: extracted from BNHI (2013) 
Since the NHI has become the most important and essential safeguard for the 
KHDOWKRI7DLZDQ¶VLQKDELWDQWVWKHUXOLQJSDUW\KDVWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\QRZWRPDLQWDLQ
the operation of the NHI. This is particularly true in view of the single public payer 
mechaQLVPLWKDVDGRSWHG,Q7DLZDQ¶VWUDGLWLRQDOVRFLHW\FKDUDFWHULVHGE\WKHORJLFRI
patriarchal governance, people look up to the government as they would do to a parent. 
They hope that the government could effectively provide their essential needs. Since the 
NHI is concerned with the welfare of all inhabitants of Taiwan, it has become an 
LPSRUWDQWLQGLFDWRURIWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHQDWLRQ¶VJRYHUQPHQW7KHUHIRUHVLQFH
the issue of the NHI has remained one of the most important political themes in every 
presidential election. Whatever be the ruling party, the policy target of the NHI has been 
to enable people to pay the least possible money and receive the most possible benefits 
under a comprehensive benefit package (Aspalter, 2002; Chen and Wang, 2006; Wong, 
Double Raise Scheme 
New Financing Scheme 
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2004). However, since the ³$VLDQ)LQDQFLDO&ULVLV´ of 1997, sluggish economic growth 
has led to heavy financial burdens on East Asian societies partly as a result of 
progressively aging population. In Taiwan, the aging population (percent population 
over 65) was 4 % in 1980, 6% in 1990, 9% in 2000 and 10% in 2007 (BNHI, 2014). 
The upwards trend is still accelerating. This has led to serious escalation in health 
expenditure. In maintaining a national healthcare system, one often faces financial 
crises and often the financial adjustments imposed lead to political problems. There may 
be little doubt that the domain of health remains within social welfare policy, but it must 
be acknowledged that it remains highly influenced by politics (Weissert and Weissert, 
1996). 
,QIDFWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRIXQGWKH1+,KDVJUDGXDOO\ZRUVHQHGIURP 
1998 (see Figure 1-7). It is the first time that the expenditure of the NHI had exceeded 
revenue. The total deficit has presently reached TWDbn 20 (GBP 4 hundred million). 
This reveals the contradictions that arise when the government tries to support the NHI 
E\XWLOLVLQJWZRLQGHSHQGHQWILQDQFLDOV\VWHPVLDUHYHQXHV\VWHPRIWKH³VL[
FDWHJRULFDOSUHPLXPV\VWHP´ZLWKWKHSUHPLXPUDWHRIZKLFKLVWKHPDLQVRXUce 
RILQFRPHDQGLLDQH[SHQGLWXUHV\VWHPEDVHGRQ³IHHIRUVHUYLFH´KHUHDIWHU))6
:LWKUHJDUGWRPRUHGHWDLOVDERXWWKH1+,¶VLQFRPHWhe premium revenues collected 
from the insured, insuring agencies and government subsides stood at 38%, 37% and 
26% respectively. The total amount was TWD 370 billion (GBP 7.4 billion or US$ 11.2 
billion) in 2007 (BNHI, 2007b: 9). In order to contain expenditure, the payment system 
ZDVFKDQJHGIURP³IHHIRUVHUYLFH´WR³JOREDOEXGJHW´E\WKH'R+DQGLQVWLWXWHGDFR-
governance mechanism between the government and the healthcare organisations from 
1998 to 2002 (Chen and Wang, 2006). The global budget system puts cap on the 
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expenses incurred by each medical field (e.g. hospitals, Western Medicine, Chinese 
Medicine, etc.). If the total services performed exceed the field's cap, the FFS 
reimbursement ratio would start to deflate, which would shrink payment for each 
service provided. 
However, although the global budget payment system (hereafter GBP) controls the 
1+,¶VH[SHQGLWure under the policy environment of common-property resources (Hurley 
and Card, 1996; Ostrom, 1990), the deficit of the NHI has been worsening since 1998. 
The problem is yet to be resolved (BNHI, 2015). Besides reforming the payment 
system, in order to financially sustain the NHI, consideration is being given to replacing 
LQFRPHJHQHUDWLRQWKURXJKWKH³VL[FDWHJRULFDOSUHPLXPV\VWHP´E\DQHZILQDQFLQJ
scheme and increasing the co-payment rate. However, as Figure 1-6 clearly shows, the 
people in Taiwan were not happy with the reform proposals of the new financing 
scheme and the double raise scheme. These issues reflect the difficulties associated with 
formulating the policy agenda of an institution such as the NHI.   
Figure 1-7. Tendency of NHI Financial Status between 1995 and 2007 
Source: extracted from BNHI (2007b) 
 30 
 
With a view to avoiding a similar financial crisis in the future, the DPP government 
ODXQFKHGD³FRPSUHKHQVLYHSK\VLFDOH[DPLQDWLRQ´RIWKH1+,EHWZHHQDQG
The reasons for the increased spending on the NHI can be discussed by referring to 
three levels (see Table 1-)LUVWDWWKHPDFUROHYHO7DLZDQ¶VSRSXODWLRQLVJURZLQJ
ever faster and, hence, there is an increasing demand for new and more costly 
technological treatments.  
Table 1-3. Factors Leading to High Healthcare Spending by the NHI 
Dimensions Factors Influences 
Macro-level 
&KDQJHVLQ7DLZDQ¶V
demographic distribution 
The ever growing proportion of aging population has 
led to decreasing premium distributions and an 
increasing rate of healthcare utilisation. 
Development of new 
medical technologies 
Following developments in new and costly medical 
technologies, e.g. heart, liver, and bone marrow 
transplants and gamma radiation, have resulted in 
higher spending on treatments. 
Meso-level 
Institutional design of 
the premium system 
The current premium system does not reflect the real 
national and family income, and the six categories 
premium system has led to an unfair load on 
contributions. 
Institutional design of  
the payment system 
Containment of the cost of the FFS system is the most 
important factor lead to the financial burden. 
Institutional design of 
comprehensive coverage 
Comprehensive coverage consumes an unduly high 
proportion of the revenues of the NHI. 
Institutional design of  
how subsidies are shared 
between the central and 
local governments 
The local governments, in particular Taipei and 
Kaohsiung city, do not want to share the subsidy of 
governmental contributions of the NHI premium and 
have accumulated a lot of debts. 
Micro-level 
Utilisation rates of the 
health services by 
patients 
Hospital-shopping or so-called moral hazard behaviour 
of the insured has resulted in high healthcare use rates. 
The behaviours of 
doctors during practice 
Under the FFS system, the provider responds by 
expanding services, reducing resources for each unit of 
service, and profiting from the sale of products and 
services not covered by the NHI. 
The gap in the prices of 
drugs 
The drug price black hole has led to a drug price gap 
and serious overmedication of patients, including 
excessive use of antibiotics. 
Source: summarised from DoH, 2001 
Second, at the meso-level, the most important problem concerns the institutional 
GHVLJQXQGHUSLQQLQJWKHPDQDJHPHQWRIWKH1+,,QFRSLQJZLWKWKHSXEOLF¶VHVVHQWLDO
healthcare needs, the most important problem concerns the imbalance between revenue 
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and expenditure. There are three institutional factors behind this imbalance. The first is 
that the prevailing premium system does not reflect the national and family income and 
worsens the gap between the poor and rich. In other words, levying a premium on the 
basis of salary leads to an unfair distribution of premium rates across the six categories 
by ignoring the difference between salary income and total income. The insurance 
premium ratio rate of the insured in the NHI is based on salary. To be fair, different 
occupations have different contribution rates under plausible sext for redistribution 
effect. However, many occupations in Taiwan have grey income which is not easily 
traced by the National Tax Administration. Thus, the premium based on payroll is 
usually inaccurate and this is unfair that some insured just contribute very low rates 
(Chen and Wang, 2006). 
Also, the institutional design of comprehensive coverage has put financial 
sustainability in jeopardy while universal coverage has exacerbated the need for cost 
containment. Likewise, the premium system has precipitated a conflict on the issue of 
sharing governmental subsidy between central and local governments. By 2001, the two 
largest cities in Taiwan, Taipei and Kaohsiung, had accumulated numerous debts related 
to premium contributions. Also, the payment system of FFS resulted in excessive 
services and resource wastage (Chang and Hung, 2008: 107; Cheng, 2003: 61-67).  
Third, at the level of the individual, the NHI has changed the behaviours of 
patients, doctors and drug industries. Specifically, the comprehensive coverage and 
compulsory enrolment mechanism of the NHI has resulted in high healthcare utilisation 
rates (BNHI, 2015). It has provided more opportunities for hospitals and drug industries 
to collaborate in pursuit of exorbitant profits and damaged service quality. For instance, 
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the hospitals can maximise their profits by denying proper care or reporting over-billing 
to the BNHI (Chen and Wang, 2006). With regard to the problem of drug price gap, the 
main reason is that pharmaceutical firms are paying outrageous amounts for drug rights 
and then passing these extra costs onto the BNHI through much higher drug prices, 
while tacking on exorbitant profits (Hsu, 2010). To keep total medical expense within 
the fixed budget, hospitals might limit the volumes or level of services, replacing high-
quality drugs with lower-priced or more profitable substitutes and further increase the 
possibility of compromising the quality of care (Hsu, 2010). To sum up, the major 
reason for the negative financial situation is that both cost containment and financing 
mechanism of the current NHI have become incapable of breaking out of the vicious 
circle. 
Financial sustainability requires adequate revenues coupled with cost containment. 
With a view to sustaining the finance of the NHI, the DPP government launched another 
huge reform between 2001 and 2004. In 2001, the director of the DoH invited several 
LQWHUQDWLRQDODQGGRPHVWLFVFKRODUVWRJHWLQYROYHGLQD³VHFRQGJHQHUDWLon of NHI 
UHIRUPSURJUDPPH´KHUHDIWHU*-NHI). The project aimed to apply more systematic 
methods to evaluate the operation of the current NHI in financial sustainability at that 
time and constructed a more advanced NHI incorporating feasible but reasonable 
solutions. The project sought to enhance co-governance and civil participations in NHI 
affairs. The possible strategies for improving financial sustainability by combining past 
policies with new ones can be categorised along three dimensions (see Table 1-4). The 
first is to change the structure of contribution rates and increase the revenue. The second 
endeavours to reduce the healthcare spending on the expenditure side. The third aims to 
reduce the comprehensive coverage side. The government has been unwilling to apply 
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the third strategy because such a policy would compromise benefits to the poor; the 
poor will not accept that.  
Table 1-4. Major Proposals for Improving the Financial Sustainability of the NHI 
(1998 to 2008) 
Strategies Proposals Policy Targets Beneficiary Victim Level 
Increasing 
income 
2G-NHI 
financing 
scheme, 
announced in 
2004  
Reconstructing 
the premium and 
contribution rate 
and increase the 
financing 
capability.  
The BNHI, the 
poor, and 
people whose 
main income 
is salary 
The rich, and 
people with 
multiple 
income 
sources 
Amendment 
The double raise 
scheme, 
announced in 
2002 
Cost containment 
and increasing the 
premiums, 
especially by 
restraining the 
over-utilisation 
rate of healthcare 
resources  
The BNHI  The insured Executive 
command 
Cost 
containment 
Strengthening 
the global 
budget payment 
system, adopted 
since 1998 and 
fully 
implemented by 
2002  
Cost containment, 
especially as a 
way of 
restructuring the 
FFS  
The BNHI The providers Executive 
command 
Administrative 
litigation with 
local 
governments, 
2004 
Clarifying the 
responsibility and 
pursing the 
payments  
The BNHI Local 
governments 
NA 
Regular 
medicine price 
survey and new 
drug price 
policy, 
announced in 
2001 
Reducing the 
drug price gap 
and decreasing 
the expenditure 
The BNHI The drug 
industries and 
hospitals 
Executive 
command 
Reducing 
coverage 
No suitable 
proposal NA NA NA NA 
Source: summarised from DoH, 2004 
In order to avoid social upheavals, the DoH has applied three ways of reducing the 
costs of health services. First, the DoH asked the two local governments to reimburse 
the accumulated debts and the administrative court adjudicated a compulsory execution 
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ruling in which the local governments were asked to pay off the accumulated debts in 
2004. Second, since the expenditure on drugs accounted for an unduly large proportion 
of healthcare spending, the DoH and the BNHI took actions to resolve the drug price 
gap (since 2003) by systematically checking and re-negotiating drug prices with drug 
companies. These initiatives have had a positive impact as far as cost containment is 
concerned. Third, it has generally been acknowledged that the adoption of GBP system 
has been an effective policy in the control of healthcare expenditure in many OECD and 
Asian countries (Chang and Hung, 2008; Chu, 1992; Hsueh, Lee and Huang, 2004; 
Wolfe and Moran, 1993). 
Healthcare reform is more a political issue than a purely technical one. A 
financially burdensome universal healthcare system damages governmental legitimacy 
&KHQDQG:DQJ,WLVH[SHFWHGWKDW7DLZDQ¶V1+,ZLOOPDLQWDLQKLVWRULFDO
legacies by efficiently allocating healthcare resources through a comprehensive service 
delivery network. In addition, in the opinion of the public and mass media, the 
healthcare organisations are one of the most important and powerful stakeholders in the 
NHI policy domain (Wang, 2012, 2013)0RUHRYHU7DLZDQ¶VKHDOWKFDUHRUJDQLVDWLRQV
make up a vast enterprise straddling varied interests. There are four medical systems 
LQFOXGHGLQ7DLZDQ¶V1+,:HVWHUQPHGLFLQHV\VWHPWKH&KLQHVHPHGLFDOV\VWHPWKH
dental care system and the hospital care system, and a range of professional 
associations. Although well-organised, it exhibits information asymmetry between the 
VWDWHDQGWKHFLWL]HQVZLWKUHJDUGWRKHDOWKVHUYLFHGHOLYHU\7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶FDSDELOLW\
with respect to health insurance service and delivery is influenced by its financial 
condition, political structure, information asymmetry in health service, as well as the 
interests of healthcare associations. Besides, a reform of financial management involves 
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changing the original allocation of resources among healthcare organisations and the 
contribution rates of the insured and employee. Efforts to enhance financial 
sustainability invariably result in numerous victims and beneficiaries, so there is 
pressure to balance the interests of different stakeholders. For instance, the 2G-NHI 
financing scheme and the double raise scheme (the reform proposal for the co-payment 
scheme) all resulted in serious political conflicts (Chen and Wang, 2006; Wong, 2004). 
The 2G-NHI financing scheme has not been passed in the Congress so far and the 2G-
NHI financing scheme and the double raise scheme not only caused protests the 
opposition parties; they also led to a lowest satisfaction rate (under 60%) with the NHI 
(please see Figure 1-6). Although the implementation of GBP system may retard the 
worse trend of financial imbalance, the NHI operation is still unstable (Chen and Wang, 
2006). 
6WDUWLQJE\WKHWXUQRIWKHPLOOHQQLXP7DLZDQ¶V1+,KDVEHHQIDFLQJWKHFKDOOHQJH
of huge debt in the 2000s, the debt of the NHI reached TWD 500 hundred millions (10 
hundred million British pounds) by the end of 2008 (China Times, 2008). Thus, the 
issue of effective maintenance has become a hot potato rather than a crown jewel. In 
order to collect public opinion on this issue, four NHI citizen forums were organised in 
2005. The FRQFOXVLRQZDVLQIDYRXURI³QRSUHPLXPVUDLVHQREHQHILWVUHGXFHDQGWKH
JRYHUQPHQWKDVGXW\WRVXVWDLQWKH1+,´'R+7KHSXEOLFJDYHDQDEVROXWH
answer rejecting any possible proposals involving premium increases or coverage 
reductions. They likHGHDWLQJD³NLQJ-VL]HEXUJHU´DWWKHSULFHRID³EDVLFEXUJHU´7KLV
means that financial sustainability of health coverage and quality is a trade-off issue. 
%HFDXVHLWWRXFKHVHYHU\RQH¶VOLIHDUHIRUPPXVWPRELOLVHSXEOLFVXSSRUW$OWKRXJK
numerous attempts have already been made to find a reasonable way to resolve the 
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financial crisis, ultimately, any decisions involving thresholds on the expenditure or the 
revenue will be matters of political judgment. Pressure to spend more will continue. The 
aim is not to define a rational end point but rather one that can be implemented within 
the given, complex political environment.  
 
1-3. Research Questions 
Policy-making and implementation systems relating to healthcare are large and 
important components in the governance of a modern state. Governing a healthcare 
system has become an especially dominant theme in recent years. Financially sustaining 
a healthcare system is highly complicated. According to Michael Moran (1999: 4), 
healthcare policy is more about healthcare than about personal service. The governance 
of a healthcare system is a large-VFDOHDFWLYLW\LQYROYLQJUHDOORFDWLRQRIWKHVRFLHW\¶V
resources. Allocation of national resources is essentially a political process. Since the 
decisions concerned involve multiple interests of numerous stakeholders, sustaining the 
healthcare system is always a central issue in a modern society (Moran, 1999: 4; 2000: 
136). One should therefore dwell more on healthcare politics than healthcare policy.  
It is essential to have a comprehensive understanding of the policy domain if one is 
to confront the political challenges associated with health reform. This thesis includes 
DQDQDO\VLVRI7DLZDQ¶V1+,ILQDQFLDOUHIRUPDVDSROLF\QHWZRUNDQGH[DPLQHVWKH
extent to which the NHI policy actors function as a coherent community. Because of its 
context-dependent character, the study of policy networks will be carried out using the 
policy domain approach (Knoke, 1994a, 2011; Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989). A 
policy domain delineates a bounded system whose members are interconnected by 
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multiple policy networks (Knoke, 2011: 211). From this viewpoint, this research 
includes a systematic analysis examination of the financial reform in the NHI policy 
domain, with particular reference to the DPP government (2000-2008). Looking through 
the lens of social network analysis (hereafter SNA), we seek to find out who actually 
KDVEHHQJRYHUQLQJWKH1+,¶VILQDQFLDOUHIRUP7KHUHE\ZHKRSHWRDUULYHDWSROLF\
recommendations for managing the NHI better. Furthermore, we inquire how previous 
reform proposals, embedded in a complex information transmission, resource-exchange 
and collective action structure of interdependencies, have been affected by interactions 
among the government bureaus, healthcare associations, employers, mass media, 
pharmaceutical associations, labour unions, congressional committees, academia, and so 
forth. In particular, we examine how policy networks form, work and affect policy 
outcomes. Using SNA, this study mainly seeks answers to the following questions:  
1. Who are the key players and what are their interests in the NHI policy domain? If 
any, what kind of policy network structure has it formed? 
2. Who rules the health policy domain and what difference does it make?  
3. What is the role of the government and what are the political obstacles in 
healthcare reform?  
4. What are the factors impacting the power distribution and policy outcomes in 
promoting the 2G-NHI financing scheme? 
5. What are the implications of these patterns of interdependency among key players 
for managing the NHI policy domain? 
6. What are the implications of the application of SNA in the current research 
addressing policy networks and network management in the NHI policy domain? 
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To sum up, as for researchers of politics, public administration, and sociology, the 
questions of interest concern who contributes to policy formation and implementation 
and why it is a perennial and unavoidable issue in the study of policy processes. This 
study seeks to provide a deeper understanding of official and unofficial stakeholders 
who are involved in the political system, the ways they influence reform proposals 
related to the NHI, and implementations through the network perspective. 
 
1-4. Organisation of the Thesis 
Through the lens of SNA, this study aims to explore who governs the NHI policy 
domain by focusing on the politics behind financial sustainability in Taiwan. Firstly, it 
identifies the nature of the financial sustainability of welfare systems in the West and 
attempts to apply the VDPHWR7DLZDQ¶V1+,SURJUDPPH$OVRDVDEDFNJURXQGWDVNLW
analyses the development of the universal healthcare system in Taiwan since 1949 and 
explores why and how the NHI could be established successfully in 1995. Based on the 
analysis, this study explores the financial problems associated with the maintenance of 
WKH1+,¶V,WDOVRLGHQWLILHVZKDWWKHSROLWLFDOGLIILFXOWLHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHVHILQDQFLDO
reforms are. Based on these considerations, Chapter 1 outlines the purpose of this study. 
Chapter 2 develops an analytical framework which gives a better sense of how 
policy is made and implemented in the context of fragmented authorities in a modern 
society. To support this effort, this chapter reviews relevant literature clarifying decision 
making LQWKHQDWLRQņLQFOXGLQJ0DU[LVPSOXUDOLVPHOLWLVPDQGFRUSRUDWLVP$OVR
WKLVFKDSWHULQWURGXFHVWKHDXWKRU¶VRZQWKHRUHWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKHFHQWUDOHPSLULFDO
issues addressed in literature. Here the NHI policy process is looked at as a policy 
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network which directs attention to the policy actors, both public and private sectors, and 
their relations with each another as the key features in national policy making and 
implementation processes. In addition, this chapter discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of policy network studies, justifies the use of SNA, and points out that a 
policy network study can go well beyond being just a metaphor.   
Chapter 3 focuses on the institutional environment underpinning the policy 
processes in Taiwan under the NHI Act and the constitution. The chapter presents a 
detailed description of the decisions on 2G-NHI proposals, and explains the three policy 
events that form the focus of this thesis.  
Chapter 4 describes a research design identifying the core policy actors in the NHI 
policy domain during the period of the DPP government between 2000 and 2008. Each 
important sector or organisation is specified and interviewed for 40-120 minutes about 
KLVKHURUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VLQWHUHVWVDQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQVLQWKHWKUHHUHSUHVHQtative policy 
events associated with the issue of NHI financial sustainability. The three policy events 
are the 2G-NHI financing scheme, the global budget payment system and the double 
raise scheme. This chapter also discusses several other methodological issues, e.g. other 
relevant data collection methods, data analysis methods and ethical issues.  
Having described the institutional environment and methodology, Chapter 5 
discusses the global structure level, or the positional perspective, of SNA by examining 
the structure and the role of relationships among policy actors. In this chapter, the 
diverse goals and interests of the policy actors in the NHI policy domain are addressed 
first. Next, the four social networks among the policy actors are merged into a multi-
GLPHQVLRQDOQHWZRUNWRH[DPLQHWKHDFWRUV¶SRVLWLRQVDQGUROHVLQWKHRYHUDOOVRFLDO
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network structure among the policy actors in the NHI policy domain. The global 
structure level of analysis helps examine how positions in the social relationship restrict 
information/resource flow such that it may shape actor participation and effectiveness in 
particular policy events. In addition, the centrality/peripherality and interest 
differentiation is reorganised to understand the characteristics of the policy actors in the 
same position or play the same role.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the analysis of the policy network in the NHI policy domain. 
It focuses on the discussion of influence power at the individual level, or the relational 
perspective, in the policy making process via an analytical index of centrality and 
structural holes, which are related to one another through exchange relations among the 
three social networks (information transmission, resource exchange and action-set 
coalition networks). This chapter also examines how the connected social structure of 
the policy actors impacts their influence in the NHI policy domain. The analysis should 
be helpful in figuring out which social relationship among policy actors is the most 
significant factor clarifying the power distribution in the policy process. 
Chapter 7 examines the relationship between social networks and policy outcomes 
associated with the 2G-NHI financing scheme. Based on previous analytical results, this 
chapter uses more specific materials from a face-to-face structural questionnaire survey 
WRLGHQWLI\SROLF\DFWRUV¶SROLF\SUHIHUHQFHVRQWKHSURPRWLRQRIWKH*-NHI financing 
scheme. In addition, this chapter examines why the promotion of the 2G-NHI financing 
scheme could not be adopted so far. The thrust of this chapter is on illustrating the 
findings and discussing the relationship between social networks and policy outcomes 
by applying the indexes of in-degree centrality and structural holes.  
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Finally, Chapter 8 presents the conclusions. This final chapter reviews the findings 
and insights gleaned along with their relevance and utility. The findings and policy 
recommendations are summarised with particular reference to the politics of financial 
sustainability in the NHI policy domain. In addition, this chapter discusses how policy 
network research might be reshaped and raises certain issues that need to be addressed 
so that the analysis can catch up to and ultimately inform world practice. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review* 
Healthcare maintenance is at the centre of political discussion and social conflict in 
almost all affluent democracies. There is a broad consensus that, everywhere, the notion 
of welfare is in trouble (Pierson, 2001, 2006). Progress in untangling the factors that 
might be generating the difficulty has been limited. This is particularly true with regard 
to processes through which the factors exert pressures on national welfare state, or 
determining their relative significance (Pierson, 2001). To address this problem, some 
have focused on broad claims to link the relationship between welfare reform and 
structural factors including globalisation, economic changes, demographic challenges 
(Coleman, 2006; Hay, 2006; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Iversen, 2001; Jackson, 2006; 
Rhodes, 2001; Schulz, 2006; Schwartz, 2001). Others have examined political 
challenges of retrenchment (Pierson, 1994, 2001, 2006). However, all these attempts 
have been unable to offer reasonably complete insights into how reform processes, or 
evidence that only support an assessment of modest impact. This research seeks to shift 
attention on the level of policy domain in order to arrive at a more comprehensive 
understanding of why previous reforms have been successful or otherwise and how 
reforms work. 
This chapter reviews relevant previous works and come up with a framework 
suitable for the study of policy-making and implementation processes associated. A 
specific issue discussed concerns KRZWRDFFXUDWHO\PHDVXUH³WKHSDWKRISRZHU´RU
                                                 
*
 3DUWRIWKHFRQWHQWVRIWKLVFKDSWHUDSSHDUHGLQWKHDXWKRUµVDUWLFOH - (2010). A Theoretical Debate and 
Strategy to Link Structure and Agency in Policy Process Studies: A Network Perspective. Journal of 
Politics and Law (peer reviewed), 3(2), 101-109.  
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more specifically³WKHSDWKRILQIOXHQFH´LQa policy process. Numerous significant 
ZRUNVKDYHEHHQSXEOLVKHGWRLOOXVWUDWHWKHWKHPHVVXFKDV³ZKRJRYHUQV´(Dahl, 1961), 
³ZKRJHWVZKDWZKHQDQGKRZ´/DVVZHOODQG³SROLWLFDOIHDVLELOLW\RISROLF\
IRUPDWLRQ´*DOVWRQ7KHVHZRUNVDWWHPSWed to demonstrate the nature of policy 
formation and examined how interdependent relationships of power can impact policy 
outcomes from their own perspectives: methodological structuralism or individualism. 
To be persuasive, however, accounts of institutional change or policy formation should 
combine microscopic and macroscopic analyses. Stakeholders in a policy domain, on 
the one hand, are embedded in the specific institutional and political environments that 
constrain their abilities and opportunities to advocate their interests; on the other hand, 
these stakeholders have their strategies and tricks to change the rules of the game and 
pursue their own policy interests. The interests and interactions of the political actors, 
the institutional rules of game, the distribution of political resources and power 
construct of their choices should be considered in a research framework. 
I divide my discussion into six sections. First, major theories and definitions of 
policy process will be discussed briefly. The second consists of an analytical 
examination of shifting conceptions of power. The third dwells on traditional policy 
process theories, focusing in particular, on the role of state, power distribution and 
exercise. It also explains the reasons why the policy network perspective is chosen in 
our work. The fourth section is devoted to a comprehensive discussion of the theory of 
policy networks. The fifth examines other relevant supplemental theories with a view to 
expanding the explanatory powers of policy network studies and why SNA is a useful 
research tool in the study of complicated policy networks. The final section discusses 
the use of social network as a way of linking structure with agency in policy studies. 
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2-1. Policy Process Theories 
Issues plague a political system; information feeds into decision-making; policies 
emerge and are implemented and evaluated. How can such fragmentary events be 
linked? Is there an inherent and consistent logic associated with the way that policy is 
made in a political system? To engage oneself with this problem is to conceptualise the 
policy process. Applying this presupposition to the field of policy process studies, 
Sabatier (2007) distinguishes between the notions of conceptual framework, theory and 
model, which operate on a continuum from broadly applicable to any situation, to 
(preferably mathematical) modelling for highly specific situations. A ³JRRG´ theory of 
the political process should be able to explain the goals, perceptions, actions and events 
among potentially hundreds of stakeholders, and lead to specific policy outcomes.  
The traditional perspective of the policy process is that of the ³VWDJHVKHXULVWLF´
according to which, a policy process follows certain steps that are clearly 
distinguishable from problem definition through a different specification, resource 
allocation and implementation method (Sabatier, 2007: 6). Specifically, a policy process 
in the NHI domain can be defined as a set of activities related to policy formation, 
implementation and outcomes of previously discussed policy events. Policy outcomes 
achieved by a particular policy is administratively assessed in terms of efficient and 
effective use of inputs to generate outputs which serve to achieve a desired outcome. 
The approach used in this research borrows from &DVWOHV¶-10) definition, where 
the term policy outcome is ³a shorthand way of referring to both the outputs of 
government programme and the real outcomes of policies in the sense of what actually 
happens to people´. Thus, policy outcomes can be seen as consequences intended or 
unintended resulting from political action or inaction (Jenkins, 1997: 31). For instance, 
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the policy outcome from the promotion of the 2G-NHI financing scheme was a failure 
despite the involvement and intervention by the policy stakeholders; the actual outcome 
was the 1.5G-NHI financing scheme. As for the promotion and implementation of the 
GBP system, the policy outcome is usually stated in terms of the effectiveness and 
impact of cost containment in the NHI by running the GBP system.  
Although WKH³VWDJHVKHXULVWLF´ conceptual framework seems to have served a 
purpose since Lasswell (Lasswell, 1990) originally proposed it (De Leeuw, 1989; De 
Leeuw and Polman, 1995), it has since drawn devastating criticism that the framework 
had failed to take into account the dynamics of multiple, interacting, iterative and 
incremental cycles of action at many different levels of mutual and reciprocal actions at 
the same time (deLeon, 2007). Sabatier (2007: 8) established the following parameters 
to assess whether a theoretical framework is appropriate to a policy process:  
1. It must do a reasonably good job of meeting the criteria of a scientific theory, i.e., 
its concepts and propositions must be relatively clear and internally consistent; it 
must identify clear causal drivers; it must give rise to falsifiable hypotheses; and it 
must be fairly broad in scope, i.e., it should be applicable to most of the policy 
processes in a variety of political systems.  
2. It must be the subject of a fair amount of recent conceptual development and/or 
empirical testing. A number of currently active policy scholars must view it as a 
viable way of understanding the policy process;  
3. It must be a positive theory seeking to explain much of the policy process. The 
theoretical framework may also contain some explicitly normative elements, but 
these are not required.  
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4. It must address the broad sets of factors that political scientists usually looking at 
different aspects of public policymaking have traditionally deemed important: 
conflicting values and interests, information flows, institutional arrangements and 
variation in the socioeconomic environment.  
Four such frameworks pertinent to healthcare policy process have been identified 
by Sabatier as meeting these parameters: the event-driven multiple streams theory 
empirically developed by Kingdon (Kingdon, 2003), the punctuated equilibrium 
framework by Baumgartner and Jones (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) in which long 
periods of policy stability are alternated by general shifts in policy perspectives and 
ambitions, the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993) that emphasizes the importance of coalition formation of camps of 
proponents and opponents to new policy directions, and the policy domain/network 
approach developed from different perspectives on network governance (Laumann and 
Knoke, 1987, 1989; Knoke, Pappi, Broadment and Tsujinaka, 1996). A policy domain 
framework is a rather complex set of concepts for guiding network analysis. It is based 
on the argument that, within a given policy domain/subsystem, organisations with an 
interest in a given policy area develop patterns of resource exchange and seek to 
influence policy events. 
/HZLQVDLGWKDW³1RWKLQJLVTXLWHDVSUDFWLFDODVDJRRGWKHRU\´:H
certainly believe that good theories for healthcare policy processes can be very 
practical. Following the principles of the theory-based evaluation framework developed 
by Birckmayer and Weiss (2000), a rigorous application of theory to the analysis of 
development and outcomes of policy processes would not just highlight whether the 
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policy has achieved its intended objectives, but also how this has happened. A good 
theory is especially important for the further refinement of evidence-based policy 
research: it would identify processes, issues, events and actors that have facilitated or 
compromised the effectiveness of policy. Or, again in the words of Lewin³If you try to 
understand something, try to change it´ (Lewin, 1945). 
 
2-2. Nature of Power in Policy Process 
Questions of policy formation are often translated into the language of power, an 
assertion theorists have debated for centuries. Undoubtedly, a policy process is a 
complex political game and is inhabited by some exchange of power. However, how to 
measure who has power to manipulate a policy outcome is always a puzzle in policy 
process studies. Furthermore, for researchers of politics, sociology and public 
administration or related disciplines, any discussion of a policy process needs to be 
grounded in an extensive consideration of the nature of power in the policy domain, 
especially with regard to the roles of state and other interest groups (Hill, 2009; 
Wildavsky, 1979). Any consideration of how the process works involves propositions 
about who dominates (Hill, 2009). The study of a policy process is essentially the study 
of the exercise of power in the formation and implementation of the process (Forester, 
1989). Therefore, it cannot disregard underlying questions about the sources and nature 
of that power.  
A policy process does not run in a vacuum, so it is difficult to identify what power 
is and how it may be exercised among the SROLF\VWDNHKROGHUV/XNHV¶V(1974) 
LQIOXHQWLDOERRN³3RZHU$5DGLFDO9LHZ´, which explains the nature of power in a 
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policy process using three-dimensional model (see Table 2-1), is the most influential 
work in understanding the nature of political power. The first dimension, the base for 
other dimensions of power, is summarised by the phrases ³WKHGHFLVLRQDSSURDFK´RU
³SOXUDOLVWDSSURDFKRIGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJ´+DPDQG+LOO-63). According to 
Dahl (1957: 203), the first face of power may be characterised as follows: ³$KDVSRZHU
over B to the extent that he can get B to do somethLQJWKDW%ZRXOGQRWRWKHUZLVHGR´
This draws attention to the fact that power involves a relationship between multiple 
political actors (Hill, 2009: 30) and who has more right to speak and advocate his 
interest in policy process. Moreover, classical pluralists based RQWKHLGHDRI³GHFLVLRQ
SRZHU´have carried RXWDVHULHVRIUHVHDUFKHVLQRUGHUWRXQGHUVWDQGLQGLYLGXDOV¶
influence on policy results. Thus, the decision approach of power treats policy making 
process a political game to understand the distribution of different interests and 
resources in a real political scenario.  
Table 2-1. Three Dimension of Power in a Policy Process 
Theorist Conception of Power Approach 
Dahl (1961) A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to 
do something that B would not otherwise do. 
The decision approach 
Bachrach and 
Baratz 
(1963) 
Of course power is exercised when A participates in 
the making of decisions that affect B. Power is also 
exercised when A devotes his/her energies to creating 
or reinforcing social and political values and 
institutional practices that limit the scope of the 
political process for public consideration only those 
issues that are comparatively innocuous to A. 
The non-decision 
approach 
Lukes (1974) A may exercise power over B by getting him/her to do 
what he does not want to do, but he also exercises 
power by influencing, shaping or determining his/her 
wants. 
The ideological level 
of power 
Source: Hudson and Lowe, 2009: Ch. 6 
The second dimension deals with the concept that many interests are in reality 
excluded from the decision-PDNLQJSURFHVVE\WKHSRZHURI³QRQ-GHFLVLRQ´$OWKRXJKLW
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is a common situation that a policy process can have the DXUDRI³WKHGHFLVLRQ
DSSURDFK´VRPHWLPHVSRZHUEHFRPHVDQLQVWUXPHQWRISROLWLFDODFWRUVWRLQKLELWRWKHU
VWDNHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVWVLQRUGHUWRPDLQWDLQWKHLUown vested interest and legitimacy. 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) emphasises WKHLGHDRI³QRQ-dHFLVLRQPDNLQJ´WRLOOXVWUDWH
the manipulation of agenda-setting power which policy actors attempt to keep these 
issues under wraps rather than respond to them. Thus, the second face of power in a 
policy process is an intention to limit the policy agenda withLQD³VDIH´VFRSHRIYHVWHG
interest groups.  
)LQDOO\WKHWKLUGGLPHQVLRQRISRZHULQSROLF\SURFHVVFRQVLGHUVDUDQJHRI³GHHS
WKHRULHV´ZKLFKJREH\RQGWKHGHFLVLRQDQGQRQ-decision approaches while coping with 
the schools of social science which consider how people are conditioned by the very 
language they speak to obey political elites (Hudson and Lowe, 2009: 114). In other 
words, the third face of power shows the ideological level of power. Lukes (1974) 
DUJXHVWKDWSRZHUH[LVWVDQGLVH[HUFLVHG³KLGGHQO\´DQGSHRSOHPD\EHVXEMHFWWR
power without being aware of this. As Italian Marxist Gramsci points out, the ruling 
class can utilise every possibility to construct a position of total control of one social 
class over another (cited by Dunleavy and O¶/HDU\%DVHGRQPRUHVRFLR-
economic resource and political influence, it is possible for ruling class to shape the 
SHRSOH¶VLQWHQWLRQDQGFUHDWHDIDOVHFRQVHQVXVRISROLF\IRUPDWLRQ  
With regard to the methodological perspectives involved in empirical studies of 
power, it is possible to identify three dominant research traditions in the field of political 
sociology: reputational, structural and decision-making approaches (Scott, 2001). As 
can be seen in Table 2-2, the reputational approach concerns those reputed to be 
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SRZHUIXOLQDSROLF\GRPDLQ,Q+XQWHU¶VZRUNDERXWFRPPXQLW\SRZHUVWUXFWXUHin 
Atlanta city, he attempted to identify powerful individuals in four areas of power: 
business, government, civic affairs, and society leaders and leaders of wealth (Hunter, 
1953). Hunter created a list of informants in four policy domains and let these 
informants identify who the most important person was in each public and social 
association. He followed this method to reduce the list of influential stakeholders to the 
top ten elites (those getting the most votes for inclusion in the list)+XQWHU¶VWKHVLV
claims that the evidence of who owns power can be ascertained via general opinion in a 
community. However, critics argue that, at best, the evidence here is composed of little 
more than a blurred impression or image of power (Scott, 2001: 86).  
Table 2-2. Research Traditions and Methods of Power Study  
Preferred Research Methods 
Research Tradition Paradigmatic 
study 
Data collection Data Analysis Object of 
analysis 
Reputational 
approach 
Hunter (1953) Experts¶ 
judgment, 
interviews 
Voting, ranking and 
rating reputational 
scores  
Images of 
power 
Structural approach Mills (1965) Documents  The frequency 
distribution, SNA 
Positions of 
power in a 
structure 
Decision-making 
approach  
Dahl (1961) Observation, 
interviews 
Policy outcomes Agencies of 
power 
Source: Scott, 2001: 83 
 In a similar vein, Dahl (1961) used a parallel method to measure power in a 
decision-making process; the difference is that he focused more on the study of the 
activities of the elites involved in the policy-making process rather than on the members 
of the associations. He H[DPLQHGDQXPEHURI³LVVXHDUHDV´VXFKDV urban regeneration, 
local schooling and nominations to political offices. Within each, he looked at specific 
decisions such as the fRUPDWLRQRID&LWL]HQ¶V$FWLRQCommission, changes to education 
budget, nominations for election as the mayor and proposals for a new city charter. Dahl 
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and his researchers used interviews, observations and documents to identify who could 
involve in policy process, who could speak during discussions, who voted for each 
proposal when a financial decision was arrived at. This approach illustrates that power 
exists in WKHDFWRUV¶SRVLWLRQVRIWKHHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV$Vwith +XQWHU¶V
ZRUN'DKO¶VZRUNDOVRMXVWGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUSRZHUDQGaddressed the gap 
between the position holders and the influence on policy process. However, as already 
mentioned, a problem associated with 'DKO¶VDSSURDFKLVthat it is difficult for 
researchers to access the participants who actually involve in the decision-making 
processes and most policy outcomes LVDUHVXOWRI³QRQ-GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ´. Moreover, the 
other question related to 'DKO¶Videas is that any exercise of power is not only a 
unidirectional path but also involves complex mutual bargaining and independent 
relationships among multiple actors. 
0D[:HEHU¶V7GHILQLWLRQRISRZHUDV³WKH probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
UHVLVWDQFHUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHEDVLVRQZKLFKWKLVSUREDELOLW\UHVWV´represents an 
interactive and reciprocal stance on the exercise of power. This definition provides the 
exercise of power in a more structural viewpoint than others. Also, the structural 
approach (see Table 2-2) concerns the characteristics of strategic positions of 
institutional environment among the stakeholders in a policy domain. Also, the 
approach is concerned more with ideas of small groups and cliques in the policy 
network. Mills (1956) explored the same LVVXHZLWKWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI³7KH3RZHU
(OLWHV´where he names, identifies positions, and reveals what he sees as a system of 
interlocking institutions. It is important for these policy actors to occupy important 
strategic positions within the relevant policy networks and institutional environments. 
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These can be important political resources while exchanging and bargaining with others 
engaged in the policy process. Without taking up such positions, individuals enjoy little 
significant power. The structural approach also provides a more institutional perspective 
than other approaches to measuring the exercise structure of power in policy domains. 
To sum up, the nature of power in a policy process is an exercise in cause and 
effect that could be observed, measured and predicted in the language of the political 
science of the 1950s (Parsons, 1999: 284). The most relevant understanding of power in 
a policy process is as power over others. Besides the discussion of power after 1950, 
some philosophers such as Dewey, Foucault and Habermas had also discussed, debated, 
theorised and interpreted the question of ³ZKDWLVSRZHU"´6XFKSKLORVRSKLFDOZRUNV
can be traced back to Hobbes, Locke, and Hume (Parsons, 1999). However, as 
mentioned before, policy processes take place in a power-exchange scenario rather than 
a coercion scenario in a democratic society. In reality, despite the fact that society 
involves power-based transactions among asymmetrical agents, policy stakeholders in a 
policy domain have their own interests and strategies to pursue their own interests. By 
collecting and mobilising political resources from other participants, participants can 
bargain for a consensus under the relationship of reciprocal power-exchange or achieve 
their desired policy output and outcome. It makes sense to claim that the nature of 
power in a SROLF\SURFHVVLV³$KDVPRUHSRZHURYHU%WKDQ%KDVRYHU$´ (Dahl, 
1961). These definitions of power have been applied by a large number of policy 
theorists to illustrate the distribution of power in a policy process. In the process, many 
policy process approaches underpinning the base of power have been created.  
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2-3. Traditional State Policy Process Approaches 
The basic approach adopted in this research departs in important ways from other 
research approaches and empirical works to state and elite policy process. The use of 
power in policy process is subtle and complex. Many researchers stand on their own 
points in order to understand how power exercise in policy process under a complicated 
political environment (Hill, 2009: Ch. 2). We have already alluded to four related 
theorists so as to explain or interpret the relationship between power and policy actors 
and the challenges associated with these approaches.  
The first relevant approach is Marxist theory. Marxist approaches to power and the 
exercise of power in state policy process are distinctive in focusing on their relations to 
economics, politics and ideologies (Jessop, 2001: 7). According to classical Marxist 
theory, the social structure of a capitalist society is essentially a class structure and the 
policy outcome of a state just reflects and maintains the interests of the capitalist class 
(the bourgeoisie; the owners of the means of production) (Hill, 2009: 40). Furthermore, 
Marxists have always claimed that state policy is determined by the class interests of 
capitalists and their agents. The policy-making process can be depicted as reflecting the 
outcome of struggles between capitalist and working classes or partially determined by 
social and political forces operating with state structure itself (Laumann and Knoke, 
1987: 6). With regard to the methodological perspective, Marxist theory¶V explanation 
that the state sees ³HFRQRPLFLPSHUDWLYHV´DVconstituting a crucial factor influencing 
the state policy process - it claims, roughly, that the nature of economic structure is an 
essential foundational feature of a state including its legal and political structure. 
Marxist theory adopts a structural perspective and sees the structure as a constraint on 
causal mechanisms whereby the role of state in policy domain can be explained by the 
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UHTXLUHPHQWVDQGUDWLRQDOLW\RIWKHHFRQRPLFV\VWHP)RULQVWDQFH2¶&RQQRU
classifies state intervention and its expenditure servicing the interest of monopoly 
capital, and that the state is run by a class-conscious political directorate acting on 
behalf of the class interests of monopoly capital.  
Marxists have conducted empirical works from the perspectives mentioned above 
with a view to explain policy outputs. Most of them addressed only at the macro level 
associated with some historical case studies (Domhoff, 1983; Skocpol, 1979). These 
works are significant because they clarify the historical and structural forces shaping the 
prevailing patterns of institutional change and policy outputs with respect to the 
dominant economic institutions of the time. However, none of these analyses tracked 
state policy-making at the level of policy stakeholders laying claims to governmental 
authority on behalf of their own interests. Marxist theory tends to take a stance which 
treats state action as to a considerable extant constrained and determined by economic 
institutions (Hill, 2009: 43). However, the policy process in modern society is 
complicated and of varied domain and the role of the state does not just simply serve the 
interests of the capitalist class. It also means that the simple proposition of policy 
outcome cannot echo all the phenomenon impinging on the policy process. This 
research does not attempt to elucidate the class basis of policy process. Rather, it 
attempts to throw light on the complex set of interacting official and unofficial 
stakeholders in order to peek into the black box of the policy process. 
The second traditional state policy approach related to this research is pluralism or 
the so-called pluralist theory. Pluralist accounts are liberal or radical alternatives to 
Marxism (Bellamy, 2001: 17). Most such accounts have been concerned with the 
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origins, prevalence, policy interests, resource endowments, and strategies of those 
associations and corporate actors as they seek to influence federal policy decisions in 
the U.S. (Laumann and Knoke, 1987: 7). The policy process in national domain is seen 
as a wide and complex interaction between interests, actors and institutions rather than 
on the institutions themselves. The pluralist school of thought in political science 
includes a theorem in which policies are developed in negotiation between public 
agencies and pressure groups organised into policy communities. The role of state has to 
be understood in the negotiation process among multiple stakeholders in policy 
domains. With regard to empirical work, Dahl (1958) argues that power in many 
Western industrialised countries is distributed widely among different groups and this 
DVVXPSWLRQKDVEHHQYHULILHGLQ'DKO¶VVLJQLILFDQWZRUN, New Heaven (Dahl, 1961). It 
also means that no group is without power to influence decision making; accordingly, 
no group is dominant. To extend and modify this point, Dahl and his followers explain 
more about their standpoint which agrees with the fact that all groups and interests do 
not have the same degree of influence in a policy domain; no one is completely 
powerless or totally dominant.  
Pluralists have been criticized for having an overly optimistic view of the diverse 
distribution of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974). Although political 
power is fragmented and dispersed, the sources of power are unequal, though widely 
distributed among individuals and groups within society (Hill, 2009: 29). Pluralists 
overestimate the ability of interest groups outside traditional elite spheres to actually 
influence political processes and outcomes. In fact, the perfect environment of equal 
power distribution has little prospect of existing in a real political process. Most policy 
outcomes are manipulated by a few powerful policy actors (Hill, 2009: 38-39). 
 57 
 
Moreover, the pluralist explanation ignores not only the role of the state in the policy 
process but also the power of the institutions which let the state have the authority to 
regulate the behaviours of policy stakeholders. In spite of the fact that pluralist theory 
reflects some social and political phenomena within a democratic country such as the 
U.S., the emphasis on interest and group interaction just provides a limited research tool 
for examining policy processes in a modern society. It also provides an ambiguous, 
causal explanation of policy outcomes and the actions of interest groups. This research 
is designed in a similar manner so as to develop a more reasonable and workable 
framework to policy stakeholder behaviour. The structure of policy network will be 
stressed by using a more systematic research tool capable of identifying coalition-
formation, influence-mobilisation and bargaining-negotiation which ultimately create 
state policies.  
The third traditional state policy approach is an elitist approach arising from 
similar dissatisfactions with liberal democracies according to the pluralist theory. 
Comparing to pluralist theory, the elite perspective assumes that the power is based on 
the unequal distribution of resources and general public has little influence on policy 
outcome. In a classical elitist perspective, the political elites maintain and exercise their 
power in the policy process by holding a crucially formal position through revolutionary 
overthrow, military conquest, control of resources, or the command of economic 
resources (Hill, 2009: 37). But with regard to the modern concept of political elites, the 
meaning of political elite is not only limited to the scopes of the actors holding formal 
political positions, but also hold a position in large-scale organisations in many areas of 
life. As has been mentioned above, Mills (1956) draws attention to institutional position 
as a source of power, and concludes that the elites occupying key positions in the 
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government, business corporations and military assume dominant roles in policy 
processes arsing in American political s\VWHP0LOOV¶WDNHVthe individual as the unit of 
analysis and suggests that the exercise of power is revealed in the overlap and 
connection between the leaders of these organisations (Laumann and Knoke, 1987: 6). 
Thus, compared to Marxist and Pluralist theories, the elitist approach provides one more 
alternative to identify who has power and how power is exercised in a policy domain 
via an analysis of the interactions among political elites occupying key positions in 
important organisations. 
In spite of the fact that elitist theory resolves the analytical problem of pluralist 
theory, it must be noted that it creates yet another bias in the exercise of power in the 
context a policy process. First, according to Hill, there are difficulties in specifying the 
mechanisms by which power is seized and the techniques used to hold on it (Hill, 2009: 
38). Second, most researches examining the elitist theory focus just on an analysis of 
powerful individuals in important organisations while ignoring the fact that the nature of 
power exercise is also revealed in inter-organisational exchanges and the influence of 
interest groups should be one of important factors determining policy outcomes 
(Laumann and Knoke, 1987: 7). Third, the distinction between elites and masses is 
oversimplified. In order to cope with these criticisms, some researchers have made 
efforts to reconcile elitism and pluralist democracy to consider at once the influence of 
both individual and organisational levels in policy domains. This research adopts a more 
comprehensive, elitist stance while mapping the structures of policy networks and takes 
into account both individual and organisational actors involved in policy processes via 
the research tool of SNA.    
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Finally, the fourth traditional state policy approach of relevance to this research is 
corporatist theory or the so-called corporatism. Like other traditional approaches, 
corporatist theory is seen as a system of interest representation. Schmitter stressed 
³LQWHUPHGLDWLRQ´WKDWJURXSVSOD\LQVRFLHWDOFRUSRUDWLVWV\VWHPLQZKLFKWKHFRQVWLWXent 
units are organised into ³a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories´(Schmitter, 1974: 93, 
1979). The second important definition focuses on the particular process through which 
public policy was formed. Corporatism is more than a peculiar pattern of articulation of 
interests. Rather, it is an institutionalised pattern of policy formation in which large-
interest organisations cooperate with each other and with public authorities not only in 
the articulation (or even ³LQWHUPHGLDWLRQ´) of interests, but in the ³authoritative 
DOORFDWLRQRIYDOXHV´DQGLQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIVXFKSROLFLHVLehmbruch, 1979: 
150). In the context of a modern democratic society, corporatism originated in the decay 
of pluralism in Western European and North American political systems and shows a 
governance regime between the public sectors and labour associations in democratic 
countries (Hill, 2009: 64). Corporatism refers to a set of institutional arrangements 
related to policy making and economic governance. It involves a model of political 
decision making characterised by a negotiated approach to key economic strategies by 
the major economic agents representing labour and capital (Baccaro, 2003). For 
instance, the healthcare funding system is operated by a committee in which the 
employees and employers are involved to govern the fund together; corporations 
cooperate with the government to maintain healthcare. Thus, corporatist mechanism has 
been seen as a kind of effective participation of labour organisations in policy 
formulation and implementation and regulation of economic activity in Europe. But in 
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the United States, most scholars agree that the political ethos there lacks corporatist 
attributes (Wilson, 1982). 
To sum up, the traditional approaches examined above are all relevant to the 
discussion of policy stakeholders and the role of state in policy domains. These 
approaches are either structural or individual perspectives and stand on certain biases 
while explaining the nature of the policy process in a modern society. In order not to 
rely exclusively on a pluralistic, individualistic or Marxist class structuralism approach, 
this research sees policies as resulting from conflicts and contradictions among multiple 
policy stakeholders embedded in the institutional and political environments. This helps 
reflect the prevailing class interests while clarifying the limited bargaining-negotiation 
system. Moreover, the role of state in policy process is an autonomous social formation 
whose strategies emerge from the basic organisational imperatives of coping with 
environment uncertainties, resource scarcities, and socio-legal constraints. Policy 
processes in a modern society involve complicated political scenarios. This also means 
that a more suitable and flexible perspective, policy network approach, is needed while 
understanding the nature of power-exchange and bargaining-negotiation relationship 
between official and unofficial stakeholders in policy domains. 
 
2-4. Network Perspective in Policy Process and Governance 
To understand the network perspective underlying the patterns of policy processes 
and governance, it is essential to grasp the basics of its historical development and 
context, main concept, critique and relevant empirical works. Bovaird and Löffer (2009) 
and Stoker (2004) KDYHREVHUYHGWKDW³IURPKLHUDUchal dominance to decentralised 
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FROODERUDWLYHPDQDJHPHQWZLWKRWKHUDJHQFLHV´LVSHUKDSVWKHPRVWDSSURSULDWH
description of the institutional transformation of the environment of policy process since 
1980s.  
2-4-1. Governance under a Fragmented State 
The role of government in advanced countries has experienced major changes over 
the past 30 years. 7KLVLVHVSHFLDOO\GXHWRWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VILVFDOFULVHVDQGRWKHUIODZV
of inefficiency and low entrepreneurship motives in the public sector (Larbi, 1999). 
More public services, more requests for civil participation, and more daily necessities 
originally belonging to the government are now relying on the private sector or some 
third party sector to fulfil the needs of the citizens. Moreover, numerous international 
non-governmental organizations, such as the World Bank and the OECD, have 
promoted the ideas of decentralisation and network governance (both in developed or 
developing countries) to render public processes more efficient and effective and to 
improve social service provision. They also bring together citizens and their authorities, 
to increase civil society participation in decision-making, and to reduce expenses 
(OECD, 1999, 2001, 2002).  
Every government apparatus around the world has been challenged while pursuing 
development in the face of the new political and economic realities. For example, 
decisions on the use of biotechnology, the location of an airport or an incinerator, or the 
restricting of public sector services such as healthcare services, can become subjects of 
intensive conflict and debate (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). What was formally a system 
RIJRYHUQPHQWE\:HVWPLQVWHUDQG:KLWHKDOOKDVEHHQWUDQVIRUPHG³LQWRDV\VWHPRI
governance involving complex sets of organisations drawn from the public and private 
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VHFWRUV´5KRGHV7KXVrather than being a top-down decision-making process 
executed by hierarchical organisations, the policy process has become a web of 
multiple-interest conflicts among various stakeholders. As is widely agreed, following 
the preponderance of financial deficits and demands for governmental reform, the 
Thatcher government in the UK and the Reagan government in the U.S. were two of the 
pioneers around the world daring to launch a series of new-right policies to break the 
old model of governance while restraining the powers of government in favour of those 
of the market. One of the key themes is a new public management approach which has 
led to a more fragmental authority of the governance mechanism emphasising 
competitive tendering. ,QSUDFWLFHWKHJXLGHOLQHLVWKDW³JRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVVKRXOGEH
acquired by competition unless there are convincing reasons to the contrary´+0
Treasury, 1998). Through this policy, it is argued, government can avoid accusations of 
favouritism and fraud, and the openness of the system will encourage more suppliers to 
participate, thus increasing competition, which will in turn reduce prices, improve 
quality and lead to greater innovation among suppliers. As a result, governments are 
getting increasingly dependent upon the knowledge, authority and resources of other 
parties (suppliers) - inside and outside government - for the achievement of their policy 
goals (Hanf and Scharpf, 1978; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Marin and Mayntz, 1991; 
Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1997).  
The UK is a pioneer not just in facilitating the changes in governance mechanisms 
as a part of a world-wide reform trend, but the trend has also created a range of new 
concepts and theories aiming to solve a variety of new governance problems emerging 
since the 1980s. In the UK, the change from traditional government to a more complex 
and diverse QHWZRUNRIDJHQFLHVLQYROYHGLQ³new JRYHUQDQFH´LVPRUHWKDQDWKHRU\
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(Goss, 2001; John, 2001; Stoker, 2004; Wilson and Game, 2006). By 1997, the 
LQFRPLQJ/DERXUJRYHUQPHQWLQWHJUDWHGWKH&RQVHUYDWLYH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSROLFy and the 
idea of new governance which was concerned more about the inter-agency working or 
partnerships at both national and local levels (John, 2001; Goss, 2001; Skelcher, 2004). 
The cross-boundary governance regime in vogue relies on horizontal networks which 
replace hierarchies in policy-making and service provision (Sullivan and Skelcher, 
2002). Based on these developments, government, private enterprises and non-profit 
organisations in the UK have built a coalition or so-FDOOHG³SXEOLF-SULYDWHSDUWQHUVKLSV´
DQG³FURVV-ERXQGDU\ZRUN´in terms of the currently popular theory of governance3. 
Furthermore, problems cannot be solved by organisations on their own. The 
phenomenon of fragmental policy making and implementation has resulted in certain 
challenges related to coordination and accountability. In response, many researchers 
have made efforts to create new theories such as the policy network analysis (Kickert, 
Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997a, b; Marsh, 1998; Rhodes, 1997), hollowing-out state 
(Rhodes, 1994) and quasi (Hudson and Lowe, 2009) or joined-up government 
(Bogdanor, 2005).  
While numerous attempts have been made in recent years to show the positive 
attributes of the multiple governance mechanisms underlying the formation or 
implementation of the policy process (Goss, 2001; Stoker, 2004; Sullivan and Skelcher, 
2002; Wilson and Game, 2006), more and more attentions have been given to their 
negative impacts. Goss (2001: 23) says that the emergence of relationships of complex 
                                                 
3
 $FWXDOO\WKHFRQFHSW³SXEOLFSULYDWHSDUWQHUVKLSV´ZDVRULJLQDOO\URRWHGLQSXEOLFPDQDJHPHQWWKHRU\
which indicates that private sectors are more effective and efficient than public sectors in public services. 
The new governance theory follows the concept and adjusts the meaning of public private partnerships. 
This theory emphasises more on the collaborative relationship than competition among stakeholders in 
policy domains and service delivery network.  
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governance makes it clearer that we are in an era of multi-legitimacies which will bring 
in new governing problems. Sorenson and Torfing (2004: 22) point out that the 
transformation tendency of decentralisation in policy process and service provision will 
face the challenge of imbalanced responsibilities and power among the stakeholders. It 
will undermine political competition and increase problems relating to how actors can 
be regulated through processes of network governance. How such a coalition among 
public, private sectors and citizens influences the structure of governance, besides 
VROYLQJWKHSUREOHPVRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VIDLOXUHDQGWKHHQWHUSULVH¶VH[WHUQDOLWLHV
needs further analysis.  
Stoker (1998: 26) points out that the new governance theory helps to provide a 
map or guide to the world of the fragmented state. However, the world seems to be 
more complex than suggested. Besides producing advantages, such as higher efficiency 
and higher potency, the role change among service deliverers has also brought problems 
never faced before under past bureaucratic systems of service delivery. Under the 
pressure to improve WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V performance, the public agencies, especially the 
elected politicians, are keen to demonstrate their partnership credentials without the 
partnership failure. This also means that problem-solving takes place in complex games 
and networks in which stakeholders behave strategically, guided by diverging or, even, 
conflicting perceptions and rules (Kickert, Koppenjan and Klijn, 1997a; Koppenjan and 
Klijn, 2004).  
To sum up, within the modern government, policy-making is becoming 
increasingly pluralistic as the policy process fragments and an increasing number of 
groups are admitted into the policy arena (Heclo, 1978). Policy-making is the result of 
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interactions between many actors. Since all these actors have their own goals and 
strategies, policy-making can best be conceptualised as a complex process that cannot 
be controlled by one single actor. The presence of interconnectional linkages represents 
DGHILQLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIVHUYLFHGHOLYHU\DQGSROLF\SURFHVV7KHWHUP³QHWZRUN´LV
used to describe the several interdependent actors involved in delivering services and 
policy processes (Rhodes, 2007: 6). These networks are made up of policy stakeholders 
who need to exchange resources (for example, money, information, expertise) to 
achieve their objectives. They seek to maximise their influence over policy outcomes, 
and avoid becoming dependent on other policy actors in policy process. Based on these 
observations, governance appears to be entangled with the natures of networks and the 
capacity of network management on the part of the government. New theoretical works 
such as policy network analysis are now available to redress the insufficiencies of 
traditional state policy approaches and clarify the nature of the policy process in a 
modern society.  
2-4-2. Policy Network Analysis: Concepts and Critiques 
Governments today are facing more fragmented governance environments. 
Traditional methods of dealing with problems are no longer enough. It is often found 
that they spawn complex issues related, for instance, to the intellectual design and 
approach them in a manner according to research and science playing the central roles. 
As mentioned earlier, the nature of welfare politics in healthcare sustainability is 
entangled with multiple formal or informal policy stakeholders and interest-exchange 
relationships among them. Without such interactions, nothing would happen and the 
policy process would come to a standstill. However, it must be recognised that decisions 
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by policy makers to exploit the increasingly complex and interdependent environment 
via stakeholders is variable. As a result, the network is a portable concept that can be 
applied to any public arena. The application of policy networks is likely to offer a host 
of insights into how policy is made and implemented different from traditional policy 
process approaches. The technique can be expected to provide a more flexible 
explanation. It is a significant alternative to understanding the complex nature of policy 
process in a modern society. 
A network exists when none of the actors has the power to determine the strategies 
of the other actors (Kickert et al., 1997a). Networks are structures of independence 
characterised by some degree of structural stability as well as formal and informal links. 
Networking commonly refers to people making connections with each other (Alter and 
Hage, 1993) while the network occurs when the links among a number of organisations 
and individuals become formalised (Keast, Mandell, Brown and Woolcock, 2004: 364). 
In a public policy domain, it has become clear in recent times that no public 
organisation has sufficient power or resources to act alone (Kickert et al., 1997a: 6). 
Therefore, some form of networked relationship appears in most public work.  
The concept of networks in the analysis of public policy processes appeared first in 
the mid-1970s and early 1980s (John, 2004: 140; Klijn, 1997: 16). In the past three 
decades, a considerable amount of effort has been put in by political scientists and 
researchers in the field of public administration to understand the structure of 
stakeholders¶ interaction in policy domains and its impact on policy outcomes and 
policy changes in the U.S. (Heclo, 1974, 1978; Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989), 
European countries (Jordan and Schubert, 1992; Kickert et al., 1997a, b; Richardson 
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and Jordan, 1979) and the UK (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Marsh, 1998; Rhodes, 1990). 
These investigations have demonstrated that a range of groups/government relationships 
exist in different policy arenas; these determine whether the policies determined 
succeed or fail (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 8). The concept of network is an 
appropriate metaphor describing the strategic interactions, for instance, between the 
Congress, the bureaucrats, the president, the courts, the people, the media, interest 
groups, and all other possible actors playing important roles in policy domains. In the 
U.S., many researchers used the metaphors like ³iron triangle´, ³whirlpool´ or ³private 
government´ to consider sub-government systems as important political decision-
making mechanisms in the earlier U.S. government (John, 2004: 142). Moreover, 
Heclo¶s (1978) popular work on ³issue network´ provides more fluid and changeable 
form of political relationships in the U.S. government. This work also led to many 
efforts focusing on the issue of the fragmental governance mechanism in the U.S. In 
Britain, network concepts dominated British policy studies for much of the 1980s and 
1990s. Various significant efforts had been made for understanding multiple policy 
domains such as agriculture (Smith, 1991, 1992); water (Richardson, Maloney and 
Rüdig, 1992); subnational government (Gray, 1994); community care (Hunter and 
Wistow, 1987), government-industry relations (Wilks and Wright, 1987) and inter-
governmental relationship (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). In related EU studies, the concept 
of policy network was seen as a new form of governance (Kenis and Schneider, 1991; 
Kooiman, 1993). Leading EU works used the idea of policy network to facilitate co-
ordination and co-governance relationships among multiple agents at cross-national as 
well as domestic levels.  
Policy network have been used to identify patterns of relations between 
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interdependent actors involved in processes of public policy making (Kickert et al., 
1997a: 6). A network arises when there is an exchange of information between groups 
and government and the exchange leads to the recognition that a group has an interest in 
a certain policy area (Smith, 1997: 76). Independence relationship is one of the most 
important characteristic of a policy network and many theoretical approaches such as 
WKH³SRZHU/resource dependence´ approach (Benson, 1975; Rhodes, 1986, 1988) and 
³idea´ approach (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998). The 
former indicates that all actors in a policy domain cannot achieve their own interests and 
goals without others assistance; they need others¶ resources and support, A similar 
situation arises when languages and ideas are shared. It also means that the policy 
problem nowadays is frequently non-hierarchical and has been become more complex 
in democratic countries. Complicated problems require a combination of resources and 
ideas owned by different actors. Interaction games involving policy actors get created 
when actors recognise that they have to depend on others for the realisation of their 
objectives and the mutual dependencies that are not equally divided across all policy 
stakeholders (Smith, 1997: 78-79). In order to achieve goals, resources have to be 
exchanged amongst stakeholders. The resources exchanged can be valuable for 
information transmission, political support such as voting, acquiring other material 
resources like money or manpower, and collaborative action aimed at similar outcome 
preferences (Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989; Knoke et al., 1996; Weishaar, Amos and 
Collin, 2015). If the government wants to achieve a particular policy goal with the 
minimum of conflict, it needs the assistance of groups in the development and 
implementation of policy. It can exchange access to the policy process for collaboration 
and establish a policy network (Smith, 1997: 78). The capability to mobilise resources 
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and consolidate policy coalitions is one of the most important means to manipulate 
policy processes in policy networks.  
As a practical phenomenon, policy networks can be found in almost every policy 
domain at both national and local levels. Policy network theory aims to avoid excessive 
bias inherent in a state- or society-centred. This facilitates an understanding of the 
complexity of the policy making process, which is embedded in the institutional and 
network structure (Kickert et al., 1997a; Marsh, 1998; Rhodes, 1997). One of the most 
significant developments in policy network studies concerns the typologies and 
characteristics of network structure (Marsh, 1998; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). Such 
developments have imputed causal power to networks (John, 2004: 144). Marsh and 
Rhodes distinguished between different types of policy networks. Among these, the 
most well-known is the typological concepts of ³policy community´ and ³issue 
network´ (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992).  
As can be seen in Table 2-3, policy community and issue networks can be seen as 
two poles between a tightly integrated network with dense interactions at one end and 
loose members and interactions at the other. The internal structure of a policy network is 
usually considered an independent variable to the extent that understanding the structure 
of a policy network will help determine policy outcomes (Peterson, 2003: 5). The notion 
of policy communities has a greater capacity than issue networks in steering or 
manipulating the policy agenda and outcomes. The limited number of actors in a policy 
community means that the participants tend to be stable over a long period of time. The 
group members do not change frequently. In a policy community, certain government 
agencies and key interests are always involved and so interaction is of high quality. As a 
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consequence, issues within a policy community are often depoliticised. They are seen as 
technical issues to be resolved by the insiders because no conflicts are perceived over 
the potential policy options conflict (Smith, 1997: 82).   
Table 2-3. Types of Policy Network 
Dimension Policy Community Issue Network 
Membership 
1. Participants 
2. Type of interest 
Very limited number; some groups 
consciously excluded. 
Economic and/or professional 
interests dominate. 
Large number. 
Encompasses a large range of 
affected interests. 
Integration 
1. Frequency of interaction 
2. Continuity 
3. Consensus 
Frequent, high quality, interactions 
among all groups on all matters 
related to policy issues. 
Membership, values, and 
outcomes remain relatively stable 
over time. 
All participants share basic values 
and accept the legitimacy of the 
outcome. 
Contacts fluctuate in intensity and 
quality. 
Access fluctuates over time 
A measure of agreement exists; 
but conflict is ever present. 
Resources 
1. Distribution of resources- 
within the network 
2. Distribution of resources- 
within the participating 
organisations 
All participants have resources; 
basic relationship is an exchange 
relationship. 
Hierarchical; leaders can deliver 
members. 
Some participants may have 
resources, but they are limited, 
and basic relationship is 
consultative. 
Varied and variable distribution 
and capacity to regulate members. 
Power There is a balance if power among 
members. Although one group 
may dominate, it must be a 
positive-sum game if the 
community is to exist. 
Unique powers, reflects unequal 
resources and unequal access. 
It is a zero-sum game. 
Source: Marsh and Rhodes (1992: 251) 
Moreover, the network community can be seen as a dominant coalition retaining 
discretion, which determines the rules of the game and regulates the process of 
exchange (Smith, 1997: 78-79). There is a VHWRI³UXOHVRIWKHJDPH´ which actors have 
to abide by in order to gain entry into the policy community. A characteristic feature of a 
game in a policy network is that the result is driven by interactions between the 
strategies of all the actors involved (Klijn and Teisman, 1997: 99). The rules of game 
govern how participants have to behave if they are to gain access to the network, e.g., 
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they shall act constitutionally, they shall accept the final decision of the government, 
they can be trusted, the demands they make must be reasonable (Rhodes, 1986). If a 
group wants to have access to a policy community, it must desist from high profile 
campaigns and become an insider developing policies in private (Richardson and 
Jordan, 1979).  
Policy communities also have institutional bases that provide further means of 
exclusion (Smith, 1997: 81). Within most policy communities, there are particular 
institutions which are central to the policy process, membership of which institutions 
ensures access to the policy community. Consequently, it is easy for a policy community 
WRH[FOXGHUDGLFDOJURXSV,Q/DXPDQQDQG.QRNH¶VZRUNRQFHUWDLQ86KHDOWK
and energy policy domains, it is shown that certain degrees of exclusion usually exist 
within policy communities. The U. S. health policy domain contains a few central 
positions occupied by actors who maintain close ties with many others, and a large 
number of peripheral positions by actors with lower visibility, fewer ties and generally 
tenuous involvement with the system. A policy community involves a conscious and 
unconscious exclusion of particular groups.  
Whilst membership in a policy community is limited, it is extremely large in an 
issue network. The network contains a large number of actors with relatively limited 
resources. Heclo (1978: 102) believes that, in many areas of policy-making in the U. S., 
there are a large number of participants with quite variable degrees of mutual 
commitment. This means that it is all but impossible to identify clearly who the 
dominant actors are. From the perspective of interactive quality, interaction is erratic in 
an issue network. The degree and importance of interaction changes constantly and who 
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has contact with whom will vary. Issue networks generally lack formally 
institutionalised contacts between groups and the government (Smith, 1997: 84). There 
is little exchange of resources, and almost no exclusion. As a result, groups move 
constantly in and out of the policy domain. This also means that it is unlikely that there 
will be a consensus. Often, there is conflict between the various government agencies 
and departments.  
Hence, from an analytical perspective, to check which actor is at the centre of a 
policy network and who has been relegated to a marginal position is an important step 
in understanding the nature of interdependent relationships and information 
communication in policy networks. Furthermore, understanding the exchange 
relationship and the relative position is basic to checking who has influence or power in 
a policy process. 
Despite the fact that policy network studies have become one of the main themes 
in policy process studies, it has also faced many critics who are highly pessimistic 
whether it indeed represents a more useful approach than those suggested in traditional 
policy process studies. First, although policy network analysis has been a research 
approach in the public process domain for many years and has offered a description of 
how policy decision processes are organised, it has not come up with an explanation of 
why it is organized in that way (Hill, 2009: 74). Due to difficulties in measuring 
networks, policy network analysis has often been treated more as a metaphor, a 
conceptual scheme, or just a management technique (networking) (Dowding, 1995, 
2001; König, 1998; Milward and Provan, 1998; Rabb, 2001; Thatcher, 1998). In 
addition, policy network theory does not have a well-developed research technique to 
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identify the network¶V boundary and stakeholders within policy domains. With regard to 
empirical application, these shortcomings can lead to not only ambiguous causal 
relationships between policy participation, policy network and policy outcomes; it can 
also be criticised for ³including everything and denoting nothing´.  
To sum up, policy networks and issue networks are important concepts, which have 
been useful in developing a better understanding of the role and interaction of official 
and unofficial stakeholders in the policy process. Although policy network theory has 
been subjected to numerous criticisms, considerable efforts have already been made to 
increase its explanatory power. In this research, we adopt the measuring technique of 
SNA as sociologists have suggested that it helps understand the distribution of power 
across multiple organizations.  
2-4-3. Role and Strategies of the State While Managing Policy 
Networks 
Activities associated with governance and public management take place 
frequently in network-like scenarios. Most policy processes in modern society 
nowadays are open for a range of participants and stakeholders. Openness facilitates 
democratic participation and flexibility. Numerous attempts have been made (Goss, 
2001; Stoker, 2004; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Wilson and Game, 2006) to 
demonstrate the positive performance of the network governance mechanism in recent 
years. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that little attention has been given to 
the negative impacts of network governance regimes (Goss, 2001). As discussed above, 
policy processes frequently cross agency lines and reach beyond the public sector into 
private and nongovernmental entities related to the policy domains. The challenge for 
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public managers in a complex policy network is how to create efficient and effective 
partnership which can help public managers in combining the resources of other agents 
and assist in setting up a communicative platform (Kickert et al., 1997b). Thus, 
numerous network-like governance mechanisms such as public-private partnership 
(PPP), BOT (Build-operate-transfer), joint government, co-governance, collaboration 
regimes, local governance or multiple level governance have been proposed in recent 
years in order to cope with the prevailing social tendency towards decentralisation. 
In the age of network governance, the elected government is just one of a number 
of bodies involved in public policy formation and service delivery. Under the pressure 
for improving government performance, many public agencies, especially the elected 
politicians, have been keen to demonstrate their partnership credentials without 
adversely affecting the network. The network governing mechanism mirrors the 
governance which has been used to depend on the patterns of relations between 
interdependent actors who cannot attain their goals by themselves but need the 
resources from other actors (Kickert et al., 1997a: 6). This also means that the public 
sector has insufficient power or resources to manipulate policy outcomes and 
implementation in the policy process (Smith, 1997). Further, the nature of network 
management is to deal with the uncertainties resulting from the interactions between 
different actors¶ strategies. Network management can be defined as a form of 
coordination of strategies of actors with different goals with regard to a certain problem 
or policy measure within an existing framework of inter-organisational relations 
(Kickert at al., 1997b: 167). For public sectors, more network management strategies 
are needed to help manage the complicated and dynamic network environment. 
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The image of the role of governmental organisations in this discussion on network 
management is quite different from the notion of a retreating government popular in 
practice and theory. The role of public manager means that public agencies will be 
actively involved in the interaction processes between actors. However, this description 
is inconsistent with the image of a strategically withdrawing public authority (Smith, 
1997). In order to minimise governance cost and increase the governance effectiveness, 
the public sector has sufficient ability to be a good network manager. In fact, by 
assuming the initiative for the arrangement and course of interaction processes, 
governments can take the initiative by promoting and helping to affect substantive 
policy outcomes. Thus, the public sector has more advantages than other stakeholders in 
managing the policy networks. First, as far as the institutional perspective is concerned, 
although the environment of governance has been decentralizing, the only statutory 
organization is the authority which controls the crucial points in the collaborative 
SDUWQHUVKLS¶VRSHUDWLRQal and policy process. As can be seen in Figure 2-1, the 
Kingdon¶s policy agenda setting model shows that there are three main streams which 
can lead to the opening of ³policy window´ (Kingdon, 2003). Many stakeholders can 
identify what the policy problem is and come up with related policy proposals, but the 
public sector has continued to be in the dominant position in policy planning and launch 
the proposals. People in general accepts this to be a part of the process of formal policy 
formation from legal and constitutional perspectives. 
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Figure 2-1. Policy Window Model of Agenda Setting 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004: 54 
Second, interactions within a policy network can be treated as a game with the 
actors operating strategically (Klijn and Teisman, 1997; Smith, 1997). Different actors 
have different goals and perceptions, so a network lacking a central steering point can 
be accompanied by tricky management problems. As already mentioned, the public 
sector is the only party with legitimate power to maintain operations within a policy 
process. Kingdon (2003) argues that a unified policy community is generally better able 
to control agenda than a fragmented issue network. Stakeholders with joint interests and 
similar values and positions often form alliances and jointly influence policy-making 
within a given area (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). From the 
perspective of network management, governments usually seek to develop closed 
communities so as to end up with effective policy outcomes (Smith, 1997: 79). It is the 
government that creates the network, controls access to it, sets up the rules of the game 
(Rhodes, 1988: 82) and, most importantly, selects the main stakeholders into the 
network community so, enhance the democratic legitimacy of the policy process. For 
example, public sector can be the network activator and orchestrates interactions to 
solve the particular problem or to achieve certain goals (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997: 
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47). Also, public organisations can mediate as network managers by acting as policy 
brokers to facilitate communications and resource exchanges and integrate disparate 
values and interests. According to Kingdon¶s (2003) agenda setting model, policy 
process is a fragmented structure made up of entrepreneurs who act as policy brokers in 
specific policy domains by not only raising problems and suggesting solutions but also 
mediating the policy process.  
Hindmoor (2009: 80) asks why governments establish policy communities with 
specific groups but not others. He suggests that governments usually work closely with 
groups controlling valuable resources which may increase the democratic legitimacy of 
policymaking and implementation. In addition to valuable information, political or other 
material resources, one of the most important elements to be selected in a policy 
community is representativeness of the groups. Daugbjerg (1998: 22) argues in a similar 
vein when he says that perhaps the most important reason why some actors are excluded 
from a network is that they lack such resources, especially representativeness. Few 
organisations ³willingly include others´ (Daaugbjerg, 1998: 22). As Rhodes puts it 
(1981: 122), organisations are primarily driven by a desire to avoid each other. In a 
policy community, there is constantly an unspoken feeling that certain groups are being 
excluded consciously (Bevir and Richards, 2009: 4). In a landmark study, Heclo (1978) 
played down the restricted nature of access to policy making. He was perhaps the first to 
FRQFHSWXDOLVHWKHLGHDRIUHODWLYHO\RSHQ³LVVXHQHWZRUNV´made up of a wider array of 
participants replacing closed circles of control. As Daugbjerg (1998, 50) states, access 
to an issue network may be relatively open but there are always some restrictions, e.g., 
the chosen DFWRUVPXVWKDYH³OHJLWLPDWH´LQWHUHVWVLQWKHLVVXHVbeing addressed. 
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Third, in situations loaded with interdependent relationships, the multiple 
stakeholders should have the ability to define, monitor and evaluate policy outcomes. 
The public sector has the most power and legitimacy to implement these functions. The 
public sector has the regulatory power needed to keep an eye on procedures and make 
procedural and, on occasion, substantive proposals (Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997: 50; 
Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987: 162-165). 7KLVIROORZV.LQJGRQ¶VOLQHRIWKLQNLQJ
about why governments address certain policies and ignore others (Hill, 2009). 
Moreover, the public sector also commands more resources while evaluating the 
performance of policy-making and implementing the policies apart. It is also capable of 
ensuring that positive outcomes and good network interactions are maintained. In short, 
public sectors possess more regulatory instruments than private sectors (Smith, 1997: 
81) and networked government can be an useful tool in maintaining positive policy 
processes and improve network interactions effectively and efficiently (Goldsmith and 
Eggers, 2004: 20-21). 
Although a fragmented policy environment improves the operational dynamics of 
the public sector and managers, a network-like mechanism obviously facilitates the 
interaction between multiple agencies that should be independent of each other 
(Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002: 26). The hallmark of effective governance in policy 
networks is openness and transparency in decision-making and a willingness not only to 
share information and resources but also to take up responsibilities via thematic, cross-
agency working groups. Thus, effective governance activities in a policy network can 
guarantee SRVLWLYHSROLF\RXWFRPHV7KHFDSDFLW\RIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VWRPDQDJH
networks is one of the most important factors impinging on democratic legitimacy. 
Authorities are required to show that the people support their proposals and the relevant 
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stakeholders in the policy domain in question, they also need to work with other 
partners to deliver upon policy targets through the agency of policy networks. Policy 
networks FDQWKXVEHVHHQDVDQDWWHPSWWRLQVWLWXWH³collaboration or co-governance´
arrangements and attempt to open up the policy process to a wider range of interests, 
which better reflect the public sectors¶SULRULWLHVDQGQHHGV 
To sum up, a network-like policy environment creates new management 
challenges. One way of meeting this challenge is to utilize strategic network 
management. Network management assumes a flexible government that is able to 
communicate with other actors and mobilise the innovative resources needed in making 
joint solutions possible (Kickert et al., 1997b: 181). Comparing with other actors, 
governmental organisations have more policy instruments to manage network 
interactions and improve WKHQHWZRUN¶V structure. The best strategy is to facilitate win-
win situations and limit interaction cost in policy domains. In this work, the interaction 
between the participants in the NHI policy domain is treated as ³network´in the policy 
processes. This approach allows us to consider and apply methodologies of policy 
network theories with a view to identifying how organizations are positioned within a 
network and to evaluate the quality and impact of the exchanges among them. 
 
2-5. Proposals for Enhancing the Explanatory Power of Policy 
Network Studies 
As has mentioned earlier, the most serious theoretical critique of policy network 
studies is the lack of explanatory power, especially with regard to the links between the 
policy network and policy outcomes or changes. There are several ways to push policy 
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network studies beyond a metaphor in methodological terms. This section will discuss a 
range of alternatives and explains why SNA was adopted for this research. 
2-5-1. Other Network Approaches to Improving the Policy Network 
Model 
According to Rhodes (2006: 436), ³SROLF\QHWZRUNDQDO\VLV´ is doing well in terms 
of how networks limit participation in the policy process, decide which issues will be 
included and excluded from the policy agenda, shape the behaviour of actors through 
the rules of game, privilege certain interests, and substitute private government for 
public accountability. The work was basically about stability, privilege, and continuity. 
However, an associated analytical problem is that it does not, or cannot, explain policy 
outcomes or changes (Dowding, 1995, 2001). There have been several attempts to 
analyse policy outcomes or changes and networks but two preliminary points should be 
made clear. First, it is a formidable task to describe and explain continuity and stability 
in a policy process. Second, the analysis of policy changes or outcomes can be a 
recurring problem but it is not specific to policy network studies. In other words, 
debates in the policy network literature mirror the large epistemological and ontological 
debates in social sciences. In facing such theoretical problems, three features are usually 
inspected: the advocacy coalition framework, the dialectical model, and the strategic 
relational theory. 
The advocacy coalition framework (hereafter ACF), developed by Paul Sabatier, is 
generally considered to be one of the most promising theories on policy processes 
(Fenger and Klok, 2001: 157). In the ACF, a policy change or outcome is viewed as a 
result of a learning process within and between advocacy coalitions. Coalitions consist 
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of actors who share basic policy beliefs and collaborate over time in a subsystem. Thus, 
ACFs in policy-making process can also be seen essentially as interactions among 
different policy actors within the policy network. According to Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1993: 16), the ACF is based at least on four basic premises: (1) understanding 
the process of policy change - and the role of policy-oriented learning therein - requires 
a time perspective covering a decade or more; (2) the most useful way of thinking about 
SROLF\FKDQJHRYHUVXFKDWLPHVSDQLVWKURXJKDIRFXVRQ³SROLF\VXEV\VWHPV´LHWKH
interaction of actors from different institutions who follow and seek to influence 
governmental decisions in the policy area; (3) the concerned subsystems must include 
intra-governmental dimensions, i.e., they must involve all relevant levels of 
government; and (4) public policies (or programmes) can be conceptualised in the same 
manner as belief systems, i.e., as sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about 
how to realise them. Sabatier argues that coalitions try to translate their beliefs and the 
corresponding belief systems determine the direction of the policy outcome and that the 
FRDOLWLRQV¶UHVRXUFHVGHWHUPLQHWKHLURYHUDOOFDSDELOLW\WRLQfluence government policies. 
The ACF deals with a multiplicity of actors in a policy subsystem as aggregates into 
various advocacy coalitions, where the coalition members share the same policy core 
beliefs and together hold a set of coalition resources (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 9). 
However, as Parsons (1995: 201) points out, the model works well for the federal and 
fragmented government of the U.S., but there is little evidence that it travels well. 
The dialectical model proposed by Marsh and Smith (2000) attempts to resolve the 
criticisms of the policy network approach made by Dowding (1995, 2001) and other 
rationalists (Rabb, 2001). They emphasise that the relationship between networks and 
outcomes is not a simple, unidimensional one; it involves highly complicated, 
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interactive activities among the factors in different levels. Moreover, they argue that 
policy outcomes and changes are functions of the interaction between (1) the structure 
of the network and the participants in the network, (2) the network and its political and 
socio-economic context, and (3) the policy network and the policy outcomes. Their 
argument is that, in order to understand and explain the relationship between policy 
networks and policy outcomes, each of these dialectical relationships should be 
examined. They see networks as structures that can constrain or facilitate action but do 
not determine actions because actors interpret and negotiate constraints. Also, 
exogenous factors often prompt network changes but actors mediate the change. Hence, 
compared with traditional policy network studies, this idea involves recognising the 
way in which actors change networks. This is the reason why Marsh and Smith (2000) 
emphasise that structures, rules and interpersonal relationships should be examined 
together. They applied a model of mutually causal and feedback relations to explain 
WUDQVIRUPDWLYHFKDQJHVLQWKH8.¶VDJULFXOWXUDOSROLFLHVVLQFHWKHV0DUVKDOVR
DSSOLHGDGLDOHFWLFDOPRGHOWRH[SODLQFKDQJHVLQWKH8.¶VSROLFLHVRQJHQHWically 
PRGLILHG*0FRUQGLVFORVLQJWKHSRZHURI³RXWVLGHU´HQYLURQPHQWDOJURXSVLQ
compelling GM foods to disappear from supermarket shelves (Toke and Marsh, 2003).  
Although Marsh and Smith (2000) attempt to provide a powerful explanatory 
model linking the notions of policy networks and policy outcomes, the model seems to 
be somewhat misleading. The trickiest problem of this model lies in the contention that 
at every independent variable there can be a dependent variable. It is therefore 
confusing to determine which variable is dependent or independent. This attempt not 
only confuses the causal relationship but also makes policy outcome harder to test and 
falsify. 
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The third way of analysing the policy-making process is through Hay and 
5LFKDUG¶VVWrategic relational theory of networks. This is a sophisticated variation 
on the dialectical theme mentioned above. This theory also aims to push policy network 
studies beyond a metaphor and avoids the ambiguities and controversies associated with 
the term ³GLDOHFWLFDO´. They argue that individuals seeking to realise certain objectives 
and outcomes make a strategic assessment of the situation where they find themselves 
in. They also argue that the context is not neutral. Networks are viewed here as highly 
flexible, volatile, adaptive, and strategically innovative, while networking is understood 
to be an intentional political action taken by individuals or composite actors in the 
pursuit of certain strategic objectives (Hay and Richards, 2000: 2). It locates network 
players, or rather the strategic actions in which they engage, within the broader, 
strategically selective context favouring certain strategies over others as a means to 
realise strategic intentions. Compared with previous two policy network approaches, the 
framework recognises that strategic actions produce direct effects upon the structured 
context within which it takes place rather than viewing players as passive agents 
constrained by structures. The idea is to facilitate strategic learning on the part of 
players and enhance their awareness of the constraints and opportunities afforded by the 
wider context (Hay, 1998: 43). Players utilise this knowledge in an attempt to reshape 
and reconfigure the network in order to promote their strategic interests and policy 
SUHIHUHQFHV7KHDERYHLGHDLVYHU\VLPLODUWR*UDQRYHWWHU¶VFRQFHSWRI
³HPEHGGHGQHVV´SURSRVHGZLWKWKHLQWHQWLRQRIOLQNLQJVWUXFWXUDOFRQVWUDLQWVDQG
individual actions in their explanatory model. 
However, that selective context is not neutral. Rather, it is too strategically 
selective in the sense that it privileges certain strategies over others. Individuals learn 
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from their actions and adjust their strategies. The context is changed by their actions, so 
individuals have to DGMXVWWRDGLIIHUHQWFRQWH[W6RDQHWZRUNLQJLVDSUDFWLFH,WLV³DQ
DFFRPSOLVKPHQWRQWKHSDUWRIVWUDWHJLFDFWRUV«ZKLFKWDNHVSODFHZLWKLQDVWUDWHJLF
DQGVWUDWHJLFDOO\VHOHFWLYHFRQWH[W´ZKLFKLVLWVHOIFRQVWDQWO\HYROYLQJWKURXJKWKH
consequences (both intended and unintended) of strategic action (Hay and Richards, 
2000: 14). 
The above ideas related to policy network studies and policy outcomes are indeed 
significant achievements within the field of policy process studies. However, these 
models and theories have their own faults. The most important and common problem is 
that they do not throw light on the causal relationships between network structures and 
policy outcomes. In addition, they also did not develop a solid and scientific analytical 
tool for verifying their model. In particular, they did not provide any clear way to 
identify the network boundary and participants. According to John (2004), there are still 
two possible ways to improve the explanatory power of the policy network approach. 
The first one is by using the rational choice theory from economics to view policy 
networks as a stable institution which can reduce the transaction costs between multiple 
actors in the policy domain (Dowding, 1995, 2001). However, this approach treats 
policy networks as a dependent variable and merely explains why this kind of policy 
networks can be formed by actors rather than policy outcomes or changes. The second 
one is to use quantitative SNA from a structural perspective to improve the techniques 
to measure the power pathways in policy processes in a formal method (Carpenter, 
Esterling and Lazer, 1998; König, 1998; König and Bräuninger, 1998; Thatcher, 1998). 
61$LVDIRUPDODQDO\WLFDOWRROIRUH[DPLQLQJDQGGHVFULELQJDQHWZRUN¶VVWUXFWXUHDQG
the associated, interconnected relationships between the actors in a bounded network. 
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The second way is adopted in this research to enhance the explanatory power of the 
policy network we examine and arrive at more systematic and scientific measures 
beyond metaphors. 
2-5-2. Social Network as a Way of Understanding a Policy Network 
Sociologists analyse social networks to find who the dominant actors are and how 
networks differ. They also try to figure out stable relationships between actors and their 
respective posiWLRQVUDWKHUWKDQWKHLUDWWULEXWHVYLDWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI³VRFLDOVWUXFWXUH´
The perspective has been applied in various disciplines such as sociology, politics, 
public administration, anthropology, communication, education, organizational 
sociology and infection studies. Almost all social network analysts are structuralists, 
because they always see their research issues in relational terms (Knoke, 2011). For 
LQVWDQFHGLVHDVHWUDQVPLVVLRQQHWZRUNVPDLQO\GHDOZLWKTXHVWLRQVVXFKDV³ZKRLQIHFWV
ZKRP´%\contrast, in the context of a policy network, one investigates resource 
exchanges between interest groups (Rhodes, 1986, 1988). As far as education is 
concerned, it is hypothesised that students who have stable friendship networks exhibit 
high learning performances. Researchers in organizational sociology are interested in 
finding out who forms the core of an informal organisation in a formal organisation and 
what the positive and negative influences of these informal groups are on the operation 
of an organisation. The meanings and contents of the relations can be technical or 
scientific information, political or strategic information exchange, resource exchange, 
influence reputations and the similarities of briefing systems and ideologies, friendship, 
trust and so on. They depend on what kind of research it is and what question the 
research wants to explore. Researchers applying SNA generally take the methodological 
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position that stable interactions among multiple actors can create an environment 
charged with social meaning. Social meaning can identify the relationships and roles of 
these actors under the network structure. They can also support collective actions in the 
future (Stokowski, 1994). 
Like any social network, a policy network consists of a bounded set of actors and 
one or more sets of relations connecting them. Smith (1997: 76) defines a policy 
network as a means of categorising the relationships that exist between groups and the 
government. Policy networks demonstrate that relationships between groups and 
governments are segmented, and that relationships vary from one policy sector to 
another. The boundaries of a closed concept, the policy domain, are socially constructed 
by mutual recognition that the preferences and actions of the actors on policy events 
must be taken into account by other domain participants (Knoke, 2011: 211; Laumann 
and Knoke, 1987: 10). The twin concepts of policy network and policy domain can be 
reconciled by recognising that a policy domain delineates a bounded system whose 
members are interconnected by multiple policy networks.  
SNA assumes that the primary unit of analysis is a social relation (a specific type 
of tie) connecting the members of a social system. The pattern of present and absent ties 
DPRQJDQHWZRUN¶VDFWRUVconstitutes its social structure. Furthermore, the perceptions, 
attitudes, and actions of organisational actors are shaped by the larger structure 
networks within which they are embedded, and in turn their behaviours can change 
these network structures (KnRNH7KHVHDVVXPSWLRQVIRFXVDQDO\VW¶V
attention on the multiple types of inter-organisational ties that may be important for 
H[SODLQLQJDSROLF\GRPDLQ¶VVRFLDOVWUXFWXUH7KH\DUHDOVRXVHIXOLQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
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consequential actions at the individual action level as well as at the level of the policy 
domain as a whole. As mentioned previously, a policy network can be seen as a set of 
political actors who engage in resource exchanges over policy outcomes as a 
consequence of their resource interdependencies. Relationships based on resource 
exchanges such as valuable information transmission or political support among policy 
actors is the analytical unit while applying SNA to a policy network (Weishaar et al., 
2015).  
As mentioned in the previous section, there are two important characteristics of the 
policy process in a policy network environment. The first is that no stakeholders can 
achieve their goals without help in the form of information and resource exchange from 
others. The second is that the exercise of power is a basic element in the policy process. 
As noted above, the exercise of power or the influential pathways in policy processes 
are clearly identified by the network relationships between two or more policy makers 
rather than by the properties or attributes inherent in the individual or group. This means 
that power relationships are asymmetrical with respect to actual or potential interactions 
in which one social actor exerts greater control over another. More specifically, if we are 
concerned more about communication and information exchange in a policy process, we 
must recognise that influence occurs when one actor intentionally transmits information 
WRDQRWKHUDQGDOWHUVWKHODWWHU¶VDFWLRQVIURPZKDWZRXOGKDYHRFFXUUHGZLWKRXWWKH
information (Knoke, 1994a: 3; Parsons, 1963). This also means that the influence is 
possible only when communication occurs among social actors. One actor must transmit 
a message to another, and the second actor must receive, decode, interpret, and react to 
WKDWPHVVDJH'DKO¶VGHILQLWLRQRISRZHURQWKHRWKHUKDQGVWDWHVWKDWSRZHULVD
relationship between social actors under a specific situation. Because a communication 
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channel must exist between the influencer and the influence, influence can also be seen 
as a relational dimension of power. The basic units of any complex policy network 
system are not individuals, but positions or roles occupied by the social actors and the 
relations or connections among these positions (Knoke, 1994a: 3).  
Following the proposal of structural properties in the mathematical subfield of 
graph theory and sociometry (Berge, 1964; Moreno, 1941), the study of interactions and 
their structures in social research has moved towards a more consistent theoretical 
framework and methodological toolbox (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). SNA provides 
scientific, quantitative means and indicators to measure the pattern and structure of 
interactions among actors. Fortunately, the technique of SNA also provides useful tools 
for measuring the influence mechanisms or power pathways in an interactive structure. 
Furthermore, SNA is also concerned with the idea of power between multiple actors via 
mapping the structure of relationship. In particular, it is concerned with measurements 
RI³FHQWUDOLW\´DQG ³SUHVWLJH´.QRNHD.QRNHDQG<DQJ6FRWW
Some research achievements which focus on the influence mechanisms underlying 
policy domains have been carried out at both community and national levels (Aldrich 
and Whetten, 1981; Galaskiewicz, 1979; Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989; Laumann 
and Pappi, 1976; Wang, 2012, 2013; Weishaar et al. 2015). 
7KHQHWZRUNDSSURDFKWRSRZHUUHTXLUHVWKDWWKHDQDO\VWDVVHVVHVDSRVLWLRQ¶V
prominence by taking into account not only its direct but also its indirect connections to 
arrive at the complete network (Knoke, 1994a: 10). The network structure of multiple 
acWRUVLQSROLF\GRPDLQVFDQFODVVLI\WKHDFWRUV¶DELOLWLHVWRLQIOXHQFHRWKHUVE\
classifying positions such as core (star), margin and broker provided the networks are 
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complete. The concept of centrality does not differentiate sending relations from the 
receiving type, but simply treats all connections as symmetrical. Centrality also means 
that a prominent actor has high involvement in many relations, regardless of whether he 
is sending or receiving ties (Knoke and Yang, 2008). Network stars (cores) acquire 
power because they are close to many other network actors, in effect, by lying between 
positions that must use them to transmit messages and goods (Freeman, 1979). On the 
other hand, prestige concepts preserve the asymmetry of ties among positions so that 
prominence increases with the extent to which a position has many relations but does 
not reciprocate (Knoke, 1994a: 10). The concept is useful in analysing the powers of 
positions in networks where commands and resources are not reciprocally exchanged. In 
a general situation, these two measures of prominence often prove useful for analysing 
power pathways. However, the choice among the alternative measures depends on both 
the conceptualisation to be implemented and the types of social network data available 
(Knoke and Yang, 2008: 62). 
Some political sociologists have applied the policy domain approach to the study 
of national policy-making processes and collective outcomes by using SNA (Knoke et 
al., 1996; Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989). This research is primarily influenced by 
/DXPDQQDQG.QRNH¶VERRN³The Organisational State: Social Choice in National 
Policy Domain´RQRUJDQLVDWLRQDOVWDWHJRYHUQDQFHVWUXFWXUH7KHLUVWXG\
utilised measures of SNA and applied the perspective of action systems to understand 
the power relationships among policy actors in the context of both health and energy 
policies. The results have shown that the state is not totally a product limited by the 
VRFLDOFODVVRUWKHPDFURKLVWRULFDOIRUFHVWUXFWXUH7KHVWDWH¶VFRQFUHte policymaking 
characteristics get exhibited through the socio-political processes underlying national 
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policy formation. The collective decision is formed by all actors participating in the 
policy events, who act together for collective interests. While using SNA is relatively 
new to the field of health policy network research, some previous investigations have 
successful experiences in employing these approaches (Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 
1989; Lewis, 2006; Wang, 2012, 2013; Weishaar et al., 2015). In this study, three policy 
events associated with financial stability of the NHI are examined through the 
viewpoint of the associated action systems. By using the analytical capabilities of SNA, 
complicated political economic forces are depicted in social network structures related 
to interest alignment and resource exchange.  
As for the analysis of governance structure and policy formation, we cannot ignore 
the fact that they are embedded within the wider political and institutional legacies. 
Inevitably, any action has to consider the characteristics of the political and institutional 
system, especially the state power of policy formation. After the implementation of the 
NHI, the change in the premium system, the reform of the co-payment system or the 
implementation of the global budget payment system will all affect stakeholders as well 
as the governance structure hugely. According to Campbell and Lindberg (1991), the 
state intentionally provides and manipulates property rights to achieve some policy 
effects. By releasing resources to create different motivations for the various actors to 
comply with, a new governance mechanism can be formed easily. This study simulates 
the network structure by adopting the action system perspective used in Laumann and 
Knoke (1987). It also includes institutional structure as a variable to understand the role 
and regulatory power of the state.  
As mentioned above, the interaction between the participants in the NHI policy 
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GRPDLQFDQEHWUHDWHGDV³QHWZRUN´LQWKHSROLF\SURFHVVHV The technique of SNA 
applied to the studies of policy network can help governmental organisations to identify 
their relative positions within the policy network and make more precise judgements to 
adopt more suitable strategies to manage the network (Laumann and Knoke, 1987; 
1989; Knoke et al., 1996). Policy networks can be seen as social networks to go beyond 
the metaphors and understand how participants in a policy domain become involved in 
policy influence activities (Knoke, 1994a: 167; Weishaar et al., 2015: 90). Both issue 
interests and influence reputation significantly affect communication network positions. 
Stakeholders with broader policy interests and higher influence reputations are usually 
located in more prominent positions in the network. People and organisations that are 
more central in a policy network are not only seen by the other actors as more 
influential in policy domains. They are also more likely to achieve their desired 
outcomes for policy events. From the viewpoint of SNA, positional centrality gives 
persons and organisations access to resources because the position connects actors in a 
given resource exchange relationship. Thus, SNA provides a reasonable and scientific 
method to explore social structures. This point has to be taken account while trying to 
understand how a policy network structure operates. 
2-5-3. Two Approaches Involved in the Application of SNA in Policy 
Network Studies 
Generally, the conceptualisation of power in a network context can take at least 
two different paths in relational analytical logic. The first, the reputational approach of 
SNA, search for power structures in which the content of the relations linking network 
actors can be interpreted as a power measure. This approach concentrates on a relational 
analysis across network members and ends up mapping power images. The other, called 
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the positional approach, conceptualises power as a dimension latent in all networks, or 
at least in those with asymmetric or directed relations (Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 
1989). A good example of the first approach is to use the notion of reputational measure 
where all network participants identify those whom they believe to be especially 
powerful and or influential in the network system or whom they believe to be 
exceptional intermediate agencies for political brokerage. Note that the emphasis is not 
on the most influential actors but on those who control the information and resource 
flows in policy processes. Another example is a resource dependency network that can 
be interpreted as the reverse view of a power network according to resource dependency 
theory (Rhodes, 1986, 1988) and power dependence theory (Cook and Emerson, 1978).  
Second to the study of power structures, the contents of the relation are less 
LPSRUWDQWWKDQFHUWDLQIRUPDOSURSHUWLHVWKDWLQGLFDWH³RQHVRFLDODFWRUH[HUWVJUHDWHU
FRQWURORYHUDQRWKHU¶VEHKDYLRXU´.QRNHD$FODVVLFH[DPSOHLV+RPDQV¶V
discussLRQRIVPDOOJURXSLQWHUDFWLRQVZKHUH³WKHPRUHSRSXODUPHPEHUVWHQGHGWR
UHFHLYHPRVWLQWHUDFWLRQ´+RPDQV+RPDQVLQVLVWHGWKDWWKHYROXPHRI
UHFHLYHGLQWHUDFWLRQVLVQRWDVLPSOHFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKHDFWRU¶VSRSXODULW\RUHVWHHP
but measures his/her power based on the ability to bestow scarce rewards. That is, 
SRZHULVWKH³IXQGDPHQWDOYDULDEOHGHWHUPLQLQJWKHUDQNRUGHURIWKHPHPEHUVRIWKH
JURXSLQWKHQXPEHURILQWHUDFWLRQVWKH\UHFHLYHG´+RPDQV%\DQDO\VLQJ
relations between network members at a policy domain level, one can better understand 
how the overall configuration facilitates or constrains the actions of policy actors. Thus, 
whether one uses power measures or approval paths, the relational approach can 
interpret the poZHUGLVWULEXWLRQDPRQJQHWZRUNPHPEHUVE\FDSWXULQJWKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶V
reputation or resource access and mobilisation ability. 
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Besides reputational or access network matrices, there is a core cluster of the NHI 
policy domain actors that all system participants perceive to be especially influential. 
These policy participants jointly occupy the centre of the confirmed information 
transmission, resource exchange and action-set coalition networks, in the sense that they 
send and receive valuable information and resources from other actors or are in 
collaboration with others for pursuing similar policy goals. These analytical elements 
point to the importance of measuring policy network structure using the relational 
approach. They are also helpful in answering somHVLJQLILFDQWTXHVWLRQVVXFKDV³ZKLFK
DFWRUVKDYHEHWWHUDFFHVVWRWLPHO\LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWSROLF\HYHQWV"´³:KDWOLPLWVWKH
PRELOLVDWLRQRIUHVRXUFHVIRUXVHLQFROOHFWLYHLQIOXHQFHHIIRUWV"´³:K\DUHVRPH
interest groups more successful than the others in affecting the outcomes of policy 
HYHQWV"´  
However, Laumann and Knoke (1987: 226) have argued that new phenomena often 
emerge through interactions among diverse participants in a network social structure. 
The idea of the brokerage position in a network system, or the so-called policy brokers 
in a policy domain, can cope with this issue from the relational perspective as well. 
Some policy actors play a critical bridging role in allowing communication and 
resources to flow from smaller to larger cliques, usually in a two-step path, rather than a 
direct one-step path. The existence of many indirect linkages (paths consisting of two or 
more steps) among the network members is a common feature of large, sparse networks. 
Because they permit the first and second participants to reach one another, third-party 
actors are critical. By not taking into account the larger domain network structure, we 
PD\UHDFKLQDFFXUDWHFRQFOXVLRQVDERXWWKHZD\VLQZKLFKSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHODWLRQV
condition the actions of their participation (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Knoke and 
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Yang, 2008; Lauamnn and Pappi, 1976: 201-205; Marsden and Laumann, 1984). 
The analysis of network linkages may be useful in accounting for certain features 
of those involved, but it is quite difficult to capture the nature of the global power 
structure with just a few important direct and indirect connections or cohesive, small 
and influential groups. Global features may not be consciously visible to the 
participants, as they involve hundreds or thousands of connections, about which the 
network actors remain unaware. Furthermore, the healthcare policy domains of large 
nation states are not simply enlarged versions of small groups or sets of strong direct 
connections among a few active policy actors, even if we sometimes hear of cosy 
triangles forming parts of them. Thus, one can seriously question whether the findings 
about the status and power of small groups can be extrapolated to large systems 
consisting of multiple actors with different backgrounds. This is also the reason why the 
reputational approach to power investigation (Hunter, 1959, 1980) has been criticised by 
academia. To make the analytical view more comprehensive in this research, the 
attention must focus on individual stars (reputational approach) and whole clusters or 
even the global network system (positional approach) simultaneously.  
The relationships among positions jointly define the structures and different roles 
through which power is generated and distributed among actors (Knoke, 1981: 275). 
Regarding the positional approach to SNA, structurally equivalent actors are typically 
two or more actors having identical or very similar relations with others in the network 
while maintaining a competitive, rather than a cohesive, relation (Knoke and Yang, 
2008: 76). In other words, the positional approach to SNA is based on identifying 
similar positions and should be contrasted with the relational or cohesive approach 
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discussed in the next chapter. Furthermore, structure equivalence is placed in the same 
position as those actors that maintain identical patterns of direct linkages with all other 
domain actors. Thus, from the perspective of structural equivalence, their social roles or 
positions are defined by regularities in the pattern among the actions, and not the 
attributes of the actors themselves (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005: Ch. 12). In contrast to 
traditional statistical techniques, SNA empirically defines social roles and positions 
among actors using network data rather than attributes of individual actors. As for 
empirical analyses, statistical techniques of SNA such as the CONCOR (short for 
CONvergence of iterated CORrelation) algorithm, Blockmodel analysis, and 
multidimensional scaling (hereafter MDS) are frequently used to define social roles and 
positions and generate images of entire power structures in network systems.  
Comparing the relational approach with the positional approach, the latter seeks 
answers to two basic questions. Firstly, which policy actors have structurally similar 
relations in these four networks, so that they can be clustered together into common 
positions? Secondly, what do the connections among those positions reveal about the 
power structures underlying the policy domain? Defining a power structure as patterned 
relations generating and distributing power among actors (Knoke, 1981: 275) only 
narrowly captures the notion of power in a network. Such a definition may fail to tap the 
V\PEROLFDVSHFWVRISRZHUQHWZRUNVUHIOHFWHGLQSROLF\DFWRUV¶UHSXWDWLRQV7KLV
research included the positional, analytical dimension as a precaution against the 
misspecification of power models, because we assume that insider perceptions of power 
and influence are important components of power structures. The two approaches of 
SNA will be explored together in subsequent empirical chapters examining the power 
relations and structure among policy actors in a policy domain. 
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2-6. Social Network as a Way of Linking Structure and 
Agency 
The use of power in a policy process is subtle and complex, so many researchers 
stand by their own viewpoints (Hill, 2009; Smith, 1997). We have already alluded 
briefly to four related state policy process theorists and their works on how one may 
explain or interpret relationships between power and policy actors and the 
methodological challenges associated with these approaches. In this section, an old 
SX]]OH³LVWKHSROLF\SURFHVVDSURGXFWRILQGLYLGXDOV¶DFWLRQVRUDsocial structure 
restriction´ZLOOEHUHYLVLWHG7KLVTXHVWLRQKDVUHPDLQed controversial and unsolvable to 
this day. In the social sciences, agency is the capacity of individuals to act 
independently and to make their own free choices (Barker, 2005: 448). Thus, it means 
WKDWSROLF\RXWFRPHVDUHSURGXFWVRILQGLYLGXDOV¶VWUDWHJical actions under the 
perspective of agency. By contrast, structure is those factors of influence (such as social 
class, religion, gender, ethnicity, customs, etc.) that determine or limit an agent and his 
or her decisions (Barker, 2005: 448). For policy stakeholders to decide upon policy 
outcomes, there has to be a political system, an institutional arrangement and so on, but 
they also have to be located in that system. This is the sort of stance that a structuralist 
might take (Hill, 2009). However, it is also true that, without individual stakeholders 
and their activities, there could be no such things as policy proposals, politicians, 
interest groups and political systems. This is the sort of stance that a methodological 
individualist might take (Scott, 2000). These two approaches demonstrate two different 
kinds of explanatory strategies in social science - one from structure to action, the other 
from action to structure. 
There is no doubt that the studies of policy process also have to use similar 
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explanatory strategies for understanding complicated policy domains which can be 
shaped by either individual action or structural pressure. Let us look in more detail at 
the structure-agency debate in policy process studies. If we borrow the categorical idea 
from Hollis (1994), the methodological problem of this issue in the studies of policy 
SURFHVVHVFDQEHH[SUHVVHGDVWKHSUREOHPRI³OHYHO-of-DQDO\VLV´VHH)LJXUH-2). As 
has been mentioned in the previous section, the top-down approach can be applied to an 
H[SODQDWRU\VWUDWHJ\LQWKHEORFNRI³VWUXFWXUDOLVPLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´VKRZQLQ)LJXUH-2. 
The causal relationship can be identified as demonstrating that structure (institutional 
and political context) shapes policy outcomes. For example, the Marxist theory 
concerning the policy outcome is the product of structural pressure and every 
stakeholder in policy domains has to follow the rules of capitalists. Despite the fact that 
VWUXFWXUDOSUHVVXUHFDQVKDSHDVFHQDULRE\FRQVWUDLQLQJWKHDFWRUV¶EHKDYLRXUVWKLs 
DSSURDFKLJQRUHVWKHLQGLYLGXDOV¶UHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHSROLWLFDOFRQWH[WDQGLQVWLWXWLRQDO
arrangement. The approach has also been criticised for being over-socialised 
(Granovetter, 1985). Individuals have their own preferences and individual actions 
might not just be determined by structure. Moreover, we have to consider the possibility 
that individuals under an environmental constraint can change the game rules. 
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Figure 2-2. Approaches in Policy Process Studies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hollis, 1994: 19 
Therefore, at the individual level, the policy process, like the bottom-up approach, 
LVVHHQDVDSURGXFWRILQGLYLGXDOV¶DFWLRQVDQGLVRQHRIWKHPDLQWHQGHQFLHVUHJDUGLQJ
the interest group approach such as pluralism, elitist theory and corporatism. The 
presently dominant trend is the approach being followed in democratic countries such as 
the U.S., UK and certain other Western countries (Scott, 2000). Theorists from these 
countries are concerned with the fact that the political phenomena associated with the 
policy processes in these countries are essentially interactive games with multiple 
stakeholders. Jon Elster (1989: 19) suggests that the elementary unit of social life is the 
individual human action. From this standpoint, the main unit of policy process analysis 
should be the individual who is self-interested and can act without limits. However, this 
stance ignores the influence of the political environment or institutional context which 
can shape the aspirations and strategies of actors under the specific game rules. More 
specifically, policy process is embedded in distinct institutional and political contexts. 
Different policy domains have distinct game rules and stakeholders. It will become an 
structuralism individualism 
explanation 
Top-down approach  
Over-socialised 
interpretation 
Bottom-up approaches 
Under-socialised  
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under-VRFLDOLVHGDSSURDFKLILWLVFRQFHUQHGWRRPXFKZLWKLQGLYLGXDOV¶IXQFWLRQVDQG
influences on the policy process. 
The traditional approaches examined above are all relevant to interactions between 
policy stakeholders and the structure and the role of the state in policy domains. These 
approaches, whether structural or individual in perspective, are based on a biased 
understanding of the nature of policy processes in a modern society. In order to sidestep 
both pluralistic individualism and Marxist class structuralism, this research sees policies 
as resulting from conflicts and contradictions among multiple policy stakeholders 
embedded in the institutional and political environments (rather than only reflecting the 
class interests in limited bargaining-negotiation systems). In terms of methodological 
stance, this thesis lies in the overlapping area in Figure 2-2. The policy process in a 
modern society is a complicated political scenario. This means that a more suitable and 
flexible perspective should be applied while seeking to understand the nature of the 
power-exchange and the bargaining-negotiation relationships between official and 
unofficial stakeholders in the policy domain. Such a complicated scenario is exactly 
what the policy network/domain approach seeks to explore. 
It is possible to argue that the network approach discussed in the previous section 
is a portable concept that can be applied to any public arena and that the study of policy 
networks offers more insights into how policy is made and implemented than traditional 
policy process approaches. Over the past three decades, a considerable amount of effort 
has been put in by political scientists or researchers of public administration to 
XQGHUVWDQGWKHVWUXFWXUHVRIVWDNHKROGHUV¶LQWHUDFWLRQVLQSROLF\GRPDLQVDQGWKHUHDVRQV
behind policy failures in the U.S., European countries and the UK. Moreover, in 
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implementation studies, espeFLDOO\LQZKDWKDVEHFRPHNQRZQDVWKH³ERWWRP-up 
DSSURDFK´LQLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDORULQWHU-sector relations literature (Scharpf and Hanf, 
1978), the concept has been used in mapping the relation patterns between actors and 
assess the influences of these patterns on the policy process. Also, many efforts have 
been made to use the research tool of SNA in the study of policy networks/domains 
(John, 2004; Knoke et al., 1996; Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989; Wang, 2005, 2012). 
It can be concluded that the network approach offers a more realistic and 
methodologically comprehensive alternative than other traditional policy process 
approaches.  
Why is the social network approach a strategy for linking methodological 
individualism and structuralism in studies of the policy process? A four-pathway model 
can be adopted from James Coleman to demonstrate the causal relationship. Originally, 
James Coleman (1990) used this framework to illustrate the methodological defect in 
:HEHU¶VDSSURDFKWRH[SODLQLQJWKHFDXVDOUHODWLRQVKip between capitalist development 
DQGWKH3URWHVWDQWHWKLF,Q&ROHPDQ¶VRSLQLRQ:HEHU¶VDSSURDFKODFNVLQGLYLGXDO-based 
evidence while seeking to explain capitalist development. As can be seen in Figure 2-3, 
the causal relationship in the structural perspective in policy process studies can be 
identified by following the fourth pathway. By contrast, the individualistic perspective 
FDQEHDGRSWHGE\IROORZLQJWKHWKLUGSDWKZD\LQZKLFKLQGLYLGXDOV¶DFWLRQVWUDWHJLHV
influence policy outcomes. The structural approach ignores the individual base of 
explanation in the policy process whereas the agent approach neglects the structural 
IDFWRUVZKLFKFDQVKDSHWKHLQGLYLGXDOV¶EHKDYLRXU7REHSHUVXDVLYHKRZHYHUDFFRXQWV
of policy formation should combine both structural and individual perspectives. This is 
because the stakeholders in policy domains are embedded in the political and 
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institutional contexts. Before the causal relationship between the action strategy and the 
policy outcome can be identified, institutional and political structures influence actor 
preferences and promote changes and boundaries to identify their interests and 
strategies. But how can we understand the context before analysing? We suggest that 
adopting the network perspective, which emphasises structural relationships as the key 
orienting principle (Knoke and Yang, 2008: 8), is a useful strategy linking pathways 
one, two and three. In fact, the policy network approach also sees networks as structures 
and actors as agents and recognLVHVWKDWDJHQWV¶VWUDWHJLHVDQGQHWZRUNVWUXFWXUHV
influence one another (Hill, 2009: 70). 
Figure 2-3. Strategy to Link Structure and Agency 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: modified from Coleman, 1990: 8 
As Granovetter (1985) points out, under- and over-socialised accounts are 
paradoxically similar in their neglect of ongoing structures of social relation - a 
sophisticated account of individual action must consider its embeddedness in such 
structures. The social network approach is capable of building a bridge between 
structural constraints and individual actions in social science and, depending not only on 
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their own relations but also on the way other actors are related, can provide a measure 
of the structural constraints of actors. Embedding actors within the set of their 
interactions can lead to insights into the distribution of power and the effective 
influence of social and political actions. With regard to the methodological stance of the 
network perspective, two features are important. First, the methodological level of the 
network approach can be identified at the meso-level (Marsh, 1998; Rhodes, 1997; 
Wang, 2012) and the unit of analysis is not an individual but a tie. The specification of 
the role of networks for different participants represents an attempt to show that this 
affects individual preference. Second, the concept of a network presents a powerful 
conceptual tool for linking the structural locations of actors, their individual 
preferences, and their actions while seeking to bridge the micro/macro gap by 
connecting structure and agency (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994; Tilly, 1997; Wang, 
2012). The reason is that the network approach describes underlying patterns of social 
structure, and explains the impacts of such patterns on behaviours and attitudes 
(Wellman, 1999: 44). 
To sum up, social scientists study power relations among people, organisations and 
nations. This is also the most important characteristic of policy process studies in 
modern societies. Policy network analysis has been the favoured research approach in 
public processes for many years as it offers a description of how policy decision 
processes are organised. However, it does not explain why they are organised in that 
way (Hill, 2009: 74). Due to the difficulties in measuring networks, policy network 
analysis has been often treated as a mere metaphor, a conceptual scheme, or a 
management technique (Milward and Provan, 1998: 397). On the other hand, 
particularly in SNA and the policy domain approach, network perspective provides a 
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useful alternative to understanding the policy processes in modern societies (Knoke, 
2011: 211) . It also provides a strategy to bridge the structural and agent perspectives 
(Granovetter, 1985).  
 
2-7. Conclusion 
In studies of policy processes, structuralists tended to ignore the possibility that 
DFWRUV¶DWWULEXWHVFRJQLWLRQVRUSHUVRQDOLWLHVFRXOGVKDSHWKHgame rules; however, so do 
individualists. Structural theories such as Marxism argue that state policies are 
determined by the class interests of capitalists and their agents. However, the reality is 
that not all modern, capitalist countries are manipulated and controlled by capitalists. 
Moreover, in many democratic countries, interest groups and their actions play an 
important role on policy outcomes in policy processes. Likewise, in approaches such as 
those based on the pluralist theory, elitist theory or corporatism neglect the structural 
and institutional contexts in which the stakeholders are embedded. It can be concluded 
that the policy processes and outcomes should not be so determined by a simple causal 
explanation of either top-down or bottom-up logic. 
As far as the practical side is considered, it should be recognized that policy 
processes in a modern society are complex, dynamic and varied. Policy process theories 
should not dwell merely on the technical functions of governments. Rather, they should 
treat them as complex and diverse interactive processes influenced by the diverse socio-
political and other environmental factors. This means that researchers should recognise 
that they operate in a dynamic environment comprising a range of stakeholders who 
may have very different interests and unbalanced influences in diverse policy domains. 
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To avoid bias in explanation, a research tool which can link microscopic and 
macroscopic analysis is necessary in studies of policy process in modern society. The 
policy network approach is an uncertain structure shaped by resource exchange and 
communicative relationships among multiple elites. The network concept in policy 
processes concerns not only more structural factors than pluralism, elitist theory and 
corporatism but also more individual factors than the Marxist theory. 
Although Downing (1995, 2001) asserts that, as used by most of its proponents, the 
concept of policy networks has no theoretical basis or explanatory value. In this view, 
the concept has been used merely as a heuristic device, a metaphor. Network structures 
per se have no influence on policy outcomes. Rather, networks reflect patterns of 
interaction and resource exchange between policy participants and it is those resource 
exchanges that determine the outcomes (Dowding, 1995: 142). Thus, the SNA, which 
can systematically measure the group/government relationships in policy processes, is 
useful in improving the explanatory power of the policy network approach. 
In conclusion, the old puzzle of structure-agency dualism is still ongoing and an 
effort to solve the problem is more likely to be futile. Therefore, this research does not 
attempt to solve this puzzle. Rather, it is an exploratory effort in search of an alternative 
way of replacing traditional policy process approaches in policy process studies and 
identifying a plausible way to link top-down and bottom-up perspectives. The network 
perspective yields a more flexible way of understanding the complicated and dynamic 
policy processes. When analysed via the social network techniques, it clarifies the 
power-relationship structures in which policy stakeholders in policy domains are 
embedded. This work can act as a foundation-element in future efforts directed towards 
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getting a better understanding of the subject through more refined applications of 
network approaches in policy process studies.
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Chapter 3. Institutional Context of Policy-making 
LQ7DLZDQ¶V1+, 
Before entering the analysis of policy networks, it is important to explore the 
formal political and institutional contexts of policy formation in Taiwan. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide a brief description of formal policy planning and legislative 
procedures under multiple jural levels of institutional contexts LQ7DLZDQ¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQ. 
This can serve as a guide to the roles of key players and the basic procedures by which 
proposed bills become law or get legitimised. From the perspective of institutionalism, 
the political and institutional contexts, and even the structure of policy networks, can be 
seen as sets of rule arrangement (Bonoli, 2001; Hall, 1992; Immergut, 1992). It is not 
unusual that these constrain action strategies and behaviours or provide veto 
opportunities for policy participants in the policy process. In any democratic country, 
every policy promotion or advocacy activity is expected to conform to the constitution 
and other relevant laws to ensure its legality and legitimacy. Engaging several formal 
institutions in a policy process can disperse power, thereby reducing the risk of arbitrary 
or capricious government action and enabling a stable policy environment and a robust 
policy network in which the government can make policy commitments that remain 
credible into the future. Thus, in order to explain differences in the abilities of policy 
participants in securing policy outcomes favourable to themselves and in the ability of 
the executive government to enact its own legislative or adjustment programmes, this 
chapter analyses the prevailing institutional dynamics that the institutional positions the 
policy actors are engaged in political decision-making in Taiwan. 
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This chapter is divided into three sections excluding this introductory section. 
Section 3-1 explores the policy formation procedure with particular reference to 
constitutional rules, legislative procedures, and the relationship between the executive 
government and legislation in Taiwan. Section 3-2 focuses on resource flow within the 
NHI financial system. The chapter starts with an analysis of formal institutional 
contexts of policy-making within the NHI policy domain for providing more 
background information before going through the main theme of this research. Section 
3-3 summarises the major conclusions drawn from the previous two sections. 
 
3-1. Formal Rules: Policy Formation Procedure in Taiwan 
Political decisions are not single, individual decisions made at one point in time. 
Often, they build upon or take positions based upon one or more previous policy 
decisions (perhaps representing vested interests). Decisions are often embedded in a 
complicated policy network with high uncertainty (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). Major 
political decisions require agreement at several points along a chain of decisions made 
by representatives of different political arenas. The fate of a reform proposal such as one 
with potential impact on national health insurance depends upon the number and 
locations of opportunities for veto along this chain. In most countries, including Taiwan, 
decisions are composed of sequences of decisions made by different actors in different 
institutional locations at different veto points. Moreover, in light of policy proposals at 
the jural level, different levels of proposals also face different veto points and players in 
the decision-making process (Bonoli, 2000; 2001). Veto points, players in different 
institutional positions and the jural characteristics of reform proposals should be 
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considered together. 
Institutional frameworks resolve conflicts by constraining actors¶ behaviours and 
limiting the number of veto players (an individual or collective actor that has the 
institutionalised power to defeat a proposed law by withholding formal approval) and 
veto points - political power and multiple points of influence on the making and 
implementation of policy under the constitution (Bonoli, 2000, 2001) - where the policy 
proposals can be considered. Numerous works have demonstrated that institutional 
mechanisms lead to predictable outcomes by restricting interests and choices (Bonoli, 
2001; Hall, 1992; Immergut, 1992; Maclntyre, 2003). The policy formation and 
legislative procedure in Taiwan is similar to those in other democratic countries where 
either official or unofficial participants can advocate or lobby for a policy subject to the 
regulatRU\VWLSXODWLRQVRIWKHQDWLRQ¶Vconstitution (Wang and Chen, 2010).  
Figure 3-1 clarifies the impact of constitutional rules and electoral results on 
political decision-making in Taiwan. The ability of an executive government, especially 
the DoH and the BNHI, to introduce a policy depends on its capacity for unilateral 
action, i.e., on the probability that the executive decision will be confirmed at 
subsequent points of decision-making. If the executive is constitutionally independent 
from the Parliament or the jural levels of the proposals are no more than administrative 
orders - that is, if the decisions do not require parliamentary approval - the executive 
may take direct action inside the administrative procedure without involving the 
Parliament. For this reason, under the regulations of Taiwan¶s constitution, the 
administrative orders or commands of the executive decision are the final decisions. The 
Parliament is neither a veto player nor has veto power during policy formation. 
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Figure 3-1. Formal Policy Formation Procedure under the Constitution 
Arenas  Moves  Results 
     
Executive  
Can members of Parliament  
overturn Executive decisions? 
 
If yes, bills should be sent to the Parliament, and then 
are subjected to veto players at veto points. 
If no, bills are promulgated and legalised by executive  
committees. 
Legislative 
Unified, or Divided government?  
If there is a stable parliamentary majority, there is no veto- 
player or veto point. 
If in minority, policy formation might face more veto players 
 
   and veto points. 
 
    
Electoral  
Can members of the electorate 
overturn Parliamentary decisions? 
 
If yes, then there will be more veto points and veto players. 
If no, just parliamentary decisions are ceased. 
Unofficial policy participants  
Source: modified from Immergut, 1992: 66 
Under the NHI Act, the NHI is a government-run, single-payer national health 
insurance scheme financed through a mix of premiums and taxes that compensates a 
mixed public-private delivery system predominantly operating on a global budget 
system (BNHI, 2015). In the case of the NHI policy formation in Taiwan, most of the 
administrative orders and commands can be adhered to or decided upon within the 
structure of the NHI Act. As can be seen in Figure 1-4, the NHI has a triangular 
governance regime made up of the BNHI, the insured and the providers. Under the 
Executive Yuan, the DoH is the leader dominating the health policy formation and 
supervising the performance of the BNHI. In the DoH, well-organised committees such 
as the NHI Supervisory Committee (NHISC), the NHI Disputes Mediation Committee 
(NHIDM) the NHI Expenditure Negotiation Committee (NHIENC) the NHI Task Force 
Office policy actors¶ participation  
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and the BNHI are important components in running the NHI (BNHI, 2015). In 
particular, the NHISC is the most important intermediary which allows social 
associations, employers and providers to communicate with each other under the NHI 
Act. Moreover, the NHIDM is an independent agency and quasi-public sector which can 
mediate disputes between the insured and the providers. Similarly, in order to negotiate 
payments to providers under the Global Budget Payment (GBP) system, the NHIENC 
was formed by delegates identified by the provider and the BNHI in 1999. Hence, most 
administrative orders and commands related to diverse health domains can be decided in 
these committees (BNHI, 2015). The committee members including the minister of the 
DoH, the BNHI and the providers, the employer, employee association representatives 
or other related welfare NGOs can be seen as important veto players in the decision-
making process. 
However, if the constitution requires parliamentary approval, the decision-making 
process moves to the Parliament. Under this situation, the political status quo of either a 
unified or a divided government and the party competition rules should be carefully 
considered as the policy process will become more complicated than the administrative 
orders and commands themselves (Bonoli, 2000, 2001). In Taiwan, the legislature or the 
so-called Legislative Yuan (Article 62 of Taiwan¶s Constitution) has two different kinds 
of powers. One is proactive, such as, with initiating a bill. The other is reactive, such as 
in the cases of cutting the budget, monitoring budget enforcement, and reviewing 
executive decree orders. Here, however, partisanship and party discipline make a 
difference. If the executive government enjoys a stable parliamentary majority and party 
discipline is being maintained, the probability that an executive decision would be 
overturned by the Parliament is extremely low. Thus, under the constitution, although 
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the Parliament is required formally to ratify the executive decision, the effects of 
partisanship will lead the Parliament to HVVHQWLDOO\³rubber-stampLQJ´ the legislation and 
the executive will remain the effective point of decision-making (Wu and Huang, 2007). 
In other words, the political environment and policy formation procedure of a unified 
government can be seen as a situation introducing administrative orders and commands.  
On the contrary, a stable parliamentary majority does not have to support the 
executive if party discipline does not require members of Parliament to veto in 
mediation with their fellow party members in the executive. Also, the probability that 
parliamentary representatives would seriously review and overthrow executive 
decisions is much greater. Under such a circumstance, one would expect significant 
policy changes and even vetoes from parliamentary representatives (Rose, 2001). 
However, the premier (the president of the Executive Yuan) can ask the legislature (the 
Legislative Yuan) to reconsider some impracticable bills in 15 days. If the Legislative 
Yuan does not reconsider or pass a resolution within 15 days, the original bills will 
become invalid. But if over one-half of the members in the legislature support the 
original bill, the premier accepts and enforces it. This power to reconsider bills is 
similar to veto power in the Executive Yuan under the political environment of a divided 
government.  
Divided government exists where different political parties control the executive 
and legislative branches in a political system. A number of researchers have claimed that 
divided government tends to lead to policy inefficiency and stalemate between 
executive and legislative branches (Binder, 1999; Coleman, 1999). While executive and 
legislative posts are determined through separate elections, there is a lack of unified 
 113 
 
leadership and this tends to lead to conflicting policy positions. Policy formation in a 
divided government will suffer from more veto players who attempt to intervene in 
policy outcomes at more veto points (Rose, 2001). This also means that because of the 
GLIIHUHQWVWDQFHVIURPWKHRSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHVWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKHUXOLQJSDUW\¶VUHIRUm 
proposals could lead to more stalemates in legislative procedure in the policy domains. 
Under such a political circumstance, it is harder for the ruling party to build a policy 
community capable of reducing uncertainties while promoting reform proposals (Wang 
and Chen, 2010).  
The power situation in the year 2000 marks the first time in history that the 
parliament in Taiwan was under the control of an opposition party. The KMT became 
the biggest opposition party and assembled other small parties to organise WKH³SDQ-blue 
FDPS´ to oppose the ruling party, the DPP, in the Parliament. A divided government 
EHFDPHDFRPPRQIHDWXUHRI7DLZDQ¶VQDWLRQDOSROLWLFDOODQGVFDSHGXULQJ'33¶VUXOH
between 2000 and 2008. Based on the experiences of advanced democratic countries, 
when high levels of partisan conflicts appear, universal political order is unlikely to 
flourish (Leonard, 1991; Rose, 2001). In other words, tKHGLYLVLRQRI7DLZDQ¶V
government between a DPP-led executive and an opposition-dominated legislature has 
led to rather inefficient policy-making (Wu and Huang, 2007). Under a divided 
government, the majority party in the parliament would not be able to distribute more 
political benefits and interests to voters than would a unified government. This pattern 
can explain legislative behaviour in Taiwan¶s Parliament during the period of the 
minority government after 2000 (Wu and Huang). Based on Taiwan¶s constitution, only 
the government can propose the budget and the legislature shall not increase the 
expenditure component of the budget. Thus, the legislature has dominating power over 
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the executive. In addition, because of a particular political dynamic - the ruling party is 
a minority in the legislative - there is a political balance, especially with regard to 
budgetary bills. The opposition would not let the government have its way and there 
would be regular party confrontations in the Legislative Yuan, especially when 
considering bills regarding budgets or controversial issues. Otherwise, the government 
would have the upper hand in the next election - this would hurt the opposition parties¶ 
competitive advantage in the election. If the government wants to pass distributed 
policies or barrel projects, the ruling party needs to strategically give up some political 
benefits or compromise on the contents of the bills when a political deadlock happens 
(Wu and Huang, 2007). This problem has been exacerbated by the increasing 
involYHPHQWRILQWHUHVWJURXSVLQ7DLZDQ¶V legislative process. Hence, there are many 
reasons for expecting that, in divided governments, universalism is less common than in 
unified governments.  
Similar factors govern the relationship between the parliamentary and electoral 
arenas. In most political systems, a parliamentary decision is the last step in enacting a 
law. However, whenever there is a possibility of popular referendum on the legislative 
decisions under consideration, this formal constitutional rule allows the electorate to 
override parliamentary decisions. In Taiwan¶s case, the right for referendum engrained 
in the constitution protects the people¶s right to resist laws they do not like (Wang and 
Chen, 2010). For instance, when the policy agenda cannot be resolved by formal policy 
formation and implementation processes, it would become a serious dispute. It is also an 
opportunity to launch the referendum process. If the referendum option has been 
invoked, the electoral arena itself will become an effective veto point and all electoral 
members will become veto players (Wang and Chen, 2010). Sometimes, when electoral 
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shifts or approaching important elections make members of Parliament and the ruling 
party especially sensitive to voters¶ reactions to controversial policy agendas, the 
electoral arena can become a de facto point of veto and drive the ruling party and the 
opposition to leave the matter aside for the moment (Immergut, 1992). Thus, the 
promotion of the 2G-NHI financing scheme that attempted to relocate the contribution 
rate of the NHI¶s revenue by the DPP government also underwent a temporary ³policy 
shift´ towards other favourable policy issues of the ruling party while approaching 
important elections. 
Constitutional rules and electoral results produce different constraints on the ability 
of the executive government to introduce new policies or promote reforms. Such 
institutional and political hurdles direct decision-making along different paths. 
Opportunities for veto determine whether the effective point of decision will lie in the 
executive arena, the parliamentary arena, or the electoral arena (Immergut, 1992). The 
specific mechanisms for veto determine precisely which veto players (including official 
policy participants or unofficial policy participants) have the power to ratify or block 
policy proposals. Moreover, formal constitutional rules and electoral results establish an 
institutional architecture in which policy-making and interactions among official and 
unofficial policy stakeholders get allowed.  
All that has been discussed above are standard political factors affecting health 
policy-making in the context of the three Taiwanese cases alluded to previously. 
Furthermore, these three cases with different jural levels faced different number of veto 
players and veto points when the DoH and the BNHI attempted to promote the NHI¶s 
financial sustainability. Table 3-1 clarifies the institutional characteristics of these three 
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policy events and also classifies the suitable dimension of political feasibility for 
promoting the three proposals. With regard to the policy event of the 2G-NHI financing 
scheme, changing the calculation of revenue contribution was a bill that needed to be 
discussed and approved by the Parliament in the NHI Act. The DPP government 
attempted to increase NHI revenue through the new financing scheme that resulted after 
intense discussion in the Parliament. In the event, this policy event could be specified 
through the involvement one way or another of numerous veto players and veto points; 
almost all actors acknowledged that arriving at political feasibility for policy-making 
was a formidable political task (Wang and Chen, 2010). In contrast, the policy events of 
the implementation of the GBP system and the double raise scheme can be adjusted and 
announced by the executive government under the NHI Act, the constitutional rules and 
the NHI Act automatically filter the number of veto points and players while promoting 
these two proposals. It could be expected that boosting the two reform policies was 
easier than dealing with the 2G-NHI financing scheme. However, in the case of the 
double raise scheme, the controversy of raising the rate of co-payment for the insured 
led to a more complicated policy conflict environment which compelled several, 
unexpected policy stakeholders to get involved energetically and advocate their 
preferred policy goals (Wang and Chen, 2010).  
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Table 3-1. Institutional Characteristics of the Three Policy Events 
N
um
be
r o
f V
et
o 
Po
in
ts
  Number of Veto Players 
 More (divided government) Fewer (unified government) 
 
More 
The amendatory act 
Policy event of the 2G-NHI 
Financing scheme (2002-2012) N/A 
Less 
Administrative orders or command levels 
Policy event of the implementation of the GBP system (1998-present) 
Policy event of the double raise scheme for co-payment (2002-2004)  
Source: the author 
This research focuses on the impact of political institutions on the ability of these 
actors to prevail in policy conflicts so far. In the past institutional perspective studies 
(Immergut, 1992), policy outcomes and policy makers¶ behaviours were analysed and 
anticipated through stable game rules. However, in this research, the rules of policy 
processes are established through a distinctive political logic that, at least at a 
preliminary level, they are capable of accounting for the three different patterns of 
political behaviours and the associated policy results. The constitutional rules of policy 
formation are also a stable institutional architecture for promoting these proposals, but 
the policy outcome is less decided by the institutional environment alone.  
 
3-2. Financial Resource Flow in the NHI  
To delineate the network¶V boundary, identify policy actors and policy actors¶ 
institutional roles and the resource capability of the NHI policy domain in terms 
financial sustainability, the financial flow pathway of the NHI operation mechanism 
should be reviewed first. Running a huge universal health care system is a complex 
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task; therefore, the operation should be supported by sustained financial provision. The 
NHI Act has set up several institutional platforms for important stakeholders in either 
financing or expenditure mechanisms. As can be seen in Figure 1-5, three main flow 
pathways need to be sustained to ensure financial sustainability by balancing revenue 
and expenditure. The first pathway is the income side of the premium scheme using six 
categories. The second pathway is the expenditure side of running the GBP payment 
system. The final pathway is the supplementary side of the co-payment system that not 
only restricts ZDVWHIXO³hospital-shopping´ on the part of the insured but also increases 
revenue to sustain the NHI. Thus, while the NHI has indeed made health care more 
affordable at the point of service for patients, issues such as how much it has increased 
total national health spending and what premium and payment system is best capable of 
restraining the spending are getting more and more important and urgent. 
On the income side, the BNHI is responsible for collecting premiums from health 
insurance subscribers. The main source of income for the programme is the six-category 
premium system based on the premium rate of 4.55% of salary (BNHI, 2015). The NHI 
is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis with the income-based premiums typical of social 
insurance systems. Also, the premium is shared by the insured, insuring agencies and 
government subsidies at 38%, 37% and 25% respectively in 2007 (BNHI, 2007a: 9). In 
addition, it is useful to note that, to embody the ideas of the NHI social relief, premium 
contribution rates differ among the six different categories of insured population. The 
government also plays a crucial role in providing a 10% financial subsidy to the insured, 
waged workers, 40% for self-employed workers and community workers, 70% (for 
farmers and fishermen, and 100% for military servicemen, retired soldiers and low-
income families (BNHI, 2004).  
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The second main source of income is the co-payment system, which attempts to 
share the cost of health care utilisation and reduce unreasonable utilisation rates of 
health care resources. The rate of co-payment can be adjusted by the BNHI and the DoH 
under the NHI Act. Regular clinical visits require a modest co-payment, from which 
poor households are exempt. In other words, co-payments are levied on each component 
of a treatment and a reasonable volume standard for outpatient visit is introduced 
coupled with a sliding fee schedule for visits above the volume standard (BNHI, 2015). 
The co-payment system also intends to encourage the public to visit community clinics 
for mild conditions and to refer to a tertiary hospital only if advanced examinations and 
treatment are needed. The rates are the highest for outpatient care at medical centres and 
the lowest at clinics.  
As far as the expenditure side is concerned, the GBP payment system is the most 
important institutional design adopted by the NHI in the interest of cost containment 
(Wang and Chen, 2010). The NHI Act has been imposing the GBP system in order to fix 
WKH\HDUO\EXGJHWVLQFHWKH1+,¶VLQFHSWLRQLQ. However, in the early days, the 
NHI was paying medical fees to health care providers RQD³IHHIRUVHUYLFH))6´EDVLV
at uniform national fee schedules. Medical services were VFDOHGDFFRUGLQJWR³WKHLU
resource-EDVHGSRLQWVRIYDOXH´ZKLFKwere then converted into fees. The dollar value 
of a point was annually negotiated between the BNHI and the association of health 
providers. Like all open-ended health insurance systems relying on FFS payments to 
SURYLGHUV7DLZDQ¶V1+,H[SHULHQFHGUDSLGLQFUHDVHVLQWKHYROXPHRIVHUYLFHVZKLFK
in turn, led to charges of supplier-induced demand for services, many of which might 
not be medically necessary (Cheng, 2003: 67). In order to restrain the gradually rising 
expenditure, the Taiwanese government set up separate global budgets and medical care 
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quality indices for dental service, Chinese medicine, office visits at clinics and hospital 
outpatient and inpatient services from 1998 to 2002. To ensure the sustainable operation 
of the NHI, the GBP system created a communicative platform for payment negotiation 
between the BNHI, the providers and the insured (BNHI, 2015). It also instituted self-
regulation and an inter-monitor environment for professional health care associations. In 
other words, the GBP system is a co-governance and responsibility-sharing regime 
aimed at cost containment between the BNHI and providers. 
In this research, three important policy events representing three parts of the 
financial flow mechanism in the past decade are selected to classify the boundary of 
event participants and explore the structure of policy networks in the NHI¶s financial 
sustainability. Events are decision points while of selecting a collectively binding 
decision and determined potentially crucial activities. We selected the following three 
major policy events at which large numbers of actors are likely to seek influence and 
about which especially reliable recall data could be gathered from informants. First, for 
the policy events of the reform planning and promotion of the 2G-NHI financing 
scheme were chosen in order to examine who rules the income side of financial 
sustainability. Second, the evaluation of the GBP system¶s annual implementation was 
also selected so as to throw light on the network structure associated with the cost 
containment mechanism of the NHI. Finally, the promotion of the new co-payment 
scheme (the so-called double raise scheme in Taiwan) was selected in order to get a 
more comprehensive understanding of the governance mechanism of the NHI¶s 
financial sustainability.  
These three representative policy events can be seen as three different policy 
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networks within the NHI policy domain. All formal and informal policy participants 
involved in the three policy events (networks) can be viewed as policy stakeholders 
with particular influence on policy outcomes in the NHI policy domain. Policy domains 
are socially constructed by the actors¶ mutual recognition that their preferences and 
actions on policy events must be taken into account by the other domain participants 
(Knoke, 2011: 211). More formally, a policy domain is any subsystem ³identified by 
specifying a substantively defined criterion of mutual relevance or common orientation 
among a set of consequential actors concerned with formulating, advocating, and 
selecting courses of action (i.e., policy options) that are intended to resolve the 
delimited substantive problems in question´ (Knoke and Laumann, 1982: 256). In this 
research, the twin concepts of policy network and policy domain are reconciled by 
recognising that a policy domain delineates a bounded system whose members are 
interconnected by multiple policy networks (Knoke, 2011: 211). 
In summary, the above three policy events can be seen as three policy networks 
within the NHI policy domain. The method of sampling follows the above cases to 
select informants who either have formal channels of communication or use informal 
media while participating in the three policy events. Thus, the insured and other relevant 
premium contributors such as employers, employee associations and service providers 
also play roles necessary under the NHI Act.  
 
3-3. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to sketch a rough picture of the institutional environment 
in which policy stakeholders operate and a brief background to three policy events in 
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the NHI domain in Taiwan. Firstly, from the perspective of formal institution, the 2G-
NHI financing scheme, as an amendatory act, not only has the most veto players and 
veto points. It is also difficult to be passed, given the regulations of Taiwan¶s 
constitution. However, the other two policy events can be viewed as administrative 
orders or commands with fewer veto points and veto players. This has meant that the 
executive government has had to overcome huge political obstacles since 2003 in 
promoting the 2G-NHI financing scheme. Secondly, the policy actors articulate their 
policy interests and impact on policy outcomes under the NHI Act. The NHI Act can 
also influence the strategies adopted to connect with others and exercise power in the 
NHI policy domain. 
Constitutional rules and electoral results produce different constraints on the 
executive government¶VDELOLW\ to introduce new policies. The institutional and political 
hurdles so arising direct decision-making along different paths in the context of 
different policies. Under Taiwan¶s constitution, legislators and party caucuses in the 
Legislative Yuan have been allowed to vote on bills and exert power over law making. 
The legislators and parties (especially committee chairs in the parliament) often wield 
considerable political power while pursuing legislative agenda. The executive branch in 
the NHI policy domain (consisting of administrative agencies, the DoH and the BNHI) 
has considerable advantages in policy planning, making, implementation and 
evaluation. One of the most important advantages is its superior access to information. 
Another important advantage is that the BNHI is the only agency constitutionally 
authorised to levy the premiums.  
As mentioned previously, the administrative agencies responsible for running the 
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NHI can be viewed as public managers of the NHI policy domain. It should be recalled 
that, although the executive branch has more public authority than other policy 
stakeholders, a divided government has replaced unified government as the institutional 
norm since 2000, thus putting the central government under siege. Maintaining effective 
governance was getting harder for the DPP government due to more pressure and 
challenges from the opposition parties and other related interest groups in every policy 
domain. The NHI policy domain has become more complicated and diverse in the DPP-
led government than previous KMT-led government. Network management of the DPP-
led executive has had to deal with more uncertainties resulting from the interactions 
among the strategies of diverse actors. This has also meant that, in reforming the NHI, 
the network management strategies and abilities of the DPP government have become 
more critical than was the case with the previous KMT government. 
This chapter has adopted the formal perspective on institutions while seeking to 
explain differences in the abilities of policy stakeholders. This is to secure favourable 
policy outcomes and the ability of the executive government to enact legislative 
programmes it prefers. Moreover, political institutions can be thought of as the 
outermost frame encompassing political conflicts. By helping shape the meaning of 
political power and providing a basis for developing political heuristics, institutions 
define the roles and resources of the policy stakeholders. They also define the terms of 
political conflicts. However, policy outcomes are not determined just by the prevailing 
institutional designs. This has meant that, since at least the 1970s, the conception of 
policy networks in policy process literature in political science has been seeking a more 
comprehensive picture of policy processes. The rise of the policy network and the 
policy domain perspective was supplemented by formal institutional perspectives in the 
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evaluation of the steering abilities of the government and explaining policy outcomes 
and changes. This is why Chapter 5 (the chapter following the methodology chapter - 
Chapter 4) starts with a discussion of the resources and policy preferences of the policy 
actors in the institutional context of the NHI, then shifts to an analysis of multi-resource 
dependency and collective action relationships among policy stakeholders.  
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Chapter 4. Methodology 
This chapter describes the methodology applied in this research. First, the policy 
network approach is employed so as get an idea of how patterns of connections among 
SROLF\DFWRUVRI7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQDIIHFWhealthcare financial sustainability. 
Second, I present details concerning data collection along with the analytical methods I 
employ and examine the links between research topics, questions, and, in particular, the 
reasons behind the research framework I adopt. Finally, certain ethical issues impinging 
on the research are discussed. 
 
4-1. Research Design 
³A research design describes a flexible set of guidelines that connects theoretical 
SDUDGLJPVWRVWUDWHJLHVRILQTXLU\DQGPHWKRGVIRUFROOHFWLQJHPSLULFDOPDWHULDOV´
(Denzin and Loincoln, 1998: 28). The approach I have employed is adapted from 
Marsden and Laumann (1977) and follows Laumann and Knoke (1987) and Knoke et 
al. (1996). The ODWWHU¶V framework is based on social network techniques, the actual 
research project for policy network structure utilised both quantitative and qualitative 
research techniques. In order to understand the power relationship and governance 
mechanisms between multiple policy actors in the previously mentioned three policy 
events of the NHI policy domain in Taiwan, my research employed both quantitative 
and qualitative methods. The participants were not only asked the same set of social 
network and policy value questions but their observations and experiences participating 
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in these reforms were also recorded to supplement the hypotheses drawn from my 
quantitative network analysis. 
The policy network approach offers more insights into how policy is made more 
than what the traditional studies of policy processes can. Decisions are shaped by 
networks of interrelated public and private sectors or elites sharing common 
expectations and interests in policy domains. Consequently, in order to investigate who 
had been dominating the NHI¶V policy-processing with a clear focus on the operation of 
the institutions (Knoke, 2011: 211), my research was concerned more about the social 
structure of multiple policy makers or of policy communities constructed by these 
SROLF\DFWRUV¶VRFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSV. Therefore, this study selects relevant policy events to 
supplement my survey-based analysis with context-dependent characters (John, 2004: 
139).  
To delineate the boundary of the NHI policy domain network with respect to 
financial sustainability, I shall review the approach of policy domain (Knoke, 1994a, 
2011; Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989; Laumann, Marsden and Prensky, 1983) and the 
financial flow pathway of the NHI operation mechanism. Following its definition 
presented in the previous chapter, a policy domain can be seen as a set of actors with 
major concerns about the substantive area. Their preferences and actions on policy 
events must be taken into account by other domain participants (Laumann and Knoke, 
1987, 1989). A specific policy domain can be seen as a bounded system whose members 
are interconnected by multiple policy networks (Knoke, 2011: 211). Researchers have 
assumed that the most significant policy actors would leave public records of their 
efforts to influence domain policies (Knoke, 1994a; Laumann et al., 1983). This means 
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that the network data collected from different policy events covering different periods in 
the NHI policy domain in the DPP government may have the potential to interpret stable 
and continuous interactions among key players during our survey period. 
With regard to the financial flows within the operations of the NHI, there are three 
main flow pathways to ensure financial sustainability (see Figure 1-6). The first 
concerns the income side of the premium scheme. The second is the outcome side of the 
payment system. The final pathway concerns the supplementary side of the co-payment 
system from the viewpoint of restricting WKHLQVXUHG¶VZDVWHIXOEHKDYLRXUwith respect 
to hospital-searching. I selected three representative policy events (occurring over the 
last decade) corresponding to the three paths of the financial flow mechanism to 
determine who governs it. I selected major policy events at which large numbers of 
actors were likely to seek influence and about which, especially reliable recall data 
might be obtained from informants. The first concerned the promotion of the 2G-NHI 
financing scheme since it could be seen as a policy network in which a lot of policy 
stakeholders involving in. I chose it to examine who influence the outcomes of the 
promotion. The second concerned the implementation of the GBP system since it could 
throw light on the question of who governs the cost containment mechanism of the NHI. 
The third concerned the new co-payment scheme (the so-called double raise scheme in 
Taiwan) in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the governance 
mechanisms underlying the financial sustainability of the NHI. The key players in the 
three policy events could be seen as three bounded policy subsystems within the NHI 
policy domain. The method of sampling used in the above cases involved selecting the 
participants engaged in the three policy events. 
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With a view to arriving at more scientific and systematic findings, I purposefully 
chose quantitative SNA. Different from the classical, empirical social research, SNA 
examines WKHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQDFWRUVUDWKHUWKDQDFWRUV¶DWWULEXWHV6RFLDOQHWZRUNGDWD 
are treated mathematically rather than statistically. This is because the observations are 
VHHQOHVVDVD³VDPSOH´RIcertain larger populations and more as population of interest 
in themselves +DQQHPDQDQG5LGGOH/DXPDQQDQG.QRNH¶VXVHG
mathematical and sociometric ways to collect and analyse data and interpret findings 
through the research framework of the collective action system embedded in U.S. health 
and energy policy domains (see Figure 4-1). They identified 65 and 56 policy events in 
health and energy policies respectively and distributed a social network questionnaire 
focusing on four sub-network categories: research, development, regulation, and 
expenditure in U.S. domestic politics (Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989). My research 
followed a similar framework during data collection and analysis. 
Figure 4-1. Model of Collective Actions within a Policy Domain 
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Source: Laumann and Knoke, 1987: 4, 1989: 19 
Following are some details concerning the analytical framework of the collective 
action system. First, an action system refers to the fact that policy actors are embedded 
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in a collective action system in the different policy event contexts. Each collective 
action system is composed of a set of consequential policy actors with different 
capabilities to influence policy outcomes. Each policy event can cause a special event 
scenario in which the powers and resources of multiple actors are bounded and 
identifiable. In Knoke et al.¶VSROLF\QHWZRUNPRGHO³GLIIHUHQWFDSDELOLWLHV´ of 
actors PHDQVWKDWWKHDQWHFHGHQWYDULDEOHVDIIHFWEXWQRWFRPSOHWHO\GHWHUPLQHDFWRUV¶
locations within policy networks. The basic principle behind this expectation is 
cumulative structure advantage: actors have border policy interests, larger resources 
capabilities, and public authorities can more easily convert the advantages into 
proximity to the centres of communication and resource exchange networks. Second, 
the actors in collective action systems pertaining to different policy events are assumed 
to have the capability to communicate information and exchange resources with other 
actors in accordance with the principle of reciprocity under a network structure shaped 
by stable interactions among actors. Third, these event participants can influence policy 
outcomes or interrelationships by monitoring, intervening in or mobilising resources. 
Policy outcomes or new interrelationships create positive or negative consequences for 
those who are involved and for the participants in each policy event.  
With a view to enhancing the understanding of the interactive structures and power 
distributions in health and energy policy domains, Laumann and Knoke (1987) focused 
on access and reputational networks. As for an access network, the communicative and 
resource support and collaborative interactions among policy participants are measured 
on the basis of how they arrive at a consensus, resolve conflicts and exchange 
information and resources within an interactive structure. Many previous studies on 
community elites have claimed that they are able to locate stable and valuable 
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information. They have claimed that the identification of the material resource exchange 
network is a prerequisite for resolving local public issues and facilitating productive 
collective actions (Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Marsden and Laumann, 1977). Therefore, 
good communications between policy participants can decrease transaction costs and 
facilitate resource exchanges and action-set coalition relationships impinging on policy-
making processes. Therefore, Laumann and Knoke (1987) focused on information-
exchange channels among policy participants in both policy domains. Knoke et al. 
(1996) also captures the power structure of labour policy domains in the U.S, Germany 
and Japan by exploring three access networks of policy participants: information 
transmission, resource exchange and action-set coalition.  
Based on the sense of power dimension of access network, the social structure of a 
national policy domain is primarily determined by the network of accesses to 
trustworthy and timely information about policy matters. The greater the variety of 
information and the more diverse the resources that a consequential actor can tap, the 
better situated the actor is in anticipating and responding to policy events that can affect 
its interests (Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989). In Knoke et al.¶VRULJLQDOSROLF\
network model, ³resource exchange QHWZRUN´ refers to a political support network. By 
contrast to ³communication QHWZRUN´, resource exchange refers to possible political 
support through votes, vetoes, lobbies and the like. Within a resource exchange network, 
DSROLF\DFWRU¶VSRZHUDQGLQIOXHQFHLVDIXQFWLRQRILWVSRVLWLRQand location in the 
overall resource exchange networks generated through dyadic resource exchanges 
(Knoke, 1994a, 2011; Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989). As for the third access 
network, action sets are coalitions whose partners have similar outcome preferences and 
work together (Knoke et al., 1996). Less-powerful policy actors protect themselves 
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from utility losses by building coalitions with other actors who share their preferences.  
On the other hand, ³reputational QHWZRUN´ is structure emphasising salient power. 
Informants are asked to designate all other policy actors that they see DV³HVSecially 
LQIOXHQWLDO´LQWKHSROLF\GRPDLQ.QRNHet al., 1996: 191). Thus, in contrast to the other 
three access networks, reputational networks emphasise perceived attributions rather 
than real access relationships. However, as the same with access networks, the 
reputational network is interpreted as an information/resource dependence network 
wherein reputational differences indicate power imbalances in a network (Knoke et al., 
1996: 193).  
%DVHGRQ&RRNDQG(PHUVRQ¶V78) power dependence theory and Rhodes¶V 
(1986) resource dependency theory, actors obtain power to the extent that others depend 
on them to supply the resources desired. Actors holding more information/resource 
dependent relationships than others are treated as more influential (Knoke, 2011; Smith, 
1997). In order to succinctly examine the power structure of a network system, the 
above mentioned access and reputational networks should be considered together in 
relational as well as positional terms (Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989; Knoke et al., 
1996). Laumann and Knoke (1987) hypothesised that if any two actors can share the 
policy interests or decrease the transaction cost of stable interactions, it is easy for them 
to shape the communicative linkages help resource mobilisation and manipulation. They 
also facilitate action-set coalitions while pursuing similar policy goals. As for this 
research, we focus on communicative, information, political resource exchange, 
collective action relationships and reputational attributions among the policy 
participants. Figure 4-2 shows the causal model of relations among institutional and 
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organisational characteristics, communication, resource exchange and collective action 
networks, influential power distribution and policy outcome.  
Figure 4-2. Analytical Model of Policy Network/Process 
Policy stakeholders¶ 
characteristics 
 Information 
transmission network 
Influence power 
in decision network 
 
Policy interests 
 
 
 Policy outcomes Resource exchange 
network Resource capabilities  
Organisational types  Action-set 
coalition network  
 
Source: modified from Knoke et al., 1996: 106 
With regard to validity and reliability issues in this research, using self-report 
quantitative network data could reflect a far-from-complete correspondence between 
VXUYH\UHSRUWVRILQWHUDFWLRQIUHTXHQFLHV³FRJQLWLYH´GDWDDQGFRQWHPSRUDQHRXV
REVHUYDWLRQV³EHKDYLRXUDO´GDWDKnoke and Yang, 2008; Marsden, 2005). However, 
SNA application seems looser and more flexible compared to other quantitative or 
qualitative methods. Firstly, few studies have dealt explicitly with the validity issue in 
SNA, e.g., to determine whether or not the relations measures actual interactions 
(Marschall, 2007: 13-14). However, research has shown that response accuracy is not 
only flawed, but also systematically biased (Bondonio, 1998; Carley and Krackhrhardt, 
1996; Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994; Killworth and Bernard, 1976; Marschall, 2007; 
Mouton, Blake and Fruchter, 1995a, b). Also, using SNA is very sensitive to response 
rate (Provan, Veazie, Staten and Teufel-Shone, 2005: 606), which is relevant to the 
validity issue in this study. John (2004) also argues that social network research is 
sensitive to collect data and takes time; thus it is unfair to judge its validity. However, 
rather than relying on data collected by a single researcher, utilising the opportunity of 
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joining research projects conducted via two research teams - one sponsored by the DoH 
and the BNHI and the other by the National Science Council (hereafter NSC) - can 
guarantee the quality and response rate of data. Secondly, it is difficult to frame the 
issue of reliability in the context of SNA. Since social patterns of interaction are likely 
to be volatile, they have not been dealt with systematically in previous social network 
research, with a few exceptions (Knoke and Yang, 2008: 35; Wasserman and Faust, 
1994: 58-59). 
SNA in the field of policy network studies can be divided into using network 
analysis as a research tool and research into SNA using policy networks as specific 
cases. Throughout this research, SNA has been applied to measure the interactive 
structures RIWKUHHSROLF\HYHQWVLQWKHSROLF\GRPDLQRIWKH1+,¶VILQDQFLDO
sustainability by utilising both quantitative and qualitative methods. The research steps 
are described below. 
1. Identification of the policy network boundaries 
This research introduces and explains the background of three important policy 
events, i.e., the policy-making process of the 2G-NHI financing scheme, the GBP 
V\VWHP¶VLPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGWKHSURPRWLRQRIWKHQHZFR-payment scheme (double 
raise scheme) of the NHI policy domain, with particular reference to the DPP 
government (2000-2008).  
2. Identification of the network actors 
Most public affairs include official and unofficial participants in the policy-making 
and implementation processes. Also, because the characteristics and interests of policy 
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domains should be identified as well, special participation is required in the policy 
process. At this stage, a primary literature collection can be helpful in coming up with 
an initial plan before proceeding to analysis.  
3. Data collection methods 
After identifying the research boundaries and network actors and documentary 
collection, a structured social network questionnaire and semi-structured interviews 
were adopted in my research to collect data. The network data so collected were utilised 
to map the influence mechanisms and the power pathways in the NHI policy domain. 
After that, semi-structured sets of interviews were conducted to expand upon the 
previous analytical results so as to get a more comprehensive understanding.  
4. Analysis of network data 
This research applied the software UCINET and Netdraw to glean preliminary 
information on WKHDFWRUV¶LQWHUDFWLYHQHWZRUNVRIFRQWDFW and information. This helped 
me come up with a graph capturing the interactive structures. Also, questions such as 
³ZKRFDQEHDSROLF\EURNHU´³ZKRLVWKHNH\SHUVRQWRGHFLGHSROLF\RXWFRPHV´
³ZKDWNLQGRIFRDOLWLRQVWKHVHSROLF\SDUWLFLSDQWVVKDSHG´ZHUHH[SORUHGE\means of 
the same software. The qualitative data was analysed through NVivo in order to 
supplement thHDQDO\VLVRILQIOXHQFHSDWKZD\VDQGVWDNHKROGHUV¶SROLF\VWDQFHVLQWKH
NHI policy domain. 
It needs to be emphasised that the key challenge that decides the success or 
otherwise of a social network study lies in identifying the network¶V boundaries and 
multiple policy participants. This research is not an exception since it involves 
 135 
 
measurement of the most comprehensive identification of the consequential policy 
participants related to three policy events. More details concerning the four steps 
discussed above will be presented in the following sections. 
 
4-2. Data Collection Strategies 
In this study, quantitative and qualitative data were collected from documentary 
literature and from responses to the SNA questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. 
After collecting relevant documents, a combined data-collection strategy was used to 
explore and answer the research questions being addressed. First, quantitative SNA was 
employed to reveal ties and network relationships from the perspective of the 
individuals in the sample list (de Vaus, 2001). Second, semi-structured interviews were 
used to collect qualitative data, with the researcher and participants as the instrument of 
choice. In other words, quantitative SNA is used to primarily explore the interconnected 
ties among the policy actors and semi-structured interviews are applied for more details 
in the discussion of the policy domain. This approach has been advocated by network 
researchers who suggest that there is a natural fit between quantitative SNA and 
qualitative studies (Emirbayer, 1997; Kilduff and Tsai, 2003). 
4-2-1. Documentary Literature and Official Statistics Collection 
Most empirical researchers are aware that data are helpful in the right context and 
data out of context are simply unhelpful. Policy network studies are very sensitive to 
boundary setting and participant identification. The appropriate archives, official and 
unofficial documents are useful in arriving at a preliminary identification of the policy 
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background, the major policy participants and their policy preferences preliminarily. In 
my study, I gathered a variety of documents to understand the developmental history of 
the NHI, in particular, focusing on financial sustainability in the three policy events. 
I collected data from a variety of relevant sources: books, newspapers, specialised 
magazines, government reports and published statistical reports, academic research 
papers, PhD theses and the like, either electronic or paper copies. Government 
documents including conference records, white papers, hansards (meeting records), 
published statistical data and some relevant project reports were collected from the 
DoH, the BNHI, the Taiwan National Library and other possible sources in order to not 
only gain a primary understanding of the historical development of the NHI but also 
LGHQWLI\WKUHHLPSRUWDQWFDVHVLQWKHSROLF\GRPDLQRIWKH1+,¶VILQDQFLDOVXVWDLQDELOLty. 
Second, specialised magazines especially from the healthcare SURYLGHUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQV
and other NGOs were collected to understand the official standpoints of the provider. 
These magazines were helpful in grasping WKHSURYLGHUV¶DQGWKHLQVXUHG¶VSROLF\
interests. Third, newspapers are an important data source to explore the social and 
political issues and attitudes of not only the public but also the government and 
healthcare organisations in these three policy events. Fourth, gathering other possible 
data sources such as books, PhD theses and academic papers and reports were helpful in 
reviewing the significant contributions of previous works with either academic or 
practical contributions. More details about the documentary data collection can be seen 
in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1. Documentary Data Collection 
Documents Sources Usage Relevance 
Academic books 
and papers  
Libraries, 
Amazon 
Literature 
review 
Helps explain the 
background of the 
research and build a 
theoretical framework 
White papers and 
reports 
The DoH and the 
BNHI 
Literature 
review and 
content analysis 
Valuable in the analysis 
of the official standpoint 
and policy promotion 
Newspapers   Electronic 
database 
Content analysis Collected from the three 
main newspapers in 
Taiwan to identify 
crucial policy events and 
screen for viewpoints of 
different key players 
PhD theses  Taiwan National 
Library 
Literature 
review 
Helps pinpoint previous 
achievements in NHI 
studies 
Committee 
hansards 
The NHI 
committees 
Content analysis Most helpful in helping 
to understand 
preliminary interactions 
and viewpoints in these 
committees   
Association 
magazines  
Healthcare 
providers, 
employee, 
employer 
associations and 
NGOs 
Content analysis Helpful in understanding 
the viewpoints of the 
providers and NGOs 
involved in these three 
cases 
Published 
statistical data 
The DoH and the 
BNHI 
Descriptive 
statistical 
analysis 
Identifies the basic 
outline and trend of the 
NHI¶s financial status 
Source: the author 
In the NHI policy domain, the identification of policy actors and their policy 
interests can be done by collecting official and unofficial documents. I compiled an 
event-based database recording the involvement of policy participants in three major 
policy events. The database captured the policy standpoints and interests along with the 
basic characteristics and roles. It also provided insights into the political and 
institutional contexts of the NHI policy process in Taiwan. Next, content analyses were 
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performed to arrive at preliminary outlines of the three cases.  
4-2-2. Network Survey and Semi-Structured Interviews 
All survey participants were asked the same set of network-related questions 
concerning their observations and experiences while participating in the reforms. They 
were also asked to supplement the interpretation of my quantitative network analysis. 
The research method combined a network survey and a set of semi-structured interviews 
in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of policy stances and arrive at 
interactive maps of the policy actors involved in the three policy events. The following 
sections describe the design of the questionnaire and interview questions as well as the 
data collection methods used. 
4-2-2-1. Sampling 
As already mentioned, the key challenge determining the success or failure of this 
research concerns the comprehensive identification of the consequential policy 
participants involved in the three policy events. Also, policy network studies are 
sensitive to the identification of research boundaries and participants. Therefore, the 
first challenge the research faced concerned sampling. Laumann et al. (1983) suggests 
that SNA-based research should focus on one or more of the following components: 
actors, relations, or activities (events). There are two methods of identifying the system 
boundaries in policy domain studies. The first is the positional approach in which 
³membership test´ refers to the presence or absence of attributes indicating the 
occupancy of a position in a formally constituted organisation (Knoke and Yang, 2008: 
15; Laumann and Knoke, 1987: 95). This approach can be also specified as a nominalist 
approach. It imposes a conceptual frameworNGHVLJQHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶V
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theoretical agenda (Knoke et al., 1996: 66). The second is the reputational approach 
which utilises the judgements of knowledgeable informants while delimiting the set of 
participant actors (Laumann and Knoke, 1987: 95; Knoke and Yang, 2008: 15). This 
approach can also be called the realist approach. It assumes that all or most actors share 
a subjective awareness of who belongs to a social system (Knoke et al., 1996: 66). In 
empirical studies, these two approaches are sometimes combined (Laumann and Knoke, 
1987, 1989; Laumann and Pappi, 1976). Laumann and Knoke (1987, 1989) used the 
event participation approach to combine the previous two approaches and identify the 
participants in different policy events so as to narrow down network boundaries in the 
scope of a huge policy domain in a specific duration. This research also follows the 
event participation approach to sample the participants and collect the network data at 
specific times and places. 
A policy domain analysis typically begins with multiple methods to delineate the 
core set of domain actors, events, and issues for a given period (Knoke, 1994a: 164, 
1994b: 278-282; Laumann and Knoke, 1987: 94-108). The social groups and key 
persons involved in policy processes can be divided into 3 categories on the basis of 
general political system: internal, external, and intermediate. The internal category 
includes political actors in the administrative and legislative sectors, such as senior civil 
servants and influential legislators. The external category includes social actors in major 
professional or occupational associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Four categories including employer associations, employee associations, welfare 
groups, and medical groups were further delineated. The intermediate category shuttles 
between the external and the internal categories and may include opinion leaders in the 
press, political parties, and the academic community.  
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As PHQWLRQHGDERYHP\UHVHDUFKRQZKRJRYHUQV7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQLV
based on data drawn from policy actors who are influential in the policy making and 
implementation processes. In order to avoid methodological mistakes and make this 
study more manageable, three important policy events representing the financial flow 
mechanism of the NHI (when the DPP was in power, 2000-2008) were selected to 
identify the scope of sampling boundary. The idea was to concentrate the analytical 
focus on the politics of financial reform in the NHI policy domain. Data on these policy 
HYHQWVZHUHFROOHFWHGIURP7DLZDQ¶VPDMRUQHZVSDSHUVRIILFLDOGRFXPHQWVDQG
governmental research reports, and used to classify the participating actors based on 
their status.  
All samples werHFDWHJRULVHGDFFRUGLQJWR/DXPDQQDQG.QRNH¶V
methodology. I tried to pinpoint the key policy players to fit the categories mentioned 
above through two sources. The first comprised the lists of three major NHI 
committees: the NHI Supervisory Committee, the NHI Disputes Review and Settlement 
Committee, and the NHI Committee for the Arbitration of Medical Costs. The second 
consisted of related participants involved in the three policy events. These three 
functional committees were under the DoH and composed of members from both public 
and private sectors. Furthermore, the lists of the three major committee members were 
very stable over several years. This suggested that the power relationships and 
participatory opportunities among the policy participants might have been stable as 
well. The function of the NHI Supervisory Committee is to oversee the operations of the 
NHI; that of the NHI Disputes Review and Settlement Committee is to mediate disputes 
related to the Programme; and that of the NHI Committee for Arbitration of Medical 
Costs is to decide the annual medical expenses for the Programme (DoH, 2004: 13). 
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Some key groups have seats in these Committees and take part regularly in the 
policymaking process under the NHI Act. I also drew a list based on data collected from 
legislative assistants in the Parliament in the period 2000-2008. I focused especially on 
the members of the Parliament and their assistants involved in these three policy events.  
In addition, I also sampled the participants from other relevant sources, especially 
from the newspapers - the China Times and United Daily News. These two newspaper 
companies are two of the biggest and most popular newspaper companies in Taiwan. 
Besides the above three committee members, there were other important policy 
participants involved in these three policy events each advocating his/her own interests 
and policy goals. Although some of them had no connections with participants in 
official channels, they still tried to influence the policy outcomes via other ways such as 
legislative lobbying, protesting, and organising participants in a collective endeavour. 
Through the two most important newspapers in Taiwan and interviews, I carefully 
reviewed and identified the policy stakeholders and their interests and standpoints with 
regard to the three policy events. Following intensive review processes and 
consultations, I arrived at an interview list consisting of 62 NHI policy participants4 
including official and unofficial actors and mediators involving three policy events in 
the NHI policy domain (see Table 4-2). 
I found that the policy participants in these three policy events were highly 
overlapping. This suggested that, in the NHI policy domain between 2000 and 2008, 
decision-making power was concentrated within a few, stable policy actors. It also 
                                                 
4
 Some interviewees mentioned that the President Shuei Bian Chen and two premiers of the Executive 
Yuan were also important in the NHI financial reforms in the DPP government between 2000 and 2008. 
However, they were not selected based on policy event participation on the one hand and they were also 
hard to be accessed on the other hand (the President Chen is serving a prison sentence now). Thus, they 
are not in the interview list of this research. 
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PHDQW,ZDVQ¶WIDFLQJ possible methodological problems arising from a changing 
network structure. These policy actors, either organisations or individuals, were then 
classified into eight categories: 10 from administrative sectors, 9 legislators involved in 
WKH1+,DIIDLUVLQ7DLZDQ¶V3DUOLDPHQWPDLQHPSOR\HUDVVRFLDWLRQVLQ7DLZDQ
(business associations), 8 main employees associations in Taiwan (labour unions), 4 
main welfare NGOs involving in the NHI financial affairs, 6 main medical associations 
in Taiwan, 8 other intermediate participants such as the mass media and political parties, 
and 12 important scholars with different standpoints and varied professional 
backgrounds. The scholars various backgrounds include health management, financial 
management, economics, public health services, laws, sociology, public administration 
and policy, health policy, political sciences, medicine, etc. In sum, the above mentioned 
policy actors participated in NHI affairs frequently. 
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Table 4-2. Major Policy Participants in the NHI Policy Domain 
Category No Title Category No Title 
Administrative 
Sector 
A1 Department of Health  D8 Taiwan Labour Union 
A2 Ministry of Civil Service Welfare 
NGOs 
E1 &RQVXPHUV¶)RXQGDWLRQ 
A3 Ministry of the Interior E2 Taiwan Health Reform Foundation  
A4 Ministry of Finance E3 League of Disable Groups  
A5 Council of Labour Affairs E4 NHI Supervision League 
A6 
Directorate General of 
Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics  
Medical 
Associations F1 
Taiwan Medical 
Association  
A7 Ministry of Economic Affairs F2 The National Union of Pharmacist Associations 
A8 Taipei City Government  F3 China Dental Association 
A9 Kaohsiung City Government  F4 
The National Union of 
&KLQHVH0HGLFDO'RFWRUV¶
Associations 
A10 Bureau of the NHI F5 Taiwan Hospital Association 
Legislative 
Sector B1 Legislator A F6 
Taiwan Community 
Hospital Association  
B2 Legislator B 
 
Intermediate 
Groups G1 United Daily News 
B3 Legislator C 
 
G2 Daily News 
B4 Legislator E 
 
G3 China Times 
B5 Legislator F 
 
G4 Liberty Times 
B6 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Caucus G5 DPP Policy Section  
B7 Kuomintang (KMT) Caucus G6 KMT Policy Section 
B8 People First Party (PFP) Caucus G7 PFP Policy Section 
B9 Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) Caucus G8 
Alliance of Fairness and 
Justice  
Employer 
Associations C1 
The Chinese National 
Federation of Industries 
Scholars H1 Prof. A 
C2 The Chinese National Federation of Commerce H2 Prof. B 
C3 
The Chinese National 
Association of Industry and 
Commerce 
H3 Prof. C 
C4 National Association of Small 
and Medium Enterprises H4 Prof. D 
C5 Association of Public Enterprises  H5 Prof. E 
Employee 
Associations 
D1 Chinese Federation of Labour  H6 Prof. F 
D2 Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions H7 Prof. G 
D3 Chinese General Federation 
of Craft Unions H8 Prof. H 
D4 Taiwan Provincial )LVKHUPHQ¶V$VVRFLDWLRQ  H9 Prof. I 
D5 Taiwan 3URYLQFLDO)DUPHUV¶Association H10 Prof. J 
D6 Committee of Action for Labour Legislation H11 Prof. K 
D7 Chinese General Labour League H12 Prof. L 
Source: the author 
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The sampling list including both organisational and individual actors faced a 
potential methodological problem. Normally, organisations cannot be viewed simply as 
³individualV´. An individual is a unitary actor while making decisions, whereas an 
organisation is a formally structured plurality of actors whose decisions are made 
through social processes involving many individual participants with different 
capacities and briefs. Moreover, organisational interests can be seen as outcomes of 
internal decision processes that take into account the interests of all members in an 
organisation. However, in reality, organisational interests are usually unitary rather than 
multiple because of the hierarchical managerial structure and common vision in a 
formal organisation. For example, the dominant coalition - a subset of organisational 
members in authority positions, typically seeks to impose its preferences or facilitate 
decisions on the entire collectively, despite the resistance from or the indifference of 
other members (Goodman and Pennings, 1977: 152; Knoke et al., 1996: 81). This also 
means that organisational interests can be organised in a unitary brief which can 
represent the collective decision making of an organisation. The highest position within 
each organisation, such as the CEO or an executive committee member, can be assumed 
to represent the interests and unify the policy goals of their members. Their social 
relations (in a policy domain is something like the interconnections of resource 
exchange) with other policy actors can be represented by WKHLURZQRUJDQLVDWLRQV¶
interconnection with other policy actors.  
Thus, in this research, the CEO or other representative individuals (such as the 
member of the above three committees) of the organisational participants in the 
sampling list were interviewed in order to collect the representational data concerning 
these organisational participants in the NHI policy domain. These policy participants, as 
 145 
 
representative interviewees, could be treated as active actors involved in these policy 
events. In the event, we had 62 policy participants. 
4-2-2-2. Network Questionnaire Design and Pre-test 
My social network questionnaire consisted of four main sections. The first 
concerned WKHLQWHUYLHZHHV¶SHUVRQDODWWULEXWHVVXFKDVDJHHGXFDWLRQJHQGHUDQG
occupation. The second focused on fundamental attitudes to the operation of the NHI 
operation. The perceptions of policy actors on the nature of financial and financing 
issues were evaluated on a five-point Likert scale. The third part of the questionnaire, 
also measured in five points, deals with the attitudes on the proposal of the 2G-NHI 
financing financial scheme and related issues for the NHI programme. This section 
measured attitudes towards the institutional design of the 2G-NHI financing scheme by 
suing eight items. The final section - the most important part of the questionnaire - 
focuses on the interactive patterns of these policy actors through not only three sub-
network systems such as information transmission relationship, resource-exchange 
relationship, action-set coalition relationship and influence powers but also some 
questions measuring who has influence and professional knowledge among these policy 
participants on the NHI (see Appendix One).  
7RLGHQWLI\WKHSROLF\GRPDLQ¶VLQIRUPDWLRQWUDQVPLVVLRQQHWZRUNUHVSRQGHQWV
ZHUHVKRZQDOLVWRIWKHLUFRUHSROLF\GRPDLQ¶VLPSRUWDQWSDUWLFLSDQWVVHH7DEOH-2) 
and asked which of the eight categories of policy actors mostly needed policy 
information from others. They then checked all policy actors from whom they received 
such information. Next, they were asked to check all policy actors to whom they were 
most likely to send information. The measurement item of information transformation in 
 146 
 
the whole questionnaire was whether ³WKHSHRSOHRUJDQLVDWLRQVRQWKHOLVWDUH
LPSRUWDQWLQSURYLGLQJ\RXZLWKLQIRUPDWLRQRUH[FKDQJHLQIRUPDWLRQZLWK\RX´ (Q1). 
Similar procedures were used to measure domain resource exchanges and collective 
action networks. Many information transmission network projects studied in the past 
had encountered great difficulties LQREWDLQLQJDFFXUDWHGDWDRQSROLF\DFWRUV¶UHVRXUFH
transactions, either because informants did not know the extent of their contributions or 
refused to reveal what they were (Laumann and Knoke, 1987: 193). As an alternative 
resource measure, we asked informants about receiving public political support such as 
voting. The measurement item concerned ³WKHSHRSOHRUJDQLVDWLRQVRQWKHOLst can 
VXSSRUW\RXUDFWLYLWLHVVXFKDVYRWLQJ\RXUSURSRVDOXQGHUDUHFLSURFDOSULQFLSOH´ (Q2). 
To help ascertain the reputations or influences of policy actors, the informants were 
VKRZQ³DOLVWRISROLF\SDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKH1+,SROLF\GRPDLQ´DQGZHUHDVNHGWR
check policy actors standing out as being especially influential in coping with general 
NHI affairs and three specific policy events (Q4). I measureGSROLF\DFWRUV¶UHSXWDWLRQ
by totalling the number of mentions each received from the informants.  
The questionnaire was designed with a view to exploring the attitudes on these 
reform proposals that the 62 policy actors who were involved in the NHI policy domain 
and attempted to evaluate the political feasibility of the policy-making and 
implementation process. After finishing the draft of the questionnaire, the research 
carried out a pre-test by collecting feedback from some core bureaucrats in the DoH and 
the BNHI and scholars in this area to check the validity and to clarify the diction of 
these questions.  
We screened the frequency and direction of the network of interaction and 
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information among the 62 policy participants. These items were helpful in arriving at a 
fundamental understanding of the political-interactive map of the NHI governance 
mechanism in Taiwan. However, as noted earlier, although the history of the NHI¶V
development spans over a long period, network data could be collected effectively for 
only the three policy events. Therefore, this research focused just on the power 
distributions between policy actors in the NHI policy process as displayed in the three 
events specified above. 
4-2-2-3. Interview Question Design 
To be comparable, all the questions posed in the semi-structured interviews needed 
to follow the principle of SNA. The question design had to be semi-structured in order 
to let interviewees feel more comfortable and have them more willing to express their 
own opinions. In order to link the purposes of policy network studies, the interview 
TXHVWLRQVFRQFHQWUDWHGRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DWWULEXWHVDQGWKHforms and contents of their 
interactions, so as to help arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of ³ZKRWKH
most influential actors are in every policy event and what kind of information exchange 
flows between these policy actors are.´)RUH[DPSOHWKHTXHVWLRQFDQEH³SOHDVH
HODERUDWHRQ\RXURU\RXURUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VSROLF\LQWHUHVWRIWKH*-NHI programme. 
Why are some specific actors influential? Why do they have an influence on the policy 
process? Please indicate the five persons from our list with whom you have closest 
business and professional communication in coping with the NHI affairs? Why and how 
do you have closed connections and with whom? Or indicate five persons with whom 
you most frequently discuss policy affairs? Why do you have frequent discussions with 
WKHVHSHRSOH"+RZGR\RXVKDUHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKH1+,DIIDLUV"´3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUH
asked to talk in detail about these issues and other related topics. Some of these 
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questions may seem sensitive for interview participants and might raise anxiety, stress 
and damage their self-esteem during data collection. The questions needed to be 
embellished in order to avoid ethical harm during the interview. 
To sum up, in semi-structured interviews, there are no simple sets of guidelines for 
determining the sample size (De la Rey, 1999). In this research, the sample was the 
same as in previous social network surveys (see Table 4-2). This was because both 
semi-structured interviews and the network questionnaire survey were conducted at the 
same time. The sociometric assessments of SNA can provide a list of key players. Since 
some these may be members of a given network community, the network based on the 
predetermined roster of these participants is bounded and restricted. In short, the role of 
semi-structured interviews is just supplemental to get a more comprehensive 
understanding of the analytical result of network survey.  
4-2-2-4. Accessing Participants 
The exact indication of the actors and events in a policy domain may decide the 
success or otherwise, of measuring who governs the policy-making and implementation 
processes. In order to minimize the cost of data-collection and maximise valid response 
rate, I utilised semi-structured interviews together with my network survey. As 
discussed previously, methods for establishing the policy domain include the positional 
approach and reputational approach (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Laumann and Knoke, 
1987, 1989; Laumann and Pappi, 1976+RZHYHULQWKHLUVWXG\RQ³Organisational 
State´/DXPDQQDQG.RQNH (1987) proposed the event participation approach to 
identify the events that are influential in the governance structure of the health and 
energy policy domains in the U.S. It also helps identify the actors in these important 
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events. This research followed this approach. 
The social network interviews were DGPLQLVWHUHGXVLQJWKH³QRWDEOHVLQWHUYLHZ´
method (Heinz, Laumann, Nelson and Salisbury, 1993). The fully-structured 
questionnaire discussed above was prepared following the identification of the key 
players, the introductory documents to the NHI financial current status and three reform 
proposals. This was to explore the preferences and attitudes of the policy actors as well 
as their network relationships. As discussed above, the participants involved in the 
policy events were potentially sensitive to issues related to policy network studies, 
especially since these types of research always focus on informal relationships and 
underlying exchange interactions. Real political decision-making is usually conducted 
in sub rosa conditions where the policy actors prefer to keep silent and do not want to 
make their opinions widely known. Besides, it is also difficult to get access to these 
policy actors without strong personal ties and trust. In addition, it is not customary in 
Taiwan to accept interviews from strangers, even for academic purposes. Past 
experiences suggest that a strong personal network or the support of public authority is 
necessary to conduct a social network interview research in Taiwanese society.   
My past experiences with universal healthcare research in Taiwan over the past few 
years (Wang, 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2013) helped build an initial personal network with 
the bureaucrats in the DoH and the BNHI, some important researchers, doctors involved 
in NHI affairs, and committee members in medical, employee and employer¶V
associations. Between 2010 and 2011, I also joined a research project sponsored by the 
DoH and the BNHI. In addition, I was the principle investigator in another research 
project granted by the NSC in Taiwan in 2011. These connections allowed me to contact 
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key informants in this investigation and ask them what procedures might be effective in 
gaining access to the policy participants involved in these three policy events. 
Moreover, joining two research teams on the NHI reform evaluation provided me with 
the rationality needed in accessing the samples. It was also helpful in getting the 
required support from the DoH, the BNHI and the NSC to carry out this investigation. 
For these reasons, these interview participants agreed to be interviewed and provided 
more assistance during my research. All this also illustrates one general point: personal 
network is helpful from both theoretical and practical perspectives: the selection of 
participants (sample) and access to potential interviewees.  
To improve the quality of our interviews, they were all personally conducted by the 
researcher. Likewise, all interviewees were persons included in our sample list 
consisting of leaders or key persons responsible for the NHI affairs in the governmental 
organisations or social groups. The interview guidelines (see Appendix Two; also can be 
modified for use in in-depth interviews.) were followed at all times. Each interview took 
between 40 minutes and 2 hours. Interviewees were shown the list of the participants 
and asked about their organisations and their involvement with each one. In order to be 
able access every participant in the interview list, we utilised the authorities of the DoH 
and the BNHI. We also collected other relevant official records and documents via the 
gateway. Some official documents and archives were very difficult to collect because of 
their obscure characteristics. In these two projects, the researchers grasped every 
opportunity to collect some data from interviewees during the interview. These 
interviews depended strongly on personal relationships and the official authority of the 
minister of the DoH and the CEO of the BNHI and their subordinates. 
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The interview procedure consisted of 3 phases. 35 out of 62 interviews were 
successfully completed between 1st August and 8th October 2010; 10 more were 
interviewed between 8th November and 15th January 2011; and the remaining 17 e were 
interviewed in the period 30th March to 30th June 2011. The network surveys and 
interviews were completed by July 2011. The completion rate was 100%.  
 
4-3. Data Analysis 
Data analysis must take into account the types of data gathered (Cohen, Manion 
and Marrison, 2000). Our data analysis was performed in two stages. The first was a 
sociometric analysis on the network data and was intended to prepare a preliminary map 
of the power distribution between the policy actors and identify potential interviewees 
for subsequent semi-structured interviews. The second stage involved a content analysis 
of the quantitative data from the semi-structured interviews. A statistical analysis with 
6366ZDVXWLOLVHGWRLQGLFDWHWKHWUHQGRIWKH1+,ILQDQFLDOVWDWXVDQGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
attitudes about the proposal to reform 2G-NHI. The units of analysis were participants 
in the NHI policy domain.  
4-3-1. Social Network Analysis 
The NHI¶V reform policy domain was examined and screened via quantitative 
SNA. The quantitative social network data collected via the questionnaire were analysed 
to determine the network size and their interconnections within the NHI policy domain. 
Social network techniques adopting a structural perspective are used to visualise the 
network of relationships systematically. In this research, quantitative social network 
data were analysed by two programmes, called UCINET and NetDraw respectively, 
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which can produce visualisations of network measures such as degree centrality, 
betweenness centrality, structural hole and density, along with the terms used to describe 
network structure and interactive frequency between policy actors (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994).  
Quantitative SNA is a method emphasising social positions and relations in a 
network structure by means of graphs derived via applications of mathematical theories. 
According to past significant empirical works in policy network studies (Heinz et al., 
1993; Knoke et al., 1996; Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989; Sohn, Yu and Kim, 1992), 
information, resource exchange and collective action relationships are the most 
important research issues in understanding the pathways of power exercise in policy 
domains. Numerous works have observed and discussed political interactions among 
policy actors via the sub-networks of communication and resource-exchange (e.g., votes 
and money). Laumann and Knoke (1987) argued that specialised communication 
linkages among consequential actors allow them to accomplish political resource 
exchanges and organise collective action while participating in policy events. 
According to previous community elite and policy domain studies (Knoke et al., 
1996; Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989; Laumann, Marsden and Galaskiewicz, 1977; 
Marsden and Laumann, 1977; Woods, 1998), although communicative and information 
channels are the most important instruments in resolving conflicts between multiple 
policy stakeholders, there is no doubt that these channels are mostly established on the 
basis of interpersonal trust. Besides communication and resource-exchange networks, 
attention is paid to the relationship with interpersonal trust in this research. However, 
the interpersonal trust relationship might be susceptible to the fancies of policy 
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participants. Some participants decline the invitation, thus increasing the over cost of 
interviewing. Thus, most of the previous works had to ignore some trust relations 
between policy makers (Knoke et al., 1996; Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989; 
Laumann et al., 1977; Marsden and Laumann, 1977; Woods, 1998). My quantitative 
social network data was designed and collected for the NHI policy domain and was 
analysed for the purpose of examining the three previously discussed sub-networks and 
influence reputation index.  
In order to analyse the quantitative social network data meaningfully, certain steps 
need to be followed. First, data validity needs to be checked. This step examines the 
returned questionnaires and differentiates between valid and invalid questionnaires for 
further analysis. For instance, if the items of social network section are nonresponse in 
the returned questionnaires, these questionnaires will be identify invalid. Second, the 
detailed coding process is initiated. If the participant has a relationship with other 
participants (the row policy actor reportedly gets policy information or receives support 
IURPWKHFROXPQSROLF\DFWRU³´VKRXOGEHentered in the coding window of UCINET; 
HOVH³´LVentered. Third, valid data sets of these sub-networks are created and 
analysed with certain indicators in order to map and screen the structure of these 
networks and relationships among the participants. Fourth, a primary explanation of the 
interactive patterns is established under the principle of policy network perspectives, 
especially the policy community/issue network typology, which can provide a rough 
political map of these policy networks in the domain of the NHI financial sustainability. 
In order to conduct the network analysis accurately, the indicators of SNA need to 
be utilised by applying relational and positional approaches. The indicators of degree 
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centrality and betweenness centrality are two most important criteria in determining 
who the key person is in a bounded domain established through a relational approach. 
³Degree-centrality index´ means that, regardless of whether they are sending or 
receiving ties, a prominent actor has high involvement in many relationships (Christina, 
2012; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Knoke and Yang, 2008; Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). A higher degree centrality score means that the actor is involved in more 
relationships (strong ties) and that the actor not only has more possibilities to mobilise 
informal power in the decision-making and implementation process but also has more 
support from other actors in the network structure (Krackhardt and Hanson, 1993). 
Degree centrality index can be calculated by formula one, 
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g
j
ji
g
j
ijiiD zzndnC
11
)()(
 
˰1˱ 
where ( )( iD nC  denotes the degree centrality of node i and ¦ 
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 counts the number of 
direct ties that node i has to the g-1 other j nodes (Christina, 2012; Knoke and 
Kuklinski, 1982; Knoke and Yang, 2008; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
Second, betweenness centrality examines how the actors control information 
exchange, resource flows or undertake collective actions within a network through a 
relational approach. The indicator is concerned with how other actors control or mediate 
the relationship between dyads that are not directly connected (Knoke and Yang, 2008: 
%XUW¶VVLJQLILFDQWZRUNRQ³VWUXFWXUHKROHV´LVDUHSUHVHQWDWLYHZRUNDERXWWKH
power of the betweenness index which focuses more on the ego-central network than on 
 155 
 
the whole network (Burt, 1992, 2001, 2004). In policy network studies, the betweenness 
centrality index means that an actor with a higher betweenness score can also be 
assumed to have more ability to be a policy broker or policy entrepreneur (Kingdon, 
2003). He has more chances to manipulate or facilitate policy outcomes or changes in 
the policy domain. The greater is DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDFWXDORUSRWHQWLDOintermediate value 
for all members of a network, the greater is his control over communication flow and 
independence of others. The betweenness centrality index can be calculated as  
 
                                                                  
˰2˱ 
where jkg  is the number of geodesic paths between the two nodes j and k, and 
)( ijk ng
 is the number of geodesics between the j and k that contain node i. Dividing 
)( ijk ng
 by jkg  measures the proportion of geodesic paths connecting j and k in 
which node I is involved (Christina, 2012; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Knoke and 
Yang, 2008; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
Third, individuals located as structural holes may have more chances to manipulate 
collective outcomes and exhibit positive individual performances (Cross and 
Cummings, 2004). It is because actors who take structural-hole positions have more 
unique and timely access to information and greater bargaining power (Burt, 1992, 
2001, 2004). Thus they control over resources and outcomes, and greater visibility and 
opportunities throughout the social system (Seibert, Kraimer and Liden, 2001: 221). 
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Burt (1992: 18) defines a structural hole as a relationship of non-redundancy between 
two contacts. According to the structural hole theory (Seibert et al., 2001: 3), it is 
advantageous for individuals to bHFRQQHFWHGWRPDQ\³DOWHUV´WKHSHUVRQ¶VQHWZRUN
PHPEHUVZKRDUHWKHPVHOYHVXQFRQQHFWHGWRRWKHUDOWHUVLQWKHHJR¶VFDQEHVHHQDV
RQHVHOIDERYH³WKHSHUVRQ´QHWZRUN,QGLYLGXDOVORFDWHGLQWKHSRVLWLRQVRIVWUXFWXUDO
holes may have more chances to manipulate collective outcomes and create positive 
individual performance (Cross and Cummings, 2004). This is because actors who take 
structural positions have more unique and timely access to information, greater 
bargaining power and thus control over resources and outcomes, and greater visibility 
and opportunities throughout the social system (Seibert et al., 2001: 221). Thus, just as 
with the previous degree and betweenness centrality indexes, the ability to utilise the 
position of structural holes is also a crucial indicator of DQDFWRU¶VSRZHUDQGLQIOXHQFH
in a network structure.  
Effective size is commonly adopted as a measure of structural holes (Burt, 1992, 
2001, 2004). According to Taylor and Doerfel (2003), effective size is a measure which 
indicates the ability to access network members beyond the initial contact of a focal 
network member. In other words, the effective size is the number of people the ego is 
connected to less the redundancy in the network. Thus, it reduces the non-redundant 
elements of the network. Thus, one key set of measures is concerned with the notion of 
redundancy. The general meaning of redundancy is a person's ego network and has 
redundancy to the extent that her contacts are connected to each other as well. Greater 
effective size indicates that actors take positions where there are larger structural holes 
with fewer redundant relationships. The normalized effective size score starts from 0. A 
larger score means that the actor is more autonomous in the network. The effective size 
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may be calculated as 
> @¦ ¦   jqjqiq mmp1  O¶VLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKTGLYLGHGE\M¶V
strongest relationship with anyone where piq = the SURSRUWLRQRIL¶VHQHUJ\that is 
invested in relationship with q. Effective size is the network size (N) minus the 
redundancy in the network (Burt, 1992, 2001, 2004; Christina, 2012) .                                          
˰3˱ 
Fourth, the indices of degree centrality, betweenness centrality and structural holes 
GHDOZLWKDFWRUV¶DELOLW\WRPDQLSXODWHDQGLQWHUPHGLDWHLQIRUPDWLRQRUUHVRXUFHIORZV
within a network at an individual level as determined by a relational approach. 
However, the structure of overall network must also be concerned with the exploration 
of the power pathways in the policy domain. There are three significant indicators of 
SNA positional approach while evaluating the entire network structure in this research. 
The first indicator is density, which can be calculated as the number of all ties occurring 
in the network matrix divided by the number of all possible ties (Knoke and Kuklinski, 
1982). Density ranges between 0 and 1, representing the extremes of a totally 
disconnected or totally connected graph. Density is one of the most important indicators 
to determine the whole structure of policy network (Christina, 2012; Knoke and Yang, 
2008). A higher density score means that the policy network could be considered as a 
policy community rather than an issue network to steer the policy agenda and the 
outcomes. For a symmetric g, the co-attendance matrix, Nijx , whose non-diagonal values 
are the number of events attended by each pair of actors, the density measure is the 
following (Christina, 2012; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Knoke and Yang, 2008; 
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Wasserman and Faust, 1994): 
 
                                                                  
˰4˱ 
Fifth, another important indicator of global network measurement is the E-I index 
(Krackhardt and Stern, 1988). The E-I index is a social network measure capturing the 
relative density of internal connections within a social group compared to the number of 
connections that group has with the external world. Krackhardt and Stern (1988) noted 
the increased effectiveness in moments of crisis of organisations which had stronger 
informal networks that crossed formal internal group structures. The calculation method 
involves the number of ties the group members have to outsiders (E), minus the number 
of ties to other group members (I), divided by the total number of ties (Christina, 2012; 
Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Knoke and Yang, 2008; Wasserman and Faust, 1994), i.e., 
Index = (E-I)/(E+I) 
˰5˱ 
The final important indicator of global network measurement is structure 
equivalence. It is also the most important foundation while discussing the roles and 
positions in an entire network structure XVLQJ61$¶V positional approach. Social 
scientists are interested not only in actor cohesion but also in the equivalence of actors, 
in the sense of two or more actors having identical or very similar relations with others 
in a network (Christina, 2012; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Knoke and Yang, 2008; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Moreover, structural equivalence also means that actors 
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are aggregated into a jointly occupied position to the extent that they have a common set 
of linkages to other system actors (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). In other words, two 
nodes are said to be exactly structurally equivalent if they have the same relationships as 
all other nodes. A node of structural equivalence can be seen as a role occupying the 
same or a similar position in the network structure; two objects in the same set are 
structurally equivalent. Structural equivalence can be calculated by the following 
formula based on the logic of the CONCOR method (White, Boorman and Breiger, 
1976) which is the most popular index used in Blockmodel analysis to partition all 
nodes into different roles and positions in a complete network structure (Christina, 
2012; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Knoke and Yang, 2008; Wasserman and Faust, 
1994): 
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˰6˱ 
However, Wasserman and Faust (1994) pointed out that there are several problems 
with CONCOR as a method for finding the positions of approximately structurally 
equivalent actors in a network system. First, CONCOR¶VSURFHGXUHRIDOZD\VVSOLWWLQJD
set into exactly two subsets imposes a particular form on the resulting positional 
structure of the network. The form of clusters is determined by the procedure rather than 
by the structure of the network. Second, the resulting CONCOR partition often shows 
little resemblance to the social relations that are intuitively and formally understood to 
exist in the network in practice. Third, the formal properties of the procedure are not 
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well understood. Although CONCOR algorithm is not perfect, it is still the most used 
indicator and is widely regarded as particularly appropriate calculating indicator for 
finding out structural equivalence positions and social roles of Blockmodels in SNA 
(Knoke and Yang, 2008: 85-91). 
Moreover, CONCOR algorithm can be used with MDS to provide a visual 
representation of pattern of proximities among different positions. In SNA, MDS is a 
statistical technique that seeks to represent social similarities (or dissimilarities) among 
a set of entities in a low-dimensional space so that entities that are more similar are 
closer in the space, and vice versa. The MDS map lets us know how close the actors are, 
whether they cluster in a multidimensional space, and how much variation there is along 
each dimension. However, as mentioned, calculating social distance among actors is 
more difficult than calculating their physical distance; the measure of social distance 
can face estimation errors. More specifically, unlike the linear yardstick distances in 
geographic surveying, social distance metrics can contain so much measurement error 
that more than two dimensions are necessary to satisfactorily reproduce the underlying 
social space. Fortunately, MDS and graph-plotting programs can be compute descriptive 
statistics and the stress coefficient that summarise the amount of error between the 
observed distance matrix and the distance matrix calculated from the k-dimensional 
solution (Kruskal and Wish, 1978: 49-52). The stress coefficient is a measure of fit 
ranging from zero to one. The closer it is to zero, the better is the fit of the spatial plot to 
the data (Christina, 2012; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Knoke and Yang, 2008; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
The above SNA indicators and the SNA survey of the 62 policy actors will be 
 161 
 
analysed in subsequent chapters. However, since one scholar in the list of policy actors 
had passed away in September, 2011, I shall not include this data in my discussion on 
the policy outcomes of the 2G-NHI financing scheme in 2012. Thus, although the 
discussion of the NHI policy domain in the DPP government (between 2000 and 2008) 
will be based on 62 samples using positional and relational approaches respectively 
(Chapter 5 and 6), in the case of the 2G-NHI financing scheme all the analysis and 
discussion will be based on the data drawn from 61 samples (Chapter 7).   
4-3-2. Statistical Analysis 
This research utilised documentary statistical data published by the DoH and the 
BNHI for the 2012 General National Health survey. The survey, a nationwide effort, 
offers perhaps the most comprehensive official statistical data and can be considered to 
be UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHQDWLRQDO¶VKHDOWKVXUYH\DQGILQDQFLDOVWDWXVRIWKHhealthcare 
system in Taiwan. The data are able to depict a detailed picture showing the trends of 
1+,¶VILQDQFLDOVWDWXVDQGRWKHUUHOHYDQWVWDWLVWLFV; they have been analysed via 
descriptive statistical analysis with the help of SPSS statistical software. 
With respect to first hand quantitative data sets, some questions related to the 
issues of the policy perceptions of the 2G-NHI financing programme were analysed to 
understand the interests and standpoints of the participants. The analysis removes the 
questions not relating to the research purposes and questions first and then checks the 
characteristics and distributions of the samples (see Appendix Three). After that, the 
items can be used to compare differences in the attitudes of participants across different 
group categories via descriptive statistical analysis and ANOVA. The analysis is also 
helpful in obtaining a general understanding of the SDUWLFLSDQWV¶SROLF\stances with 
 162 
 
respect to specific reform proposals. Also, Pearson correlation analysis will be applied 
to check the correlation between different sources of access and reputational network 
data and avoid the possibility of collinearity between them.  
4-3-3. Content Analysis 
All interviews were audio-UHFRUGHGZLWKSDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRQVHQWWUDQVFULEHGWR
ensure accurate and complete recording, and entered into NVivo qualitative data 
analysis software for data analysis and management. The software is considered to be an 
effective tool to analyse and understand qualitative data for documentary management 
(Bazeley, 2007). Handwritten notes were taken as well during each interview. 
Reflections were recorded as soon as possible after each interview. In order to increase 
the accuracy of the transcripts, a summary of the transcript or full transcript was sent to 
each participant to check for errors and misunderstandings. After checking, the 
transcripts and other relevant documents, they were reviewed and entered. Hence, the 
software of NVivo qualitative research was utilised to manage and let the unstructured 
qualitative data make sense in this research. 
Qualitative data analysis starts with a transcript review of the semi-structured 
interviews and keeps notes of all comments and research analyses. Our examination of 
the qualitative data included six more specific analytical steps inspired by Creswell 
(2003). The first step consisted of organising and preparing the data for analysis. This 
step included transcription of the interviews and data entry. Second, the data were 
analysed to gain a sense of the content and identify the general ideas, tones, impressions 
and credibility. This step attempted to develop an overall feel of the information. Third, 
detailed coding process and analysis was begun, starting with chunks of data that could 
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be segregated into categories. This step initiated the data analysis by importing the 
transcripts and coding in NVivo. Fourth, the coding process included both open coding 
and axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) so as to be able to describe the participants 
as well as the themes for further analysis. This step started analysis by conceptualising, 
categorising, naming the main concepts such as network, informational transmission, 
and political support from the unstructured qualitative data. This was followed by the 
identification of the themes from the initial codes and chunks. The themes were 
analysed for each individual case and then compared across the different cases. Fifth, 
the description and themes were assessed and presented as a narrative. This step 
identified appropriate ways of presenting the data. Sixth, the data was interpreted and 
supplemented by SNA. This step confirmed the propositions using the results from 
quantitative SNA and the documentary review. 
To sum up, every feasible analytical method was used in this research in order to 
see how these participants were related and who was in the centre of the policy 
networks of the decision makers. The influence power and other related sub-personal 
interactions were analysed from data collected from the documentary review, the 
quantitative social network, and the supplemental interview transcripts. Two 
observations are pertinent here. First, it is important to locate the centre of the decision-
maker networks so as to identify who the most powerful stakeholder is in shaping the 
policy process as indicated by centrality scores. In the quantitative analysis, a number is 
assigned to each participant and applied to a multi-dimensional scaling map, which 
attempted to represent the path distance and pathway from each participant to the centre 
of the decision makers. Second, the documentary literature and interview transcripts 
were analysed to supplement and test the accuracy of the results from the quantitative 
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SNA.  
 
4-4. Ethical Issues  
An application for ethical review was submitted to the School of Sociology and 
Social Policy, the University of Nottingham for approval prior to data collection (see 
Appendix Four). In addition, this research obeyed the ethical request from the NSC in 
Taiwan in order to process the research project and gain support from the NSC. 
Moreover, I recognised that I am required to obey the latest statement of ethical practice 
from the British Sociological Association. The School¶s approval was granted before 
implementation. The School was informed of changes in the protocol throughout the 
period of the study.  
Informed consent (see Appendix Five for the Chinese version) was obtained from 
the participants prior to all individual network and semi-structured interviews. All were 
provided full disclosures. M\UROHDVDUHVHDUFKHUVWXG\LQJSROLF\DFWRUV¶
communication and information exchange interactions from the perspective of policy 
network was made known to all involved in the research. Participants were informed 
clearly of the research purposes, what activities are expected of them with regard to the 
interviews, and any risks to their anonymity. Data were stored securely. After each 
LQWHUYLHZWUDQVFULSWVRIWKHLQWHUYLHZVDQGWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VQDUUDWLYHVUHJDUGLQJWKH 
interviews were sent to participants to check the content again in order to reduce 
mistakes and misunderstandings. The final transcripts were made available to the 
participants if asked for. After each interview, a code number was applied to each audio-
mp3 to ensure that the information on the identity of the participants is removed. The 
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list of codes and participant details were kept separately in a secure place. Only the 
researcher had access to the records. The interview mp3 files were stored in an extended 
hard disk and will be destroyed after seven years in accordance with the University of 
1RWWLQJKDP¶VJXLGHOLQHV 
With regard to more details about the procedures of network survey and semi-
VWUXFWXUDOLQWHUYLHZVDOOLQWHUYLHZVWRRNSODFHDWWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ORFDWLRQLQRUGHUWR
make them feel more comfortable and ensure that no ethical issues were encountered. 
No unusual pressure or financial incentives were used to encourage participation in this 
research. Because of the sensitivities involved in policy network research, the interview 
questions avoided language that potentially caused anxiety, embarrassment, stress, and 
GDPDJHWRSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VHOI-esteem. Furthermore, SNA can reveal positive or negative 
information; the researcher and participants are responsible for the ethical use of the 
information that was obtained (Cross and Parker, 2004).  
As far as the report writing is concerned, I omitted information that may reveal the 
identities of individual participants while discussing the findings and using quotes. The 
idea was WRSURWHFWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SULYDF\DQGDYRLGWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶XQHDVLQHVVwith 
potential betrayal in policy domains. I recognised my ethical responsibility to 
disseminate research findings that may potentially impact practices and policies, in 
particular with regard to the ethical principles of the ethical review form which I had 
filled out before starting the research. 
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Chapter 5. Global Power Structure* 
This chapter contextualises the research questions posed in previous chapters by 
using analytical models of policy networks and domains. The focus will be at the 
comprehensive level of policy network analysis: global power structure. The natures 
and functions of policy actors under the National Health Insurance Act will be discussed 
ILUVWWRSURYLGHDEDVLVIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHSROLF\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQVWLWXWLRQDO
positions, resource capacities and overall public interests. Combined with the discussion 
presented in Chapter 3, this chapter sets for the analytical arguments to come in 
subsequent chapters. The second part applies the SNA positional approach to analyse 
the entire network structure.  
This chapter is made up of five sections. The first section introduces the nature and 
policy preference of policy actors in the NHI policy domain. The second explores some 
characteristics of the entire networks, such as network density, the network degree 
centrality index, the E-I index and distance-based cohesion in information transmission, 
resource exchange, action-set coalitions and reputation networks. It identifies the 
HTXLYDOHQWDFWRUV¶UROHVDQGSRVLWLRQVE\FRPELQLQJWKHLUUHODWLRQVZLWKRWKHUSROLF\
DFWRUV¶UHSXWDWLRQDODWWULEXWLRQVLQIRUPDWLRQWUDQVPLVVLRn network, resource exchange 
network, and action-set coalitions into a multi-network structure. The structure is then 
analysed in the third section using the CONCOR algorithm and the Blockmodel. One-
way ANOVA is applied to determine the statistical differences between distinct 
                                                 
*
 3DUWRIWKHFRQWHQWVFRQWDLQHGLQWKLVFKDSWHUDSSHDUHGLQWKHDXWKRUµVDUWLFOH- (2012). A Network 
Approach for Researching Political Feasibility of Healthcare Reform: The Case of Universal Healthcare 
System in Taiwan. Social Science & Medicine (SSCI listed, peer reviewed), 75(12), 2337-2344. 
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structurally equivalent groups. In the fourth section, the roles of policy actors in 
separate networks pertaining to information transmission, resource exchange and action-
set coalitions are subjected to Blockmodel analyses. Section Five summarises the 
conclusions. 
 
5-1. Policy Actors¶ Policy Preferences in the NHI Context 
The DoH and the BNHI run a compulsory healthcare system that provides 
universal coverage and comprehensive benefits to all inhabitants in Taiwan. The single 
public payer, the BNHI, tries to contain administrative costs to a very low level. In 
addition to the policy actor samples identified in Chapter Four, the system takes into 
account other policy participants engaged in co-governance, responsibility sharing and 
PXWXDOVXSHUYLVLRQZKLOHHVWLPDWLQJFRVWV7KH1+,¶VILQDQFLDOIORZPHFKDQLVPLVDQ
institutional co-management platform in which not only official sectors but also 
unofficial actors can legally participate in the policy-making process and share their 
resources. Different members of the governing committees have different institutional 
roles and resources and it is possible that they might exploit their positions to shape 
their standpoints and classify their own influential power in the policy network scenario. 
(1) Administrative Sectors (N=10) 
Nature and Functions: 
Since the adoption of the NHI in Taiwan in 1995, the system has remained a 
government-run, single-player national health insurance scheme. While administrative 
sectors occupy institutionally advantageous positions, the ruling party has the final 
responsibility for operating the NHI in a sustainable manner. The DoH is designed to 
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manage domestic health affairs and the BNHI does the same for NHI affairs. Under the 
supervision of the DoH, the BNHI is the only body authorised to levy the premiums in 
the NHI. It is also an intermediary between the insured and providers and has the 
legitimacy and responsibilities to facilitate communications among them. The BNHI is 
also responsible for system planning, promotion, implementation, supervision, research 
and development, manpower development, information management and auditing 
(BNHI, 2007a: 6). In addition, there are other relevant administrative sectors such as 
Ministry of Civil Service, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and two municipal city governments in Taiwan. Some of them are the 
contributors to public revenue collected under the NHI Act. However, many of them 
play only secondary and supplemental roles by assisting in the operation of the NHI or 
providing consultancy services to the DoH and BNHI in ensuring financial balance. 
Preference: 
In making sure that the NHI operates smoothly and at the lowest cost possible, 
most of the administrative sectors, especially the DoH and BNHI, rely upon the NHI to 
provide the best healthcare service of which not only the insured are satisfied with the 
service quality but also in the way in which the providers and the insured can be 
involved in sharing resources and responsibility. In addition, since the continually 
expanding trend of expenditure is irreversible, the reform of the NHI financial system is 
getting more pressing and politically sensitive. However, due to the rising financial 
deficit of the central government as well as the drastic increase in political competition, 
the ruling party always hopes that she can be safe in the morass of the problem of the 
1+,ILQDQFLDOVXVWDLQDELOLW\:KHWKHUDUHJLPHFRQWLQXHVGHSHQGVRQWKHUXOLQJSDUW\¶V
governance performance whereas the parW\¶VRZQSULRULW\LVWRZLQHOHFWLRQV7KH
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following was said in an interview with a participant from the DoH: 
³mm««The main goal of the DoH is to ensure the stable operation of 
healthcare and provide comprehensive medical service to the people. There is no 
doubt that the government is responsible for the sustainable operation of 
healthcare. Without such stability, the government loses its credibility. The ruling 
party treats the NHI reform as a hot potato. This creates immense pressure on the 
BNHI and DoH.´$GPLQLVWUDWLYHVHFWRU$ 
6RPHWLPHVWRDGGUHVVSHRSOH¶VDQJVWGXULQJDSSURDFKLQJHOHFWLRQVWKHUXOLQJ
party might temporarily put aside reform proposals or switch the focus to other less 
controversial issues.  
(2) Legislative Sectors (N=9) 
Nature and Function: 
7KH3DUOLDPHQWKDVOHJLVODWLYHSRZHUXQGHU7DLZDQ¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQ$OOamendatory 
bills must be submitted to and reviewed by the Legislative Yuan. Due to a divided 
government and drastic increase in political competition between 2000 and 2008, the 
relationship between the central government and the ruling party (the DPP) and the 
majority of Parliament (the KMT) usually present more conflicts on policy legislative 
procedures. There have been two main parties occupying seats in the Legislative Yuan. I 
interviewed WKHPDMRUSDUW\FDXFXVHVWRXQGHUVWDQGHYHU\SDUW\¶VSROLF\SUHIHUHQFHDQG
strategies. Also, other very active and deeply involved legislators in the Social Welfare 
and Environmental Hygiene Committee (the committee which helped divide the 
congressional legislators such that each member does not need to study every bill) in the 
Legislative Yuan were also interviewed as the informants. 
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Preference: 
The first priority of the ruling party and its legislators is to continue its ruling 
power and pass its reform proposals in the Legislative Yuan. However, the opposition 
may also intend to drive the NHI reform in different directions. These different policy 
stances and reform proposals could represent different party standpoints. The legislators 
not only review and reduce budgetary bills, but also monitor the enforcement of the 
budget by passing resolutions with the bills. They also seek to satisfy expectations from 
the electorate. They play their roles carefully to balance pressures and anticipations 
fURPGLIIHUHQWVRXUFHV$FOHUNDVVRFLDWHGZLWK.07¶VSDUW\FDXFXVPHQWLRQHG  
³Even when the party caucus belongs to the same political party as the ruling 
party, reform proposals presented by the latter are not accepted without question. 
We have the responsibility to deliberate on proposals presented by the Executive 
Yuan and not merely issue acceptance stamps. We also have to manage pressure 
and expectations from the voters. Some legislators are backed by welfare and 
labour groups and could thus more easily take their side. Similarly, legislators 
backed by medical groups are more prone to back these said groups. Hence, the 
discussion on the NHI reform proposals in the Legislative Yuan is always very 
complicated and different legislators backed by different groups want to promote 
their own alternatives on different policy stances.´/HJLVODWLYHVHFWRU% 
In terms of political conviction, the stances of the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity 
Union (the TSU) are similar, so the two-party alliance earned the nicknaPH³WKHSDQ-
JUHHQFDPS´/LNHZLVHVLQFHWKHVtance of the opposition party (the KMT), which has 
EHHQLQWKHPDMRULW\LQWKH/HJLVODWLYH<XDQVLQFHLVVLPLODUWRWKDWRIWKH3HRSOH¶V
)LUVW3DUW\WKH3)3WKHDOOLDQFHPD\EHFDOOHGWKH³WKHSDQ-blue FDPS´  
(3) Employer associations (N=5) 
Nature and Functions: 
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There are five major employer associations in Taiwan. Although each represents 
VSHFLILFHPSOR\HUV¶LQWHUHVWVWKUHHRIWKHVHDVVRFLDWLRQVKDYHRYHUODSSLQJPHPEHUVKLS
(the Chinese National federation of Industries, the Chinese National Federation of 
Commerce, the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce). According to 
the NHI Act, the employer associations are among the contributors to the premiums. 
Since the premiums increase the financial burden on the associations, employer 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVSOD\DFULWLFDOUROHLQPRQLWRULQJWKH1+,¶VRSHUDWLRQV7KHUHIRUHWKH
representatives of these five employer associations also have institutional positions to 
express and fight for their preferred policy goals in the Expenditure Negotiation 
Committee. Every delegate of the employer associations has one vote to approve or veto 
proposals related to revenue or expenditure. 
Preference: 
Employers are also receivers of healthcare services. Hence, while seeking to 
decrease the contribution rate, their representatives seek to gain a more comprehensive 
VHUYLFHSDFNDJHDQGPRQLWRUWKHSURYLGHUV¶VHUYLFHTXDOLW\,QVRPHFDVHVHPSOR\HU
associations even stood by with the representatives of the insured agaiQVWWKHSURYLGHUV¶
representatives. In other cases, they collaborated with the providers to negotiate with the 
representatives of administrative sectors. This incoherence has led to vacillation among 
HPSOR\HU¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV7KH\KDYHUHPDLQHGPRVWO\SDssive. They have been more 
concerned with who can provide more benefits and which proposals end up in the final 
bill. All this points to an information and knowledge gap between the employer 
representatives and the administrative sectors or medical associations. The interviewee 
from the National Association of Small and Medium Enterprises stressed:  
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³(PSOR\HUDVVRFLDWLRQVDUHDQLPSRUWDQWVRXUFHIRUSUHPLXPV+RZHYHU,
have to confess that we are usually not very keen participants because most of us 
are less familiar with healthcare issues and thus cannot contribute extensively. 
Furthermore, opinions vary among different employer associations, and without 
FRQVHQVXVWKHVHDVVRFLDWLRQVFDQQRWH[HUWDQ\UHDOLQIOXHQFH´ (Employer 
association C4) 
(4) Employee associations (N=8) 
Nature and Function: 
Compared to employers, employees are usually more disadvantaged. Although 
WKH\DUHWKHYRWHUVDQGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVLQPDQ\SROLF\GRPDLQVPRVWHPSOR\HHV¶ULJKWV
and interests are often ignored in national polices. Under the NHI Act, the 
representatives of the employee associations are expected to negotiate employee interest 
with representatives from other categories. These representatives serve as public-
opinion agents who can enter national politics on behalf of emplR\HHV¶LQWHUHVWVDQGFDQ
also be county-level interpellators and overseers, so that they can have political 
influential power to bargain with the central government, the employers and the 
providers based on their own public-opinion foundation. However, mostly, the 
HPSOR\HHV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVKDYHEHHQQRQSURIessional and passive delegates on the NHI 
affairs. 
Preference: 
7KHILUVWSULRULW\RIWKHHPSOR\HHV¶OHDGHUVLVWRSURWHFWWKHULJKWVDQGLQWHUHVWVRI
all employees. They are expected to champion more comprehensive and superior 
healthcare provisions along with a lower premium contribution rate. To realize this goal, 
usually, delegates representing different employee associations establish collaborative 
alliances with welfare NGOs who generally profess similar stances with regard to 
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policy processes. In addition to protecting their own official right, they seize upon every 
opportunity to speak up in favour of protecting labour rights in the NHI policy domain. 
The interviewee representing the Taiwan Labour Union claimed:  
³Employee groups and Welfare NGOs usually have the same interests when it 
comes to healthcare issues. We do not wish to see the BNHI, DoH, and medical 
groups gain sole control over healthcare. It is true, however, that the healthcare 
system in Taiwan has always had imbalance between the insured and the provider. 
The BNHI always sides with medical groups in attempts to increase premiums to 
PHHWWKHODWWHU¶VQHHGV´7KLVLVWKHUHDVRQZK\ZHDUHDOZD\VYHU\GLVFRQWHQWZLWK
the reform proposals about financing scheme and pull every string and strive for 
our voice in this matter.´(PSOR\HHDVVRFLDWLRQ'  
(5) Welfare NGOs (N=4) 
Nature and Function: 
Although representatives from welfare NGOs delegate the rights and interests of 
the insured (except for the employers and employees), the representation of some of 
them has been questioned frequently. Under the NHI Act, the representatives are 
expected to articulate the preferences of the insured, monitor the performance of the 
1+,¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDQGQHJRWLDWHWKHFRQWULEXWLRQUDWHVDQGGLVWULEXWLRQVDVVRFLDWHG
with the global budget payment. Welfare NGOs constantly monitor the quality of health 
service and oppose medical providers and administrative sectors. However, welfare 
NGOs stick to institutional channels advocating their policy goals or impacting policy 
outcomes. Some claim that they are more representative than many involved in the NHI 
committees. FRULQVWDQFHVRPHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVVXFKDVWKH)LVKHUPDQ¶V)RXQGDWLRQDQG
WKH)DUPHU¶V$VVRFLDWLRQDUHXVXDOO\LQDFWLYHLQWKH1+,SROLF\GRPDLQDQGWKHLU
participation is a format outweighing quality. Further, most welfare NGOs represent 
social groups engaged in providing political support and election mobilisation through 
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social group networks. Hence their representatives have long been regarded as 
LPSRUWDQWVRFLDOPHFKDQLVPVLQPDLQWDLQLQJWKHUXOLQJSDUW\¶VOHJLWLPDF\ 
Preference: 
Compared to medical associations, most welfare NGOs are deficient in manpower 
and financial resources. However, as a public group close to the people, their 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶ILUVWSULRULW\LVWRSURWHFWWKHULJKWVDQGLQWHUHVWVRIWKHVRFLDOJURXSV
concerned. The interviewee of the Taiwan Health Reform Foundation expressed:  
³Welfare NGOs strive to become more involved in healthcare issues. However, 
our understanding of the NHI system cannot refute the fact that medical groups 
and thus are often ignored. The same can be said of our resources, thus rendering 
us unable to conduct a systematic study of healthcare policies. We usually end up 
just monitoring the procedures and serve as a voice of the people.´:HOIDUH1*2V
E2) 
Like the previous two categorised associations, these welfare NGOs aim not only 
to share revenue but also to gain health service from providers. These welfare NGOs 
care about the contribution rate in the financing scheme and the service quality they 
obtain. They always approach official representatives in the NHI policy domain to 
negotiate with the government for lower contribution rates and a more comprehensive 
package. They also champion better service quality and review the annual global budget 
payments of medical associations. My experience indicates that they usually have major 
conflicts with medical providers in matters related to financing and payments. 
(6) Medical Associations (N=6) 
Nature and Function: 
The NHI covers Western medicine, Chinese medicine, dental care and hospital care 
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as well as preventive heaOWKDQGFKLOGGHOLYHU\VHUYLFHVWRPHHWWKHSXEOLF¶VGLYHUVH
medical needs. Western medicine can be divided into three levels of healthcare 
providers: Taiwan Hospital Associations, Taiwan Community Hospital Associations and 
the National Union of Pharmacist Association. The NHI can be seen as a co-governance 
mechanism between the government and healthcare providers. This is because the 
BNHI and the DoH not only pay medical fees to the medical providers in exchange for 
high quality medical care but also set up indices to evaluate the service quality. To 
ensure the sustainable operation of the NHI, the GBP system has created a 
communicative platform for annual payment negotiation between the BNHI and 
providers. It has also created a self-regulation and inter-monitor environment consisting 
of professional healthcare associations. The medical associations do not just engage in 
self-regulation to provide medical services within their associations; they also negotiate 
annually the price of points with other delegates under the GBP system. Even in more 
toilsome environments, the healthcare providers, including the pharmaceutical 
association, generally exhibit professional asymmetry in health service provision and 
medical cost estimation. 
Preference: 
Most medical providers strive for more income and support from the public and 
less service pressure. They want the public to be highly satisfied with the healthcare 
system. They also want to get as much medical payment as possible. In the early days, 
the NHI paid medical feHVWRKHDOWKFDUHSURYLGHUVRQD³IHHIRUVHUYLFH´))6LQ
DFFRUGDQFHZLWKXQLIRUPQDWLRQDOIHHVFKHGXOHV))6VDWLVILHGWKH0HGLFDO$VVRFLDWLRQV¶
profit requirements. But it also increased the financial burden and led to resource 
wastage. However, more recently, in order to restrain healthcare expenditure, medical 
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associations have started negotiating the annual payment rate with other official 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGLQWHUQDOO\UHJXODWHKRVSLWDOV¶DQGGRFWRUV¶PHGLFDOEHKDYLRXUXQGHU
the global budget system. Under the GBP system, operations have deteriorated in many 
hospitals. For these reasons, reasonable growth in the global budget and punishment for 
poor performance have become the priorities of many medical associations during NHI 
negations.  
 The interviewee from the Taiwan Hospital Association stressed that the control 
targets imposed by the GBP system is a major constraint in balancing high-quality 
PHGLFDOVHUYLFHSURYLVLRQDQGSURYLGHUV¶VXUYLYDOULVN  
³7RWHOOWKHWUXWKZHDUHDOOQRWKDSS\ZLWKWKH deadlock between the medical 
associations and the inured. The representative groups from the insured always 
stand on different viewpoints with us. They just oppose what they want to oppose, it 
is not rational! In fact, medical groups are usually in a disadvantaged position. 
Since the GBP system was implemented, we have been struggling to maintain 
finances. However, there is a general negative opinion towards us that further 
damages our confidence. Few acknowledge the quality of our services in such a 
financially limited environment. We are not being selfish, but we need to take care 
RIRXUQHHGV´(Medical association F5) 
(7) Intermediate Groups (N=8)   
Nature and Function: 
Mass media are frequently touted as the essential fourth power ensuring checks 
and balances in a democracy. Intermediate groups may not be institutional participants, 
EXWWKH\VRPHWLPHVSOD\DQLPSRUWDQWUROHE\DURXVLQJSHRSOH¶VDZDUHQHVVRIWKHLU
ULJKWVDQGLQWHUHVWV)RUH[DPSOHLQWKHFDVHRIWKHGRXEOHUDLVHVFKHPH¶VSURPRWLRQ
the QHZVSDSHUV¶news story and commentary RIWKH%1+,¶VSROLF\FDXVHGWKH
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opposition party and the public to oppose hikes in rates and forced the ruling party to 
compromise on the final scheme. In addition to mass media, the policy research sections 
of the various political parties help study the reform proposals and draw up their own 
proposals, thus promoting inter-party competition and legislative wrestling. 
Preference: 
Intermediate groups, especially the mass media, have not been stable in terms of 
their preferences. The interview participant from the Daily News mentioned had the 
following to say:  
³7KHPHGLDLVPDLQO\FRQFHUQHGZLWKEDODQFHGUHSRUWLQJDQGGHOLYHULQJ
information... :HSOD\DYHU\DFWLYHUROHLQGHOLYHULQJDQGPDQDJLQJLQIRUPDWLRQ´ 
(Intermediate group G2)  
Similar to the situation of other countries, each mass medium has its own views on 
each issue. )RULQVWDQFHHYHQWKRXJKWKH/LEHUW\7LPHV¶VSROLWLFDOYLHZVDUHFORVHWR
those of the ruling party, the political stances of the United Daily News, the Daily News 
and the China Times are closer to those of the pan-blue camp. Their reports on the NHI 
reforms are usually critical when the DPP was in power. In many cases, some popular 
newspapers (especially the United Daily News, the Daily News and the China Times) 
FULWLFLVHGQRWMXVWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHIRUPSURSRVDOVEXWDOVRWKHPHGLFDOSURYLGHUV¶
interests. Quite often, they trace controversial issues and write critiques to express the 
YRLFHRIWKHGLVDGYDQWDJHGPLQRULW\LQ7DLZDQ¶VVRFLety. The interviewee from the 
China Times said:  
³PPLI\RX¶GOLNHWRGLVFXVVWKLVLVVXHLWLVFOHDUWKDWGLIIHUHQWmedia support 
different political tendency. For example, as you know, the Liberty Times is pro-
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'33ZKLOHWKH8QLWHG'DLO\1HZVLVRQ.07¶s side. Thus, the reports or comments 
on the NHI issues of the Liberty Times are always more friendly to the DPP 
government than others. However, most media looks at the new financing scheme 
from a critical standpoint. The public has a right to information, and the 
government has the responsibility to ease their concerns.´,QWHUPHGLDWHJURXS* 
(8) Scholars (N=12)   
Nature and Function: 
Since the planning of the first generation of the NHI, scholars specialising in 
healthcare service, financial management, social policy, law and public administration 
have been playing important roles in administrative sectors or be the consultants of 
many associations or social groups. The DoH and BNHI appointed several reputable 
scholars as official committee members to serve spokesmen of the public. Some 
scholars have served in important official positions such as the CEO of the BNHI, the 
minister of the DoH and the chairman of other related NHI committees. Moreover, 
many scholars in the interview list had joined the research teams examining the 1G-NHI 
comprehensive physical examination and the formulation process of the 2G-NHI 
programme. Their varied and professional backgrounds have sometimes helped resolve 
strong differences during conflicts.   
Preference: 
Scholars are usually expected to give advice and suggest better alternatives from a 
professional standpoint. In most cases, they prefer to play a neutral third-party role and 
mediate conflicts among representatives with different interests. Some of them have 
been invited by the DoH or the BNHI to debate on the formulation process of the 2G-
NHI and other reform proposals. However, those previously in important official 
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positions are expected to harmonise their professional standpoints with the ruling 
SDUW\¶VSROLF\SUHIHrence and improve the feasibility and political acceptability of 
reform proposals. One of the most important scholars shared his participation 
experience as follows:  
³I had many opportunities and experiences to participate in the affairs of the 
NHI over the past two decades. I have also served as a chairman of many NHI 
committees and occupied a position in the DoH. As academics, we support the 
sustainable management of healthcare and often voice our opinions to the BNHI 
and the DoH from a professional standpoint.´6FKRODU+ 
To sum up, every group of policy actors has its own resources and policy 
preferences while participating in the NHI policy domain. The DoH and the BNHI have 
more power under the NHI Act. Employer associations, employee associations and 
medical associations can be seen as interest groups which are necessary parts of the NHI 
politics in Taiwan. They faithfully play their roles in the policy-making processes and 
advocate their standpoints by lobbying or collaborating with other alliance members. 
The news media are also important actors in the policy process. Active communications 
PHGLDFDQEHVHHQDV³ZDWFKGRJV´RIWKHJRYHUQPHQW6RPHVFKRODUVZKRKDYHVHUYHG
as the director of the NHI, the CEO of the BNHI, a member of an important NHI 
committee, or as an advisor in some association or social group may provide valuable 
input or professional advice needed to direct the policy process at hand into a productive 
direction. 
This section has clarified the nature, function and general policy preferences of 
every policy participant sector in the NHI policy domain. Policy preferences and stances 
specific to the case of the 2G-NHI financing scheme will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
 181 
 
5-2. Overview of Global Network Structures  
This section seeks to reveal the general global network structure and identify the 
UROHVRIDFWRUVLQ7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQE\DSSO\LQJWKUHHLQGLFDWRUVQHWZRUN
density, network degree centralisation score, E-I index and distance-based cohesion. 
Network density is the number of ties/links among people in the network, expressed as a 
percentage of all possible ties. For instance, if every person is tied directly with every 
other, the density is 100%. The most centralised network would be star shaped, with 
everyone at the perimeter being directly tied to the one at the centre, but not to each 
other. Network degree centralisation compares the observed centralisation with this 
perfectly centralised star-shaped scenario for a network of the same size, and expresses 
it as a percentage. A degree of centralisation means that, as only a few actors hold the 
majority of the ties linking the network together, only one may reach the well-connected 
few to reach the entire network. The E-I (external-internal) index is the number of ties 
group members have to outsiders, minus the number of ties to other group members, 
divided by the total number of ties. The resulting index ranges from -1 (all ties are 
internal to the group) to +1 (all ties are external to the group). Distance-based cohesion 
is useful in interpreting the cohesiveness of the total structure of the network. The group 
in-degree centrality index and E-I index will also be described in this section. The 
description is preliminary in the sense that the policy participants are not clustered 
according to similar power relations with one another, yet it has descriptive value for the 
conventional public-private actor category. 
6WDUWLQJZLWKWKHSROLF\DFWRUV¶UHSXWDWLRQDODWWULEXWLRQVDQGRYHUDOOFRPSDULVRQV
with other networks, Table 5-1 displays the ranking of the eight different policy 
participant types (in network terms, their in-degrees: the number of times an actor was 
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PHQWLRQHGDV³HVSHFLDOO\LQIOXHQWLDO´LQWKH1+,SROLF\GRPDLQ5HSXWDWLRQDO
attributions may simply indicate the inforPDQWV¶MXGJPHQWVPDGHDVQDWXUDOREVHUYHUVRI
the network system. A reputational attribution is a perception of power imbalance rather 
than real relationships between actors in a network. Of the four network structures, the 
mean density is the highest for the reputation network (16.2% of choices made, with an 
DYHUDJHRI³YRWHV´UHFHLYHGSHUSROLF\SDUWLFLSDQWLQWHUPHGLDWHLQWKHDFWLRQ-set 
coalition network (11.1% of choices made, with an average of 6.742 votes per policy 
actor) and the information transmission network (10.1% of choices, with an of average 
6.161 votes per policy participant), and the lowest in the material resource exchange 
network (6.5% of choices, with an average 3.968 votes per policy participant). The 
degree centralisation scores indicate how centred the network is around a few dominant 
policy actors. It can be seen that the reputation network (61.838%) and information 
transmission network (61.380%) are the most highly centralised while the least 
centralised is the resource exchange network (41.709%) - the action-set coalition 
QHWZRUN¶VFHQWUDOLVDWLRQLVYHU\FORVHWRWKLV)XUWKHUPRUHWKHRYHUDOOSRVLWLYH(-I index 
value shows that these four network structures exhibit rather than homophily 
(Krackhardt and Stern, 1988). The information transmission network, with the highest 
E-I index value (0.650), has more heterogeneity than the other network structures. 
Finally, distance-based cohesion shows the number of edges in the shortest path 
between each pair of nodes in a network. In addition to the reputation network, the 
action-set coalition network has the highest distance-based cohesion value (0.417), 
which illustrates that the relations in acting together in NHI policy events is more 
relationally cohesive than the information/resource exchange relations in the NHI policy 
domain. Thus, these four networks present very different pictures.  
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Table 5-1. Four Network Structures Classified by the Type of Policy Participants 
 Information N. Resource N. Action-set N. Reputation N. 
 In-degree E-I Density E-I In-degree E-I In-degree E-I 
Administrative sector  10.400 0.543 0.378 0.292 7.000 0.420 13.200 0.687 
Legislative sector 4.000 0.915 0.278 0.529 3.889 0.263 16.444 0.793 
Employer assoc. 1.400 1.000 0.600 -.0091 0.800 0.333 8.800 0.800 
Employee assoc. 2.375 1.000 0.571 0.111 2.750 0.091 7.250 0.923 
Welfare NGOs 6.750 1.000 0.667 0.515 6.750 0.667 7.500 0.953 
Medical assoc. 7.500 0.931 0.600 0.345 6.833 0.692 16.833 0.834 
Intermediate groups 11.375 0.685 0.036 0.840 1.500 0.938 4.125 0.820 
Scholars 4.417 0.867 0.000 1.000 2.917 1.000 5.583 0.924 
Overall mean in-degree 6.161 3.968 6.7425 9.887 
Network centrality 61.380% 41.709% 42.790% 61.838% 
Network density 0.101 0.065 0.111 0.162 
Overall E-I index 0.650 0.397 0.397 0.573 
Distance cohesion 0.377 0.240 0.417 0.429 
Source: the author 
As mentioned earlier, public administrators and parliamentary actors play a crucial 
role in the NHI policy domain. The right to vote in the legislature is given only to these 
individuals. However, legislators may be organised collectively along party lines, so 
these party groups in parliaments and in legislative committees are corporate actors (the 
DPP caucus, the KMT caucus, the PFP caucus and the TSU caucus). Table 5-1 clearly 
shows that the members in the legislative and administrative sectors enjoy a reputation 
for having influence substantially above the average. However, in comparison with 
other networks, it is also obvious that the in-degree values of legislative members are 
much lower than their reputational values and those of the administrative sector. It is not 
implausible that the legislators, who have the right to vote on bills and oversee the 
SXEOLFVHFWRU¶VLPSOHPHQWDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHRFFXS\DQDGYDQWDJHRXVLQVWLWXtional 
position in the policy formation and implementation processes, notwithstanding the fact 
                                                 
5
 The action-set coalition network is a symmetric matrix. 
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that they seldom exchange information/material resources with other policy participants. 
For legislators and party caucuses, parliament won't be in session during all year, the 
frequent information and political resource exchange has just occurred in the session. 
This is the reason why the results show that information and political resource exchange 
between the legislative sector and other policy participants are rare. The public sectors, 
especially the DoH (A1) and the BNHI (A10), maintain highly frequent interactions 
with other policy stakeholders through numerous platforms, including publishing new 
white papers, hosting public for a and building regular committees for healthcare 
service and global budget negotiations. It is also interesting that the members of the 
medical associations enjoy the highest reputations as a result of their superior access to 
information and knowledge. They also have greater power and resources while 
negotiating with the DoH and the BNHI or lobby in the legislative procedure. From the 
perspective of the degree centrality, it can be concluded at this stage that the legislative 
sector, the medical associations and the administrative sector are the most important 
SOD\HUVLQ7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQ 
Turning to the information transmission network, Table 5-1 suggests that the chief 
communication targets in the NHI policy domain are the administrative sector (10.400) 
and intermediate groups (mass media; 11.375). These two have the highest in-degree 
scores, followed by the medical associations. Moreover, employer associations have the 
lowest in-degree scores, showing that other policy stakeholders did not have that many 
information exchanges with them. On the other hand, the E-I index value also reveals 
some interesting characteristics of the entire network, split into the categorised groups. 
A positive and high E-I value indicates more and stronger cross-site relations compared 
to within-site ties. Krackhardt and Stern (1988) suggest that a positive E-I value will be 
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rare in whole networks because of a tendency for friendships to cluster within the group 
rather than external to it. However, Table 5-1 shows that all E-I index values in the 
information transmission network are positive. Furthermore, the employer associations, 
employee associations and welfare NGOs all score 1 for their information exchange 
relations (their overall densities within the groups are all 0). This can be taken to mean 
that the external linkages between the different groups clearly dominate internal 
linkages within these three policy participants in the NHI policy domain. 
However, Table 5-1 also presents somewhat different results. First, the indicators 
for the overall mean in-degree index (3.968), network degree centrality (41.709%), 
network density (0.065), E-I index (0.397) and distance cohesion (0.240) are lower for 
the resource network. This means that the resource exchange network is less centralised 
and also less connected than the information transmission network. This demonstrates 
that weak ties, indeed, bring a wide range of policy participants and categories together 
than other relations in the network. It can therefore be supposed that weak ties in the 
resource exchange network are important for resource mobilisation. Second, it also 
seems that there are fewer resource exchanges than information transmission 
interactions among policy participants. This might be because not all information 
transmission in a policy domain consists of items in high demand, such as resource 
exchanges with other policy actors. Much information is broadcast freely to all system 
participants. To distinguish between valuable and more-or-less freely distributed 
LQIRUPDWLRQWKHPRUH³PDWHULDO´UHVRXUFHVVXFKDVYRWHVXSSRUWDOVRQHHGWREH
discussed. Thus, in order to capture the total power picture of a policy network, it is 
essential to combine the above with the insights from the relational approach (as will be 
discussed in the next chapter). The comments of the interviewees were confined to 
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policy resources that only other policy participants could provide.  
The administrative sector (7.000), the welfare NGOs (6.750) and the medical 
associations (6.833) have higher centrality in-degree scores than the other policy 
stakeholders in the resource exchange network. This shows that these policy actors are 
more active and have more capabilities for resource mobilisation than others in the 
resource exchange relation. Moreover, the E-I index values show that the scholars 
exchanged resources with other categories rather than internally within the group of 
scholars. On the contrary, although the group E-I indexes of the resource exchange 
network are all positive, the employee associations (0.091) have a lower E-I value than 
that in the information transmission network. The members of this group access and 
mobilise more material resources within the group than through information exchange.  
Finally, Table 5-1 presents the action-set coalition network, which also has a 
somewhat different pattern. The action-set coalition network brings together policy 
DFWRUVZLWKVLPLODULQWHUHVWVLQWKH1+,SROLF\GRPDLQVRWKDWWKHJURXSV¶LQWHUQDO
densities might be very high. The most important evidence is that its distance-based 
cohesion is higher than for the other networks in the NHI policy domain. The in-degree 
centrality index suggests that the chief collaborative coalitions in the NHI policy 
domain are quite fragmented and dispersed among these groups. However, in the action-
set coalition network, the issue is the extent to which policy actors in the same category 
act together. Here, the internal density and the E-I index refer to the densities of 
coalition partners chosen from within each policy participant category. For example, 
few scholars act together in policy event action-sets, and the state government, 
legislative sector and intermediate groups all participate in self-coalition at a lower 
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average rate. In contrast, 60 percent of the employer associations, 57.1 percent of the 
employee associations, 66.7 percent of the welfare NGOs and 60 percent of the medical 
associations are linked to one another by collaborating in two or more event action-sets. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that coalitions formed in the NHI policy domain arise 
mainly within the employer, employee and medical associations and the welfare NGOs, 
and not across different categories. However, the groups also rely on resources from 
different groups (E-I value=0.515). In addition to working together, they need to 
collaborate with other groups to collect more information and resources affecting policy 
outcomes.  
 
5-3. Global Power Structures in the NHI Policy Domain 
This section looks at the global power structure in the NHI policy domain using the 
Blockmodel analysis and MDS. This section weaves together the diverse strands 
mentioned in the previous section into the global network structure of power 
distribution. Specifically, different types of relationships - SROLF\DFWRUV¶ information 
transmission, resource exchange networks, the action-set coalition network, and the 
reputation perception network - are combined to reveal the multiplex patterns 
connecting core and peripheral clusters of actors with equivalent ties. The analytical 
emphasis thus moved actor cohesion to actor equivalence. 
5-3-1. Multi-Matrix and Blockmodel Analysis 
With the decision having been made to examine a full network that includes all 
domain actors irrespective of their authority roles based on formal institutions, the first 
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task is to construct a matrix that optimally measures power in networks. A general 
problem with exchange networks is that the commodities or material resources 
exchanged can be very different. Thus, identifying which relation between policy actors 
reflects the total power structure is quite a difficult task in both theoretical and empirical 
VWXGLHV$V&RRN¶VVRFLDOH[FKDQJHWKHRU\DUJXHVVRPHLPEDODQFHPD\EH
built into actual exchange networks, especially if more than one potential power 
resource is taken into account. For instance, valuable policy information may be 
exchanged not only for other valuable information, but also for securing other resources, 
such as legislative votes. To obtain a complete picture of the multiple, hidden power 
dimensions, an analyst would have to exhaustively enumerate the important power 
resources and their exchange rates. In addition, one should try to gather data on 
exchange offers that were not accepted by more powerful or active policy actors. 
Because such information is lacking, this chapter will focus on the four relations 
H[DPLQHGLQWKHSUHFHGLQJFKDSWHUVSROLF\DFWRUV¶UHSXWDWLRQDWWULEXWLRQVLQIRUPDWLRQ
transmission, resource exchange, and action-set coalitions. The idea is to bring our 
JOREDOSRZHUVWUXFWXUHDQDO\VLVFORVHUWRRSHUDWLRQDOLVLQJ&RRNDQG(PHUVRQ¶V
SRZHUGHSHQGHQFHWKHRU\DQG5KRGHV¶VUHVRXUFHGHSHQGHQF\WKHRU\   
In combining the four networks, assumptions about their relative importance for 
WKHRYHUDOOSRZHUVWUXFWXUHVKRXOGILUVWEHGLVFXVVHG7KHQHWZRUNRISROLF\DFWRUV¶
reputations captures a salient power structure dimension. In an interview, the informants 
were asked to identify all RWKHUSROLF\SDUWLFLSDQWVWKDWWKH\VDZDV³HVSHFLDOO\
LQIOXHQWLDO´ZLWKLQWKH1+,SROLF\GRPDLQ7KHUHVXOWLQJUHSXWDWLRQZDVDQDV\PPHWULF
network; its rows were the respondents and its columns were the policy participants 
mentioned as being especially influential. Second, it was not a social exchange network, 
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in the sense of summarising information on actual exchanges or collaborative 
interactions. Rather, it was a perceptual network. It served both to identify actors 
believed to be powerful and to remedy some of the pitfalls associated with mis-
specifying the exchange relations (to be described next). 
Other power structure dimensions are captured by access networks: informational 
transmission, resource exchange and action-set coalition. Most elite network studies 
(Higley, Hoffmann-Lange, Kadushin and Moore, 1991; Higley and Moore, 1981; 
Hunter, 1959; Luamann and Knoke, 1987, 1989; Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Moore, 
1979) collect relational data concerning structural ties that offer elites direct or 
shortened indirect communication/resource exchange opportunities. In the associated 
matrices, the actors granting access are placed along the rows and the actors seeking 
DFFHVVDUHWKHFROXPQV$SROLF\DFWRU¶VSRVLWLRQZLWKLQWKHSRZHUVWUXFWXUHLV
determined by both the information/resources sent and those received. Based on the 
questions asked, the information/resource receivers are supposed to be dependent policy 
participants because they had claimed to need the information/resources provided by the 
senders to achieve their policy goals. Since they enjoy better and broader access, the 
column actors, are likely to be more powerful. However, one need not rely solely on the 
FROXPQDFWRUV¶FODLPVDERXWWKRVHSROLF\DFWRUVWRZKLFKWKH\KDYHDFFHVV,GHDOO\WKHir 
responses should also be cross-validated by the respective row actors. For this reason, 
VRPHUHVHDUFKHUVVHHLQIRUPDWLRQUHVRXUFHH[FKDQJHUHODWLRQVDV³FRQILUPHG
LQIRUPDWLRQUHVRXUFHH[FKDQJHPDWULFHV´ (Knoke et al., 1996; Laumann and Knoke, 
1987, 1989). They reveal latent access dimensions of power networks. These relations 
can be seen as a way of double-checking asymmetric networks such as the reputational 
one.  
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%\XVLQJERWKDFWRUV¶UHSXWDWLRQDQGDFFHVVQHWZRUNPDWULFHVDFRUHFOXVWHURI
policy actors in the NHI policy domain can be identified. This cluster jointly occupies 
the centre of the confirmed information/resource exchange relations, in the sense that 
they send and receive valuable information/material resources to and from other 
positions. If nothing were known about the interests of the policy actors in the central 
positions or with strong connections, one might doubt whether they actually constitute a 
unified ruling caucus in terms of a policy community or policy advocacy coalition. Do 
they usually agree on public policies, or are they divided into two or more opposing 
subgroups with different policy preferences? In analysing reputational attribution and 
access networks, it is possible for one player to appear powerful simply because he/she 
can access or receive valuable information/resources from other policy players. This 
does not mean that these powerful policy actors share the same policy preferences and 
act together with the receivers towards common policy goals. Some policy actors might 
occupy less powerful positions in the reputation and access networks, but would still be 
able to protect themselves from utility losses by building coalitions with other actors 
who share their preferences on a particular set of policies. Therefore, the fourth power 
structure matrix, the action-set coalition network, is constructed. Action-set 
relationships are coalitions whose partners hold the same policy goals with respect to a 
legislative bill or policy event. Thus, the action-set matrix is symmetric; both parties are 
included twice and the columns and rows contain the same data.  
%\MRLQWO\DQDO\VLQJWKHIRXUSRZHUVWUXFWXUHGLPHQVLRQVRISROLF\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
reputations, information and material resource exchange networks and action-set 
coalitions, global power structure analysis comes closer to operationalising Cook and 
(PHUVRQ¶VSRZHUGHSHQGHQFHWKHRU\DQG5KRGHV¶VUHVRXUFH 
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dependency theory. Actors obtain power to the extent that others depend on them to 
supply the desired resources. In order to accomplish this objective fully, the reputational 
distribution network should be interpreted as a resource dependence matrix wherein 
reputational differences indicate power imbalances. In this case, interpreting a non-
mutual reputation as an indicator of a resource dependence relation may overemphasise 
WKHGHSHQGHQFHDVSHFW5HSXWDWLRQDODWWULEXWLRQVVLPSO\LQGLFDWHWKHLQIRUPDQWV¶
judgments as natural observers of the network system. Thus, a conservative strategy of 
interpreting the weight of reputation attributions in the multi-matrices can be useful in 
exploring the global power structure.  
Based on the above discussion of the rationale for combining different networks, it 
can be anticipated that the new multi-matrix network will be much more complex, 
increasing the difficulty of the following analysis and explanation. Blockmodel analysis 
is a quantitative method for reducing the complexity of relations and perceptions in 
multiple networks of actors. Details of the technical procedures are available from 
several sources (e.g. Christina, 2012; Knoke and Kuklnski, 1982; Knoke and Yang, 
2008; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). A Blockmodel analysis is a way to cluster actors 
into positions, or cluster their relations into roles, by analysing multiple actor-by-actor 
binary networks. The analysis searches for structurally equivalent policy participants. 
Policy participants maintain the same or very similar patterns of ties to other policy 
participants across the four networks. The original network data are partitioned into 
eight subgroups, each containing policy actors that occupy structurally similar positions 
ZLWKLQWKHIRXUQHWZRUNSRZHUVWUXFWXUHV7KHVHVXEJURXSVDUHFDOOHG³SRVLWLRQV´RU
³EORFNV´DQGDUHGHVFULEHGLQWKHIROORZLQJVHFWLRQV.  
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5-3-2. Splitting by Applying the Blockmodel Analysis 
In order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the structural organising 
principle underpinning the NHI policy domain in Taiwan, Blockmodel analysis and 
MSD are performed. CONCOR is a procedure based on the convergence of iterated 
correlations. One way to display the results following a series of partitions from 
CONCOR is to construct a tree diagram indicating the degree of structural equivalence 
among the positions and identifying their members (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 378). 
The tree diagram shown in Figure 5-1 is a graphical representation resulting from the 
CONCOR algorithm that rearranges the order of policy participants according to their 
similarity of participation in different blocks. The tree diagram also places policy 
stakeholders located close to other stakeholders in similar clusters. The scale gives the 
level at which they are affiliated via overlapping participation and the corresponding 
numbers of overlaps.  
The diagram leads to two important findings. First, the 62 policy participants can 
be clustered into eight structural equivalent blocks at level three, through the procedure 
of correlation calculation. The output results can be addressed through the output of a 
partition diagram, which shows information similar to that determined by CONCOR. 
The three splits are shown as a tree diagram in the partition diagram in Figure 5-1. In 
the first division, all policy participants are in a single group determined by a loose 
standard. The group can be seen as one block in the network. In the second division, 
they are subdivided into four groups, as the tree diagram shows on the column of label 
2. In the third division, they are clustered into eight groups. The eight blocks can be 
seen as eight roles sharing similarities such as attitudes, behaviours and relationship 
with others (Borgatti, Everett and Johnson, 2013: 207). The actors in the same block 
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have identical or vary similar relations with others in a network (Knoke and Yang, 2008: 
76). In other words, actors in the same equivalence block tend to exhibit a certain 
amount of homogeneity.  
Figure 5-1. Tree Diagram Obtained by Applying CONCOR Analysis over 62 Policy 
Participants in the NHI Policy Domain 
 
Source: the author 
Note: The level at which any pair of policy actors are aggregated is the point at which both can be 
reached by tracing from the start on the right to the policy actors on the left. The scale at the top gives the 
level at which they are clustered and correspond to the number of overlaps. Hence, to find all members of 
vertex i's block at level k, simply locate the value of k on the line connected to i, then move on to all actors 
that can be reached from this point by tracing to the left are in i's block.   
The second finding is that reordering the members into these eight blocks mostly 
maintains the original public-private policy actor categories within each block. For 
example, in block two (labelled B), the re-clustered members are all scholars. In block 
three (labelled C), all members are legislative actors. 
An eight-EORFNVROXWLRQIRUWKHIRXUQHWZRUNVLQ7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQLV
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already too complex to be interpreted easily and completely. The action-set coalition 
network is a symmetric matrix with lower weights than the others. By contrast, the 
reputation network is a perception network rather than a set of real relations. It is also 
rather simple for discussing relationships between actors. However, the algorithm of 
CONCOR is now regarded by researchers to be a bit peculiar; the technique usually 
produces meaningful results only by condensing the original complicated multiplex 
matrices into a simpler image. The sequences among the eight blocks ordered by their 
average reputations are indicated by labelling the positions with letters. Furthermore, 
the differences between these eight blocks should be considered before proceeding with 
further analysis. Therefore, we used the ANOVA in order to get a more comprehensive 
understanding of the characteristics and differences between the eight blocks.  
Table 5-2 presents the results of the ANOVA. The eight groups differ significantly 
from one another (based on the network in-centrality index). Some of the differences in 
the mean scores of the in-degree centrality index are quite large. Because of the simple 
research purpose here, post-hoc comparison is not used to further explore the actual 
differences between the groups. Block A is a generalist cluster with quite high in-degree 
scores of the four networks (information network: M=19.970, SD=23.697; resource 
network: M=14.903, SD=16.482; reputation network: M=30.104; SD=22.09; action-set 
coalition: M=15.946, SD=14.773), including eleven policy actors: players A1, A4, A5, 
A6, A9, and A10 in the governmental sector, E1 that belongs to the welfare NGOs, and 
F2, F3, F4, and F5 from the medical associations. Some of these players are very active 
and influential in the NHI policy domain. For example, actor A1 (DoH), actor A10 (the 
BNHI) and all of the policy actors from medical associations (F2 to F5) in this cluster 
enjoy very high network in-degree centrality (see Chapter 6). Based on in-degree 
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centrality, block A is the most influential of the eight blocks on average in the NHI 
policy domain.  
Table 5-2. One Way ANOVA among Eight Positions in the NHI Policy Domain 
 Eight block positions 
Network features A B C D E F G H 
Information transmission 
P=0.002(<0.001) 
Resource exchange 
P=0.016(<0.05) 
Reputational attribution 
P=0.000(<0.001) 
Action-set coalition 
P=0.02(<0.05) 
19.97 
(23.70) 
14.90 
(16.48) 
30.10 
(22.09) 
15.95 
(14.77) 
7.240 
(5.524) 
4.781 
(3.921) 
9.153 
(5.612) 
4.098 
(1.782) 
6.011 
(3.386) 
7.378 
(3.845) 
33.10 
(21.91) 
16.12 
(5.903) 
14.21 
(2.504) 
10.38 
(6.825) 
30.60 
(15.75) 
16.94 
(5.757) 
2.459 
(2.008) 
1.639 
(1.796) 
11.48 
(12.22) 
4.918 
(4.015) 
26.56 
(15.13) 
3.279 
(1.159) 
9.508 
(2.694) 
6.885 
(1.540) 
3.279 
(3.456) 
2.787 
(2.998) 
10.49 
(7.697) 
13.44 
(7.485) 
6.739 
(4.880) 
5.829 
(5.191) 
5.827 
(6.356) 
12.75 
(6.896) 
Source: the author 
Note: The coefficients are means and the numbers in brackets are standard deviations.  
In contrast, block B contains all of the scholars working in public health or medical 
policy: H1 to H12. Based on the density value, it can be seen that the members of this 
block do not act together in the NHI policy domain (density within group=0%). They 
are not influential (their in-degree centrality scores are far below the values of block A 
in all four networks) but some policy actors (especially the influential actors from the 
administrative sector and the medical associations) in the NHI policy domain rely on 
their professional consultations to guide them in dealing with NHI affairs.  
Block C, containing the legislative actors B1, B5, B6, B7, and B9, is also unified. 
As previously mentioned, the legislative sector is playing a crucial role in policy 
formation and implementation and these are expected to have been enjoying high 
reputations in the NHI policy domain. The main body in this block is the party caucus 
controlling the formal power to legalise all bills in the Congress. Thus, it can be seen 
that block C not only gets very high scores in the reputational attribution network 
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(higher than block A, M=33.10, SD=21.91), but also induces many other policy actors to 
attempt to collaborate with them (action-set coalition: M=16.12, SD=5.903).  
Block D is the smallest generalist cluster, comprising a legislative actor (B3) and 
medical associations F1 and F6. In comparison with other blocks, this block not only 
enjoys very high reputation scores (reputation network: M=30.60, SD=15.75) but also 
has a greater ability to access information and material resources (informational 
transmission: M=14.21, SD=2.504; resource exchange: M=10.38, SD=6.825). Based on 
the above, block B seems to be the second most powerful block in the NHI domain. The 
most important feature of this block is that, the congressman with a medical background 
is also a doctor and not only paid a lot of attention to the NHI financial reform but also 
collaborated with two other active and influential medical associations: F1 and F6 
(density within group=66.7%).  
According to the differences in the mean in-degree scores, it seems the following 
split blocks do not have influential positions in the NHI policy domain. Block E 
includes six players, the administrative sectors A2, A3, and A7 and the employer 
associations C1, C2, and C3. A common feature among these actors is that those from 
the government are all responsible for economic and commercial affairs and 
communicate frequently with the employer associations. Thus, it can be anticipated that 
these six policy actors might have had similar interests and stances in the NHI policy 
domain. Based on the density value, the members of this block can be said to be loosely 
collaborating in NHI policy affairs (density within group=26.7%).  
Block F is in a pro-intermediate position containing one administrative sector A8. 
The feature of the actor A8 (the Taipei City government) was a news maker in the NHI 
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affairs and had very close interaction with mass media when the DDP was in power. The 
four major intermediate groups, G1-G4, constitute the most influential block in terms of 
information transmission (M=26.56, SD=15.13). The members include four of the most 
popular newspapers in Taiwan. Despite its high in-degree centrality score for 
information transmission, these policy players do not act together in promoting any of 
the NHI affairs (density within group=0%). The most important feature of this block is 
that these actors play an important role in transmitting valuable information on all NHI 
policy events.  
Block G can be seen as a largely pro-employee position, including two other major 
legislative sectors, B2 and B4, and two major employer associations, C3 and C5. 
Although the members of this block do not exchange valuable information/resources 
with others (information transmission: M=3.279, SD=3.456; resource exchange: 
M=2.787, SD=2.998), they seem to be acting together for common interests within the 
block at above-average rates (density within group=31.1%) and also act with other 
blocks to pursue common policy goals (action-set coalition: M=13.44, SD=7.485). 
However, most policy actors in this block are either not active or not influential in 
participating in policy events.  
In contrast with block G, block H - containing three major public-private subsets 
(i.e., major employee associations, D2 and D8), three major welfare NGOs (E2 to E4) 
and four intermediate groups (G5 to G8) - is simpler and more consistent. The common 
characteristics of this block can be divided into three points. First, the members are all 
concerned about the interests of disadvantaged minorities and are very active in fighting 
the coalition of medical associations (density within group=41.7%). Second, the 
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members are linked to other blocks through collaborations in event action-sets (action-
set coalition: M=12.75, SD=6.896). Third, the block has somewhat smaller scores with 
respect to access connections (information transmission: M=6.739, SD=4.880; resource 
exchange: M=5.829, SD=5.191), which indicates that it is not influential over policy 
outcomes (reputation network: M=5.827, SD=6.356).   
The important features of the eight blocks in the NHI policy domain are 
summarised in Table 5-3.  
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Table 5-3. The Eight Blocks and Their Features in the NHI Policy Domain 
Blocks Policy Participants Players Density Features 
A 
Administrative sectors: A1, A4, A5, 
A6, A9, and A10 
Welfare NGOs: E1 
Medical associations: F2, F3, F4, and 
F5 
11 0.382 
The actors in block A all have high 
reputations and are very actively 
involved in NHI affairs. Most are 
administrative sectors or medical 
associations.  
B 
Scholars: H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6, 
H7, H8, H9, H10, H11, and H12 
12 0.000 
This is a unified block and the biggest 
in the NHI policy domain. It is not 
influential but some policy actors rely 
on their professional consultations. The 
members are all scholars.  
C 
Legislative sectors: B1, B5, B6, B7, 
B8, and B9 
6 0.200 
The members are from the legislative 
sectors, especially including all 
caucuses in the parliament. They 
control the power over the legalisation 
of bills in the Congress. 
D 
Legislative sectors: B3 
Medical associations: F1 and F6 
3 0.667 
This block includes one congressman 
and two medical associations and is the 
smallest in the NHI policy domain. The 
congressman has a background as a 
physician and is familiar with NHI 
affairs. 
E 
Administrative sectors: A2, A3, and 
A7 
Employer associations: C1, C2, and 
C4 
6 0.267 
This block combines actors from 
administrative sectors and employer 
associations. Most of the public sectors 
in this block are responsible for 
economic and commercial affairs. 
F 
Administrative sectors: A8 
Intermediate groups: G1, G2, G3, and 
G4 
5 0.000 
Most members of this block are from 
the mass media. The intermediate 
actors G1, G2, G3, and G4, are from 
newspapers with the highest circulation 
in Taiwan, and have a high impact on 
information transmission in the NHI 
policy domain. 
G 
Legislative sectors: B2 and B4 
Employer associations: C3 and C5 
Employee associations: D1, D3,D4, 
D5, D6, and D7 
10 0.311 
Most members are employee 
DVVRFLDWLRQVRUUHSUHVHQWHPSOR\HHV¶
interests. Some policy actors in this 
block represent the inactive 
disadvantaged minority in Taiwan 
society.  
H 
Employee associations: D2 and D8 
Welfare NGOs: E2, E3, and E4 
Intermediate groups: G5, G6, G7, and 
G8 
9 0.417 
Most members of this block are similar 
to those in block G. They also represent 
the interests of blue-collar workers and 
the general insured. Actors in this block 
are more active than those in block G in 
NHI policy events.  
Source: the author 
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5-3-3. Power Structure Analysed by Calculating the Spatial Distances 
among the Eight Blocks 
Usually the goal in equivalence analysis is to identify and visualise clusters of 
cases, and the global power structure becomes much clearer in the MDS analysis of the 
multiplex matrices. However, identifying and measuring social distance among actors is 
technically more difficult than measuring physical distance. The MDS, as a general data 
analysis technique, has been used in SNA for the more specific task of presenting 
equivalences among actors by calculating their social distances. The output of MDS is a 
set of estimated distances among pairs of entities, which can be expressed as 
coordinates in one-, two-, or higher-dimensional space. Moreover, MDS can also be 
XVHGWRYLVXDOLVHWKHEORFNV¶VSDWLDOGLVWULEXWLRQFUHDWHGE\CONCOR in a two - or 
higher - dimensional space (Breiger, Boorman, and Arabie, 1975; Wasserman and Faust, 
1994). Thus, a social-spatial map is akin to a geographic map showing the EORFNV¶
relative positions for the interpretation of power distribution in a policy domain.  
To calculate the social distances between pairs of blocks in the NHI policy domain, 
I begin with the multiplex matrix created earlier and compute the Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficients for all pairs of policy participants. That is, an initial 
correlation matrix reflecting the mutual correlations between policy participants can be 
computed using the CONCOR procedure. In this correlation matrix, the higher is the 
correlation between a pair of policy actors, the greater is the similarity between them in 
the matrix. Next, the squared correlation matrix is entered into the metric-MDS solution 
and plotting routine in UCINET. This allows for a comparison of the proximity of 
policy actors in the multidimensional scaling map with the partitions resulting from 
CONCOR. This program iteratively derives for each object, plots the points as pairs of 
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&DUWHVLDQYDULDEOHVDQGFRPSXWHVWKHVROXWLRQ¶VVWUHVVYDOXH 
Figure 5-2 displays the two-dimensional MDS solution of the multiplex relation 
analysis. The stress value (0.322) indicates acceptable fits but is somewhat higher than 
desirable (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). However, this figure can be used to provide 
approximate relative locations for the policy participants in the context of the four 
relations. In the figure, policy participants who are closer to each other in the space are 
relatively more structurally equivalent. One way to study this figure is to note the 
attributes of policy participants in different regions of the map. Some distribution 
characteristics can clearly be identifiable. First, the policy actors who are also scholars 
(H1 to H12) are all aggregated in the middle to upper left part of the space; most policy 
actors from the legislative sectors occupy very close positions (in the lower left corner, 
such as B1, B5, B6, B7, B8, and B9). Because of the short social distances among them, 
these two groups can be seen to be forming a cohesive alliance with frequent 
information/resource exchange and action-set coalition relations.  
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Figure 5-2. Spacial Distances in Multiplex Matrix among the NHI Policy 
Participants: Two-dimensional MDS Analysis of Simple Matching Coefficients 
(Stress=0.322) 
 
Source: the author 
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B6 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Caucus D8 Taiwan Labour Union G6 KMT Policy Section   
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Second, all members from the administrative sectors (policy participants A1 to 
A10) are in the upper half of the map, whereas all members from the legislative sectors 
are in the lower half. The large social distance between the administrative and 
legislative sectors shows their lack of structural equivalence in the NHI policy domain.  
Third, most of the employee associations (policy participants D1 to D8) are located 
in the lower right corner, while most of the employer associations (policy participants 
C1 to C5) are in the upper right part. It seems that these two categories of players not 
only take different stances but also lack similar relations with other players in the NHI 
policy domain.  
The final noteworthy feature of the MDS map is that the policy participants from 
the medical associations also occupy places very close to the members of the 
administrative sectors (A1 and A10) in the upper left part of the map, and to all of the 
scholars. These policy actors can be seen as a large alliance that stands in opposition to 
the employee associations. The finding also shows the evidence again that the public 
sector (the DoH and the BNHI) and most medical associations have frequent 
interactions in dealing with the affairs of the NHI (the same analytical result also can be 
seen in Chapter 6). Also, note that the policy participants with high reputational scores 
are located on the left side of the map, whereas, those occupying the right half are less 
influential in the policy domain.  
Another way to interpret the two-dimensional MDS plot is to compare the 
proximity of actors in the MDS map with the partition resulting from CONCOR. Figure 
5-2 tells us a story that is broadly similar to the above with respect to the stances 
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assumed by the eight blocks. It can be seen that the split is essentially the right half 
versus the left half of the diagram. Further, if the eight-position result from the 
CONCOR algorithm is examined, there is a very close correspondence with the previous 
interpretation of the MDS. The members of block A (administrative sectors A1, A4, A5, 
A6, A9, and A10; welfare NGO E1; medical associations F2 to F5) are all in the upper 
left part with the exception of member A9. The members of block B (scholars H1 to 
H12) are clustered towards the left middle part. The members of block C (legislative 
sectors B1 and B5 to B9) are located together in the lower left corner. The members of 
block D (legislative sector B3; medical associations F1 and F6) are also located on the 
left side between blocks B and C. The members of block E (administrative sectors A2, 
A3, and A7; employer associations C1, C2, and C4) are in the upper right corner. The 
members of block F (administrative sector A8; intermediate groups G1 to G4) are also 
in the upper right part, above block E. The members of block G (legislative sectors B2 
and B4; employer associations C3 and C5; employee associations D1 and D3 to D7) are 
mostly in the lower right part with the exception of C3 and D5. The members of block 
H (employee associations D2 and D8; welfare NGOs E2, E3, and E4; intermediate 
groups G5 to G8) are located in the lower right corner with the exception of E4 that is 
towards the top of the diagram. Policy actor E4 is the only member of block H that is 
conjoint with the influential block A. 
In addition to the information about mutual positions among these policy 
participants, there are also other important features of power distribution in the NHI 
policy domain worthy of discussion here. First, the social distances between these eight 
blocks are not unduly large. With the exception of block F and most of block H, most 
blocks are located close to and are conjoint with block A. It seems that, apart from 
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blocks F and H, these blocks have a very high degree of boundary penetration with one 
another. The phenomenon of boundary penetration clearly shows that the nature of 
SRZHUGLVWULEXWLRQLQ7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQKDVDFRPSOLFDWHGLQWHUDFWLRQ
structure, with interest intermediation surrounding block A (administrative sectors A1, 
A4, A5, A6, A9, and A10; welfare NGO E1; medical associations F2, F3, F4, and F5) 
rather than a hierarchical or isolated mode among these blocks. The block A including 
administrative sectors, welfare NGO and medical associations can be seen as a core 
interest representation system surrounded by other members of blocks. It also means 
that it can be seen as a corporatist mechanism between the public sectors and medical 
associations in the NHI policy formulation and implementation. However, these core 
members also have interactions with the policy actors outside of the block A and the 
policy outcome can be understood in the negotiation process among multiple 
stakeholders in these blocks in the NHI policy domain. Thus, iWVHHPVWKDW7DLZDQ¶V
NHI policy domain has been constructed as a combination of pluralist and corporatist 
expectations about power structure in a democratic country. 
Second, Figure 5-2 also shows that the government sectors (A1: DoH and A10: 
BNHI) responsible for NHI affairs are not located near the centre of the MDS map. 
These two policy participants with high in-degree centrality values in the four networks 
do not absolutely dominate the policy outcomes in the NHI policy domain. Rather, they 
collaborate with other policy participants (especially the medical associations, scholars 
and legislative sectors).  
Third, in comparison with the participants from the government sectors (e.g. A1 
and A10), some of the medical associations (F1 to F5) and scholars (H7 and H8) are 
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closer to the centre of the map. As previously mentioned, scholars involved in the NHI 
policy domain received low reputational scores but H7 and H8 are quite distinctive. One 
possible reason is that these two scholars have other official appointments. For instance, 
player H7 was the Committee Chairman of the National Health Insurance Supervision 
Committee and player H8 was the minister of the DoH between 2000 and 2004. Thus, 
their influence is not just a reflection of their positions as scholars. This suggests that 
these policy participants are more deeply involved in NHI affairs than the other 
participants, and also more influential in the NHI policy domain. More particularly, 
policy actor F1 (the Taiwan Medical Association) has shorter social distances to the 
members of blocks A and B than to the other members of block D. The Taiwan Medical 
Association clearly has a very high degree of boundary penetration with block A and 
pro-scholar block B. 
Finally, based on the composition of block A, a particularly significant feature of 
this plot is that the government in Taiwan stood with the medical associations rather 
than the welfare NGOs or employee associations in dealing with NHI affairs in the DPP 
government from 2000 to 2008. As previous mentioned, the close position between 
administrative sectors and medical associations can be seen as an effective interest 
representation system surrounded by other policy actors in the NHI policy domain. The 
Taiwan government is more concerned with the policy interests of the medical 
associations than with those of the insured, blue-collar workers and disadvantaged 
minorities in the healthcare system. Thus, the composition of the jointly occupied 
blocks and their locations in the social map reflect a basic political cleavage between the 
medical associations and the disadvantaged and discriminated against members of the 
population, and the power distribution is obviously lopsided in the NHI policy domain. 
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However, although the welfare NGOs are relatively weak and scattered across the NHI 
policy domain, policy participant E4 (NHI Supervision League) is the one exception, 
located adjacent to the government sectors (A1 and A10) in block A. This means that E4 
might have more opportunities to influence and connect with government actors A1 and 
A10 for information/resource exchange or to act in conjunction with them, than other 
welfare NGOs in the NHI policy domain. 
 
5-4. Comparison of Image Roles (Positions)  
The MDS map reveals a basic underlying power cleavage among the policy 
participants and the eight blocks by measuring their social distances from each other. 
The question of how the eight blocks relate to each other has remained unanswered. It is 
also important to describe the form of relations that splits the blocks. In this section, the 
ties between and within the positions will be discussed using the image roles/positions 
obtained from CONCOR.  
The interactive relationships between these positions or blocks can be represented 
DV³GLJUDSKVRIWKHLPDJHJUDSK´RUWKHVR-called reduced graphs (a kind of directed 
graph), in which the links between two positions (which will be represented as letters) 
are depicted as arrows emerging from the sending block and pointing at the receiving 
block. The direction of arrow means that the receiving block is depended by the sending 
block in the relational network. On the contrary, it also can be interpreted that the 
sending block needs to mobilise information or resources from the receiving block. In 
this case, the block who has more incoming connections is more influential than others. 
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The goodness-of-fit measure of a block model (R-square) is a criterion used to 
assess how much of the variance in the ties in the block model can be accounted for by a 
³SHUIHFW´VWUXFWXUDOEORFNPRGHO A tie between blocks, indicating powerful 
relationships between the policy participants in these blocks, is considered to exist only 
if the density of relations within or between positions exceeds the overall mean density 
of the respective network. In other words, a useful way to summarise the ties between 
blocks/positions is the density matrix calculated by the CONCOR procedure. The 
sequences among the eight blocks ordered by their average reputations are indicated by 
labelling the positions with letters. For example, block A stands for the most influential 
block and block C would be the next one and so on. Furthermore, a block with a high 
density of ties among its members is represented by enclosing its letter in a circle. Two 
positions whose members are extensively linked in the coalition network are identified 
either (1) by using a capital letter for the more powerful block and a lower-case letter 
for the less powerful coalition partners, or (2) by using the same capital letter with 
numerical subscripts when members of the two blocks occupy adjacent ranks in the 
reputation hierarchy. In the diagrams, directed arrows indicate that policy information or 
material resources are sent or built between blocks, and circles indicate within-block 
exchanges at above-average rates. Double-headed arrows mean that high 
information/resource flows are approximately balanced in both directions between the 
two blocks. For imbalanced relations in these three policy events, two arrows of varying 
thickness reveal which position had sent more information to the respective recipient. 
Imbalanced information/resource flowing to positions occupied by the public actors is 
an important characteristic of pluralist interest intermediation. 
As previously mentioned, eight-block solutions for these four networks are already 
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complicated and not easy to interpret comparatively. The main reason for this is that 
both the action-set coalition network and the reputational network have lower weights 
because they are considerably simpler than the other two networks. For example, the 
information transmission network has the highest goodness-of-fit value (0.192), the 
reputational network has the second highest (0.183), and the action-set coalition ranks 
last (0.154). Thus, the action-set coalition dimension of the power structure is not only 
theoretically but also empirically downgraded, relative to the other three networks. In 
addition, as far as the theoretical base is concerned, the coalition network can be 
expected to primarily structure the main diagonal of the blockmodel, bringing together 
actors with similar interests in the NHI policy domain so that internal block densities 
are very high.  
A second expectation is that the reputational network will mainly structure the 
columns of the data matrices. That is, it can be expected that there is overall agreement 
within the NHI policy domain regarding the most powerful actors, so that the column 
blocks contain either a high density or a very low density (in a dichotomous 
representation, either 0s or 1s) (Knoke et al., 1996: 203). The fine-grained details of the 
power structure will appear in the information transmission and material resource 
exchange networks. Thus, it can be concluded that the reputational network and the 
action-set coalition network will not serve as the best measures of blockmodel fit for 
exploring power structure. Instead, this section will concentrate on interpreting the 
diagrams for the information and resource exchange networks. 
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5-4-1. Information Transmission 
Table 5-4 shows the density and image matrices of the information transmission 
network as derived by the CONCOR procedure. First, the goodness-of-fit of this model 
is 0.192. That is, almost one-fifth of the variance in the ties in the CONCOR model can 
be accounted for by a perfect structural blockmodel. This value is somewhat low, so it is 
hard to say whether it is acceptable. Second, the average density of the whole network is 
0.101, so that the image matrix can be transferred from the density matrix by the D 
density rule (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 390). This rule specifies that a tie is presented 
between two positions, if the density of ties from actors in one position to actors in 
another position is greater than or equal to the density of the matrix as a whole. For 
example, consider the path from the members of block A to the members of block F. 
The proportion of ties is 0.364. Since this is larger than the density of the total 
VRFLRPDWUL[³´SUHVHQWFDQEHFRGHGIURPEORFN$WR)LQWKHLPDJHPDWUL[,IWKH
GHQVLW\ZHUHOHVVWKDQWKHHQWLUHGHQVLW\WKHQ³´DEVHQWZRXOGEHFRGHG7KH
resulting image matrix can help create for a further analysis of reduced graphs. In a 
reduced graph, positions are represented as nodes, and ties between positions as arcs 
connecting nodes. 
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Table 5-4. Density and Image Matrices (R-squared=0.192, average density=0.101) 
Density Matrix Image Matrix 
 A B C D E F G H  A B C D E F G H 
A 0.327 0.098 0.136 0.273 0.030 0.364 0.073 0.040 A 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
B 0.030 0.015 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C 0.182 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 C 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0.212 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.000 D 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
E 0.197 0.083 0.083 0.167 0.033 0.333 0.033 0.019 E 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
F 0.545 0.383 0.100 0.600 0.167 0.450 0.140 0.311 F 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
G 0.155 0.042 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.022 G 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
H 0.152 0.028 0.111 0.148 0.019 0.311 0.033 0.222 H 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Source: the author 
Figure 5-3 shows the reduced graph for the image matrix in Table 5-4 of the 
information transmission relation in the NHI policy domain. Only blocks A, F, and H 
exhibit high densities of internal policy communication. 22 of the 56 inter-block 
densities indicate frequent ties. These ties represent two rival NHI policy centres. The 
most powerful block, A, contains the major public actors in the governing centre (the 
'R+DQGWKH%1+,LQFOXGLQJRQHZHOIDUH1*2WKH&RQVXPHUV¶)RXQGDWLRQDQG
major influential medical associations (the National Union of Pharmacist Associations, 
the Chinese Dental $VVRFLDWLRQWKH1DWLRQDO8QLRQRI&KLQHVH0HGLFDO'RFWRUV¶
Association, and the Hospital Association). Block A maintains direct links with six other 
blocks, the exception being block B. Only two of them have balanced information flows 
in both directions (pro-legislator blocks C and D). Most of these exhibit one-sided 
inflows towards the centre (blocks E, F, and H), while one has imbalanced information 
flow (pro-intermediate block F). This also means that all blocks excepted block B need 
to mobilise valuable information to deal with the NHI affairs from block A.  
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Figure 5-3. Information Transmission among the Eight Positions in the NHI Policy 
Domain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author 
Note: In this case, an arrow from A to B can be interpreted by the way that A block has chosen B block as 
its interaction partners (or A block has mobilised resources from B block) in the relational network.  
The second most powerful centre is block F, which consists of the most popular 
newspapers in Taiwan (the United Daily News, the Daily News, China News, and 
Liberty News) and the Taipei city government. The members of block F maintain 
frequent mutual information transmission with other blocks. Some are balanced 
relationships (blocks E, G, and H), although there is imbalanced mutual information 
exchange with blocks A and D. The pro-intermediate block, F, relies on the policy 
information from the pro-scholar block B. Based on the outflow and inflow connection 
from block F, the pro-intermediate group is very active and collaborates with others in 
information transmission. Block A as an informational transmission centre has more 
inflow information exchange while block F plays more of a receiver than a sender role. 
Thus, comparing blocks A and F, both have six direct connections with other blocks in 
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D 
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B 
F 
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the information transmission network. The role of block A is more like an information 
provider. In contrast, the role of block F is closer to an information exchange platform 
in the NHI policy domain. However, influence flow between them is imbalanced, 
making block A the more influential centre. 
Pro-scholar block B has no information exchange relation with the other blocks. It 
is relatively isolated. Pro-legislator block C has information exchange relation with 
block A, it might be because that the legislators having institutional veto power play a 
very important role in the policy formation process. To achieve desirable policy 
outcomes, the administrative sectors (the DoH and the BNHI) and medical associations 
have to communicate and share information with these legislators frequently. Block D, 
consisting of two major medical associations (the Taiwan Medical Association and the 
Taiwan Community Hospital Association) and one active legislator, seems to be an 
active block in the information transmission network. Block D also has four direct 
information link with blocks A, E, F, and H and maintains balanced information 
exchange with block A and take advantage of an imbalance flow with block F. By 
contrast, pro-employee association blocks G and H, which include representatives from 
the population of disadvantaged minorities, hold very sparse information connections 
with the other blocks. Blocks E, G, and H seek valuable information about the NHI 
affairs from the most powerful centre block A.  
7RVXPPDULVH7DLZDQ¶V1+,policy domain consists of two rival policy centres in 
information transmission activities. However, they seem to form a large alliance. As 
shown in Figure 5-3, the most powerful block, A, has reciprocal information exchange 
with the other powerful blocks D and F. This means that the members of these three 
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blocks share information frequently and appear to form a clear triangular governance 
regime integrating all important government sectors, medical associations and 
newspapers. In other words, block A has the ability to secure consensus. By contrast, the 
other blocks, especially the peak employee or employer associations (the insured), have 
been excluded by the governing alliance and have no influence in the NHI policy 
domain. The peak employee, employer associations and welfare NGOs have little to 
affect policy outcomes. It seems that, despite the triangular governance regime, there is 
a political cleavage between the insured and the alliance between the DoH, the BNHI, 
and the providers. 
5-4-2. Resource Exchange  
Table 5-5 shows the density and image matrices of the resource exchange network 
as obtained from the CONCOR procedure. Two observations may be made. First, the 
goodness-of-fit of this model is 0.158. This value is obviously lower than that of the 
information transmission network and means that about one-seventh of the variance in 
the ties can be accounted for. Second, the average density of the whole network is 
0.065, which is also lower than for the former network. The image matrix of the 
resource exchange network in the right part of the table can be used for further analysis 
of the reduced graphs.  
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Table 5-5. Density and Image Matrices (R-squared=0.158, average density=0.065) 
Density Matrix Image Matrix 
 A B C D E F G H  A B C D E F G H 
A 0.300 0.068 0.076 0.242 0.015 0.000 0.055 0.010 A 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
B 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 C 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0.212 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.037 D 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
E 0.121 0.014 0.083 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.019 E 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
F 0.455 0.317 0.033 0.467 0.033 0.100 0.000 0.178 F 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
G 0.073 0.025 0.050 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.078 0.056 G 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
H 0.111 0.028 0.056 0.111 0.019 0.089 0.044 0.222 H 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Source: the author 
Figure 5-4 demonstrates a power picture similar to that of the information 
exchange network, but with some differences. Most blocks (A, C, D, F, G, and H) 
maintain high densities of internal resource exchange. 15 of the 56 inter-block densities 
indicate frequent ties. This suggests that, in the resource exchange network, more ties 
were built for internal exchange within blocks than external interaction between blocks. 
By contrast, there are more external information exchanges among blocks in the 
information transmission relations. In this network, the 15 frequent ties, considered 
together, suggest that there is a single governing centre (in Figure 5-4). As before, the 
most powerful block A contains the major public actors of the governing centre (the 
'R+DQGWKH%1+,LQFOXGLQJRQHZHOIDUH1*2WKH&RQVXPHU¶V)RXQdation) and the 
major medical associations (the National Union of Pharmacist Associations, the Chinese 
'HQWDO$VVRFLDWLRQWKH1DWLRQDO8QLRQRI&KLQHVH0HGLFDO'RFWRUV¶$VVRFLDWLRQ, and 
the Hospital Association). Block A maintains direct links with all seven other blocks, 
just one of which has balanced resource flows in both directions (the link with block D). 
Most of these have one-sided inflows to the centre (those with blocks E, F, G, and H); 
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only two have one-sided outflows (to pro-scholar block B and pro-legislator block C). 
In other words, to achieve the policy goals, blocks E, F, G, and H seek the unilateral 
resources from the power centre block A, whereas block A needs to mobilise the 
resources from the pro-scholar and pro-legislative blocks. It seems that, although block 
A is the power centre holding the most ties with other blocks, the members of block A 
also need to mobilise other valuable resources in the NHI policy domain. For instance, 
the public sectors and medical associations need to consult with scholars to cope with 
the NHI affairs. Their advocated reform proposals or the NHI bills also need to be 
supported and approved by the legislative sectors in policy legitimation process under 
the constitution. Thus, blocks B and C may not be as influential from the perspective of 
the social network but they are powerful because they occupy important institutional 
positions.  
Figure 5-4. Resource Exchange among the Eight Positions in the NHI Policy 
Domain 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author 
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Note: In this case, an arrow from A to B can be interpreted by the way that A block has chosen B block as 
its interaction partners (or A block has mobilised resources from B block) in the relational network. 
The second most powerful centre of the resource exchange network is not as clear 
as it was in the case of the information flow network. A possible candidate is block D, 
consisting of the two major medical associations (the Taiwan Medical Association and 
the Taiwan Community Hospital Association) and one active legislator. The block 
maintains frequent mutual exchange relations with blocks A and F and has one-sided 
inflows from block H. The members of block F are also active in resource exchange 
relations, relying on resources from blocks A, B, D, and H. Some of the ties with blocks 
D and H consist of imbalanced mutual resource exchanges. Based on the outflow 
connections from block F, as with information transmission, the pro-intermediate group 
is very active and attempts to mobilise more inside information. The members of block 
G have no resource exchange relations with other blocks, suggesting that the pro-
employees block is relatively isolated in the resource exchange relation. However, block 
H, consisting of employee associations (the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions and 
the Taiwan Labour Union) and welfare NGOs (the Taiwan Health Reform Foundation, 
the League of Disabled Groups, and the NHI Supervision League), is more active than 
block G in terms of external connections with other blocks. By contrast, pro-employee 
associations belonging to blocks G and H include representatives of the population of 
disadvantaged minorities. They have frequent resource exchange interactions within 
their groups but very sparse resource exchange connections with other blocks in the 
NHI policy domain. They also acquire or mobilise resources in supporting their policy 
stances from the most powerful (central) block, A.  
TRVXPPDULVH7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQ consists of one dominant policy 
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centre, block A. However, this governing centre has a balanced reciprocal resource 
exchange relation with block D and relies on resources from blocks B and C. The 
members of blocks A and D share their political resources frequently and seem to have a 
governing alliance, integrating the members of all important government sectors and all 
the medical associations. In other words, the reduced graph reveals that the most 
powerful governing alliance, of blocks A and D, dominates NHI policy formation and 
implementation by connecting with blocks B and C. By contrast, as the analytical 
results for the information transmission network show, the other blocks, especially 
prominent employee associations or employer associations (the insured) are excluded 
from the governing alliance. They have neither connections with the legislative sectors 
nor influence in the NHI policy domain. It can therefore be concluded that the peak 
employee/employer associations and welfare NGOs stand in a weak position, without 
the ability to manipulate and mobilise resources and so affect policy outcome.  
Regarding the triangular governance regime between the government, the insured 
and the providers, there is a political cleavage between the insured and the alliance 
constructed by the DoH, the BNHI (the single payer) and the providers based on the 
analytical results for both the information transmission network and the resource 
exchange network. 
 
5-5. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to clarify many issues related to the power structure in the 
NHI policy domain. First, an eight-block solution was clustered using the CONCOR 
procedure with a multiplex matrix that combined the information transmission, resource 
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exchange, reputational attribution and action-set coalition networks. These eight blocks 
contain structurally equivalent policy participants maintaining the same or very similar 
patterns of ties with the other participants across the four networks. In view of the split 
result, the components of these eight blocks can be said to be reflecting the original 
public-private categories.  
By applying multidimensional scaling, these policy participants were plotted to 
examine the mutual social distances among them. The social distances between these 
eight blocks are not too large in the MDS map. With the exception of block F and most 
of block H, most other blocks are located close to or conjoin block A. It seems that, with 
the exception of blocks F and H, the blocks have a very high degree of boundary 
penetration with one another. This shows clearly that, rather than being a hierarchical or 
LVRODWHGVWUXFWXUHSRZHUGLVWULEXWLRQLQ7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQGLVSOD\VD
fragmented and complicated interaction structure of interest intermediation surrounding 
block A (administrative sectors A1, A4, A5, A6, A9, and A10; welfare NGO E1; medical 
associations F2 to F5).  
Image roles can be used to reveal more specific and clearer power patterns between 
blocks. More general interpretations can be made. A general conclusion is that the 
public actors (the DoH & the BNHI) and all of the medical associations not only have 
strong reciprocal connections in their information/resource exchange relationships but 
also play very important roles in the NHI reform. Based on the findings from the 
positional analysis, it seems that their interaction in the NHI policy domain reveal a 
stable policy community consisting of leading actors in the policy reforms. The alliance 
between the public actors and the medical associations sets the rules of the game, 
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determines membership and the main policy direction of the community. In keeping 
with the NHI Act, this policy community also has an institutional basis. This conclusion 
is supported by several previous empirical findings (Chen, 2005; Wang, 2012). In 
addition, the legislative sectors are important. As previously discussed, the main reason 
is that the Parliament occupies an institutionally advantageous position; it has veto 
power in policy-making processes, according to the Constitution of Taiwan.  
Another important feature is the political cleavage between the insured (the peak 
employee and employer associations and welfare NGOs) and the alliance between the 
government (single payer) and the service providers (medical associations). The insured 
groups located in the issue network are excluded from the policy community. The 
insured groups abide by the rules of the game but do not have adequate resources to 
exert continual influence on the policy outcomes. The groups of the insured seem to 
lack the appropriate channels to access and mobilise political resources for policy 
advocacy and interest intermediation. It seems that the employee association and the 
welfare NGOs do play necessary roles, although they do not have significant influence. 
Election outcomes, which determine party control of national legislature and 
administration, are crucial for understanding interest intermediation and authoritative 
decision-PDNLQJLQ7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQ,WFDQEe anticipated that the interest 
of the intermediary group can be consolidated if the alliance between the public sector 
and the medical associations secure political support from the majority of the congress. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are two important approaches to 
examining power relationships in SNA: relational analysis and positional analysis. This 
FKDSWHUVWDUWHGZLWKWKHGLVFXVVLRQRISROLF\DFWRUV¶SRVLWLRQVDQGUROHVLQWKH1+,
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policy domain and engaged in a systematic analysis of the overall social structure of and 
power relations among 62 policy actors. The findings point to two crucial features of the 
overall structure of the NHI policy domain: (1) there is a policy community organised 
by an alliance between the public sectors and the medical associations; (2) there is a 
political cleavage between the insured and the alliance between the government and the 
providers. However, this is still short of a reasonably comprehensive analysis based on 
SNA. To arrive at more insights concerning the resource interdependency among the 
policy actors, we need to move from the global level to the relational level of power 
structure. The next chapter aims to do exactly that. 
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Chapter 6. Policy Networks: the Nature of 
Influence in the Policy Domain* 
6-1. Informal Rules: Social Structure of Policy actors 
Alongside the constraint of the formal institutional context, the struggle over 
collective decisions involves numerous interactions among stakeholders, which permits 
their conceptualisation and analysis as networks of exchange relations. Policy processes 
can be seen as collective actions and pre-existing stable interactions among policy 
actors. They constitute a social structure shaping mutual role expectations and peer 
pressures through collective action (Carlsson, 2000; Carlsson and Sandström, 2008; 
Scholz, Feiock and Ahn, 2006). The structure influences the collective atmosphere 
comprising social norms and interaction patterns and, in the process, can be seen as 
informal game rules facilitating the resolution of political conflicts. It is also helpful 
while coordinating different policy interests and briefs so as to realise more acceptable 
policy outcome. In other words, social relationships can enhance or hamper the 
collective action in policy-making processes. From the perspective of the policy 
network approach, the limited number of actors means that the participants have stable 
and frequent resource exchanges and interactions over a long period of time. The stable 
policy network structure can be seen as a kind of informal institutional context which 
PDNHVSROLF\DFWRUV¶EHKDYLRXUPRUHSUHGLFWDEOHDQGPDQDJHDEOH$OWKRXJKSROLF\
                                                 
*
 A part RIWKHFRQWHQWVRIWKLVFKDSWHUDSSHDUHGLQWKHDXWKRUµVDUWLFOe - (2013). Policy Network Mapping 
of the Universal Healthcare Reform in Taiwan: An Application of Social Network Analysis. Journal of 
Asian Public Policy (peer reviewed), 6(3), 313-334. Another was published as a chapter in the book - 
(2015). Policy Network of Universal Healthcare Reform in Taiwan" in Yu-Ying Kuo (ed.) Policy Analysis 
in Taiwan: The State of the Art (Ch. 12), Bristol, UK: Policy Press.  
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formation should be confirmed by the rules of the constitution, serious activities 
involved in the planning, formation and implementation of policies are determined 
largely by the briefs and behaviours of core policy actors. Rather than formal rules, 
social relationships, as informal rules in a policy network, could fix policy outcomes in 
some cases. Both formal rules and informal structures should be considered in process 
studies (Bruijn and Heuvelhof, 2008; Compston, 2009; Knoke, 1994a; Kickert et al., 
1997a, b; Marsh, 1998; Rhodes, 1997).  
From the perspective of network analysis, it can be anticipated that a limited 
number of key players control scarce political resources that are highly valued by 
others. Resource-rich actors typically exchange their information or resources in pursuit 
of collaboration and support from their co-action partners (Knoke et al., 1996; Laumann 
and Knoke, 1987, 1989). From the relational perspective, an active actor with more 
connections also enjoys more opportunities to manipulate or mediate the policy 
outcome (Knoke, 1994a, 2011). If tKHDFWRUV¶UHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKLQDQHWZRUNVWUXFWXUH
are directed (contain only directed edges) rather than undirected (contain only 
undirected edges), it can be expected that the relationship between information and 
resource dependence will create power asymmetry between them. From the positional 
perspective, occupying a central position within information transmission and resource 
exchange networks allows one to coordinate collective actions. Social network analysis 
will be helpful here for systematically categorising the policy participants in the NHI 
policy domain. 
As noted in Chapter 2, the exchange networks most relevant to this research 
EURDGO\IROORZ.QRNH¶VD-7) analytical distinction between influence and 
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dominant networks or relationships. Influence relationships involve persuasive 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVLQWHQGHGWRFKDQJHRWKHUV¶perceptions and beliefs regarding political 
actions along with their potential consequences in a bounded domain. Over the course 
of their research on local and national policy domains, Laumann and his colleagues 
suggested that the flow of information about policy issues among elite actors can be 
viewed as the primary social network in the resolution of issues (Galaskiewicz, 1979; 
Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989; Marsden and Laumann, 
1977). Also, actors in a policy network are interdependent because they cannot attain 
their goals by themselves; they require the resources of other actors (Kickert et al., 
1997a: 6). Dominating relationships involve exchanges of sanctions intended to 
IDFLOLWDWHRUUHVWUDLQRWKHUV¶EHKDYLRXUVDVGLUHFWHGE\WKHLQLWLDWRUV+HQFHDQDO\WLFDO
influence and domination relationships correspond to the policy information 
transmission network and the resource exchange network, respectively. It can be 
hypothesised that policy makers occupying important positions or having a large 
number of ³LQSXWWLQJFRQQHFWLRQV´ with the information transmission and resource 
exchange networks are more likely to participate in dominant activities and be seen by 
their peers as influential in collective policy making. Policy stakeholders in the policy 
domain are embedded not only in the formal institutional rules but also in the specific 
social context existing between them. Moreover, both formal and informal game rules 
constrain or facilitate their abilities and opportunities to advocate for their own interests 
and policy goals. 
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6-2. General Characteristics of Social Relationships 
As described above, a policy network analysis is based on the contention that 
understanding the characteristics of the information transmission and resource exchange 
networks is fundamental to the accurate interpretation of power distribution in a policy 
domain (Knoke et al., 1996; König and Bräuninger, 1998; Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 
1989). This section attempts, primarily, to assess the general network structure and 
LGHQWLI\WKHUROHVRISROLF\DFWRUVLQ7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQE\DSSO\LQJWKH
technique of social network analysis.  
Table 6-1 shows some basic properties of the two social networks in the NHI 
policy domain. The density of the information transmission network (percentage of 
possible ties, 73.2%) is much higher than that of the resource exchange network 
(39.5%). This means that policy actors have more frequent information transmission 
interactions than in resource exchanges. The resource exchange relationship is not only 
more likely to be concentrated among a few core policy actors; there are also more 
isolated actors with few relationships with others (information transmission network=4; 
resource exchange network=15). The same is evident with respect to indicators of 
distance-based cohesion and fragmentation. However, all policy actors in the 
information transmission network are nearly fully connected. Most pairs (dyads) are 
connected directly along two-, three- or four-step paths.  
 227 
Table 6-1. Properties of Information transmission and Resource Exchange 
 
Information transmission Resource exchange 
Whole Network Characteristics: 
Density (%) 73.2% 39.5% 
Average Path 2.716 2.647 
Distance-based Cohesion 25.1% 11.0% 
Distance-based Fragmentation 74.9% 89.0% 
Path Lengths (%)   
1 13.3% 17.2% 
2 35.0% 32.7% 
3 25.4% 28.1% 
4 19.8% 14.9% 
5 6.2% 4.9% 
6 0.4% 1.7% 
7  0.5% 
No connection (N) 4 15 
Egocentric Characteristics: 
Ego-network Size (Aver. N) 7.6 3.9 
In-degrees (Aver. N) 20.0 6.3 
Reciprocity (Aver. N) 98.2 29.1 
Local Density 25.5 19.8 
Local Betweenness 6.7 10.9 
Source: the author 
At the actor level, the mean egocentric network size (total number of unique 
contacts), in-degrees, reciprocity (percentage of mutual dyadic ties), local density 
(percentage of ties present within the ego network) and local betweenness (betweenness 
of ego in own network) all exhibit higher values in the resource exchange network than 
in the information transmission network. This is contrary to what is expected. There 
might be an interesting contrast here in the local betweenness indicator between the 
information transmission and resource exchange networks. As the table shows, the local 
betweenness of the information transmission network (6.7) is much smaller than the 
value 20.8 for the resource exchange network. A network structure with high density 
means that actors have little chance to mediate or broker two other unconnected actors. 
This is the reason that the local betweenness of information transmission network 
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exhibits a value lower than that of the resource exchange network. This suggests that the 
associated financial reforms have a diffuse communication structure. 
The resource exchange network, however, presents a very different picture. As 
expected, the densities are sparser than the information transmission densities; they are 
smaller than 39.5 percent of all possible ties in the resource exchange network. Further, 
many more dyads (N=15) are unreachable by paths of any length. Most of the policy 
participants have no interconnections in terms of resource exchange. At the egocentric 
level, the means of ego-network size, in-degrees, reciprocity, local density and local 
betweenness are lower than those for the information transmission network. This also 
PHDQVWKDWWKHLQIRUPDWLRQWUDQVPLVVLRQQHWZRUNRI7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQLV
comparatively well attended by active policy actors. On the other hand, this can also be 
interpreted as indicating that the resource exchange network is centralised around fewer 
capable actors than the case with the information transmission network. As has been 
discussed above, both the information transmission and resource exchange networks can 
be separated into core and peripheral parts. The core part of the information sharing 
network seems to have more influence over policy outcomes than the core part of the 
resource exchange network. This difference in importance shows up in their effects on 
WKHDFWRUV¶UHSXWDWLRQVDQGDFWLYLWLHV.  
 
6-3. Network Plots of Social Relationships: Core/Periphery 
Model  
Network plots, or graphs, have been developed for each of the network relationship 
measures. These plots provide descriptive evidence concerning the overall network 
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structure and the embeddedness of individual agencies, from both the relational and 
positional perspectives. Mapping the network connections between actors provides a 
useful pictorial representation of the links between people. The figures that follow 
combine the three types of ties (information transmission, resource exchange and 
collective action) in the NHI policy domain. The thicknesses of the lines between nodes 
(policy actors) reflect the number of different types of ties. For the purposes of this 
mapping exercise, three different types of ties between the policy actors are taken into 
account as indicating either stronger or weaker relationships. The relative positions in 
the core/periphery network structure are used for understanding the informal rules 
governing the NHI domain. The maps presented below were generated using Netdraw, a 
visualisation tool of the UCINET package.  
Policy stakeholders having the most connections with others are placed at the 
centre of the network plots by this software. In Table 6-2, it shows that the different 
shapes of the dots (policy actors) reflect which policy participant sample it is from. The 
different sizes of nodes indicate higher or lower in-degree centrality scores; a larger 
node indicates a higher in-degree centrality, i.e., that the participant has more incoming 
connections than others. Different colours indicate different relative positions in the 
structure. Blue nodes are policy actors with very close connections with each other at 
the core of the policy network. These close connections create a circumstance of high 
density network structure between blue nodes. As previous mentioned, high density is 
one of the most important features of a policy community. The high density network 
structure of these core policy actors is more probable to be seen as a policy community 
in which all participants share basic values and accept the legitimacy of the outcome 
(see Section 2-3-2). By contrast, due to the loose connective structure among the policy 
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stakeholders, the red nodes occupying the peripheral positions can be seen as an issue 
network probably lacking influence during policy-making. Whilst membership in a 
policy community is limited, it is extremely large in an issue network. An issue network 
contains a large number of actors with relatively limited resources. It is hard to arrive at 
a consensus in such a network. According to literature on policy networks, policy 
communities have more capacity than issue networks to steer or manipulate policy 
agendas and outcomes. It should be noted that the length between two nodes in the 
network plots drawn by Netdraw has no significant theoretical meaning. 
Table 6-2. Network Plots Interpretation 
Category Number Code Shape 
Administrative sectors 10  A1-A10  Circle 
Legislative sectors  9  B1-B9  Square 
Employer associations  5  C1-C5  Up Triangle 
Employee associations  8  D1-D8  Box 
Welfare NGOs  4  E1-E4  Down Triangle 
Medical associations  6  F1-F6  Circle-in-Box 
Intermediate groups  8  G1-G8  Diamond 
Scholars 12 H1-H12 Cross 
Source: the author 
According to the analytical model of policy network studies, pre-existing stable 
communication and resource exchange relations are a prerequisite for policy 
stakeholders resolving conflict and collaborating in the policy domain. Therefore, the 
structures of the information transmission and resource exchange networks can be to 
indicate a fundamental policy-making environment affecting power distribution 
between policy actors and outcomes.  
Figure 6-VKRZVWKHVWUXFWXUHRIWLHVIRUHDFKRIWKHSROLF\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
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communication interactions in the NHI policy domain. The policy actors can be divided 
into core and peripheral parts to demonstrate who is influential in communication 
relationships. The inner region (blue nodes), point to an information transmission 
network with many strong and dense incoming and outgoing connections, particularly 
to the DoH (A1) and the BNHI (A10), who have the authority to deal with NHI affairs, 
and to most of the scholars (H1-10). It is not a surprise that these participants are near 
the centre of the network. Furthermore, most welfare NGOs, including the Taiwan 
Health Reform Foundation (E2), the League of Disabled Group (E3), the NHI 
Supervision League (E4), and some intermediate groups such as the United Daily News 
(G1), the Daily News (G2), the China Times (G3), and the DPP policy section (G5), are 
also central in information sharing and exchange. The interaction between the DoH, the 
BNHI and some of the scholars with professional knowledge may be forming a close 
consultation platform for coordinating diverse interests. They also help resolve conflicts 
under the regulations of the NHI Act. Mass media also plays an important role with 
information transmission and delivery between the DoH (A1), the BNHI (A10), and 
some of the welfare NGOs. The communication channels between the public sector 
bodies (the DoH and the BNHI) and the group consisting of welfare NGOs are 
established by sounding others to avoid controversies. The positional distribution 
suggests that those located at core positions in the NHI information transmission 
network are quite professional and have a problem-solving orientation. The core policy 
actors active in the NHI information transmission network play important roles during 
consultation and suggestion delivery to communicate opinion conflicts and reach 
consensuses. In the interview with the informant of the NHI Supervision League (E4) 
and scholar H3, they mentioned:  
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³:HDFWXDOO\KDYHDFRPPXQLFDWLRQFKDQQHOZLWKWKH'R+DQGWKH%1+,EXW
it is not very formal. When they attempt to promote new reform proposals or 
formulate new policies, they sometimes take soundings to show their respect on our 
opinions. However, the respect is just superficial. Likewise, we also usually express 
our opinions on some NHI issues by the channel. However, I think our opinions are 
not important in the process of their policy formulation, but we actually have 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVRPHWLPHV´(Welfare NGOs E4) 
³0\FROOHDJXHVDQG,DUHDGYLVRU\FRXQVHOORUVRIWKH'R+DQGWKH%1+,VR
that we have many chances to exchange of views and discuss with committee 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGRIILFLDOVLQWKH'R+DQGWKH%1+,´ (Scholar H3) 
Figure 6-1. Network Plot: Information Transmission Relationship (In-degree 
Network Centralisation = 51.163%) 
 
Source: the author 
Note: An arrow from A to B indicates that A has chosen B as one of his or her top five interaction 
partners in this relational network. 
By contrast, the representatives of the medical associations, most of the 
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participants of the employees, the employer associations and some representatives of the 
OHJLVODWLYHDQGSXEOLFVHFWRUVDUHQRWYHU\DFWLYHLQWKH1+,¶VLQIRUPDWLRQVKDULQJDQG
exchange. These actors in the outer region can be seen as peripheral actors without 
strong reciprocal connections with others in the information transmission network. The 
figure also demonstrates that A1 (DoH, 34 direct ties) and A10 (BNHI, 32 direct ties) 
are the core actors, sharing information (both giving and receiving) with numerous other 
actors in the NHI policy domain. These two public sector policy actors occupying the 
institutional positions for planning, promoting and implementing NHI policies need to 
communicate frequently with other actors. Another important feature of Figure 6-1 is 
that there are six isolated nodes (B9, D5, G6, G7, H11, and H12) that have no 
communication with others. These six policy actors are quite inactive in terms of 
information sharing and communication. Thus, it can be concluded preliminarily that, 
although the DoH and the BNHI might be dominating with strong and frequent 
communication relationships with most policy stakeholders, other important policy 
stakeholders such as most of the employee and employer associations and some 
representatives of the legislative and public sectors have few reciprocal connections 
with one another in terms of communication. This structure suggests that these inactive 
policy stakeholders with different policy stances might find it hard to resolve conflicts 
of opinion and reach consensus with the leading actors.  
The resource exchange network is illustrated in Figure 6-2, which again presents 
the network structure using the core/periphery technique as in Figure 6-1. The most 
central policy actors here belong to three categories: the public sector (A1, A4, and 
A10), the legislative sector (B1 to B4), and the entire group of medical associations (F1 
to F6) - shown in different shapes and sizes. They form a close, solid policy community 
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and appear to have the most lines coming into and going out from each of them; 
calculations of the size of their ego-networks have confirmed this. This also means that 
most resource exchange activities take place in the triangular interdependent zone, 
reflecting the relationships between the public sector (the DoH and the BNHI), the 
active legislative representatives, and all of the medical associations. In the interview 
with the informants of the BNHI (A10), the Taiwan Medical Association (F1) and the 
legislator from the DPP (B3) mentioned:  
³It is a fact that the BNHI works more closely with medical associations, 
given that the latter are service providers and the former is a healthcare authority. 
On the one hand, it is necessary to consult with medical groups to establish 
budgetary distribution for the year; on the other hand, the BNHI has to maintain 
healthcare quality. It is thus only natural for the BNHI and medical groups to work 
in close association with each other.´$GPLQLVWUDWLYHVHFWRU$ 
³It is a fact that medical groups do indeed have frequent interactions with the 
BNHI and the DoH. This is partly because they monitor the healthcare system 
while we provide service. Another reason is that we need to provide services based 
on the GBP system, and thus are partly controlled by the BNHI and the DoH´
(Medical association F1) 
³I think it is very normal for us to support the reform proposals of the DoH 
and the BNHI, because we are all party members of the DPP. It is also normal that 
the KMT legislators do not support the reform proposals of the DPP government. 
The other reason is that the DPP is backed by the medical groups more than other 
social groups. This is the reason why we also have more interconnections with the 
medical groups in coping with the NHI affairs´/HJLVODWLYHVHFWRU% 
However, in addition to A1 (the DoH) and A10 (the BNHI), most of the legislative 
sectors (the KMT caucus and its legislators), except for the ruling party caucus and the 
legislators, oppose the promotion of the new financing scheme (will be discussed in 
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Chapter 7). Moreover, some of the medical associations show just a lukewarm welcome 
to the promotion of the new financing reform. Thus, although policy actors A1 (the 
DoH) and A10 (the BNHI) are still the two most influential core policy actors in the 
political support relations, they have had to compromise with other core policy actors in 
promoting the new financing scheme.  
Figure 6-2. Network Plot: Resource Exchange Relationship (In-degree Network 
Centralisation = 16.662%) 
 
Source: the author 
Note: An arrow from A to B indicates that A has chosen B as one of his or her top five interaction 
partners in this relational network. 
From the institutional perspective, the Parliament has legislative power under 
7DLZDQ¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQ$OODPHQGDWRU\ELOOVPXVWEHVXEPLWWHGWRDQGUHYLHZHGE\WKH
Legislative Yuan (the Parliament). The BNHI and the DoH depend on the agreement of 
the legislative power for policy formation and implementation. On the other hand, the 
medical associations providing healthcare services and receiving payments from the 
 236 
 
BNHI are also very sensitive to changes in the regulatory rules and resource allocations. 
The medical associations, by virtue of their superior professional knowledge, financial 
resources and political influence in comparison to the groups representing the groups of 
the insured, do not just coordinate and collaborate with the BNHI and the DoH over 
health service provision; they also lobby for their preferred policy outcomes in the 
Legislative Yuan. On one hand, as the providers of the NHI system, it was a very serious 
matter that the medical associations boycotted the provision of healthcare services for 
some time. On the other hand, many DPP legislators representing the interests of the 
providers were financially and politically supported by these medical associations. It 
can be seen that some ties between these three core policy actors are reciprocal. So far, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that some legislators in the policy community assume 
WKHUROHVRI³YHWRSOD\HUV´$WWKHVDPHWLPHERWKDGPLQLVWUDWRUVWKH'R+DQGWKH
BNHI) and medical associations are the leading actors during policy reform. 
Comparatively speaking, coming from different categories, the policy actors 
allocated to the peripheral area are very diverse. Most supported the implementation of 
the GBP system but had some misgivings concerning the new financing scheme and the 
double raise scheme. Although some (B5 to B9, D1, D2, E2, and E3) have resource 
exchange connections with others, these outer policy actors hold disadvantageous 
positions in terms of resource exchange and gaining political support for policy 
formation. On the one hand, this means they might have found it more difficult to build 
the strong connections with influential actors needed to intermediate in the resource 
flow and influence policy outcomes. On the other hand, their peripheral allocation 
reveals that they have fewer political resources to exchange with others in the policy-
making process.  
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In addition, seventeen policy actors are isolated in the resource exchange network, 
including most of the intermediate groups and scholars. Compared to the core actors, 
these isolated policy actors, who supported the reform proposal of the new financing 
scheme, may be excluded from the NHI reform process. Two key features of this 
phenomenon may be noted. First, these actors do not occupy institutional positions on 
any governing committees that would allow them to influence policy outcomes under 
the NHI Act. They do not have votes to exchange or the power of veto. Second, these 
policy actors are not directly involved in resource allocation and service provision. In 
comparison with other policy actors, they are active in information sharing and 
communication but seem to be inactive in terms of political resource manipulation and 
mobilisation. They neither seek political support nor have the capability to provide 
resources to support others in the NHI policy domain. 
The action-set coalition network is illustrated in Figure 6-3, as determined by a 
technique analogous to that used in arriving at the previous two plots. As in the resource 
exchange network, the most central policy actors again come from three categories: the 
public sector (A1, A8, and A10), most of the actors in the legislative sector (B2 to B9, 
the only exception being B1) and all medical associations (F1 to F6), shown in different 
shapes and sizes. They form a close, solid policy community and appear to have the 
most lines coming into and going out from each of them. Calculations of the sizes of 
their ego-networks led to the same conclusion. It can also be seen that, just like the 
network structure of the resource exchange network, most of the collective action took 
place within the triangular interdependent relation between the public sector (the DoH, 
Taipei City Government and the BNHI), the active legislative representatives and all 
medical associations.  
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Figure 6-3. Network Plot: Action-set Coalition Relationship (In-degree Network 
Centralisation = 42.787%) 
 
Source: the author 
Note: An arrow from A to B indicates that A has chosen B as one of his or her top five interaction 
partners in this relational network. 
It can be seen from Figure 6-3 that most of the legislators are involved in frequent 
and dense collective and collaborative actions with other players. It might be that the 
Legislative Yuan (the Parliament) has legislaWLYHSRZHUXQGHU7DLZDQ¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQDQG
all amendatory bills must be submitted to and reviewed by it. Not only the BNHI and 
the DoH but also other policy players such as employer and employee associations, 
welfare NGOs and medical associations have to depend on the agreement of the 
legislative power for policy formation and implementation. On the other hand, the 
representatives of the medical associations, by virtue of their professional knowledge 
and huge medical resources, not only coordinate and collaborate with the BNHI and the 
DoH in health service provision, but also lobby for their preferred policy outcomes in 
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the Legislative Yuan. Some ties between the three core-category policy actors - which 
can be seen as a policy community engaging in collective action - are reciprocal, that is, 
these policy actors seek political support from each other. So far, combined with the 
previous analytical results, this seems to confirm that most of the legislators among the 
SROLF\HOLWHDFWDV³YHWRSOD\HUV´LQSROLF\IRUPDWLRQ and reform promotion, in which 
the administrators (the DoH and the BNHI) and the medical associations are the leading 
actors.   
In sum, these figures illustrate the usefulness of examining ties between policy 
actors in the NHI policy domain. The core/periphery model not only helps estimate the 
degree of closeness to the core of each actor but also helps visualise the structure of 
bounded networks. The resource exchange network and collective action network 
present very different pictures from the information transmission network. First, as 
expected, the density and centralisation of the resource exchange relationships and the 
collective action among these policy stakeholders (especially the former) are sparser 
than in the communication network, with fewer incoming and outgoing interactions 
with others. Second, combined with the analytical results in chapter 5 and 6, it is not 
surprising that the policy actors A1 (the DoH) and A10 (the BNHI) are the most central 
actors in these three networks, and it seems that these two actors with high in-degree 
centrality exchange not only valued information but also political resources with others 
under the NHI Act. This may be why most policy actors collaborate with them. Third, in 
comparison with the situation in the informational transmission network, a triangular 
political resource exchange relation is formed between the core members of the BNHI, 
the DoH, some active legislators and most of the medical associations in the resource 
exchange and action-set coalition networks. The alliance can be seen as a policy 
 240 
 
community with high density that had excluded societal actors in reform processes. The 
views of interviewees from the BNHI (A10), the Taiwan Medical Association (F1), and 
the legislator from the DPP (B3) quoted in earlier sections support these analytical 
findings. However, the interviewee from the BNHI disagreed with the statement that 
VRFLHWDODFWRUVZHUHH[FOXGHGLQWKHSROLF\SURFHVVHVUHODWHGWRWKH1+,¶VUHIRUP  
³1R1R1R«1RWOLNHDV\RXKDYHPHQWLRQHG,have to correct your 
statement. The BNHI does not operate with the intention of ignoring the opinions 
of labour associations, welfare groups or other societal groups. It is a fact that the 
BNHI works more closely and frequently with medical associations, given that the 
latter are service providers and the former is a healthcare authority. Thus, please 
do not treat us unjustly, ok?´$GPLQLVWUDWLYHVHFWRU$ 
Regarding the above finding, the informants from the Taiwan Health Reform 
Foundation (E2) and the Taiwan Labour Union (D8) held opinions different from those 
of the BNHI. They said:  
³<RXNQRZ«ZHOIDUH1*2VVWULYHWREHFRPHPRUHLQYROYHGLQKHDOWKFDUH
issues. We actually try very hard but the problem is that we do not have enough 
professional knowledge on the NHI programme and its operation. Thus, our 
understanding of the system cannot rival that of medical groups and thus are often 
ignored by the medical associations and the BNHI. The same can be said of our 
resources, thus rendering us unable to conduct a systematic study of healthcare 
policies. Hence, in order to service as a voice of the people, we usually just end up 
monitoring the procedures. We do this by supporting legislators and monitoring the 
process outside of the system.´:HOIDUH1*2V( 
³To tell the truth, we do not wish to see the BNHI, DoH, and medical groups 
gain sole control over healthcare. It is true that the official website indicates that 
the operation of the NHI in Taiwan is a balanced and equal partnership among the 
public sector, the insured and the provider. It is rubbish! The healthcare system in 
Taiwan has always had imbalances. I think the BNHI always sides with medical 
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JURXSVDQGDWWHPSWVWRLQFUHDVHSUHPLXPVWRPHHWWKHODWWHU¶VQHHGV´(PSOR\HH
association D8) 
In contrast, the policy community in the information transmission network is 
formed by the BNHI, the DoH, most of the scholars, most of the mass media, and the 
welfare NGOs. The difference might be indicating that the information sharing and 
transmission relations are more related to consulting activities while the resource 
exchange and collective action relations reflect sustainable political mobilisation and 
lobbying activities needed for the sensitive policy legalisation process. 
 
6-4. Who Has Strong Reputations in the NHI Policy Domain? 
$QDFWRU¶VUHSXWDWLRQLQRQHSUH-existing bounded network structure is also an 
important factor determining their capability to access information and mobilise 
resources. As discussed above, the core/periphery model estimates each actRU¶V
closeness to the core, and the structures of the two policy communities demonstrate a 
clear picture that all other core policy actors and activities surrounded the central actors 
A1 (the DoH) and A10 (the BNHI) in the NHI policy domain. However, the 
cRUHSHULSKHU\QHWZRUNSORWLOOXVWUDWHVWKHDFWRUV¶FORVHQHVVWRWKHFHQWUDODFWRUVUDWKHU
than their reputations and influence in the network structure. In other words, the 
FRUHSHULSKHU\QHWZRUNSORWVKRZVDFWRUV¶enthusiastic initiatives rather than their 
prominence. Within the social network technique, a large range of measures of global 
QHWZRUNUHSXWDWLRQVDQGDJHQFLHV¶VRFLDOUHSXWDWLRQVLVDYDLODEOH7KHIROORZLQJWDEOHLV
based on the three different types of network ties discussed above - informational 
transmission, resource exchange and action-set coalition. We will also discuss the 
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DFWRUV¶SURIHVVLRQDONQRZOHGJHFDSDELOLWLHVDQGLQLWLDWLYHDFWLYHRULQDFWLYH
participation) in order to get a more comprehensive understanding about the policy 
actors¶FDSDELOLWLHVDQGSDUWLFLSDWRU\EHKDYLRXULQWKH1+,SROLF\GRPDLQ  
,QPHDVXULQJWKHDFWRUV¶VRFLDOUHSXWDWLRQVRUSURPLQHQFHVDFFXUDWHO\WKHLQGLFDWRU
of in-GHJUHHFHQWUDOLW\ZLOOEHXVHGWRHVWLPDWHWKHQHWZRUN¶VGHJUHHRIFHQWUDOLVDWLRQ
and degrees of centrality of the individuals involved. The network degree centralisation 
score is based on the centrality scores of each individual in a bounded network. Degree 
centrality simply counts the direct ties going into and coming out from people in the 
network. Those with the most ties have the highest centrality scores, reflecting how 
others perceive a person to be in terms of their informal resources. Two classes of 
prominence measure need clarification: centrality, where a prominent actor has high 
involvement in many relations, regardless of whether they are sending or receiving ties; 
and prestige, where a prominent actor initiates few relations but has many direct 
receiving ties (Knoke and Yang, 2008: 62). The prominence measure of prestige is more 
suitable IRUPHDVXULQJDFWRUV¶VRFLDOUHSXWDWLRQV7KXVWKHLQGLFDWRURI³QRUPDOLVHGLQ-
GHJUHHFHQWUDOLW\´which are comparable across different networks will be applied to 
FDOFXODWHWKHDFWRUV¶SURPLQHQFHZLWKLQWKHVHFRPSOHWHQHWZRUNV 
As Table 6-3 shows, the information transmission network is the most centralised 
among the four networks. This means that fewer policy actors are sought out for this 
purpose than for other interactions. The resource exchange network, meanwhile, is the 
most GLVSHUVHG7KHWDEOHDOVRGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHLQGLYLGXDOV¶LQ-degree centrality 
measures for the eight highest-ranked policy actors in each network. Some important 
differences can be seen between the information transmission and resource exchange 
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networks. First, there are seven policy actors (A1, A10, G1, G2, G3, G4, and E2) ranked 
in the top seven for in-degree centrality in the information transmission network, while 
there are ten in the resource exchange network. This allows easier examination of the 
social network plots, which show the fragmentation and sparseness of the resource 
exchange network structure. Second, the top seven roles of these two network structures 
show different patterns of influential power distribution. The medical association 
representatives, F1, F2, F3, F5, and F6, play an important role in resource exchange in 
the NHI policy domain. However, the social structure of the influence of the 
information transmission network shows quite a different pattern. In contrast, the mass 
media (G1 to G4) without political resources to exchange (low in-degree centrality in 
resource exchange network) shows great influence on information and communication 
in the NHI policy domain. The finding also demonstrates that the mass media in Taiwan 
hold frequent connections with the policy stakeholders concerned. In addition, the 
Administrative actors (A1 and A10), legislative actors (B6), some medical associations 
(F1 to F6), and welfare NGOs (E1 and E2) are more likely to provide essential political 
support than others in the policy-making process. 
Table 6-3. Centrality Measures for Individuals within Networks ± Highest Ranked 
Actors 
Actor 
Relational networks Reputational network 
Information N. Resource exchange N. Action-set coalition Influential reputation 
Centrality Ranking Centrality Ranking Centrality Ranking Centrality Ranking 
Admin. 
Sector 
A1 63.93 2 47.54 1 52.46 1 77.05 1 
A2 1.64  0  1.64  3.28  
A3 1.64  1.64  11.48  3.28  
A4 3.28  8.20  9.84  14.75  
A5 11.48  0  3.28  16.39  
A6 9.84  6.56  3.28  26.23  
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Actor 
Relational networks Reputational network 
Information N. Resource exchange N. Action-set coalition Influential reputation 
Centrality Ranking Centrality Ranking Centrality Ranking Centrality Ranking 
A7 1.64  1.64  0  3.28  
A8 3.28  1.64  34.43 2 4.92  
A9 3.28  1.64  6.56  3.28  
A10 70.49 1 45.90 2 34.43 2 63.93 2 
Legis. 
Sector 
B1 4.92  3.28  9.84  9.84  
B2 6.56  3.28  14.75  8.20  
B3 16.39 8 4.92  11.48  27.87  
B4 4.92  4.92  16.39 8 8.20  
B5 8.20  3.28  9.84  9.84  
B6 13.12  13.12 7 22.95 4 59.02 3 
B7 8.20  9.84  21.31 5 57.38 4 
B8 8.20  8.20  19.67 6 36.07 7 
B9 0  6.56  13.12  26.23  
Employ
er 
Assocs. 
C1 6.56  4.92  6.56  32.79  
C2 1.64  1.64  4.92  19.67  
C3 0  1.64  8.20  9.84  
C4 1.64  1.64  4.92  6.56  
C5 1.64  1.64  11.48  3.28  
Employ
ee 
Assocs. 
D1 11.48  8.20  22.95 4 31.15 8 
D2 6.56  9.84  16.39 8 19.67  
D3 3.28  3.28  13.12  13.12  
D4 0  1.64  9.84  6.56  
D5 0  1.64  3.28  8.20  
D6 4.92  1.64  6.56  9.84  
D7 3.28  6.56  27.87 3 6.56  
D8 1.64  6.56  18.03 7 0  
Welfare 
NGOs 
E1 11.48  13.12 7 14.75  27.87  
E2 18.03 7 14.75 6 19.67 6 11.48  
E3 4.92  4.92  9.84  1.64  
E4 11.48  11.48 8 9.84  8.20  
Medical  
Assocs. 
F1 16.39  22.95 4 16.39 8 47.54 5 
F2 11.48  13.12 7 14.75  19.67  
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Actor 
Relational networks Reputational network 
Information N. Resource exchange N. Action-set coalition Influential reputation 
Centrality Ranking Centrality Ranking Centrality Ranking Centrality Ranking 
F3 9.84  14.75 6 9.84  24.59  
F4 8.20  11.48  11.48  18.03  
F5 16.39 8 24.59 3 14.75  39.34 6 
F6 11.48  16.39 5 22.95 4 16.39  
Interme
diate 
groups 
G1 39.34 4 0  0  11.48  
G2 40.98 3 0  0  9.84  
G3 34.43 5 0  0  9.84  
G4 21.31 6 0  0  11.48  
G5 6.56  0  16.39 8 3.28  
G6 0  0  3.28  4.92  
G7 0  0  1.64  1.64  
G8 3.28  1.64  19.67 6 1.64  
Scholars 
H1 16.39 8 9.84  6.56  14.75  
H2 16.39 8 0  3.28  6.56  
H3 6.56  9.84  4.92  18.03  
H4 13.12  0  4.92  16.39  
H5 9.84  11.48 8 6.56  11.48  
H6 4.92  3.28  3.28  6.56  
H7 3.28  0  3.28  11.48  
H8 1.64  1.64  6.56  6.56  
H9 0  0  3.28  3.28  
H10 3.28  0  3.28  11.48  
H11 0  0  1.64  1.64  
H12 0  0  1.64  1.64  
Centralisation 51.163% 16.662% 42.787% 62.869% 
Mean 7.316 3.955 11.052 16.208 
Std Dev 10.943 4.669 9.729 16.293 
Source: the author 
Third, the normalised in-degree centrality scores of the top seven policy actors in 
the information transmission network are clearly much higher than those of the highest 
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policy actors in the resource exchange network. This means that the top seven policy 
actors in the information transmission network enjoy more prestige than those in the 
resource exchange network. For instance, A1 (the DoH) and A10 (the BNHI) are 
conspicuously more influential and have better reputation in information sharing 
(A1=63.93, A10=70.49) than in resource exchange (A1=47.54, A2=45.90). Fourth, A1 
and A10 play a central role in both network structures. 
:LWKUHVSHFWWRWKHQHWZRUNVWUXFWXUHVRIWKHDFWRUV¶FROOHFWLYHDQGFROODERUDWLYH
actions and their influential reputational attributions in the NHI policy domain, it seems 
that the network structure of the action-set coalitions among these policy actors is more 
fragmented and sparser than their influential reputational attributions. First, there are 
eight policy actors (A1, A8, A10, B6, B7, D1, D7, and F6) ranked as the top five in 
terms of in-degree centrality in the action-set coalition network,. This shows that these 
policy actors have more frequent collective and collaborative actions with others in 
dealing with NHI affairs. Furthermore, although the action-set coalition network is 
another relational network, just as in the cases of information transmission and resource 
exchange networks, the high-ranked policy actors are quite different in these three 
networks. As for the action-set coalition network, it seems that the members of the 
legislative sector (B5 to B8) and the employee associations (D1, D2, D7, and D8) 
usually act collaboratively with others in the NHI policy domain. This implies that 
employee associations without the valued information and resource flows that are 
voiced in public statements on behalf of employees, necessitate collaboration with 
RWKHUV0HDQZKLOHRWKHUVGHSHQGRQWKHOHJLVODWRUV¶FROODERUDWLRQEHFDXVHWKH\KDYHWKH
advantage of veto power in the policy-making process.  
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The reputational attribution in the decision-making network (based on those actors 
mentioned to be most prominent) is composed of a few central policy actors strongly 
tied to each other and a more loosely connected periphery. It seems that the 
representatives of the administrative sector, A1 (the DoH) and A10 (the BNHI), the 
legislative sector, B6 (the DPP caucus, the party in power) and B7 (the KMT caucus, 
the largest opposition party), and the medical association F1 (Taiwan Medical 
Association) are the core players with the highest influence in the NHI decision-making 
network. These policy players can be treated as political elites with high influence in 
policy processes, dominating policy making in reform promotion. A1 (the DoH) and 
A10 (the BNHI) are the central competent authorities regarding NHI affairs and may 
have advantaged institutional positions relative to the other actors. F1 (Taiwan Medical 
Association) is the largest and most influential medical association in Taiwan. Two 
influential party caucuses (the DPP and the KMT caucuses) control agenda setting and 
have the veto power in policy legalisation. Especially the KMT caucus has occupied the 
majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan since 2000. This may be why the legislators 
and party caucuses have high reputational attribution in the policy-making networks of 
the NHI. 
Finally, as the data collection of access networks and reputational attribution, the 
same method was used to collect subjective perceptions on which actors use 
professional knowledge or initiative in dealing with NHI affairs. These two networks 
(professional knowledge and initiative networks), like the reputational network, can also 
EHVHHQDVWKHVXEMHFWLYHSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHSROLF\DFWRUV¶DWWULEXWLRQV7KHYDOXHs can 
be calculated via the corresponding in-degree centrality index values. The findings are 
shown in Table 6-4 demonstrating similar plot structures. First, the same seven policy 
 248 
 
actors (A1, A10, E4, F1, F3, F5, and F6) are ranked in the top five for in-degree 
centrality in these two networks, meaning that all these policy actors are capable and 
active in policy activities. Furthermore, the policy actors with high 
knowledge/capability have the advantage in terms of information asymmetry compared 
to those with no professional knowledge. Professional knowledge may be an important 
resource for policy actors, not only in terms of involvement but also in terms of impact 
on the NHI policy process. Second, although the top five policy actors are the same in 
both networks, different patterns of influential power distribution can be seen. The 
BNHI (A10) and the DoH (A1) seem to play an important role in NHI knowledge 
consultation in the NHI policy domain. In contrast, they are not as active as some of the 
medical associations (F1, F3, F5, and F6) and the welfare NGO E4.  
Table 6-4,QGLYLGXDOV¶ Professional Knowledge and Participatory Initiative within 
the Networks - Highest Ranked Actors 
Actor 
Professional Knowledge Participatory Initiative 
Centrality Ranking Centrality Ranking 
A1 DoH 30.329 2 18.121 5 
A10 BNHI 34.168 1 20.113 4 
E4 NHI Supervision League 18.675 5 25.334 3 
F1 Taiwan Medical Assoc. 25.667 3 28.221 2 
F3 China Dental Assoc. 22.231 4 28.221 2 
F5 Taiwan Hospital Assoc. 22.231 4 30.113 1 
F6 Taiwan Community H. Assoc. 22.231 4 28.221 2 
Source: the author 
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6.5 Political Brokerage in the Policy Domain 
Another method of SNA applicable in exploring the nature of power and how it is 
exercised is to examine the brokerage positions in the social network. Brokerage is 
JHQHUDOO\XQGHUVWRRGDVWKHLQWHUPHGLDWHSRVLWLRQWKDWRQHDFWRUWDNHVEHWZHHQ³WKH
VHQGHU´DQG³WKHUHFHLYHU´6WXG\LQJWKHEURNHUDJHSRVLWLRQVRIGLIIHUHQWDFWRUVLQD
network provides information at two levels. Firstly, it captures the specific role(s) 
different actors assume and their relative centrality in the network. Secondly, it offers 
interesting insights concerning the most prominent types of flows taking place in the 
network as a whole. According to Burt (2007: 23), there are three benefits of being a 
broker: (1) access to alternative viewpoints and applications in a network, (2) early 
access to innovative ideas and thoughts, and (3) the ability to transmit the new ideas and 
thoughts if there is an advantage to be gained. In recent discussions in the field of policy 
studies, policy entrepreneurs and brokers take up the central stage in theoretical models 
designed for policy formulation. Policy entrepreneurs also play key roles in the multiple 
streams model developed by John Kingdon (2003). Such entrepreneurs may be 
positioned anywhere in a policy community, either inside or outside the government, 
and apply their resources (time, energy, reputation, funds) in defence of certain 
proposals based on expected future profits. In the policy network scenario, the roles of 
SROLF\EURNHUVZKRDUHHTXLYDOHQWWRWKHSROLF\HQWUHSUHQHXUVLQ.LQJGRQ¶V
policy window theory, no doubt represent one of the most important influences on 
policy outcomes. 
In this section, the indicators of betweenness centrality and structural holes will be 
applied to determine which actors occupy advantageous positions in the three relational 
networks previously analysed. Betweenness centrality indicates that the extent to which 
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an actor lies between two or more actors and is dependent on them while engaging in 
exchanges (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005: Ch. 10). To the extent that they fall on 
geodesic paths between other pairs in the network, betweenness centrality views an 
actor as one in a favoured position (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005: Ch. 10). Actors with a 
high degree of betweenness centrality are considered significant or powerful in a 
network. The assumption is that the more dependent actors are on others to make 
connections, the more opportunities and alternatives they have. A weakness of 
betweenness centrality is its assumption of geodesic paths. For instance, two actors 
connected by several paths may not use the geodesic path because these two actors do 
not use the connection path in the geodesic path. Thus, the other indicator - structural 
holes - may measure the brokerage capability of policy actors in the NHI policy domain 
more accurately.  
A structural hole is a buffer: a space between you and the people you are connected 
to. According to the structural hole theory (Seiber et al., 2001: 3), it is advantageous for 
individuals to be connected to many alters who are themselves unconnected to the other 
DOWHUVLQDQHJR¶VQHWZRUN,QGLYLGXDOVORFDWHGLQSRVLWLRQVRIVWUXFWXUDO holes may have 
more chances to manipulate collective outcomes and create positive individual 
performance (Cross and Cummings, 2004), because actors who take structural positions 
have more unique and timely access to information, greater bargaining power and thus 
control over resources and outcomes, and greater visibility and opportunities throughout 
the social system (Seibert et al., 2001: 221). 
Structural holes are measured using the UCINET algorithm produces an effective 
score. Not counting ego ties, ³HIIHFWLYHVL]H´ is the number of alters minus the average 
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ties of alters within the ego network. In other words, conceptually, it is the number of 
people to whom the ego is connected, minus the redundancy in the network. Thus, it 
avoids non-redundant elements in the network. Greater effective size indicates that 
actors take positions wherever there are greater structural holes. The normalised 
effective size starts from 0. A larger score means that the actor is more autonomous in 
the network. 
It is clear from Table 6-5 that the three social network variables have distinct 
distributions over the policy participants. In the information transmission network, the 
administrative sectors A1 (the DoH), A8 (the Taipei City Government), and A10 (the 
BNHI), have the highest betweenness centrality and effective size scores, indicating 
more opportunities to intermediate or control information flows. In addition, policy 
actors of intermediate groups such as G1 to G4 are the most popular mass media entities 
in Taiwan and also have advantaged positions in terms of collecting and transmitting 
information. Regarding in-degree centrality and core/periphery model, in addition to 
public actors (A1 and A10), mass media (G1 to G4) stand out in terms of prominence, 
brokerage units also share information sharing and transmission. This finding reveals 
that the characteristics of inter-sector ties among mass media allow information to be 
mobilised and coordinated among the stakeholders. The interview with the informant of 
the Daily News (G2) can support the above analytical result. He said: 
³I think the role of the media is mainly concerned with balanced reporting 
and delivering information to the people. To obtain information, we frequently 
contact the BNHI, medical groups, labour associations, welfare NGOs and those 
legislators who involve deeply in the NHI affairs. We play a very active role in 
managing and delivering information, especially on the issue of the 2G-NHI 
financing scheme. However, it is also true that different media groups have 
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different political affiliations. Thus, you may sometimes smell that some media 
UHSRUWVRPHQHZVRQSXUSRVH«´,QWHUPHGLDWHJURXS* 
Table 6-5. Brokerage Ability Measures for Individuals within the Networks ± 
Highest-Ranked Actors 
Actor 
Relational networks 
Information N. Resource exchange N. Action-set coalition 
Betweenns. Structural 
holes 
Betweenns. Structural 
holes 
Betweenns. Structural 
holes 
Admin. 
Sector 
A1 31.66 40.63 26.01 40.24 28.94 27.25 
A2 0.02 9.39 0.04 2.50 0 1.00 
A3 0.01 6.14 0.04 3.10 3.42 4.43 
A4 0.01 3.56 0 1.33 0.38 3.33 
A5 2.58 20.50 2.43 8.08 0 1.00 
A6 0 3.25 0 2.50 0 1.00 
A7 1.28 3.10 0 1.00 0 .00 
A8 10.51 32.12 1.21 17.59 10.40 17.38 
A9 0.01 1.50 0.02 1.40 0.04 2.00 
A10 13.66 37.05 4.70 22.80 7.36 15.29 
Legis. 
Sector 
B1 0 1.00 0 1.00 0.23 4.00 
B2 0 1.50 0 2.00 0.72 5.44 
B3 0 4.54 0 1.80 0.70 4.14 
B4 1.00 2.13 2.02 3.00 1.99 5.60 
B5 0.02 2.71 0 1.00 0.78 3.67 
B6 0 4.00 0.19 5.14 5.81 10.14 
B7 0 2.36 0.26 3.06 5.40 9.00 
B8 0 2.36 0.01 1.94 6.14 8.50 
B9 0 1.00 0 1.21 1.00 4.25 
Employ
er 
Assocs. 
C1 0 2.19 0 3.00 1.02 3.00 
C2 0 3.33 0.04 3.50 0.09 1.67 
C3 0 7.58 0 1.83 2.67 4.20 
C4 0.09 3.00 0 2.33 0.57 2.33 
C5 0.01 2.38 0 4.00 4.50 5.57 
Employ
ee 
D1 0.22 4.35 1.55 8.20 3.90 9.86 
D2 0.13 7.00 2.85 9.67 1.10 5.60 
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Actor 
Relational networks 
Information N. Resource exchange N. Action-set coalition 
Betweenns. Structural 
holes 
Betweenns. Structural 
holes 
Betweenns. Structural 
holes 
Assocs. D3 0 1.80 0.37 3.00 0.32 4.00 
D4 0 2.00 0 2.50 0.72 3.67 
D5 0 2.00 0 .00 0 1.00 
D6 0.05 4.65 0.05 4.67 0.03 2.00 
D7 0 1.67 0 2.50 6.03 13.24 
D8 0.01 1.83 0.01 2.60 1.46 6.64 
Welfare 
NGOs 
E1 0 3.29 0 5.00 3.40 6.33 
E2 0.38 6.38 6.95 13.86 2.08 9.00 
E3 1.43 6.32 4.33 10.50 0.14 3.00 
E4 0 4.06 0.32 4.81 0.48 3.33 
Medical  
Assocs. 
F1 0.14 5.07 0.53 6.41 0.74 4.60 
F2 0.05 4.04 0.11 2.50 4.08 5.22 
F3 0.06 3.80 0.79 5.69 0 1.00 
F4 0.02 2.56 0.15 2.70 0.12 2.14 
F5 0.60 8.03 1.19 8.18 0.46 4.33 
F6 0.04 4.18 9.50 7.11 3.04 8.57 
Interme
diate 
groups 
G1 1.88 22.88 0.12 4.28 0 .00 
G2 11.28 30.46 3.06 14.09 0 .00 
G3 6.75 22.96 3.18 8.89 0 .00 
G4 1.69 14.80 0.13 7.77 0 .00 
G5 6.61 18.52 1.71 6.85 3.37 6.60 
G6 0 2.38 0 1.00 0 1.00 
G7 0 1.00 0 .00 0 1.00 
G8 0.18 9.93 0.96 2.60 1.99 8.33 
Scholars 
H1 0 6.35 0 3.17 0.01 1.50 
H2 0 2.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 
H3 0 5.85 0 4.33 0.83 2.33 
H4 0 4.19 0 3.00 0.04 1.67 
H5 0 4.17 0 5.00 0.20 2.00 
H6 0 1.33 0 2.00 0 1.00 
H7 0 1.20 0 1.25 0 1.00 
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Actor 
Relational networks 
Information N. Resource exchange N. Action-set coalition 
Betweenns. Structural 
holes 
Betweenns. Structural 
holes 
Betweenns. Structural 
holes 
H8 0.01 3.75 0 1.33 0.12 1.50 
H9 0 .00 0 1.00 0 1.00 
H10 0 1.00 0 1.33 0 1.00 
H11 0 1.33 0 1.00 0 1.00 
H12 0 1.50 0 2.00 0 1.00 
Mean 1.490 6.870 1.207 4.954 1.883 4.366 
Std Dev 4.746 9.056 3.623 6.246 4.099 4.775 
Centralisation 30.66% 25.21% 27.50% 
Source: the author 
In addition, G5 (DPP sector) is the think tank of the ruling party for the 2G-NHI 
examinations run between 2001 and 2004. This actor was important in the evaluation of 
the reform proposal and made suggestions to the ruling party and the caucus in the 
parliament. Moreover, only a few representatives of the administrative sectors and 
intermediate groups have had opportunities to dominate information flows in the NHI 
policy domain. 
Comparatively speaking, the brokerage role of the intermediate groups (G1 to G5) 
is not apparent in the resource exchange network. This can be interpreted as follows. 
Although they can be brokers in facilitating or obstructing information sharing among 
policy actors, they are not important in intermediating the political resource exchange 
relationship. However, the information transmission and resource exchange networks 
also share similarities, the most obvious of which is that A1, A8, and A10 occupy the 
most important brokerage positions, not only in information but also in resource flows. 
Moreover, it can be seen that the action-set coalition network and the resource exchange 
network share similar structures in the allocation of brokerage roles. These public 
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sectors are successfully coordinating collective actions among these policy actors or 
obstructers, thus diminishing the possibilities for collective collaboration.  
In sum, based on the betweenness centrality and structural holes indicators, the 
DoH (A1), the Taipei City government (A8), and the BNHI (A10) are the three top 
policy actors with the most opportunities for brokering information transmission, 
resource intermediation and collective coordination and collaboration. It has been 
demonstrated that these administrative sectors hold strategic positions in the promotion 
of NHI financial reforms. This may account for the previous analytical result that the 
DoH and BNHI, with large in-degree centrality scores, enjoy high level of prominence 
and prestige in the three relational networks and the decision-making network.   
 
6-6. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the nature of policy-making environments. The roles of 
the policy participants in the NHI policy domain have been identified by applying SNA 
(see Table 6-6). Some fundamental and obvious rules can be identified. First, based on 
the relational perspective, the interactive pattern between the policy actors can be 
helpful in creating a collective atmosphere reflecting a social norm-based, interactive or 
casting couch culture, which can be seen as a kind of informal institution constraining 
SROLF\DFWRUV¶EHKDYLRXUVVRDVWRPDNHSROLF\RXWFRPHVPRUHSUHGLFWDEOHDQG
acceptable. Being located in strategic brokerage positions in dealing with NHI affairs, 
the BNHI (A10) and the DoH (A1) are not only the most influential policy actors in the 
information transmission, resource exchange and action-set coalition networks but also 
the policy brokers. This also means that these two policy actors, owing to the valued 
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information and political resources they command, play an important role in sharing 
information and exchanging resources with others in the NHI policy domain. On the 
contrary, most scholars, employer associations, employee associations, welfare NGOs 
(except for E2) and most intermediate groups stand on the periphery of the NHI policy 
domain. Compared with the core policy actors, the number of periphery actors is large, 
so consensus is not easily reached. The analytical results demonstrate that these 
peripheral policy actors can be seen as forming an issue network (Marsh and Rhodes, 
1992: 251) but without the influence to determine policy outcomes and implementation.  
Table 6-6. Policy Actors¶ Influence and Positions in the NHI Policy Domain 
Network positions Policy actors 
Core   Administrative sectors A1 (DoH) and A10 (BNHI)  
 Legislative sectors B6, B7, and B8¶s reputational attribution in 
decision-making network 
 Some medical associations: F1 (Taiwan Medical Association), 
F5 (Taiwan Hospital Association), and F6 (Taiwan Community 
Hospital Association) in resource exchange relations 
 Some intermediate groups G1 (United Daily News), G2 (Daily 
News), G3 (China Times), and G4 (Liberty Times) in 
information sharing and transmission network 
Semi-periphery Welfare NGO E2 (Taiwan Health Reform Foundation)  
Periphery Most scholars, most employee associations, most employer 
associations, most welfare NGOs except E2 (Taiwan Health Reform 
Foundation), most intermediate groups except for G1, G2, G3, and 
G4 in information transmission  
Brokerage A1 (DoH), A8 (Taipei City Government), and A10 (BNHI); Some 
intermediate groups G1 (United Daily News), G2 (Daily News), G3 
(China Times), and G4 (Liberty Times) in information sharing and 
transmission network 
Source: the author 
Furthermore, based on the in-degree centrality scores, the DoH (A1) and the BNHI 
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(A10) possess the greatest influential power among the policy actors of the public 
sector, and some actors in the other categories as well. This shows that policies related 
to the NHI sustainability are mainly directed by the official authorities. Since these two 
public actors are also powerful policy brokers with huge brokerage profiles, they may 
have more opportunities to lead the promotion of the NHI reform. In addition, the 
Taiwan Medical Association (F1) and Taiwan Hospital Association (F5) possess higher 
in-degree centrality figures than the other medical organisations. This indicates that, in 
addition to the DoH and the BNHI, these medical associations are more influential and 
active in the NHI affairs. It is also clear that few medical organisations in the policy 
elite hold peripheral positions. Therefore, all the three entities can be seen as a stable 
policy community (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992: 251) that has substantial influence over 
NHI policymaking. To achieve desired policy goals, more organised and 
institutionalised collaboration is necessary for successful collective action. It is 
important to build a cohesive policy community. If the alliance were to develop into a 
policy community there has to be a high degree of consensus on policy aims and the 
rules of interaction and resource exchange. This alliance may build the rules of game to 
govern how participants have to behave if they are to gain access to the network. This 
also makes it easier for the government to manage the network, resolve conflicts and 
build consensus with the providers in the NHI policy domain. It is evident from Table 6-
4 that the policy community has the advantage of professional knowledge asymmetry in 
medical services and financial controls.  
7KHODERXUIRUFHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVHJ1DWLRQDO)DUPHUV¶$VVRFLDWLRQ'
1DWLRQDO)LVKHUPHQ¶V$VVRFLDWLRQ'7KH/HDJXHRI:HOIDUH2UJDQLVDWLRQVIRUWKH
Disabled (E3), and the Taiwan Labour Legislative Union (D8)) and employer 
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representatives (e.g., the National Association of Small and Medium Enterprises (C4), 
the Chinese National Federation of Industries (C1)), and various experts and scholars, 
are the peripheral actors that focus on relational and decision-making networks. They 
are obviously not in the member list of the NHI policy community. Furthermore, the 
VRFLDOZHOIDUHRUJDQLVDWLRQVHJ&RQVXPHUV¶)RXQGDWLRQ(7DLZDQ+HDOWKFDUH
Reform Foundation (E2), Taiwan Disability Welfare Association (E3) and the NHI 
Supervision League (E4)) are positioned between the core and the periphery. Although 
they are not considered to be a part of the policy-making community network formed by 
the alliance among the BNHI, the DoH and the medical organisations, neither do they 
belong with those focusing on relational and decision-making networks that have minor 
influence. The reason is that social welfare organisations can appropriately utilise 
resources outside of their system (e.g., media and social movements) to reflect their 
opinions on the NHI policy, support the legislators whose standpoints are close to their 
own, thus forcing the BNHI, the DoH and the medical organisations to respond to their 
demands. 
We have already presented the central findings from a more theoretical perspective 
based on the analytical results from the above four networks. The policy actors more 
central in resource exchange networks were (1) seen by others NHI policy stakeholders 
as being more influential in the NHI affairs; (2) more likely to become active in the NHI 
controversies; and (3) more likely to achieve their desired outcomes  (Galakiewicz, 
1979; Knoke, 1994a). In contrast, brokerage activities paint a picture similar to that 
derived from the analysis of in-degree centrality. Brokers wheel and deal primarily 
within communication and resource exchange networks. Hence they are connected with 
influence rather than domination forms of power (Knoke, 1994a: 144). Thus, both the 
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DoH (A1) the BNHI (A10) are not only influential but are also dominant while dealing 
with NHI affairs using the relational approach. 
Combined with the discussion in Chapter 3, it seems that the government (the 
BNHI and the DoH) is the most influential policy actor in both formal and informal 
institutional NHI policy environments. There is no doubt that some legislators and party 
FDXFXVHVRFFXS\LQVWLWXWLRQDOO\DGYDQWDJHRXVSRVLWLRQVDQGFDQEHWUHDWHGDV³YHWR
SOD\HUV´ZLWKLQIOXHQFHRYHUUHIRUPSURPRWLRQ$OWKRXJKWKHJRYHUQPent plays an 
important role in dealing with NHI affairs, it is also difficult to say whether the 
government has been strong enough to completely manipulate the policy-making 
process in an interest-fragmented policy network. Even though the public sectors and 
the medical associations have built policy communities within the NHI policy domain, 
the promotion of the 2G-NHI financing scheme has faced great resistance and has not 
succeeded so far. The SNA indicators used in this chapter have focused on individualV¶
relational levels, but they may have ignored the macro factors of social networks and 
policy networks. Thus, in order to get more comprehensive understanding of power 
distribution in the NHI policy domain, it is necessary to integrate the analytical results 
of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 during interpretation and explanation.   
Combined with the finding in Chapter 5, it can be surmised that another important 
IHDWXUHRIWKHSRZHUVWUXFWXUHLQ7DLZDQ¶VXQLYHUVDOKHDOWKFDUHV\VWHPLVWKHREYLRXV
existence of a political cleavage between the insured and the alliance between the 
government (a single payer) and the provider (medical associations). Moreover, the 
groups of insured lack a channel to access and mobilise political resources for policy 
advocacy and interest intermediation. It seems that the peak employee association and 
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the welfare NGOs play necessary roles without influential power in the NHI policy 
domain; they lack access to other powerful policy participants. Thus, with regard to 
more general aspects of the political system, election outcomes, which determine party 
control of national legislature and administration, are crucial for understanding interest 
LQWHUPHGLDWLRQDQGDXWKRULWDWLYHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJLQ7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQ,WFDQ
be anticipated that the alliance between the public sector and the medical associations 
may provide more opportunities to achieve their policy goals than other stakeholders if 
they can gain political support from the majority of the Congress. Unfortunately, the 
DPP government was under the political environment of divided government between 
2000 and 2008. 
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Chapter 7. Do Social Networks Matter in 
Determining Policy Outcomes? The Case of the 
2G-NHI Financing Scheme* 
Policy network analysis seeks to identify the important actors - governmental and 
nongovernmental organisations, interest groups, and other individual policy actors - 
involved while describing and explaining the structure of their interactions during 
policy-making processes. They are also useful in explaining and predicting collective 
policy decisions and outcomes. With these objectives, policy theorists and empirical 
researchers have applied several network analytical perspectives and, in the process, 
have defined a host of concepts, principles and propositions. Some have explained how 
the structure of policy networks affects policy outcomes (Marsh, 1998: 10). Networks 
reflect interactional patterns and resource exchanges between policy actors, and it is 
these resource exchanges that determine outcomes (Dowding, 1995: 42). In this chapter, 
I explore thHTXHVWLRQRIKRZWKH1+,SROLF\QHWZRUNVLQFOXGLQJSROLF\VWDNHKROGHUV¶
social relationships and their collective actions impact policy outcomes. I do so with 
reference to the recent high profile case of the 2G-NHI financing scheme reform.  
Thomas and Gilson (2004: 279) have observed that healthcare reform is an 
inherently political process within which, sound technical analysis is never enough to 
guarantee the adoption of policy. This observation is also applicable in the context of 
                                                 
*
 Part of the contents of this chapter apSHDUHGLQWKHDXWKRUµVDUWLFOH- (2013). The Application of Social 
Network Analysis on Power Pathway Measurement in Public Policy: The Case Study of National Health 
Insurance's Crucial Policy Events. Public Administration & Policy (TSSCI listed, peer reviewed), (57), 
37-90. 
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Taiwan, where several attempts at healthcare reform have fallen by the wayside for 
reasons related to the political process (Wong, 2003). Hence, in order to arrive at 
appropriate network management strategies for the public sectors to reduce resistance to 
reform, a systematical SNA analysis of the proposals for political feasibility is necessary 
for reform promotion.  
Nevertheless, questions arise as to what methods might be adopted to 
systematically evaluate the political feasibilities of the various proposals, and whether 
the results of the political feasibility analyses adopted actually reflect health politics in 
the real world. It also remains unclear whether political feasibility analyses actually 
enhance the adoption of the policy proposals. Deviating from the previous two 
analytical chapters, this chapter sets out to address these questions by presenting the 
results of such an analysis of policy process of the new NHI financing scheme. 
 
7-1. Background and Content of the Reform Proposal  
 As mentioned previously, in terms RILWVXQEDODQFHGILQDQFLDOVWDWXVWKH1+,¶V
financial reform has not been that successful. Faced with the continuing problems, the 
Executive Yuan (the DPP was in power) in Taiwan launched a comprehensive project, 
covering the period from July 2001 to October 2004, which aimed at restructuring the 
current NHI programme into the so-called the 2G-NHI programme (see page 30-32 for 
more details). This initiative was carried out by the NHI Taskforce based at the DoH, 
with around 120 scholars and experts from diverse fields, including economics, 
sociology, law, public health, public administration, and social welfare.  
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 The Taskforce was divided into five groups: (i) Policy Evaluation and 
Organisational Systems; (ii) Economics and Financing; (iii) Healthcare Distribution; 
(iv) Citizen Participation; and (v) Statistical Analysis (DoH, 2004). The Taskforce set 
out to thoroughly investigate the problems encountered by the NHI programme, ranging 
from the financing system underpinning the scheme, to public participation, and 
subsequently went on to propose systematic suggestions for solutions in various areas.  
In August 2004, the 2G-NHI Taskforce publishHGLWVILQDOUHSRUW³Toward an 
Accountable NHI: Quality, Equity and Participation´DUHSRUWZKLFKZDVEDVHGRQ
values that are somewhat different from those specified in 1990, during the planning 
stage of the NHI programme. At that time, greater attention was paid to universal 
coverage, adequate care, cost containment and efficient use of healthcare resources 
(CEPD, 1990: 12). In other words, although equity remains an important issue within 
the 2G-NHI programme, the values of accountability, quality and participation are 
recent important additions.  
As in the implementation of the national health insurance system of many countries 
throughout the world, the NHI in Taiwan is financed primarily by payroll taxes 
collected from both employers and employees. However, the government also plays a 
prominent role in subsidising the premiums, with variations in the subsidy rates for 
different categories of insured persons.  
 As shown in Table 7-1, the NHI financing scheme is divided in terms of six 
categories of insured persons, with the shares of the premiums payable by the insured 
parties varying from one category to another. Thus, the insurance status of individuals 
changes as a resulting from a change in job, moving house or getting married. Their 
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share of the premiums will also be adjusted.  
Table 7-1. Share of NHI Premiums 
Category Beneficiary Category 
Share (%) No. of the 
Insured and 
Dependents Insured Employer Government 
1 
Civil servants or government 
employees 40 ± 60 
 
Self-employed persons; 
employers 100 ± ± 
11,780,375 
Employees of public or private 
enterprises 30 60 10 
 
2 
Members of occupational 
associations without specific 
employers; seamen serving on 
foreign vessels 
60 ± 40 3,683,993 
3 0HPEHUVRI)DUPHUV¶RU)LVKHUPHQ¶V$VVRFLDWLRQV 30 ± 70 2,629,808 
4 Military personnel ± ± 100 579,318 
5 Low-income households ± ± 100 204,218 
6 
Veterans ± ± 100  
9HWHUDQV¶GHSHQGHQWV 30 ± 70 3,256,558 
Other individuals 60 ± 40  
Amount     22,134,270 
Source: DoH, 2004: 19 
 As opposed to being based on personal income, the current NHI premiums are 
calculated according to the levels of insurable income reported by all insured parties 
(which may well have been under-reported). In Taiwan, the definition of insurable 
income differs from that of personal income, with the former referring to regular income 
received from an employer, and which is self-reported by the employer or the employee, 
whilst the latter includes all income that a person may acquire from both their main 
employer and any other sources, such as income from other side jobs. Some 
commentators therefore argue that the current arrangement may provide a loophole 
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whereby individuals can avoid paying higher premiums by joining a category with a 
lower share of premium.  
Since the implementation of the NHI scheme, medical costs in Taiwan have 
increased dramatically, the growth in insurance revenue has not kept pace with the rise in 
medical costs. The 2G-NHI Taskforce has estimated that the funding based upon 
insurable income is smaller than that based upon personal income; for example, 
between1996 and 2001, the overall rate of growth in medical expenditure was 28.27 
percent, whereas the average growth in personal income was 19.56 percent, and the 
average growth in insurable income was 17.44 percent (2G-NHI Taskforce, 2003).  
 In order to address the problems of insufficiency and inequity with regard to the 
current NHI financing scheme, the Economics and Financing Group of the 2G-NHI 
Taskforce submitted an NHI funding reform proposal, with the major objective of the 
proposal being the achievement of a balance between medical expenditure and the 
revenue obtained from premiums. Other objectives included the assurance of a 
relatively equitable share of premiums, the simplification of the administrative 
procedures and the creation of a financing scheme that could be more affordable and 
sustainable. As a result, five general principles were laid down based upon these major 
policy objectives (2G-NHI Taskforce, 2003): 
(i) The share of the premiums for employers and the government are calculated 
in accordance with fixed formulae, including certain parameters, such as the 
percentage of personnel fees for employers, and the growth rates in GDP and 
medical costs for the government.     
(ii) Representatives of the insured are mandated to decide collectively the scope 
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of benefits, as well as the level of premiums.  
(iii) Insured persons do not have to report to the Bureau of the NHI any changes in 
their insurance status due to changes in job, residence, or other matters.  
(iv) The current rates of contribution shares, as well as the ratios of government 
subsidisation amongst beneficiary categories, are to be eliminated.  
(v) The NHI contributions of insured parties are to be calculated according to 
their personal income rather than their insurable income.  
In short, since the announcement of the results of the 2G-NHI plan in 2004, the 
financing scheme of the 2G-NHI transformed from a classification-based system (i.e., 
the premium was typically divided into six categories and 14 items) to a system that is 
based on the total income of a household. The promotion of the 2G-NHI financing 
scheme is the most important policy goal to sustain the NHI operation since that time. 
From that moment on, numerous obstacles were encountered during the process of 
promoting the new financing scheme, and losses continued to increase. Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that the 2G-NHI plan was submitted by numerous directors of the DoH 
and even the chief of the BNHI6 for approval by the Parliament, the reform plan was 
finally accepted in 2012 when the former director of the DoH, Mr. Chi-Liang Yang, and 
the former Premier of the Executive Yuan in Taiwan, Chun (Sean) Chen, reconciled 
most political conflicts among different policy stakeholders in the Congress. However, 
the most crucial aspect of the 2G-NHI system - the new financing scheme (i.e., the 
calculation of premiums based on the total income of a household) was not approved 
unconditionally because this scheme would hugely impact the insurance contribution 
                                                 
6
 The BNHI changed its name to the National Health Insurance Administration (NHIA) on January 1, 
2010. 
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rate of the insured. To replace this and in order to sustain the current NHI programme, 
an expedient scheme, called the 1.5G-NHI financing scheme, was added with an extra 
fee (i.e., supplementary the NHI premium) to the current six categories and 14 items. 
This additional fee led to an, as yet, unresolved dispute among politicians, resulting in a 
series of political effects. The interviewee from the DoH indicated the cause of the 
comprised policy outcome and is disappointed with the final policy outcome but he also 
stands on the positive perspective on it. He said:  
³The subtle differences in the relationship between the Executive Yuan and the 
Legislative Yuan mean that the opposition ruling the majority in the latter makes it 
difficult to derive support for the 2G-NHI reform spearheaded by the DoH, which 
operates under the auspices of the former. Thus, it was very hard for the DPP to 
promote an unpopular reform proposal under the political arena divided 
government. As expected, the 2G-NHI reform only conditionally passed legislation 
in 2012 when the KMT was in power and made up the majority in the Parliament. 
You have to be aware that the adoption of the new financing scheme is not 
unconditional, right? It still faced a huge political struggle in the environment of 
XQLILHGJRYHUQPHQW«PP«+RZHYHULQWKHIDFHRIRSSRVLWLRQWKHSURSRVHG*-
NHI financing scheme was not fully implemented, but was instead compromised as 
for its 1.5G counterpart. This, however, still serves as an important milestone in 
the sustainable management of the healthcare system. I think I can live with that!´
(Administrative sector A1) 
The final policy outcome of the promotion of the 2G-NHI financing scheme is that 
the lower limit of the supplementing premium has increased from the original NT$ 
2,000 (= £ 40) to NT$ 5,000 (= £ 100). Compared to the 1G-NHI financing scheme, the 
consequent change is not huge for all the policy stakeholders, and there is less impact 
on the insured. Despite the adoption of the 1.5G NHI financing scheme in 2012, the 
financial sustainable ability has not improved much (NHIA, 2015). Thus, the wicked 
financial unsustainability of the NHI has continued to worsen day by day.  
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7-2. Policy Preferences and Positions 
 Eight specific major issues regarding the 2G-NHI financing scheme were selected 
for enquiry to 61 policy participants in this study (one scholar passed away while this 
reform proposal was approved conditionally in 2012). Table 7-2 summarizes the eight 
issues, along with one additional questionnaire item aimed at measuring their overall 
degree of support. The eight issues were the items in the social network questionnaire 
IRULQYHVWLJDWLQJWKHSROLF\DFWRUV¶SHUFHSWLRQDQGDWWLWXGHVRIWKH*-NHI financing 
scheme and related issues. Each of these eight core issues received at least a 65 percent 
positive response rate, general support was discernible for these issues. 
There were two relatively controversial issues involving Q3 (whether the premiums 
should be pre-deducted on the basis of a hypothetical contribution rate), and Q4 (whether 
the representatives of the insured should be authorised to decide the scope of the benefits 
and the premium levels). The design of both of these items received around 26 percent 
opposition from interviewees. In addition, Q7, on whether government contribution 
should be based on formulae with fixed parameters, including growth rates in GDP and 
medical expenditure, also received more than 20 percent opposition from interviewees.  
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Table 7-2. Major Issues and Interviewees¶ Attitudes towards the 2G-NHI (n = 61) 
Items 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
  No. %   No.  %   No.  %  No.  %  No.  % 
Q1.  The classification system 
should be eliminated. ± ± 6 10.3 6 10.3 31 51.3 18 28.2 
Q2.  
Premiums should be 
calculated according to 
taxable income. 
2 2.6 11 18.4 5 7.9 32 52.6 11 18.4 
Q3.  
Premiums should be pre-
deducted on the basis of a 
hypothetical contribution 
rate. 
2 2.6 14 23.7 5 7.9 34 55.3 6 10.5 
Q4.  
Representatives of the 
insured should collectively 
decide the scope of benefits 
and the level of premiums. 
6 10.5 10 15.8 5 7.9 24 39.5 16 26.3 
Q5.  A top limit should be set for NHI premiums. ± ± 8 13.5 2 2.7 33 54.1 18 29.7 
Q6.  A bottom limit should be set for NHI premiums. ± ± 8 12.8 9 15.4 36 59.0 8 12.8 
Q7.  
7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
contribution should be 
calculated based on formulae 
with fixed parameters, 
including growth rates in 
GDP and medical 
expenditure. 
2 2.6 11 18.4 3 5.3 31 50.0 14 23.7 
Q8.  
7KHHPSOR\HUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQ
should be based on a certain 
percentage of personnel fees 
in firms. 
2 2.8 8 13.9 5 8.3 32 52.8 14 22.2 
Overall level of support for the 2G-
NHI initiative* 5 8.1 13 21.6 ± ± 38 62.2 5 8.1 
Source: the author 
Note:  * The options and codes of the items were: (1) no changes at all to the current system; (2) minor changes 
based upon the current system; (3) major changes based upon the 2G-NHI initiative; and (4) all changes to be 
adopted for the 2G-NHI initiative. 
As shown in Table 7-3, the single item measuring the overall degree of support for 
the 2G-NHI initiative appears to be consistent with the mean score for the eight core 
issues. This is despite the fact that the positions of employee associations vary 
GUDPDWLFDOO\EHWZHHQ³OHDVWVXSSRUW´ZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHLWHPLVHGTXHVWLRQVWR
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³PRGHUDWHVXSSRUW´EDVHGXSRQWKHRYHUDOOTXHVWLRQ$FFRUGLQJO\WKHPHDQVFRUHVRI
Q1-Q8, employee associations (3.04) take the lowest position. On the contrary, the 
legislative sector (4.25) seems to ³VWURQJO\DJUHH´ with these eight cores, reform issues. 
Further, compared with other groups, welfare NGOs get the lowest score in terms of the 
overall level of support, suggesting that welfare NGOs are unhappy with the content of 
the reform proposal. The results based on all subjects confirmed that there were more 
mixed reactions to Q4 and Q7, followed by Q2, on whether the premiums of the insured 
parties should be calculated based upon taxable income. 
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Table 7-3. Descriptive Statistics and Group Differences (n=61)a 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
Mean 
Score 
Q1-Q8 
Overall 
Level of 
Supportb 
Panel A: All Subjects (N=61) 
Mean 3.97 3.66 3.47 3.55 4.00 3.72 3.74 3.78 3.73 2.70 
Std. Dev. 0.90 1.07 1.06 1.33 0.94 0.86 1.11 1.05 0.65 0.74 
Panel B: Administrative Sector (N = 10) 
Mean 4.11 3.63 3.75 4.00 4.22 3.78 4.22 4.22 4.00 3.00 
Std. Dev. 0.60 0.74 0.46 0.93 0.44 0.44 0.67 0.67 0.34 0.50 
Panel C: Legislative Sector (N = 9) 
Mean 4.33 4.00 4.00 4.33 4.67 4.00 4.33 4.33 4.25 3.00 
Std. Dev. 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.58 1.00 0.58 0.58 0.33 1.00 
Panel D: Employer Associations (N = 5) 
Mean 3.60 3.00 3.00 4.40 4.00 3.20 3.80 3.00 3.45 2.50 
Std. Dev. 0.89 1.41 1.87 0.55 1.41 1.30 1.10 1.58 0.88 0.58 
Panel E: Employee Associations (N = 6) 
Mean 3.17 3.33 3.33 2.50 3.00 3.33 2.67 2.80 3.04 2.83 
Std. Dev. 0.98 1.03 1.03 1.23 1.10 1.03 1.03 1.10 0.72 0.98 
Panel F: Welfare NGOs (N = 4) 
Mean 4.50 4.50 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.13 1.50 
Std. Dev. 0.71 0.71 1.41 0.00 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 0.00 0.71 
Panel G: Medical Associations (N = 6) 
Mean 4.00 3.50 3.33 3.33 4.60 4.33 4.00 4.40 3.89 2.50 
Std. Dev. 1.10 1.64 1.21 1.51 0.55 0.52 1.55 0.89 0.47 0.84 
Panel H: Intermediate Groups (N = 8) 
Mean 4.40 3.80 3.60 3.80 3.80 3.80 4.00 4.00 3.88 2.50 
Std. Dev. 0.89 0.84 0.89 1.10 0.45 0.45 0.82 0.00 0.35 0.58 
Panel I: Individual Scholars (N = 11) 
Mean 4.33 4.67 3.67 4.00 4.67 4.00 3.33 4.00 4.08 3.00 
Std. Dev. 1.16 0.58 1.53 1.73 0.58 1.00 1.16 0.00 0.85 0.00 
Source: the author 
Notes: 
a    The items in bold text are the means for the eight stakeholder groups. These are below the grand means. 
b    The options and codes of the items were: (1) no changes at all to the current system; (2) minor changes based 
upon the current system; (3) major changes based upon the 2G-NHI initiative; and (4) all changes to be adopted 
for the 2G-NHI initiative. 
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 Furthermore, a further examination of the differences between the eight 
stakeholder groups contributed further insights into the overall political feasibility. A 
quick general impression can be gained from the numbers highlighted in bold in Table 
7-3, which provides a clear indication that the mean scores of these items are below the 
grand means for the stakeholder groups. For example, all legislators interviewed 
provided greater support for all of the major issues than the mean scores for all subjects. 
As for holding veto power to legalise these reform proposals under the constitution in 
Taiwan, the KMT government had a better chance than the DPP government to promote 
the 2G-NHI financing scheme under a unified-government environment. Despite the 
fact that the final result was still politically compromised, the great support from the 
Legislative Yuan can be seen as a determinant factor for the adoption of the 1.5G-NHI. 
The informant of the DoH has many experiences to communicate and interact with 
these legislators. He mentioned: 
³'XULQJWKHperiod of the DPP government, the political atmosphere under a 
divided government was unfriendly to the ruling party. The legislators of the KMT 
tried their best to obstruct most bills proposed by the DPP government. The 2G-
NHI reform proposal spearheaded by the DoH was obviously gotten less support 
from the Legislative Yuan. Thus, although the 2G-NHI initiative was organised by 
the DPP government, the reform proposal has not been passed in the Congress till 
party turnover in 2008. As expected, the 2G-NHI reform only passed legislation in 
ZKHQWKH.07ZDVLQSRZHUDQGPDGHXSWKHPDMRULW\LQWKH3DUOLDPHQW´  
(Administrative sector A1) 
 In addition, as compared to the other stakeholder categories, individual scholars 
and public administrators showed above average support for most of these major issues. 
The informant of the DoH and two leading scholars in designing the 2G-NHI 
programme said:  
 273 
 
 ³There is no doubt that the 2G-1+,LQLWLDWLYHLVYHU\LPSRUWDQWIRU1+,¶V
sustainability. Overcoming all difficulties in promotion of the reform proposal, 
HVSHFLDOO\WKHQHZILQDQFLQJVFKHPHLVRXUPDLQDGPLQLVWUDWLYHJRDO´ 
(Administrative sector A1)  
³7KH*-NHI programme has made profound achievements in the views of 
QXPHURXVH[SHUWVDQGVFKRODUV¶HIIRUWV:HGLG QRWZRUNIRUDQ\SDUW\ZHGRQ¶W
KDYHDQ\SROLWLFDOLGHRORJ\7KXVLWLVXQIDLUWRODEHOXVDV³IHOORZWUDYHOHU´RIDQ\
3DUW\$OOZHZDQWWRGRLVWRSXUVXHFLWL]HQ¶VKHDOWKE\PDNLQJWKH1+,
SURJUDPPHPRUHVXVWDLQDEOH´ (Scholar H1) 
³The 2G healthcare programme is a culmination of the work of numerous 
scholars and should be passed to ensure the sustainability of the healthcare 
V\VWHP´ (Scholar H2) 
 Medical associations seem to agree with most of the measures in the 2G-NHI 
financing scheme; however, given that they are mainly healthcare providers as opposed 
to insurance contributors, they have a lesser stake in the financing scheme. The 
informant from the Taiwan Community Hospital Association indicated that for these 
medical associations, changes in the payment system may arouse greater concerns.  
³,WKLQNPHGLFDOJURXSVVXSSRUWWKHQHZILQDQFLQJVFKHPHEXWZHSUHIHUQRW
to make strong assertions. We are more concerned with the GBP system, because 
WKLVDIIHFWVXVPRUH´ (Medical association F6) 
 On the other hand, the insured including welfare NGOs and employee associations 
showed lower average support for most of these major issues. The opinions expressed 
by the NHI Supervision League and the Chinese Federation of Labour in the interviews 
support the analytical results of these items. They mentioned:  
³,WKLQNWKDWWKHQHZILQDQFLQJVFKHPHIRUPRVWHPSOR\HHVLVDEXUGHQ,QWKH
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past two decades, because of the imbalance between the rising price and 
decreasing monthly minimum wage, I believe that the living expenses have become 
a big burden for salaried men. Thus, the 2G-NHI financing scheme that might raise 
the contribution rate of the general insured, should be considered carefully with 
regard to its negative effects on the employee. I also appeal that the government 
should sustain the NHI programme by shifting attention to control the 
expenditures.´ (Employee association D1) 
³,NQRZWKHVXVWDLQDELOLW\RIWKH1+,LVTXLWHLPSRUWDQWEXW,GRQRWDJUHH
with the new financing scheme. First, under my observation, the healthcare 
providers in Taiwan enjoy the benefit of little risk and high profits under the GBP 
system; why should we have to pay more for supporting their benefit? Second, the 
design of the new financing scheme is still controversial. How should we believe 
that the scheme could bring a better medical care service for us? Third, the change 
of financing method may increase our financial burden. Are these policy planners 
UHDOO\DZDUHRIWKHGLIILFXOWLHVEHLQJHQFRXQWHUHGE\WKHPDVVHV"«´ (Welfare 
NGOs E4) 
The statement reproduced below, perhaps is the most representative of the 
LQWHUYLHZHHV¶RSLQLRQVUHODWHGWRWKHGLVSXWHVRQWKHQHZILQDQFLQJVFKHPHIURPWKH
insured groups. Their opinion shows that knowledge asymmetry is a serious factor 
impacting the SHRSOH¶VSROLF\DFFHSWDQFHOHYHOV  
³7RWHOOWKHWUXWKRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH1+,SURJUDPPHFDQQRWULYDOWKDW
of medical associations and thus are often ignored by the BNHI and the DoH. The 
same can be said of our resources-especially manpower and financial resources, 
thus rendering us unable to conduct a systematic study of healthcare policies. We 
are not fully informed about the new financing scheme, so we maintain a 
FRQVHUYDWLYHVWDQFHRQWKHLVVXH´ (Employee association D7) 
³1RRQHLQRXUJURXSreally understands the new financing scheme. We 
simply think that a higher premium may increases pressure on the part of the 
LQVXUHGVRZHGRQ¶WIXOO\VXSSRUWWKHQHZILQDQFLQJVFKHPH´ (Welfare NGOs E3) 
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The broad impression gained from an examination of Table 7-3 is further 
substantiated by Figure 7-1, which plots the mean score responses for all stakeholder 
groups against overall attitudes towards the items, and Figure 7-2 which plots the mean 
score responses against the overall level of support for the NHI reform. These two 
ILJXUHVIXUWKHUGHPRQVWUDWHWKHVHJURXSV¶SHUFHSWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKHUHIRUPSURSRVDOV. 
Figure 7-1. Mean Score of All Items for 2G-NHI Reform by Stakeholder Groups 
 
Source: the author 
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Figure 7-2. Overall Support Degree for 2G-NHI Reform by Stakeholder Groups 
 
Source: the author 
As discussed within the reform proposal, the ideas of sustainability, equity and 
responsibility are embedded within the 2G-NHI financing proposal. According to the 
results from the interviews, the eight issues introduced in the new scheme received a 
certain level of support from the players, particularly those relating to the elimination of 
insured categories and the establishment of upper and lower limits for the NHI 
premiums. However, according to policy actor D4 (#D4 in Table 4-2), the vested 
LQWHUHVWJURXSVVXFKDVWKH7DLZDQ3URYLQFLDO)LVKHUPHQ¶V$VVRFLDWLRQGLGQRWDJUHH
with the cancellation of insured categories based upon occupation. The informant from 
the Taiwan 3URYLQFLDO)LVKHUPHQ¶V$VVRFLDWLRQVDLG 
³:K\GRQ¶WZHVXSSRUWWKHSURSRVDO",WLVYHU\VLPSOH7KHGHVLJQRI*-NHI 
financing scheme will damage the rights and interests of fishermen. In the original 
financing method, fishermen can pay NHI premiums at a lower contribution rate. 
:HRIFRXUVHGRQRWVXSSRUWLW´ (Employee association D4) 
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All members of the welfare NGOs (E1, E2, E3, and E4) were also opposed to the 
setting of either upper or lower premium limits, since they felt that premium limits 
would undeUPLQHRQHRIWKHSULPDU\DLPVRIWKHILQDQFLQJUHIRUP³HTXLW\´'HVSLWH
most respondents agreeing to the setting of a lower limit for premiums, many felt that 
those who could not afford the minimum premiums should be subsidised by the 
government through the social welfare system (Administrative sector A8 and A9; 
Employee association D1; Medical association F5 and F6).  
Changes in the basis upon which premiums were to be calculated, along with the 
shifting of financial responsibility to the insured parties, were the least popular 
measures amongst those interviewed. Although there was some discernible support for 
extending the funding base from insurable income to taxable income, many of the 
respondents questioned the feasibility of collecting premiums on the basis of taxable 
income largely because of concerns over the definition of taxable income and the 
procedure to be used for collecting individual contributions (Administrative sector A3; 
Legislative sector B2 and B7; Employer association C2 and C3; Employee association 
D2 and D4; Welfare NGOs E3; Medical association F6, and Intermediate group G5).  
The equitable sharing of NHI contributions between employers, employees and the 
government remained a troublesome subject, since many of the respondents disagreed 
with the notion that the insured party alone had to bear the responsibility for the 
fluctuations in medical expenditure. Furthermore, some of the respondents questioned 
the validity of the mechanism which essentially required representatives of the insured 
parties to collectively decide the benefits and the premium levels. Some argued that the 
system under which the NHI representatives were identified was unclear and difficult to 
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operationalise (Administrative sector A1and A10; Employer association C5; Employee 
association D3 and D4, and Welfare NGOs E2). It is also a typical difficulty of network 
management for the public sectors. The statement from the informant of the BNHI 
demonstrated below is the most representative opinion received from representatives of 
the insured groups.   
³2ND\WRWHOOWKHWUXWKWKHLQYLWDWLRQRIGHOHJDWHVIURPGLIIHUHQt groups for 
participating the NHI policy formulation and decision in formal channel is a tough 
task for the BNHI. There are numerous groups or NGOs in Taiwan. Most of these 
social groups claim that they have strong will to join whichever NHI committees 
anGFDQUHSUHVHQWPRUHSHRSOH¶VLQWHUHVWV+RZHYHUWKHSRVLWLRQRIFRPPLWWHH
members is limited. These social groups always do not satisfy the lists of every 
committee members in the NHI policy domain. Balancing the representatives and 
interests among multiSOHVRFLDOJURXSVLVDSROLWLFDODUW«´(Administrative sector 
A10) 
Some medical groups argued that the insured parties had neither the professional 
knowledge to enable them to reach decisions appropriate to medical coverage, nor the 
necessary budgets to enable them to purchase such services (Medical association F1, 
F2, F3, F4, and F6). They also argued that the societal groups are usually hostile to them 
for no reason. It seems that the societal groups distrust them in the NHI policy domain. 
Three presidents of three different medical associations indicated this by claiming:  
³,DJUHHZLWKWKDWWKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIWKHJURXSVUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHLQVXUHGLV
important and necessary in coping with NHI affairs. However, I think their 
participation has led to the discussion and decision with low quality as well. The 
most important reason is that most of these delegates are not professional in 
medical care and NHI finance. They usually just blindly object reform proposals 
and our suggestions. The knowledge asymmetry leads to a serious cognitive gap 
EHWZHHQWKHLQVXUHGDQGWKHSURYLGHU´ (Medical association F1) 
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 ³In fact, all hospitals have contracts with the BNHI under the NHI 
programme should respond to public demands and government mandates. 
Moreover, if we fail to meet the targets, many interests will be affected. I may not 
be able to pinpoint which specific measure we care most about, but basically it is a 
synergy effect. To tell the truth, the GBP system has not provided enough incentive 
to us given the huge size of our revenue. Thus, we always try our best to provide 
medical services with high-quality by cost control method. We are not selfish and 
just benefit-orientation. It is unfair for the societal groups merely discredit us.´
(Medical association F5) 
Finally, the intermediate groups show some support for the new scheme, albeit not 
with any real degree of strength. As previously mentioned, one informant of the mass 
media expressed that the report about the new financing scheme should balance positive 
and negaWLYHSHUVSHFWLYHV6RPHWLPHVIRUIDFLOLWDWLQJWKHSHRSOH¶VFRPPRQVHQVHDQG
PRQLWRULQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLRQFULWLFDOFRPPHQWVRQUHIRUPSURSRVDOV
should be faithfully reported: 
³I think the media is mainly concerned with balanced reporting and 
delivering information to the people. However, the media tackles the new financing 
scheme from a critical standpoint. As for most people, they do not have enough 
professional knowledge to understand the new financing scheme fully. The public 
has a right to information, and the government has the responsibility to ease their 
concerns.´ (Intermediate group F1) 
 
7-3. Network Structure and Policy Outcome: Centrality 
Perspective 
Based on the power approach of policy process theories, the basic assumption 
behind the causal relationship between policy-making processes and outcomes is that 
powerful or influential actors are more likely to dominate the policy outcomes during a 
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policy-making process. Policy network theory refers to the patterns of interaction 
among policy actors in policy domains in which the structure of policy networks 
influences policy outcomes (Compston, 2009: 35; Knoke, 1994b: 287-289, 2011: 210; 
Marsh, 1998: 11; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 8). Moreover, the structure of policy 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHODWLRQDOQHWZRUNVDUHLPSRUWDQWIRUXQGHUVWDQGLQJKRZWKH\EHFRPH
LQYROYHGLQSROLF\LQIOXHQFHDFWLYLWLHV,QWKHFDVHRI/DXPDQQDQG.QRNH¶VUHVHDUFKRQ
the U.S. energy and health policy domains, influence occurs when one actor 
intentionally transmits valued information or political resources to another that alters the 
latters¶DFWLRQV.QRNHE, 163). Thus, these relationship models and positions of 
actors within policy networks simultaneously determine the power and network 
structures of policy community members. In other words, the basic units of any 
complex political system are not individuals, but positions or roles occupied by social 
actors and the relations or connections between these positions.  
The interactions and communications in policy networks can be conceptualised as 
a system of exchanges in which actors seek to realise their own goals (Pappi and 
Henning, 1998). Policy network approaches emphasise the actions and structures 
resulting from policy outcomes and how actions and interactive structures between 
policy actors generate influence and determine policy outcomes (Knoke, 1994b: 288, 
2011: 211). According to Granovetter (1985), the existence of influence or power 
among actors is embedded in the networks of social relations. Also, influence is possible 
when communication occurs between policy actors. Based on the indicators of SNA, 
policy actors with higher in-degree centralities in information transmission or resource 
H[FKDQJHQHWZRUNVDUHPRUHOLNHO\WRLQIOXHQFHRWKHUDFWRUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVDQG
behaviours. In decision-making networks, the core policy actors may have greater 
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influence compared to those placed in periphery positions, and are more likely to be 
able to dominate the decision processes (Knoke, 1994a, 1994b, 2011). In summary, as 
the model of collective action system in Figure 4-2 shows, social relations among policy 
actors do not only to shape the power structure of policy networks, but also directly or 
indirectly affect policy outcomes. Consequently, these effects form a relational network 
of information transmission, resource exchange and action-set coalition that determines 
the position and influence of the actors involved, thereby influencing policy outcomes. 
Hence, based on the model of Figure 4-2, the modified model depicted in Figure 7-3 
VKRZVWKDWLQIOXHQWLDOUHSXWDWLRQDODWWULEXWLRQPHGLDWHVEHWZHHQWKHSROLF\DFWRU¶V
relational networks and policy outcomes.  
Figure 7-3. Power Pathway and Policy Outcome Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author 
In order to avoid the possibility of collinearity in the network data, Pearson 
correlation analysis was conducted to examine the relationship among various 
independent variables (i.e., information transmission, material resource exchange, 
action-VHWFRDOLWLRQVDQGSROLF\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHSXWDWLRQDWWULEXWLRQVLQGHFLVLRQ-
Knoke, 1994a, 1994b: 288, 
2011: 211 Granovetter, 1985 
Network in-degree 
centrality 
Reputational 
attribution 
Policy outcomes 
Compston, 2009: 35; Knoke, 
1994b: 287-289, 2011: 210;  
Marsh, 1998: 11; Rhodes, 
1997: 36-39 
 282 
 
makings). According to Table 7-4, a positive correlation exists among the three 
relational networks and the reputational attributions on decision-makings, indicating 
that actors who are popular in social relation networks might influence policy processes 
significantly (Knoke et al., 1996; Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Marsh, 1998). However, 
for social network data, it is expected that the correlations between the action-set 
coalition network and the resource exchange network (0.674**) and between the 
information transmission network and the resource exchange network (0.758**) are 
high, implying the possibility of statistic collinearity. Therefore, the resource exchange 
network might not be applicable for subsequent analyses. Previous policy network 
studies have asserted that effective communications among policy actors mitigate policy 
conflicts and contribute to achieving not only a consensus but also effective collective 
actions in the policy-making and implementation processes. In addition, because they 
have more opportunities to dominate the valued information or communication channels 
in policy networks, actors with high level of in-degree centrality in information 
transmission can significantly influence policy outcomes (Knoke et al., 1996; Laumann 
and Knoke, 1987, 1989; Marsden and Laumann, 1977). Moreover, the relationship 
between each relational network and the reputational attribution of the decision-making 
network shows that, in contrast to the information transmission network (0.594**), the 
correlation between the resource exchange network and the reputational attribution 
network is higher (0.797**), which might suggest collinearity between these two 
variables. Therefore, two relational network variables, information transmission 
network and action-set coalition network, were retained for subsequent regression 
analysis.    
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Table 7-4. Correlations among Key Network Centrality Variables (n=61) 
 Information 
transmission 
Resource 
exchange 
Action-set 
coalition 
Reputational 
attribution 
Information 
transmission 
1 0.758** 0.386** 0.594** 
Resource 
exchange 
 1 0.674** 0.797** 
Action-set 
coalition 
  1 0.600** 
Reputational 
attribution 
   1 
Source: the author (*, p<0.05; **, p<0.01) 
 Path analysis is used in statistics to describe directed dependencies among a set of 
variables. To determine whether social relations among policy actors and their 
influence-related reputational attributions have affected policy outcomes, I use the 
pathway model diagram illustrated in Figure 7-4 based on the in-degree centrality of the 
information transmission network, action-set coalition network, their influential 
reputational attributions, and policy outcomes. Since the information transmission 
network and the action-set coalition network may influence each other, Laumann and 
Knoke (1987) and Knoke et al. (1996) have suggested that effective communications 
among policy stakeholders lead to successful, collective actions. Therefore, the 
following possible interpretation between power pathways and policy outcomes seems 
to be plausible: 
(a) The in-degree centrality of information transmission network influences the policy 
outcomes through four pathways: the in-degree centrality directly influences the 
policy outcome. It also influences the effects and influential power of policy actors 
in a network-like surrounding. All this is captured in the following influence 
pathway: the information transmission network ĺ WKHSROLF\RXWFRPHVĺWKH
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action-VHWFRDOLWLRQQHWZRUNĺLQIRUPDWLRQWUDQVPLVVLRQQHWZRUNDJDLQĺSROLF\
outcomes through personal reputational attributions.  
(b) The in-degree centrality of the action-set coalition network influences policy 
outcomes through two pathways: the in-degree centrality of action-set coalition 
network directly influences policy outcomes; and the networks of action-set 
coalitions directly influence the personal influential reputational attribution of policy 
actors in a decision-making network, and then influence policy outcomes. In other 
words, the prestige of the information transmission network, action-set coalition 
network, and reputational attribution network directly associates with policy 
outcomes. Moreover, the in-degree centrality of information transmission network 
and action-set coalition network directly and indirectly influence policy outcomes.  
Figure 7-4. Modified Power Pathway and Policy Outcome Model 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Knoke et al., 1996: 106 
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 7-5. The analytical result 
of pathway model diagram in Figure 7-4 can be demonstrated as Figure 7-5, which 
illustrates a causal model capable of better explaining the failure of promoting the 2G-
NHI financing scheme within the network variables adopted in this study. The 
Information 
transmission 
Action-set 
coalition 
Reputational 
attribution Policy outcomes 
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influential reputational prominence influences the desired policy outcome only slightly 
(E=0.051, p=0.058<0.1). The information transmission interactions of actors is 
associated with the influential reputation of decision-making networks positively and 
significantly (E=0. 427, p<0.001). The action-VHWFRDOLWLRQQHWZRUNDIIHFWVDFWRUV¶
influential reputation attribution in the decision-making network directly, positively and 
significantly (E=0. 433, p<0.001). Greater information transmission connections among 
SROLF\SDUWLFLSDQWVSRVLWLYHO\IDFLOLWDWHWKHSROLF\DFWRUV¶FROOHFWLYHDFWLRQVE=0.384, 
p<0.01). Based on these pathways of direct influences in this model, the influence 
power of each actor in the decision-making network is an essential feature affecting 
policy outcomes. Conversely, no significant and direct correlation exists among the 
information transmission network, the action-set coalition, and the failure in promoting 
the 2G-NHI financing scheme. Moreover, a policy actor with great in-degree centrality 
of the information transmission network and the action-set coalition network positively 
affects their influential attributions in policy-making processes. In other words, 
prominence in communication and collaborative activities substantially raises policy 
DFWRUV¶LQIOXHQWLDOSRZHULQWKH1+,SROLF\GRPDLQ7KLVILQGLQJUHFHLYHVVXSSRUWIURP
*UDQRYHWWHU¶VLGHDRIVRFLDOHPEHGGHGQHVVDVZHOODV/DXPDQQDQG.QRNH¶V
(1987) policy domain model. In addition, the action-set coalition relationship of these 
policy actors is dependent on effective communications while reducing conflicts and 
achieving consensus during the promotion process of the 2G-NHI financing scheme. 
Therefore, the policy actors who substantially depend on others in the information 
transmission relations in the reform policy network must collaborate with others to 
achieve their policy goals.   
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0.033 
0.427*** 
0.051+ 
0.433*** 
0.384** 
-0.057 
Table 7-5. Regression Model for the Total Household Income System (n=61) 
Dependent variables 
 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Policy outcomes Reputational attribution Action-set coalition 
E exp (E) E VIF E VIF 
Information 
transmission 
0.033 1.033 0.427*** 1.173 0.384** 1.000 
Action-set coalition -0.057 0.944 0.433*** 1.173   
Reputational 
attribution 
0.051+ 1.052     
Adjusted R-S 0.151+ 
炷Cox & Snell炸 
0.495*** 0.133** 
-2 log likelihood 70.861   
Source: the author (+, p<0.1; *, p<0.05; **, p<0.01; ***, p<0.001) 
Figure 7-5. Centrality Network Pathway Model for Policy Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author 
Regarding direct influences between variables in the pathway model, the 
information transmission network, action-set coalition network, influential reputational 
attribution of policy actors, and the final policy outcome exhibited a noteworthy 
statistical relationship. Based on the pathway model shown in Figure 7-5, the influential 
reputation attribution of these policy actors is the mediator variable among the 
informational transmission relationship, the action-set coalition network, and the final 
policy outcome. In other words, the information transmission, and the action-set 
Information 
transmission 
Action-set 
coalition 
Reputational 
attribution Policy outcomes 
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coalition relationship among the policy actors in this case did not directly affect the 
result of the policy outcome. Rather, these factors affected the policy outcome through 
the influence-power that the policy actors had on the promotion process of the reform 
proposal. However, because the total adjusted R2 for this power pathway and policy 
outcome model suggests that the overall goodness of fit was not high, the causal 
relationship should be explained conservatively.  
 
7-4. Network Structure and Policy Outcome: Brokerage-role 
Perspective 
Several researchers (Burt, 1992, 2001, 2004; Granovetter, 1973; Homans, 1951, 
1974; Marsden, 1982, 1983) have stressed the importance of actors occupying strategic 
positions in social networks to explain aspects of the diffusion processes in social 
structures. If contact between two parties is possible only through a third party, the latter 
can be regarded as being in control of resource flow. This strategic position can be seen 
as a structural hole between two actors unconnected to each other. The role of structural 
holes in policy networks is presented in Figure 7-6. The ego can be seen as oneself and 
DOWHUUHIHUVWRWKHSHUVRQ¶VQHWZRUNPHPEHUVLQWKis figure. When an ego takes the 
network position of greater structural holes (see the leftmost network diagram in Figure 
7-6), it is linked to fragmented social groups. In this case, the ego enjoys structural 
autonomy, which means to become less dependent and non-substitutable (Burt, 1992). 
This network structure demonstrates that the ego has more opportunities to control 
information exchange or resource flow and does not readily build mutual trust 
relationships with others within a network (Klijn and Teisman, 2000: 97-98; Knoke and 
Yang, 2008: 67). Structural autonomy, or a non-substitutable role, serves as an incentive 
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for the ego to feel a greater sense of self-FRQWUROZKLFKHQKDQFHVWKHHJR¶VVHQVHRI
significance and competency within the policy network. 
Figure 7-6. Hypothetical Network Diagram for Structural Holes  
Source: Lee and Kim, 2011: 210 
In contrast, fewer structural holes (see the rightmost network diagram in Figure 7-
6) produce a greater number of mutual parties, which serves as incentive mechanisms 
for the ego to collaborate with others in a network (Coleman, 1988). For instance, if 
Alter 1 is tied with Alter 4, they may have access to the same type of social support 
(e.g., same information). It also means that the ego is less likely to manipulate the 
information flow between them. Moreover, the ego may be concerned that his or her 
opportunistic behaviors will spread quickly in dense networks. Furthermore, the ego is 
more likely to be pressured to feel a sense of obligation to share social support with 
others. For example, in moderate structural KROHVWKHHJR¶VRSSRUWXQLVWLFEHKDYLRUFDQ
be oppressed if Alter 1 is connected to Alters 2 and 3. In this case, all actors share the 
ego and this could serve as a constraint mechanism at times when the ego may not want 
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others to know about its reactive commitment behaviour. 
Interest intermediation is integral to the policy-making processes of most policy 
domains. In his structural hole theory, Burt (1992) emphasised the importance of the 
brokerage roles of the actors in a social network. If there are lots of structural holes in a 
policy network, there will also be lots of brokerage opportunities for some actors in the 
policy-making processes. The research of Fernandez and Gould (1994) on the U.S. 
national health policy domain shows that occupancy of brokerage positions in a policy 
domain's communication network is a crucial determinant of influence. In the NHI 
SROLF\GRPDLQWKHQHWZRUNZLWKPRUHVWUXFWXUDOKROHVPD\LQFUHDVHWKHHJR¶VDXWRQRP\
to manipulate resource and informal flows in the policy processes and may have more 
opportunities to influence policy outcomes. Thus, the power pathway and policy 
outcome models shown in Figure 7-3 can be verified by the theory of structural holes.  
The indicator of effective size was adopted as a measure of structural holes (Burt, 
1992). Conceptually, ³HIIHFWLYHVL]H´ is the number of people the ego is connected to, 
minus the redundancy in the network. That is, it reduces non-redundant elements in the 
network. A greater effective size indicates that actors take positions where there are 
greater structural holes.  
Table 7-6 shows the correlation matrix between the effective sizes of the structural 
holes in the three relational network variables and the in-degree centrality of the 
reputational attribution network (reputational attribution of actors should be measured 
by the indicator of in-degree centrality). This indicates that all variables are statistically 
significant and positive. Most of the correlation coefficients are at the medium level, 
with the highest being 0.83 (p<0.01). The information transmission network and 
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resource exchange network are positively correlated. The resource exchange network 
and action-set coalition network are also positively correlated (r=0.72, p<0.01), while 
the resource exchange network and personal influential reputation attribution are 
positively corrected (r=0.64, p<0.01) as well. It is reasonable for personal influential 
reputation attribution to have a positive correlation with the information transmission 
network (r=0.41, p<0.01) and action-set coalition network (r=0.62, p<0.01). Moreover, 
the high correlation between the resource exchange network and other network 
variables indicates that there are collinearities among these variables. Thus, for the same 
reasons as mentioned in previous section (see page 279-280 for more details), two 
relational network variables, the structural hole of information transmission network 
and action-set coalition network, were retained in subsequent regression analyses.    
Table 7-6. Correlations among Key Structural-hole Variables (n=61) 
 Information 
transmission 
Resource 
exchange 
Action-set 
coalition 
Reputational 
attribution 
Information 
transmission 
1 0.830** 0.489** 0.407** 
Resource 
exchange 
 1 0.724** 0.635** 
Action-set 
coalition 
  1 0.619** 
Reputational 
attribution 
   1 
Source: the author (*, p<.05; **, p<.01) 
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 7-7. The pathway model 
in the figure illustrates the optimal model that explains the failure of promoting the 2G-
NHI financing scheme within the variables by the perspective of structure hole. As with 
WKHSUHYLRXVPRGHOSURPLQHQFHRIWKHVHSROLF\DFWRUV¶LQIOXHQWLDODWWULEXWLRQVLQFUHDVHV
the chances of desired policy outcomes only slightly. The brokerage role of collective 
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action among policy actors significantly increases their influential reputation attribution 
of the decision-making network (E=0.552, p<0.001). By contrast, the information 
transmission interactions among the actors are not statistically significant probably 
because of the influential reputation of the decision-making networks. A higher effective 
size of the information transmission network (more brokering opportunities) positively 
associates with the brokerage role of the action-set coalition network (E=0.489, 
p<0.001). Based on these pathways of direct influences, the actor who holds strategic 
positions with high effective size of structural holes in the decision-making network is 
an essential factor that affects policy outcomes. Conversely, no significant and direct 
correlations exist among the information transmission network, action-set coalition 
network, and the failure of promoting the 2G-NHI financing scheme. Moreover, the 
structural holes of action-set coalition network positively affect the influential power of 
policy participants involved in the NHI policy. In addition, the action-set coalition of 
these policy actors is dependent on the possibility of controlling the communication 
channel (the information transmission network) to manipulate valued information or 
achieve consensus in the promotion process of the 2G-NHI financing scheme. 
Therefore, the policy actors who have greater effective sizes in terms of structural roles 
have greater chances to take up brokerage roles in these social relations with respect to 
the 2G-NHI financing scheme policy network in achieving their policy goals. 
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0.027 
0.489*** 
-0.120 
0.137 
0.552*** 
0.130* 
Table 7-7. Regression Model for the Total Household Income System (n=61) 
Dependent variable 
 
Independent variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Policy outcome Reputational 
attribution 
Action-set coalition 
E exp (E) E VIF E VIF 
Information 
transmission 
0.027 1.027 0.137 1.314 0.489*** 1.000 
Action-set coalition -0.120 0.886 0.552*** 1.314   
Reputational attribution 0.130* 1.139     
Adjusted R-S 0.138* 
炷Cox & Snell炸 
0.495*** 0.226*** 
-2 log likelihood 71.751   
Source: the author (+, p<0.1; *, p<0.05; **, p<0.01; ***, p<0.001) 
Figure 7-7. Structural Hole Pathway Model for Policy Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author 
Regarding direct influences in the pathway model, the brokerage role of the 
information transmission network, action-set coalition network, influential reputational 
attribution of policy actors, and the final policy outcome exhibited statistically 
significant relationships. As is evident from Figure 7-7, the influence-reputations of 
these policy actors are the mediating variable among the structural holes in the action-
set coalition network and the final policy outcomes. In other words, a policy participant 
plays a strong brokerage role in the information transmission network, and the action-
Information 
transmission 
Action-set 
coalition 
Reputational 
attribution Policy outcome 
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set coalition network does not directly affect the result of the policy outcome. Instead, 
these factors affect the policy outcome under the influence of the policy actors had on 
the policy network. Thus, the policy actors who have greater structural holes in the 
information transmission network and the action-set coalition network will have more 
influence to determine policy outcomes. However, the adjusted R2 for the pathway 
model suggests that the overall goodness of fit is slightly low, and that the causal 
relationship should be conservatively explained. 
 
7-5. Conclusion  
Deviating from the previous two chapters, this chapter used the 2G-NHI financing 
VFKHPHDVWKHFDVHWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHFDXVDOUHODWLRQVKLSVDPRQJSROLF\DFWRUV¶VRFLDO
networks and policy outcomes. Despite its popularity, there have been ongoing reforms 
in the NHI Programme ever since its initial implementation. A major attempt at the 
structural reform of the programme was made between 2001 and 2004 (2G-NHI), 
carried out by a Taskforce under the Executive Yuan in Taiwan. According to the 
findings, the 2G-NHI financing reform proposal has received a certain level of support 
from policy stakeholders, with most of the respondents recognising the ideas of equity 
and sustainability with regard to the overall proposal, and therefore demonstrating their 
intention to support such measures as eliminating the system of classifying the insured 
parties (that had existed since the establishment of the Taiwanese Labour Insurance in 
1950), and expanding the funding base for the programme. Nevertheless, since most 
insured persons believe that the government must play a significant role in financing the 
programme, plans for sharing the contributions between the insured, the employed and 
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the government have remained controversial.  
Furthermore, mechanisms for deciding the insurance revenue and medical costs 
amongst the representatives of the insured had not yet been spelt out. It is also clear that 
few employer associations had agreed with the design of the system for calculating each 
HPSOR\HU¶VVKDUHRIWKHFRQWULEXWLRQV6LQFHWKHHPSOR\PHQWUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
employers and employees in Taiwan has become more flexible and diversified, it has 
been difficult to estimate the exact personnel fees in firms. Therefore, it was difficult to 
fit them into the reform proposals.  
With respect to the policy preferences of key players, there was strong support for 
the reform proposal as a whole amongst the legislative, administrative elite and 
scholars. However, this may be attributable to some individuals or organisations within 
the internal group being simply more familiar with the proposal. Given that the 
insurance deficits have been an issue of major concern for many years, they may also 
have been attracted by the potential of the reform proposal to reduce the overall 
financial burden on the government. 
Employee associations and welfare groups appear to be skeptical of the reform 
proposals, particularly with respect to the placing of financial responsibility on the 
insured parties. Likewise, the employer associations also had some issues with the 
proposed scheme: disagreement with expanding the funding base from insurable income 
to taxable income, and the calculation of contributions based on personnel fees.  
Medical associations appear to have been in agreement with most of the measures 
in the reform proposal. However, given that they are mainly healthcare providers as 
 295 
 
opposed to insurance contributors, they had smaller stakes in the financing scheme. It 
seems that changes in the payment system may arouse greater concerns for these 
associations.  
Finally, the role of mass media is just to report the issue faithfully and raise the 
DZDUHQHVVRIWKHSHRSOH¶VULJKW,QWHUPHGLDWHJURXSVVKRZHGVRPHVXSSRUWIRUWKHQHZ
scheme, albeit not with any real degree of strength.  
Based on the analytical results from my path analysis, the influence of the NHI 
policy actors as a group on decision-making depends on their positions and relations in 
the three relational networks. Correlations were found with the relationships between 
the original social network matrices and the personal influence-based reputational 
attributions of policy actors in the decision-making network. All the relational networks, 
irrespective of whether they are from the perspectives of in-degree centrality or 
EURNHUDJHUROHKDYHVLJQLILFDQWO\OHGWRWKHVHSROLF\DFWRUV¶LQIOXHQWLDOSRZHUZKLOH
promoting the 2G-NHI financing scheme. This result shows that the policy actors who 
maintain higher levels of ties with other policy actors are more likely to achieve their 
desired policy outcomes in the NHI policy domain (Knoke, 1994a; Laumann and 
Knoke, 1987, 1989). On the other hand, a policy actor with more structural holes in the 
three relational networks also had more opportunities to manipulate the information and 
resource flow among these policy participants (Fernandez and Gould, 1994). According 
to previous studies (Klijn and Teisman, 2000: 97-98; Knoke and Yang, 2008: 67), actors 
in a fragmented network structure tend to focus on their own ambitions and interests 
rather than collective goals. Owing to the autonomy of these network positions, actors 
with greater structure holes may have more chances to destroy the collective goals 
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which are different from theirs. This finding reveals that policy actors who occupy 
network positions embedded in greater structural holes could lead the reform towards 
their desired policy outcomes. 
It is important to note that the multiple regression analysis in both pathway models 
VKRZVWKDWWKHSROLF\DFWRUV¶LQIOXHQWLDOUHSXWDWLRQDODWWULEXWLRQLQWKHGHFLVLRQ-making 
network is significantly correlated with their information transmission and resource 
dependency activities. This result also indicates that policy actors who are prestigious or 
hold more structural holes in communication and resource dependency relations have a 
considerably higher influence in the NHI decision-making processes, which support 
previous empirical findings (Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989; Knoke et al., 1996)  
In policy process theories, decision-making is a political game rather than technical 
one. Nevertheless, the most important thing is that they can be used to effectively depict 
the image of power allocation for political games and investigate the relationship 
between power pathways and policy outcomes in real scenarios (Compston, 2009; 
Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Sandström, 2008). The analytical results presented here offer 
a more nuanced picture where higher influential reputation in a decision-making process 
had greater influence on the policy outcome as far as the 2G-NHI financing is 
concerned. Moreover, the rich relationships among and the structural holes between the 
information transmission and action-set coalition networks among the policy actors 
influences the policy outcome because they have greater influential power than others in 
the policy processes. It looks as if the policy actors in the 2G-NHI financing scheme 
policy network, who were influential, controlled substantial information or resources, 
and were independent of others, opposed the proposal for the total household income 
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system. What is most interesting, is that the leading policy actors (the DoH and the 
BNHI) in this case could not still dominate the policy process to their desired policy 
outcome, instead, resulted in the outcome wherein the compromised scheme - the 
supplementary NHI premium - was added to the original fees of the six categories and 
14 items. This compromise reveals that although the policy actors of the welfare NGOs, 
the Employer Associations and Employee Associations stand on the relative periphery 
position with less influence in policy processes; the government and the representatives 
of the medical associations could not still ignore their questions and opposition to the 
reform proposals.    
By integrating the finding of this chapter and previous two chapters, it may be 
concluded that the SNA approach is a useful tool in subsequent policy promotion 
DFWLYLWLHV$VDQDQDO\WLFDOWRRO61$FDQV\VWHPDWLFDOO\HYDOXDWHDQDFWRU¶s chances and 
capacity to influence policy outcomes by analysing their interdependency relationships 
and social positions in a network structure. The analytical results could lead to an 
effective network management strategy that takes into account political expediency. 
Acting as a core policy maker and broker in the policy domain, the government has 
more abilities to promote full communications and interflow among all participants, 
sidestep conflicts, and reach a consensus. This also means that a government with a 
strong in-degree centrality and brokerage profile in resource exchange relationships can 
have more strategic opportunities to be an initiator and coordinator mobilising and 
manipulating political resources in the policy network. However, if the government is 
not a part of the policy community or a policy broker with a strong brokerage profile, 
public managers should try to establish a close and robust connection with the core 
actors or coordinators to assure their support in the policy-making processes. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusions, Limitations, and 
Implications  
This chapter summarises the theoretical contributions of this study. Policy 
implications are drawn on the basis of the findings. Finally, suggestions for further 
study are explicated based on the theoretical and methodological limitations of this 
study.  
 
8-1. Summary of Findings  
8-1-1. Who are the Key Players in the NHI Policy Domain and What 
are Their Interests 
Based on documentary analysis and careful consultations, my findings show that 
there is high overlap between the policy participants in the three crucial policy events 
examined. This shows that, in the NHI policy domain, decision-making power is very 
concentrated in a few and stable policy actors. This research has identified 62 NHI 
policy participants, which include both organisations and individuals and can be 
classified into eight categories including 10 in the administrative units, 9 legislators 
involved in the affairs of the NHI on behalf of the ParliDPHQWPDMRUHPSOR\HU¶V
DVVRFLDWLRQVEXVLQHVVDVVRFLDWLRQVPDMRUHPSOR\HH¶VDVVRFLDWLRQVODERXUXQLRQV
prominent welfare NGOs involved in the NHI financial affairs, 6 medical associations, 
8 other intermediate participants such as those drawn from mass media and political 
parties, and 12 scholars exhibiting different standpoints. All participants were from 
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Taiwan and were engaged continually with the affairs of the NHI. 
Since the adoption of the NHI in Taiwan in 1995, the system has been a 
government-run, single-player national health insurance scheme. The NHI governance 
mechanism can be seen as a triangular partnership among the government, the insured 
and the provider. Administrative sectors occupy institutionally advantageous positions 
in the NHI policy domain. However, the ruling party is also responsible for sustainable 
operation in the domain. With a view to making sure that the NHI operates smoothly 
and operates with the lowest cost possible, most of the administrative units, especially 
the DoH and the BNHI, rely upon the NHI programme to provide the best possible 
healthcare service which not only satisfies the insured but also involves both providers 
and the insured alike in sharing its resources and responsibilities.  
Due to the divided government and the drastic increase in political competition 
between 2000 and 2008, the relationship between the central government and the ruling 
party (the DPP) and a majority in the Parliament (the KMT) presented more conflicts on 
policy legislative procedures. As for the ruling party and its legislators, the first priority 
is to continue its rule by ensuring that it wins the next elections. Policy achievements 
are necessary for being re-elected. For the DPP government, passing its NHI reform 
proposals in the Legislative Yuan is among the most important achievements in 
increasing its own governance legitimacy and popularity. Likewise, in accordance with 
their respective party standpoints, opposition parties have been persistently driving the 
reform of the NHI in other directions. 
According to the NHI Act, as major contributors to the premium scheme that partly 
finances the NHI, employer associations are highly sensitive to increases in the cost of 
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running the NHI. By contrast, the first priority of the representatives of the employee 
associations is to protect the rights and interests of all employees and exert their right to 
speak on behalf of the interests of labour. Likewise, the priority of the representatives 
from welfare NGOs is to articulate the preferHQFHVRIWKHLQVXUHGPRQLWRU1+,¶V
performance and negotiate the contribution rate and the distribution of the global budget 
payment in the NHI policy domain. 
With a view to providing comprehensive medical care, the NHI covers Western 
medicine, Chinese medicine, dental care, and hospital care as well as preventive health 
and child delivery services. Western medicine is further divided into three levels of 
healthcare providers: Taiwan Hospital Associations, Taiwan Community Hospital 
Associations, and the National Union of Pharmacist Association. All these providers 
seek more income for themselves coupled with less service pressure while running the 
NHI system. They do want the public to be highly satisfied with their efforts, but they 
also want the maximum possible monetary returns for themselves. 
,QWHUPHGLDWHJURXSVDUHQRWLQVWLWXWLRQDOSDUWLFLSDQWVLQ1+,¶VDIIDLUVEXWWKH\
VRPHWLPHVSOD\LPSRUWDQWUROHVE\DURXVLQJSHRSOH¶VDZDUHQHVVRILVVXHVWKUHDWHQLQJ
their own rights and interests. Therefore, I included their behaviour in my analysis.  
Some prominent scholars with professional knowledge and good reputation were 
also invited by the DoH and BNHI to be official committee members to consult with. 
Some of these members served as the CEO of the BNHI or the minister of the DoH to 
direct and plan the reform proposals for the ruling party (the DPP) during 2000-2008. 
These scholars with high professional knowledge have been deeply involved in NHI 
affairs since the adoption of the NHI in 1995.  
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The above policy stakeholders are the key players in the three different policy 
events. Furthermore, in the case of the promotion of the 2G-NHI financing scheme, 
these key players also pursue their own preferences by influencing collective outcomes. 
As can be seen in the analysis in Chapter 7, it seems that all legislators and party caucus 
representatives have been providing greater support for all major issues involved in 
promoting the 2G-NHI programme than the mean scores for all subjects. In addition, 
when compared to the other stakeholder groups, individual scholars and public 
administrators showed above average support for most of these major issues. On the 
other hand, the insured, including welfare NGOs and employee associations, showed 
lesser than average support for this reform proposal. The remainder, such as medical 
associations, employer associations and intermediate groups, adopted a neutral stance. 
8-1-2. Structure and Characteristics of the NHI Policy Domain 
SNA was employed to identify the compositions, interrelationships and perceived 
influences of the NHI reform participants in Taiwan with the goal of understanding the 
reform process. Some fundamental and obvious rules in the NHI policy domain have 
been found. First, based on the relational perspective, the interactive pattern between 
these policy actors may set up a collective atmosphere such as social norm or interactive 
FXOWXUHZKLFKFDQEHVHHQDVDNLQGRILQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQFRQVWUDLQLQJSROLF\DFWRUV¶
behaviours, It also makes the policy outcome become more predictable and acceptable. 
In comparison to information transmission and resource exchange networks, policy 
actors have more frequent information transmission relationships than in resource 
H[FKDQJHLQ7DLZDQ¶V1+,SROLF\GRPDLQ7KLVILQGLQJUHFHLYes support from Laumann 
DQG.QRNH¶V-.QRNHDDUJXPHQWRQSROLF\GRPDLQ³DWWKH
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heart of every policy domain analysis is the structure of its policy communication 
QHWZRUN´$OWKRXJKUHVRXUFHH[FKDQJHUHODWLRQVKLSVLQWKH1+,GRPDLn are more likely 
to be concentrated around certain core policy actors, there do exist other isolated actors 
without any relationship with others. 
The second main conclusion is that in addition to the administrative sector, the 
medical associations have also been playing important roles. Although they do not seem 
to have frequent mutual communicative connections with the leading actors, the DoH 
and the BNHI, have not been influential in the resource exchange network. By contrast, 
medical associations retained a crucial position by interacting reciprocally with 
influential actors (the DoH, the BNHI and some legislators) in the resource exchange 
network. This suggests that that they may be more capable in mobilising and 
manipulating valued political discourse to advocate for and reach their policy goals than 
other categories of policy stakeholders. From the indicators of the in-degree centrality 
value of professional knowledge and the participative initiative network showed in 
Table 6-4, they seem not only to be enjoying information asymmetry but also be 
involved actively in coping with NHI issues. The composition of the policy community 
(Marsh and Rhodes, 1992: 251) with high influence in policy processes is based on the 
triangular, reciprocal interactions between the government, the legislative sector 
(especially some legislators backed by the medical groups) and the medical 
associations.  
The third main finding is that most insured participants such as the employee 
associations, employer associations, welfare NGOs, the scholars and the intermediate 
groups appear to be peripheral and minimally influential. An exception is one of the 
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welfare NGOs (#E2, the Taiwan Health Reform Foundation) who, although perceived to 
be highly influential in the resource exchange nHWZRUNGLGQ¶WVHHPWRKDYHIUHTXHQW
reciprocal connections with the policy community. Some of these policy stakeholders 
were isolated in the resource exchange; they were essentially inactive or expressed little 
interest in NHI issues. The roles of these in the issue network (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992: 
251) pointed to little influence in the NHI policy domain. 
From the analytical perspective of global network approach (positional approach), 
these 62 policy actors were categorised into eight structurally equivalent roles. The 
social distances between the eight blocks are not great, most blocks are located close to 
each other. With the exception of block F and most of the members of block H, they are 
all adjacent to block A, which includes influential key players such as administrative 
sectors of the DoH and the BNHI and medical associations. It seems that, with the 
exception of blocks F and H, all the blocks exhibit a very high degree of boundary 
penetration. This clearly shows that the power distribution in TaiwDQ¶V1+,SROLF\
domain has a fragmented and complicated interaction structure (with interest 
intermediation surrounding block A), a rather hierarchical or isolated arrangement 
among the blocks. Thus, both the relational and positional network analyses have 
confirmed that the administrative sector (the DoH and the BNHI) and the medical 
association are both leading key players in the NHI policy domain.  
In sum, DPDMRUIHDWXUHRI7DLZDQ¶VXQLYHUVDOKHDOWKFDUHV\VWHPLVWKHDSSDUHQW
existence of political cleavage between the insured (the employee associations, 
employer associations and welfare NGOs) and the alliance between the government 
(single payer), the legislators (some legislators backed by the medical groups) and the 
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providers (medical associations). Moreover, the insured lack appropriate channels to 
access and mobilise political resources for policy advocacy and interest intermediation. 
It seems that, although they do not have influence-power, employees associations and 
the welfare NGOs play their roles quite appropriate. Further, some legislators can be 
³YHWRSOD\HUV´$PRUHJHQHUDOIHDWXUHRIWKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHPLVWKDWHOHFWLRQRXWFRPHV
which determine party control of national legislature and administration, are crucial in 
understanding interest intermediation and authoritative decision-PDNLQJLQ7DLZDQ¶V
NHI policy domain. It seems that the interest intermediation can be maintained 
continuously if the alliance between the public sector and the medical associations are 
able to gain political support from the majority of the Parliament.  
8-1-3. Role of the Government and the Political Obstacles of Reform 
Promotion 
This study has been able to locate strategically significant key players, both at 
group level (e.g. a broker block or a gate role block referred to in Chapter 5) and the 
individual level (e.g. as mentioned in Chapter 6, efficient actors are those who can reach 
all other actors along the shortest path characterised by low cost and fewer brokers). 
The BNHI and the DoH (a representative of the government) are not only the most 
influential policy actors but are also well connected with most policy actors in the 
information transmission network, the resource exchange network and the action-set 
coalition. Furthermore, the indicators of betweenness centrality and structural holes 
suggests the DoH and the BNHI are also top policy actors as they possess most 
opportunities for brokering information transmission, resource intermediation and 
collective coordination and collaboration in the NHI policy domain. It also means that 
these two policy actors with professional NHI knowledge play the most important role 
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of leading and brokerage in sharing information, exchange resource and collaborate 
with others in the NHI policy domain. The environment of the NHI policy domain in 
Taiwan is essentially executive-led. By contrast, the 2G-NHI financing scheme and the 
double raise scheme have faced such a great resistance that they have not seen any 
success so far. Although the government plays an important role in managing NHI 
affairs, one cannot say that the government is strong enough to be able to manipulate the 
policy-making process in such an interest-fragmented policy network. 
In Chapter 5, ³LPDJHUROHV´ were used to reveal more specific and clearer power 
patterns among blocks so as to reveal more details about the power distribution between 
these participants. It is seen that this approach enables more general interpretations 
(beyond empirically accurate descriptions) of the power structures at a given moment. 
One general conclusion is that the public actors (the DoH and the BNHI) and all of the 
medical associations not only have strong reciprocal connections in their 
information/resource exchange relationships but have also been playing very important 
roles in NHI reform. Their interaction in the NHI policy domain seems to have resulted 
LQD³VWDEOHSROLF\FRPPXQLW\0DUVKDQG5KRGHV´PDGHXSof core leading 
actors in the policy reform. In addition, because of their position as veto players under 
7DLZDQ¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQWKHOHJLVODWLYHVHFWRUVDUHLPSRUWDQW  
,Q7DLZDQ¶VFDVHWKHSXEOLFVHFWRUWKH%1+,DQGWKH'R+LVWKHRQO\DXWKRULVHG
body with public power to maintain the operation of the NHI. They have more 
regulatory power to keep an eye on producers, and making procedural and, on occasion, 
substantive proposals. Based on their high in-degree centrality value, they can be seen 
as network activators arranging the interactions necessary to solve particular problems 
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or to achieve specific goals. Also, because of their high betweenness centrality and great 
structural holes, they can be seen as policy brokers while facilitating information 
communication and resource exchange or integrating different values and interests 
impinging on the policy processes. In collaborative action, they may have the ability to 
covenant, monitor and evaluate to achieve the positive outcomes of policy processes in 
a network-like environment.  
$QRWKHULPSRUWDQWIHDWXUHRIWKHSRZHUVWUXFWXUHLQ7DLZDQ¶VXQLYHUVDOKHDOWKFDUH
system is the obvious political cleavage between the insured (the peak employee and 
employer associations and welfare NGOs) and the alliance between the government (as 
the role of a single payer in running the NHI programme) and the providers (medical 
associations). Moreover, the insured lack effective channels to access and mobilise 
political resources for policy advocacy and interest intermediation. Employee 
associations and the welfare NGOs might be playing important roles but, because of 
their lack of access to other powerful policy participants, they do so without influence-
power. In addition, a more general aspect of the political system, election outcomes, 
which determine party control of national legislature and administration, are crucial for 
understanding interest intermediation and authoritative decision-PDNLQJLQ7DLZDQ¶V
NHI domain. It is plausible that the interest intermediaries can be consolidated if the 
alliance between the public sector and the medical associations can gain political 
support from the majority of the congress.  
8-1-4. Why the Promotion of the 2G-NHI Financing Scheme Failed 
It seems that changes in the financing system arouse great concerns among all 
policy stakeholders. We have already noted that social networks among key players 
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have statistically significant consequences on reform promotion. According to the 
findings in Chapter 7, the 2G-NHI financing reform proposal has received a certain 
level of support from policy stakeholders, with most of the respondents recognising the 
ideas of equity and sustainability with regard to the overall proposal. This demonstrates 
their intention to support such measures as eliminating the system of classifying the 
insured parties (that have existed since the establishment of the Taiwanese Labour 
Insurance in 1950), and expanding the funding base for the NHI. Nevertheless, since 
most insured persons believe that the government must play a significant role in 
financing the NHI, the plans for sharing the contributions between the insured, the 
employed and the government have remained controversial.  
Furthermore, mechanisms for deciding the insurance revenue and medical costs 
amongst the representatives of the insured have not yet been spelt out. It is also clear 
that very few employer associations agreed with the design of the new financing scheme 
ZLWKUHVSHFWWRFDOFXODWLQJDQHPSOR\HU¶VVKDUHRIWKHFRQWULEXWLRQV,QYLHZRIWKHIDFW
that the employment relationship between employers and employees in Taiwan has 
become more flexible and diversified, it has become difficult to estimate the exact 
personnel fees of firms, and therefore difficult to fit this in with other reform proposals. 
It appears that this reform proposal exacerbates the conflict between the employer and 
employee.  
As for the policy preferences of key players, as a whole, there was strong support 
for the reform proposal amongst the legislative and administrative policy actors who 
serve as core policy actors or brokers in coping with NHI affairs. However, this may be 
attributable to certain individuals simply being more familiar with the proposal than 
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others in these groups. Given that the insurance deficits have been an issue of major 
concern for many years, they may also have been attracted by the potential of the reform 
proposal in reducing the overall financial burden on the government. 
Being in alliance with the administrative sectors, medical associations naturally 
agree with most of the measures in the reform proposal (see Chapter 7). However, given 
that they are mainly healthcare providers as opposed to insurance contributors, they 
have smaller stakes in the financing scheme. Healthcare providers in Taiwan are usually 
cohesive and share same policy preferences in the NHI policy domain. As for the 
medical associations, they all focus on the operating benefits derivable via healthcare 
provision. Thus, more than the new financing scheme, they are concerned with the cost 
containment mechanism - the GBP system. Intermediate groups play a crucial role in 
information transmission and mostly support the new financing scheme, albeit not with 
any real degree of strength. 
Employee associations and welfare groups appear to be sceptical of the financing 
reform proposals, particularly that of placing financial responsibility on the insured 
parties. They have many issues with the proposed scheme. For example, disagree with 
the proposal to expand the funding, increasing insurable income at the expense of 
taxable income, as well as of how contributions based on personnel fees are calculated. 
Although they are in the periphery position and do not have influence- power in the 
NHI policy domain, the symbolical significance of their participation and 
representativeness of the insured may increase the political leverage they have to secure 
3DUOLDPHQW¶VVXSSRUW while resisting reform proposals.   
In the case of the 2G-NHI financing scheme, the knowledge asymmetry related to 
 310 
 
medical service and NHI finance between the insured groups and the providers may 
have been a serious problem. Some interviewees from the medical associations 
complained that the representatives of some insured groups are not professional enough 
to be able to cope with the NHI issues. They usually blindly oppose what they want to 
oppose; in particular, suggestions made by the providers. Some interviewees from the 
insured have reported negatively on many benefit-oriented proposals initiated by the 
providers. However, some interviewees from the insured groups also recognised that 
they did not have enough resources to study the reform proposals systematically. It is 
likely that they were unable to fully understand the contents of the reform proposals 
and, hence, had no idea how to strive for their own rights. According to the findings of 
Chapter 7, the representatives from the insured groups are often against the reform 
proposals based on their intuition that the new contribution rate of premium will 
increase their financial burden.  
 
8-2. Policy and Theoretical Implications  
8-2-1. Policy Implications  
As for reform promotion, the evaluation of political feasibility of the reform 
proposal is a necessary and important stage. In assessing the political feasibility of 
UHIRUPSURSRVDOV,IRXQGWKDW7DLZDQ¶V1+,programme had become an involved 
system encompassing a multiplicity of interests, so its promotion was facing challenges 
from several exclusive societal actors. As previously mentioned, engaging all policy 
stakeholders to participate in the policy process on an equal basis is a deciding factor in 
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getting a policy to be successfully adopted in a democratic society. Under the NHI Act, 
the triangular governance regime with equal partnership between the BNHI, the insured 
and the providers is at the core of NHI operations. However, the current power structure 
in the NHI domain seems to be obstructing the reform proposals and, in the process, 
damaging the welfare of the general public - especially of the disadvantaged minority in 
Taiwan. For instance, the reform in cost containment could be successfully updated to 
the GBP system, because this policy does not increase the burden on the general public 
and there are unimpeded communications and resource exchange channels between the 
government and the medical associations to achieve mutual agreement. However, the 
reform proposals related to increasing income for the NHI programme, which increase 
WKHJHQHUDOSXEOLF¶VILQDQFLDOEXUGHQDUHVWLOOEHLQJRSSRVHGLQWHQVHO\E\WKHHPSOR\HH- 
and employer-associations and the welfare NGOs; there is also much negative public 
opinion reported by the mass media. Thus, from the viewpoint of network analysis, 
although both administrators and medical associations are the leading actors in the NHI 
reform (not including most other societal actors in the policy community), the 
promotion of the 2G-NHI financing scheme has so far ended in failure. In particular, 
owing to the political cleavage, the double raise scheme has been facing profound 
resistance from the general public and the Parliament.  
Also, this study has crucial implications for public managers who are responsible 
for the operation of the NHI programme. As previously mentioned, the administrative 
agencies responsible for running the NHI sustainably can be looked upon as public 
managers of the NHI policy domain. My study has determined that public managers in 
question are DoH and the BNHI. Public managers need to acknowledge the complexity 
of social and policy networks and pay more attention to understanding the resulting 
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opportunities and drawbacks in promoting reform proposal, especially in network-like 
policy process environment. For instance, this study has found that policy actors with 
greater network in-degree centrality are in a strategic position from which they can 
access and mobilise more information and social support resources, which provide them 
with the direct access needed to increase their influence-power within the NHI policy 
domain.  
In pursuing later-stage health reform, SNA is a useful research tool which can help 
to identify key players, or even key clusters of players, so that the public managers can 
be more focused and efficient in enhancing the overall political feasibility of the reform. 
However, to work effectively in the complex political environment surrounding the NHI 
reform, it is crucial for the network manager to balance the interests of the provider 
against those of the insured, especially when the manager is not in alliance with the 
provider and, hence, appears to be ignoring the LQVXUHG¶VGHPDQGV7KHUHIRUH
increasing the number of delegates from the insured and strengthening their right to 
speak through formal channels is a reform direction for the 2G-NHI system. It can be 
anticipated that the representativeness and legitimacy of collective decision-making can 
be improved by letting in more representatives of the insured in the policy community 
of the NHI domain. It is therefore pleasing that, with a view to promoting the 2G- NHI 
system, the government of Taiwan has recently taken action to form a new, triangular 
committee (namely the National Health Insurance Committee, the NHI committee) that 
includes the public sector, the insured and the provider. This move can be seen as an 
adoption of collaborative and equal partnership with a view to increase social consensus 
and accountability while linking NHI revenues and expenditures for sustainability. An 
interviewee from the DoH had this to say:  
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³The government has been aware the importance of social groups¶ 
participation for expanding the legitimacy of reform promotions. The DoH has 
instituted a plan to establish the NHI committee to increase the representativeness 
of labour and social welfare groups. Future budgetary distribution and healthcare 
policies will be negotiated between medical groups and the insured in person to 
ensure the representativeness of the latter.´$GPLQLVWUDWLYHVHFWRU$ 
All future reform proposals and expenditure negotiations will be discussed and 
planned in this committee. It can be anticipated that the new committee will reflect the 
greater institutionalisation among the triangular participants than the present. In 
converting this anticipation into reality, the public sector would need more managers 
with strong collaborative skills to engage with more social agencies and work together 
for achieving policy goals. Improved communications between the insured and the 
providers can be expected to moderate the political cleavage between the insured and 
the alliance between the government and the provider.   
If the NHI programme is to be run by the NHI committee in the future, it is very 
important for the public sector to deal with uncertainties in the collaborative network in 
the NHI committee. Multiple stakeholders with diverse interests with respect to NHI 
affairs and their interactions will exacerbate the complexities and uncertainties 
associated with collaborative management and collective decision-making in the 
committee. It is important for public managers to be equipped with tools to regulate 
these. For example, if interactions within networks are systematically evaluated as 
inadequate, there may be something wrong at the network level. Evaluating network 
management is a necessary step for network managers in limiting interaction costs, 
building consensus and achieving a win-win situation and successful collective action. 
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Enhancing interactions within networks are sometimes viewed as a way of 
increasing the effectiveness of policies as well coming up with an effective method of 
problem solving (Glazbergen, 1995; Scharpf, 1978). To better understand the 
FRPSOH[LW\DQGG\QDPLFVRIFRPPLWWHHPHPEHUV¶QHWZRUNVLWLVSURSRVHGWKDW%1+,
and DoH representatives develop the capability of mapping and understanding the 
network structure of the NHI committee not only by using social network techniques 
but also by applying frequent informal and formal feedback meetings with individual 
representatives. On the other hand, the network management strategies of the BNHI and 
the DoH committee members are necessary to manage uncertainties and decrease 
collective risks. A formal and institutionalised communication platform can be expected 
to facilitate frequent interactions between the representatives to mitigate information 
asymmetry and interest conflicts; thus building greater trust, collaboration and 
consensus in the committee. According to network theory, a frequent and cohesive 
interaction is one of the most important key elements of trust that can reach successful 
collective action (Klijn and Teisman, 2000: 97-98). Further, trust-building should be 
embedded in a stable and equal network environment (Klijn and Teisman, 2000: 97-98; 
Schuppert, 2011: 293). 
In addition, the finding in Chapters 6 and 7 suggests that the knowledge gap 
between the insured and the providers had led to unfair participation. In order improve 
the effectiveness of the new, equal triangular NHI committee, the government should 
first increase the professional competence of the insured groups. One way of doing this 
is to allocate more financial and manpower resources to the delegates of the insured 
groups. In addition, since the public has a right for information and the government has 
the responsibility to ease related concerns, the government should try harder to deepen 
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the people¶s understanding of NHI operations and the logic behind the financial reform.  
In conclusion, SNA is a useful research tool to display power maps and 
interdependency patterns among policy stakeholders. It is also as an excellent analytical 
method for systematically evaluating the political feasibility of policy-making and 
implementation. If the government occupies a central role in a policy network, it 
becomes easier for public managers to exercise their influence on other stakeholders in 
a cohesive manner. Once the government has achieved a significantly higher value of 
the structural-hole indicator, public managers will have more chances to manipulate 
valued information and political resource flow to redress the asymmetry in the 
participation of the committee members. On the contrary, if the government continues to 
maintain a peripheral position (like an issue network without influence in a policy 
network), the public managers should try to strategically access or collaborate with 
other influential stakeholders to promote reform proposals in policy processes. My 
finding is that SNA can be helpful for public managers who need to be a more skilful 
boundary-spanner with the objective of enabling a quicker and more productive 
consensus in a collective-action policy environment. 
8-2-2. Theoretical Implications  
Policy networks can be seen as social networks demonstrating how participants in 
the policy domain get involved in policy-influencing activities (Knoke, 1994a: 167, 
2011: 211). Most past studies on policy networks utilised descriptive analyses and 
certain concepts drawn from typology. Most of these have been criticised for reducing 
the issues at hand to mere metaphors for describing the complex structure of a policy 
network (Dowding, 1995, 2001). Complicated political forces are depicted using SNA 
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in the social network structures of interest alignment and resource exchange in this 
study. The causal relationship between policy network structure (such as tight network 
community and loose issue network) can be systematically investigated by applying 
SNA. In my study, SNA has provided an understanding of the power pathways 
dominating in the policy process that is superior to that derivable from traditional state 
policy process approaches such as Marxism, pluralism, elitism, or corporatism while 
DQDO\VLQJWKHDFWRUV¶LQWHUFRQQHFWHGH[FKDQJHUHODWLRQVKLSVLQWKHSROLF\GRPDLQ The 
associated social network mapping can be useful for examining how NHI policy makers 
in Taiwan interact and influence each other. The visual nature and systematic approach 
underpinning social network mapping is capable of providing meaningful insights for 
policy makers and programme managers regarding how one could implement strategies 
for engaging important stakeholders or managing interactions of particular significance 
in collaboration with other stakeholders. Both issue interests and stakeholder influences 
significantly affect their communication, resource exchange and collaborative network 
position; those with broader policy interests and higher influence reputations are found 
to be located in more prominent positions in the NHI network. Compared with the 
traditional state policy process approaches, SNA provides a flexible and scientific 
research method for assessing political feasibility from the perspective of social 
structure, which has to be taken into account in order to fully understand how a policy 
network structure operates.  
Despite the fact that SNA benefits and expands the use of policy network theory, it 
is worth noting that the application of SNA in policy network studies also faced some 
criticism. First, network analysis has proven to be inadequate in providing fully 
determined causal analysis of particular networks in structural terms (Dowding, 1995: 
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158). According to the discussLRQRI&ROHPDQ¶VVWUXFWXUH-agency link model, there may 
EHDPHGLDWLQJPHFKDQLVPOLNHKRZQHWZRUNVWUXFWXUHVKDSHVLQGLYLGXDOV¶EULHIDQG
strategic behaviours in a network) between network structure and collective outcome. 
Second, methodological concerns about the selection of the members in a network, the 
reliability of the responses and bias in the application of technologies may be a big issue 
in the application of SNA. For instance, some previous studies on organisational 
behaviour revealed that the investigators may face the risk that the respondents 
incidentally mix up or confuse the measurements of instrumental and expressive 
relationships in the survey (Krackhardt and Hanson, 1993; Karckhardt and Stern, 1988). 
It may also lead to a theoretical problem while clarifying the differences and effects 
between them. Third, although network structure is stable (Knoke, 2011; Laumann and 
Knoke, 1987, 1989), SNA merely shows a narrow snapshot of interactions among key 
players rather than the complex dynamics of policy processes. Thus, it is really hard to 
get the whole picture between the change of network structure and policy outcome.  
All the criticisms discussed above may be the limitations in applying SNA. 
However, like other research methods, researchers must take care in identifying the 
network and its boundaries and samples, be aware about changes over time and use their 
knowledge about the research context to make sensible judgments (John, 2004: 147-
148). In studying network structure, applying SNA techniques is better than not just 
running computer and statistical software involving Likert scales measuring network 
perceptions but also carrying out rough interviews in present policy network studies 
(John, 2004: 147-148). This thesis may therefore provide a methodological invention 
for empirically gauging political networks through SNA.  
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Second, those scholars studying the role of state in welfare and health policy 
reforms have mostly depended on analyses based on Marxism, pluralism, corporatism, 
or a historical perspective. Further, very few academics have studied the policy domain 
in Taiwan. Policy outcomes are not products limited by the social class or the macro 
historical force structure. Rather than reflecting just the class interests, historical 
legacies and the clarity or otherwise the limited bargaining-negotiation system, my 
research sees policies as resulting from contradictions and collaborations among 
multiple stakeholders embedded in the scenario of collective action. This thesis has 
contributed to the literature on the studies of healthcare reform by responding to the 
persistent calls for the integration of the policy network model into SNA (John, 2004; 
König). The goal was to clarify collective participating activities and relationships, and 
thus deepen the understanding of how healthcare financial sustainability in Taiwan is 
influenced by interactive forces between state power and other societal stakeholders. 
For instance, I have empirically verified that the triangle governance mechanism in the 
NHI operation is not balanced and equal. I have also shown that the representatives of 
the insured, especially some employee¶s associations and welfare NGOs, are weak in 
impacting policy outcomes. In all this, I acknowledge that the participations and opinion 
expressions by all the stakeholders continue to be necessary for increasing 
governmental legitimacy while maintaining the NHI programme. This contention is 
supported by empirical finding that the largest stakeholders in the NHI operation, the 
seemingly weak insured, can become much stronger if the various recommendations I 
have made are implemented. The third theoretical contribution of this thesis lies in the 
proposed alternative approach to the study of healthcare policy reforms in East Asian 
societies, and in Taiwan in particular. Firstly, because of the political sensitivities 
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associated with healthcare politics, this is something rarely attempted by Taiwanese 
scholars. My analytical results can increase the understanding of current reform 
deadlock in the NHI policy domain. Secondly, as empirically illustrated in this thesis, 
state power in Taiwan has been heavily influencing the NHI reform policy domain at 
both the institutional and network levels. This situation has many similarities with 
healthcare operations experimented with in other East Asian countries such as South 
Korea and Japan. Most of these countries had faced a need for welfare state expansion 
in the 1990s; and they were all seen as developmental states experiencing analogous 
political developments and economic growth patterns (Ng, 2008).  
The patterns of state-society relations in most East Asian states are fundamentally 
different from those in the West. As discussed in section 1-2-1, most East Asian states 
can be seen as developmental welfare states; where the lines between public and private, 
government and market, often get blurred (Ng, 2008). The authoritarian governments in 
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan attempted to legitimise their rule through successful 
economic development and welfare expansion since 1980s. This is why Taiwan and 
other East Asian countries favoured state intervention, instead of letting the market do 
the job. As for economic growth, the states established incentives and disincentives to 
direct private investment. In turn, the resulting success reinforced state legitimacy and 
maintained social order. It seems that state legitimation stems from its policy 
achievements, rather than the way it came to power. The Taiwan government had 
established incentives to encourage the medical associations to play the roles of 
healthcare providers. Successful healthcare provision in turn reinforced the legitimacy 
of the government. The development of social welfare in Japan and South Korea 
expansion between 1990s and 2000s followed a similar path (Kwon, 2007; Peng and 
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Wong, 2004). 7KHOHVVRQIURP7DLZDQ¶VH[SHULHQFHmay have pointers for other 
renowned but traditional welfare systems in these developmental state nations. 
 
8-3. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies   
Although the insights gained from this study are important, it displays severe 
limitations. The results cannot be generalised due to the research context and the small 
sample size. The latter might be the reason that network centrality approached only a 
marginal significance level in the regression model in Chapter 7. This also indicates that 
I cannot make claims about the direction of causation. Furthermore, the data was 
collected from three important policy events as a policy domain in Taiwan. Future 
studies will do well to verify the findings from studies involving much larger samples 
collected from different research contexts. Further, more comparative studies in other 
countries should be useful in determining if larger context factors such as culture, 
society or political institutions influence the relationships between social networks and 
collective effectiveness in the policy outcomes in different policy domains.  
Secondly, as mentioned above, the regression and pathway model of social 
networks and the policy outcome of the 2G-NHI financing scheme has raised another 
methodological problem. In this context, the discussion of these social networks among 
policy stakeholders was collected from the participants in three important NHI financial 
reform events between 2000 and 2008 when the DPP was in power whereas my 
interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2011. Also, the comprised policy outcome 
of the 1.5G-NHI financing scheme was known much later in 2012. Although these 
participants are the same policy actors, policy domain approach assumes that the 
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interaction among policy participants, their interests and strategies are stable. The robust 
network-like policy environment (not easy to change during a period of the ruling party 
was in power) has a significant impact on the collective policy outcomes (Laumann and 
Knoke, 1987, 1989; Knoke, 1994a, 2011), the time gap between the data collection of 
social networks and the result of policy outcomes will damage the explanatory power of 
the model. This methodological issue should be noted in further network research.  
ThirdlyDVLQGLFDWHGLQ&KDSWHULWLVQHFHVVDU\WRDGGUHVVWKHOLPLWDWLRQRI³self-
reported network data´WKDW can, at times, reflect a ³far-from-complete correspondence 
between survey reports of interaction frequencies (³cognitive´ data) and 
contemporaneous observations (³EHKDYLRural´ data) (Marsden, 2005). Albeit with 
caution, we may assume that self-reported network relationships are accurate and valid. 
Although my network survey was conducted in person, the network data were gleaned 
from self-reported interactions with other participants in my interview list. Romney and 
Weller (1984: 59-77) discovered that as the reliability of the informant increases, so too 
does the accuracy of the responses. Corman and Bradford (1993), however, found that 
highly connected actors, with numerous interactions, were more apt to inaccurately 
report their social relationships. Unfortunately, although it is impossible to eliminate 
inaccuracies entirely in self-reporting, it is important to bear in mind that responses 
about relationships given by each actor in a network are more valid than those given by 
third-party informants. This is the reason why SNA seems looser and more flexible 
compared to other quantitative or qualitative methods (Bondonio, 1998; Carley and 
Krackhrhardt, 1996; Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994; Killworth and Bernard, 1976; 
Mouton et al., 1955a, b). 
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Some limitations of this study are related to the measurement of social networks in 
the policy processes. Research on national or local community political systems 
suggests that three generic relationships are especially significant in identifying social 
structure in the policy domain: information transmission, resource transactions and 
boundary penetration (Laumann and Knoke, 1987, 1989). Although this research 
focuses on the effects of communications, resource exchanges and collaborative 
interactions among participants, other crucial relational concepts such as mutual trust 
and professional consultation in the NHI affairs are also significant in policy processes 
and activities and should be considered in future studies.  
Another possible limitation of this study relates to boundary identification. Since I 
had sampled 62 key participants by applying the event participation approach in 
combination with the positional and reputational approaches, I might have missed some 
key persons or organisations such as the prime minister and the president between 2000 
and 2008. It is not improbable that these persons had exerted significant influence on 
NHI¶V. However, two reasons prompted me to neglect their roles: (1) the DoH and the 
BNHI are supervised by the Executive Yuan and the president, and can be assumed to 
stand on the same policy stance; (2) it is very hard to interview previous premiers and 
presidents; one of the previous presidents has been convicted for embezzlement and is 
in prison right now. The lesson is that the influential political elites should be 
considered whenever they are accessible.  
My interview list had not included broadcast media, which may have played 
important roles in information transmission between the public and the policy actors. 
There were two reasons for the exclusion: (1) no official and unofficial documents and 
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the participants in the interview list indicated that broadcast media were important, in 
practice, to NHI reform; (2) there were more than 100 channels and 15 news stations in 
broadcast media in Taiwan - their interviews could well have complicated my research 
unduly. In view of the large-VFDOHRI7DLZDQ¶VEURDGFDVWPHGLDLWLVYHU\KDUGWR
interview all of them. Further, it is often said that, because they play such an important 
role in determining the fortunes of political candidates and issues, mass media can be 
viewed as the fourth branch of the government. Access to information is essential to the 
health of a democracy, especially on major policy issues involving well-informed 
professionals. It ensures that citizens make responsible, informed choices rather than 
acting out of ignorance or misinformation. The investigation of broadcast media should 
be considered in similar future surveys. 
Finally, future studies are likely to do well by collecting time-series data throwing 
light on interactive activities in policy processes. A policy domain can be seen as a set 
of actors with major concerns about the substantive area, whose preferences and actions 
on policy events must be taken into account by other domain participants (Laumann and 
Knoke, 1987, 1989). A policy domain can be seen as a bounded system whose members 
are interconnected by multiple policy networks (Knoke, 2011: 211). The network data 
collected from the three different policy events cover three different periods in the NHI 
policy domain that may have the potential to misinterpret the stable interactions 
observed among the key players during the period in question (the period of the DPP 
government). However, one important criticism is that network data, by themselves, 
show no more than a narrow snapshot of the interactions among key players rather than 
providing real information about time-serial dynamics of network structures. Further, 
the policy domain approach cannot clarify the dynamics of these three different policy 
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events taking place in distinct environments. The lesson is that future studies should 
collect time-series data of dynamic features of policy network studies.  
 
8-4. Conclusion 
It goes without saying that the most suitable descriptions of welfare politics in the 
QDWLRQDOKHDOWKFDUHV\VWHPDUH³OLPLWHGUHVRXUFHVDQGXQOLPLWHGZDQWV´'XHWR
competitive political structures and financial crisis, the planning of the 2G- NHI reform 
programme and other financially sustainable proposals arose immediately after the 
transition from the first ruling political party in 2000. This transformation of political 
structure had not only created differences in policies but also affected the transition in 
the governance structure of the NHI of the moment. On the other hand, as for the NHI 
governance structure, the entire implementation of the global budget system in Taiwan 
since 2002 has been based on collective negotiations between the healthcare providers 
and the government, in order to reasonably restrain the medical expenditures involved 
in carrying out the NHI obligations. This meant that the original NHI financial system, 
especially on the expenditure side, which was controlled by the government, got 
successfully transformed into a co-governance pattern, with the state and healthcare 
organisations sharing in the responsibility. 
In the meantime, the other financial reforms, the double raise scheme and the new 
financing scheme, attempted to sustain the NHI financially by improving the co-
payment and revenue mechanisms, which were in the process of planning but were 
subjected to more political pressure from numerous policy stakeholders. As Laumann 
and Knoke (1987: 5) argue, state policies are the product of complex interactions among 
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government and nongovernment organisations, each seeking to influence collectively 
binding decisions that have consequences in light of their own interests. Hence, it would 
be a mistake to look at the issue of financial sustainability in isolation. While the public 
sector remains dominant in many of the areas in healthcare provision, it is not 
inconceivable that they are better off playing smaller roles in some cases. In other 
words, different policy domains have specific rules of game and different governance 
mechanisms can be shaped in unique policy scenarios. Thus, it should be clear that there 
is little possibility for the public sector embedded in distinct policy environments to 
maintain consistent influence and power in these different cases. In the case of the NHI 
policy domain, the participants of the insured with disadvantaged positions can obstruct 
the intention of strong and powerful alliance between the public sectors and the 
providers. It also means that, in order to promote the NHI financial reform smoothly, the 
participation and opinions of the insured should not be excluded while designing the 
institutional setting.  
Finally, the issue of healthcare sustainability is rarely a finished business. The use 
of SNA can facilitate a systematic evaluation of political feasibility and benefit 
collaboration, resource generation and support extension in the course of the reform 
processes. Influence networks revealed by SNA can shed light on who is actually 
driving the decision-making. Such knowledge can foster faster adoption of the new 2G-
NHI programme LQDPDQQHUFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHFRXQWU\¶VSULRULWLHV,WVKRXOGEHXVHIXO
if the findings could also be applied in the management of issues and stakeholders while 
pursuing a more sustainable universal healthcare system - in real politics. 
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Appendix 1. Network Questionnaire 
 Personal and Confidential: Your name is a required field for computer analysis. 
However, confidentiality of your responses will be strictly maintained. All results will 
be shared in summary form only. Individual responses will remain anonymous; only 
one researcher (Guang-Xu Wang) will have access to your information. 
Gender: F  M    
Age:___________ 
Education level:  
(1) Undergraduation completed   (2) Postgraduation completed  (3) PhD completed 
The major of the highest level: 
(1) Art  (2) Law  (3) Social Science  (4) Business   
(5) Science and Engineering  (6) Medical Science  (7) Others 
Experience of study abroad: (1) No  (2) Yes 
For how long did you attend the policy event:____________/ month 
Did you have any formal position or office in the NHI committee or the DoH and the 
BNHI between 2000 and 2008: (1) No  (2) Yes 
Do you have any formal position or office in the NHI committee or the DoH and the 
BNHI at this moment: (1) No  (2) Yes 
 
Section: Perception and Attitude on the General NHI Affairs 
1. The NHI V\VWHPVKRXOGEHWRWDOO\³SK\VLFDOO\H[DPLQHG´. 
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
2. The imbalance between revenue and expenditure of the NHI system is an 
abominable issue for it to sustain.  
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
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(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
3. In order to sustain the NHI system, the NHI financing scheme should be reviewed 
and redesigned. 
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
4. In order to sustain the NHI system, the GBP system should be reviewed and 
redesigned.  
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
5. In order to sustain the NHI system, the co-payment scheme should be reviewed 
and redesigned.  
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
6. The NHI reform in Taiwan has always been a political issue rather than a 
technique. 
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
 
Section: Perception and Attitude on the 2G-NHI Financing Scheme 
1. The classification system should be eliminated. 
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
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2. Premiums should be calculated according to taxable income.  
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
3. Premiums should be pre-deducted on the basis of a hypothetical contribution rate. 
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
4. Representatives of the insured should collectively decide the scope of benefits 
and the level of premiums.  
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
5. A top limit should be set for NHI premiums. 
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
6. A bottom limit should be set for NHI premiums. 
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
7. 7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶Vcontribution should be calculated based on formulae with fixed 
parameters, including growth rates in GDP and medical expenditure. 
(1) Strongly Disagree 
(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree 
8. 7KHHPSOR\HUV¶FRQWULEXWLRQVKRXOGEHEDVHGRQ a certain percentage of personnel 
fees in firms. 
(1) Strongly Disagree 
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(2) Disagree 
(3) Neutral 
(4) Agree 
(5) Strongly Agree  
 
Section: Network Survey 
From memory: Please select names of up to 5 people or organisations that are 
important in the following three connection type from the list I show you. (show the list 
like Card A to respondent: explain this list shows the participants in three important 
policy events between 2000 and 2008 (show the event list like Card B), and ask them to 
tick up to five actors in the following questions) 
1. The people (organisations) on the list are important in providing you with 
information or exchange information with you. 
(1).________  (2).________  (3). ________  (4). _________  (5). _________ 
2. The people (organisations) on the list can support your activities such as voting for 
your proposal under a reciprocal principal. 
(1).________  (2).________  (3). ________  (4). _________  (5). _________ 
3. The people (organisations) on the list can collectively act with you for achieving 
common goals of the NHI policy formulation and implementation. 
(1).________  (2).________  (3). ________  (4). _________  (5). _________ 
4. Please select up to five people (organisations) who are most influential in the NHI 
policy domain or three policy events (specify the event). 
(1).________  (2).________  (3). ________  (4). _________  (5). _________ 
5. Please select up to five people (organisations) who most motivated (actively 
participate and get deeply involved in the NHI policy domain) or three policy 
events (specify the events). 
(1).________  (2).________  (3). ________  (4). _________  (5). _________ 
6. Please select up to five people (organisations) who are most knowledgeable (who 
has comprehensive understanding about the policy issue) in the NHI policy domain 
or three policy events (specify the event). 
(1).________  (2).________  (3). ________  (4). _________  (5). _________ 
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Card A: Major Policy Participants in the NHI Policy Domain 
Category No Title Category No Title 
Administrative 
Sector 
A1 Department of Health  D8 Taiwan Labour Union 
A2 Ministry of Civil Service Welfare 
NGOs 
E1 &RQVXPHUV¶)RXQGDWLRQ 
A3 Ministry of the Interior E2 Taiwan Health Reform Foundation  
A4 Ministry of Finance E3 League of Disable Groups  
A5 Council of Labour Affairs E4 NHI Supervision League 
A6 
Directorate General of 
Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics  
Medical 
Associations F1 
Taiwan Medical 
Association  
A7 Ministry of Economic Affairs F2 The National Union of Pharmacist Associations 
A8 Taipei City Government  F3 China Dental Association 
A9 Kaohsiung City Government  F4 
The National Union of 
&KLQHVH0HGLFDO'RFWRUV¶
Associations 
A10 Bureau of the NHI F5 Taiwan Hospital Association 
Legislative 
Sector B1 Legislator A F6 
Taiwan Community 
Hospital Association  
B2 Legislator B 
 
Intermediate 
Groups G1 United Daily News 
B3 Legislator C 
 
G2 Daily News 
B4 Legislator E 
 
G3 China Times 
B5 Legislator F 
 
G4 Liberty Times 
B6 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Caucus G5 DPP Policy Section  
B7 Kuomintang (KMT) Caucus G6 KMT Policy Section 
B8 People First Party (PFP) Caucus G7 PFP Policy Section 
B9 Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) Caucus G8 
Alliance of Fairness and 
Justice  
Employer 
Associations C1 
The Chinese National 
Federation of Industries 
Scholars H1 Prof. A 
C2 The Chinese National Federation of Commerce H2 Prof. B 
C3 
The Chinese National 
Association of Industry and 
Commerce 
H3 Prof. C 
C4 National Association of Small 
and Medium Enterprises H4 Prof. D 
C5 Association of Public Enterprises  H5 Prof. E 
Employee 
Associations 
D1 Chinese Federation of Labour  H6 Prof. F 
D2 Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions H7 Prof. G 
D3 Chinese General Federation 
of Craft Unions H8 Prof. H 
D4 Taiwan Provincial )LVKHUPHQ¶V$VVRFLDWLRQ  H9 Prof. I 
D5 7DLZDQ3URYLQFLDO)DUPHUV¶Association H10 Prof. J 
D6 Committee of Action for Labour Legislation H11 Prof. K 
D7 Chinese General Labour League H12 Prof. L 
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Card B: Three Important Event List 
 
1. Promotion of the 2G-NHI financing scheme 
2. The Global Budget Payment System implementation  
3. Promotion of the new co-payment scheme (can also be called double raise scheme) 
 
 
 
Note: In order to get more valid information to maintain consistency among all interview 
participants, please answer these items with reference to your attendance experiences 
during the DPP government, in particular.
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Appendix 2. Interview Procedure Guide for 
Network Survey 
Interview format 
(The following are some tips to conduct a good interview. However these can be modified 
to use in a semi-structured interview).  
1. Introduce yourself. 
2. Explain to them the reason for the interview. 
3. Confidentiality re-statement ± Tell them you are not going to record any names. 
4. Be prepared. Have the interview questions ready and phrase them so that you obtain 
as much information as possible. 
5. Make them feel comfortable and encourage them to open up and feel free. 
Introduction 
Thank you very much for accepting my interview. I hope you will find this 
conversation about social networks interesting, and I am confident that what we learn from 
this research will help all individuals who are directly affected by the healthcare policy of 
Taiwan and hopefully, the research findings can help modify the terms of the service in 
such a way that all citizens can enjoy an improved healthcare service. 
Personal details 
 I am a doctoral student and a researcher in the research team of the HNI financing 
reform project sponsored by the BNHI, the DoH and the NSC. In this project, my role is to 
assist the principal investigator to design the research, collect and analyse data, in 
particular, I am coming in to study the policy networks among policy participants in this 
case. µ1HWZRUNUHIHUVto everyone who might be involved in the policy process and intend 
to construct a stable interactive relationship to advocate their own interests and relevant 
activities.  
:KHQ,WDONDERXWWKH³QHWZRUN´,ZLOOVKRZWKHQHWZRUNGLDJUDPRIWKHLUQHWZRUNVRWKH\FDQ
picture networks as relationships) 
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Objective 
The reason behind the interviews is to gather information on how networks and 
communications work in the policy process of NHI policy domain, specifically to find out 
if there are any specific behaviours that encourage or discourage networking. Our objective 
for this interview is to find out about your involvement in NHI policy making - your 
observations and experiences about policy-making and implementation process. We are not 
going to focus on networking tools like instant messaging. Instead, we want to focus on the 
attitudes and behaviours that you have observed and experienced.  
Confidentiality 
I will be interviewing 62 people in total, and the information from all the interviewees 
will be compiled into one report. Nothing you say will ever be used against you. All 
information obtained will be treated with utmost confidentiality. If you have any questions 
or doubts you want to clear before the interview, please feel free to ask.  
(Wait 30 seconds to see if they have any questions. Then turn on the recorder) 
Questionnaires  
Let us start to read the questionnaire. As you can see, the questionnaire focuses on the 
issue of the NHI financial affairs and attempts to understand your opinion on this issue. 
Also, and the most important part, is network questionnaire to explore the interactive 
relationships among policy actors in the policy process. In order to answer this part of the 
question, you should have a look at the participant list and tick the appropriate participant 
who has a close relationship with you. These relationships can be information transmission 
relationship, resource-exchange relationship (like voting), and action-set coalition network. 
(Explain more about some words if the interviewee cannot understand or find them to be sensitive 
to answer).  
 
Examples of Interview questions 
x Please describe some specific attitudes or behaviours, which you have observed or 
experienced in policy process of the 2G-NHI financing scheme case or others.  
x What encourages or discourages people¶s behaviours from getting involved in 
policy networks?  
x Of the topics we have discussed around interactive network in policy process, what 
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attitudes or behaviours do participants who are involved in the policy making 
demonstrate most often?  
x Is there a culture in this policy domain that supports going to others for information, 
and what have you observed or experienced that leads you to believe that?  
x Is networking among the stakeholders an important factor to impact the policy 
outcome?  
x In your opinion, have you ever been influenced because of the relationship you 
have with others in the group? How does your colleague react with your standpoint 
and decision on this issue? What impact does he have on your decision making? 
x What are your feelings about giving or getting information from others on this 
issue? 
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Appendix 3. Demographic Characteristics of 
Respondents  
 This research identified policy makers including official actors, unofficial actors and 
mediators as the population. Comparisons based on gender and age are made. Among the 
subjects, female are 17.74% (11), male are 82.26% (51). This means that male members 
occupied a dominant role in the policy-making process. With regard to age, there is no 
respondent under age 20.  Subjects from ages 21-30 are 1.61% (1), 31-40 are 14.52% (9), 
41-50 are 25.81% (16), 51-60 are 40.32% (25) and above 60 are 17.74% (11). In terms of 
educational level, doctorate level are 19.35% (12) are at a doctorate level; 46.77% (29) are 
DWDPDVWHU¶VOHYHO, undergraduate level are 33.87% (21). Looking from the point of highest 
degree obtained and comparing areas of study,  1.61% (1) is from the Arts field, , 16.13% 
(10) from Law, 30.65% (19) from social Sciences,, 8.06% (5) from Business, 4.84% (3) 
from Science and Engineering, 33.87% (21) from Medical Sciences and 4.84% (3) from 
other areas. When comparing subjects who had overseas study experience with those who 
do not, only 33.87% (21) had overseas education and 66.13% (41) studied locally. 
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents (n=62) 
 Category Frequency  Percentage 
Sex Males 51 82.26 
 Females 11 17.74 
 21-30 1 1.61 
Age 31-40 9 14.52 
 41-50 16 25.81 
 51-60 25 40.32 
 Upper 60 11 17.74 
Education level Completed undergraduate 21 33.87 
 Postgraduate completed 29 46.77 
 PhD degree 12 19.35 
 Art 1 1.61 
Highest degree Law 10 16.13 
 Social Science 19 30.65 
 Business 5 8.06 
 Science and Engineering  3 4.84 
 Medical Science 21 33.87 
 Others 3 4.84 
Experience of study 
abroad 
No 41 66.13 
Yes 21 33.87 
Source: author
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Appendix 4. Research Ethic Checklist 
School of Sociology & Social Policy 
Research ethics checklist for staff and students 
 
This form must be completed for all research projects, research assignments or 
dissertations/theses which are conducted within the School and involve human 
subjects.  You must not begin data collection or approach potential research 
participants until you have completed this form, received ethical clearance, and 
submitted this form for retention with the appropriate administrative staff.   
If the study is based only on a review of documentary sources and involves NO 
fieldwork of any sort, then this form does not need to be completed.  
Completing the form includes providing a brief summary of the research in Section 2 
and ticking some boxes in Section 4.  Ticking a shaded box in Section 4 requires 
further action by the researcher.  Two things need to be stressed:   
 Ticking one or more shaded boxes does not mean that you cannot conduct your 
research as currently anticipated; however, it does mean that further questions 
will need to be asked and addressed, further discussions will need to take place, 
and alternatives may need to be considered or additional actions undertaken.   
 Avoiding the shaded boxes does not mean that ethical considerations can 
subsequently be 'forgotten'; on the contrary, research ethics need to be 
informed - for everyone and in every project ± an ongoing process of reflection 
and debate.   
The following checklist is a starting point for an ongoing process of reflection about the 
ethical issues concerning your study. 
 
SECTION 1: THE RESEARCHER(S) 
To be completed in all cases 
Title of project: 
Name of principal researcher: Guang-Xu Wang 
Status:  Ŀ Undergraduate student 
Ŀ Postgraduate taught student  
Ŀ Postgraduate research student 
Ŀ Staff 
Email address: guangxu.wang@gmail.com 
Names of other project members: 
 
To be completed by students only: 
Student ID number: 4067105 
Degree programme: PhD in Social Policy and Administration 
Module name/number: 
Supervisor/module leader or tutor: Prof. Ian Shaw and Prof. Lina Song 
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SECTION 2: RESEARCH WITHIN OR INVOLVING THE NHS OR SOCIAL CARE 
Does this research involve the recruitment of patients, staff, records or other data 
through the NHS or involve NHS sites or other property? 
Ŀ  <HV 
Ŀ   No 
If you have answered YES to the above question, ethical approval MUST be sought from 
the relevant NHS research ethics committee. Evidence of approval from such a 
committee MUST be lodged with the School office prior to the commencement of data 
collection.   
Does this research involve the recruitment of users, staff, records or other data through 
social service authorities (children and adult services) or involve social service sites or 
other property? 
Ŀ  <HV 
Ŀ   No 
If you have answered YES to the above question, then you must check whether or not 
the relevant social service authority has its own ethical scrutiny procedures.  If 
appropriate, evidence of approval from such an authority MUST be lodged with the School 
office prior to the commencement of data collection. 
Where external ethical approval has been obtained from a NHS committee or social 
service authority completion of this form is optional. 
 
SECTION 3: THE RESEARCH 
Please provide brief details (50-150 words) about your proposed research, as indicated 
in each section 
1. Research question(s) or aim(s) 
The research endeavours to explore political cleavages and power relations through 
examining three representative cases of the NHI domain in financial reform. By doing 
so, the study aims to assess the NHI¶s financial reform in the past decade and provide 
possible policy recommendations to manage these policy networks. Furthermore, looking 
at it from the network perspective, it is essential to inquire how these reform proposals, 
embedded in a complex communicative and resource-exchange structure of 
interdependencies; has been affected by interaction among the government bureaus, 
healthcare associations, employers, mass media, pharmaceutical associations, labour 
unions, congressional committees, academia, and so on. In particular how do policy 
networks form, work and affect the policy outcome. 
 
 
2. Method(s) of data collection 
1. Documentary literature collection 
2. Social network questionnaires 
3. Semi-structured interviews 
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3. Proposed site(s) of data collection 
1. For documentary literatures, the sites of data collection are the BNHI and DoH 
libraries, Taiwanese National Library, digital databases. 
2. For social network data, LQ SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ RIILFH RU WKH SODFe they arrange for the 
network survey. 
3. For semi-structured interviews, in participants¶ office or the place they arrange for 
the interview. 
  
 
4. How will access to participants be gained? 
Three ways will be adopted: 
1. Personal direct relationships, by phone or e-mail. 
2. Other interviewees¶ personal relationships to introduce other appropriate 
participants. 
3. Ask help from the staffs in the DoH and BNHI and access to participants by official 
channels. 
 
 
SECTION 4: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Please answer each question by ticking the appropriate box. All questions in section 4 
must be answered. 
4.1 General issues 
 Yes No 
Will this research involve any participants who are known to be vulnerable due to: 
Being aged under 18? 
Residing in institutional care (permanently or temporarily)? 
Having a learning disability? 
Having a mental health condition? 
Having physical or sensory impairments? 
Previous life experiences (e.g. victims of abuse)? 
2WKHUSOHDVHVSHFLI\« 
 v 
Will this research place participants at any greater physical or emotional risk than they 
experience during their normal lifestyles? 
 v 
Will this research involve any physically invasive procedures or the collection of bodily 
samples? 
 v 
Will this research expose the researcher to any significant risk of physical or emotional 
harm? 
 v 
Will this research involve deception of any kind?  v 
Will this research involve access to personal information about identifiable individuals 
without their knowledge or consent? 
 v 
,ZLOO LQIRUP LPPHGLDWHO\ WKH6FKRRO¶V(WKLFV2IILFHU LI , FKDQJH WKHPHWKRGVRI GDWD
collection, the proposed sites of data collection, the means by which participants are 
v  
 362 
 
accessed, or make any other significant changes to my research inquiry  
 
4.2 Before starting data collection 
 Yes No 
I have read the Research Code of Conduct guidelines of the University of Nottingham, in 
particular sections 3 and 4, and agree to abide by them:  
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/ris/local/research-strategy-and-
policy/research-governance.php  
v  
I have read the Data Protection Policy and Guidelines of the University of Nottingham and 
agree to abide by them: 
Policy - 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/%7Ebrzdpa/local/dp-policy.doc 
Guidelines - 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/~brzdpa/local/dp-guidance.doc  
v  
My full identity will be revealed to all research participants v  
All participants will be given accurate information about the nature of the research and 
the purposes to which the data will be put 
v  
All participants will freely consent to take part, and this will be confirmed by use of a 
consent form.  (An example of a consent form is available for you to amend and use.) 
v  
One signed copy of the consent form will be held by the researcher and another will be 
retained by the participant 
v  
It will be made clear that declining to participate will have no negative consequences for 
the individual  
v  
It will be made clear that participation is unlikely to be of direct personal benefit to the 
individual 
v  
Participants will be asked for permission for quotations (from data) to be used in research 
outputs where this is intended 
v  
Incentives (other than basic expenses) are offered to potential participants as an 
inducement to participate in the research.  (Here any incentives include cash payments 
and non-cash items such as vouchers and book tokens.) 
 v 
For research conducted within, or concerning, organisations (e.g. universities, schools, 
hospitals, care homes, etc) I will gain authorisation in advance from an appropriate 
committee or individual.  (This is in addition to any research ethics procedures required 
by those organisations, particularly health and social care agencies ± see Section 2.) 
v  
 
 
4.3 During the process of data collection 
 
 Yes No 
I will provide participants with my University contact details, and those of my supervisor, 
so that they may make get in touch about any aspect of the research if they wish to do so 
v  
Participants will be guaranteed anonymity only insofar as they do not disclose any illegal 
activities  
v  
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Anonymity will not be guaranteed where there is disclosure or evidence of significant harm, 
abuse, neglect or danger to participants or to others 
v  
All participants will be free to withdraw from the study at any time, including withdrawing 
data following its collection 
v  
Data collection will take place only in public and/or professional spaces (e.g. in a work 
setting).  If fieldwork takes place in WKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VKRPHSOHDVHRXWOLQHLQ6HFWLRQ
what steps will be taken to ensure your safety.  You may wish to consult the SRA 
researcher safety guidelines:  http://www.the-sra.org.uk/staying_safe.htm  
v  
Research participants will be informed when observations and/or recording is taking place v  
Participants will be treated with dignity and respect at all times v  
 
 
4.4 After collection of data 
 
 Yes No 
Where anonymity has been agreed with the participant, data will be anonymised as soon 
as possible after collection 
v  
All data collected will be stored in accordance with the requirements of the Data Protection 
Act 1998   
v  
Data will only be used for the purposes outlined within the participant information sheet 
and consent form 
v  
Details which could identify individual participants will not be disclosed to anyone other 
than the researcher, their supervisor and (if necessary) internal and/or external examiners 
without their explicit consent 
v  
,ZLOOLQIRUPP\VXSHUYLVRUDQGRUWKH6FKRRO¶VUHVHDUFKHWKLFVRIILFHUDQGLIQHFHVVDU\
statutory services of any incidents of actual or suspected harm of children or vulnerable 
adults which are disclosed to me during the course of data collection 
v  
 
 
4.5 After completion of research 
 
 Yes No 
Participants will be given the opportunity to know about the overall research findings v  
Data must be submitted to the School office and will be retained (in a secure location) for 
7 years from the date of any publication based upon them, after which time it will be 
destroyed. 
v  
All hard copies of data collection tools and data which enable the identification of individual 
participants will be destroyed 
v  
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